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Abstract 
The study empirically examines three main issues. First, the study examines the 
relationship between corporate governance and risk-taking. Second, the study investiga tes 
the association between corporate governance and credit rating. Third, the study examines 
the link between corporate governance and cost of capital. Corporate governance was 
represented in this study by the mechanisms of corporate governance index, ownership 
structure and board structure, and firm performance was represented by risk-taking, credit 
rating and cost of capital. Using a sample of 200 companies from 10 OECD countries over 
the 2010 to 2014 period and relying on a multi-theoretical framework, the findings are as 
follows. First, the results suggest that firms with good corporate governance are shown to 
engage less risk-taking. Second, the findings indicate that firms with good corporate 
governance generally have higher credit ratings than firms with poor corporate governance. 
Third, the results suggest that firms with good corporate governance generally have lower 
cost of capital than firms with poor corporate governance. Ownership structure and board 
structure, as representatives of corporate governance, all demonstrated similar results. 
Differences among firms were seen in terms of legal and accounting traditions, as well as 
in terms of culture. Yet, the findings appeared to be relatively consistent across Anglo -
American and Continental European traditions, despite the fact that there was different 
emphasis placed on some corporate governance mechanisms, and despite different cultura l 
characteristics. The findings are robust to endogeneity problems, alternative measures and 
estimation techniques used such as two-stage least squares, lagged reports and fixed effects 
reports. Overall, the findings have major implications for regulators, academics and 
practitioners. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction, Background and Motivation 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In recent years, researchers have shown great interest in the subject of corporate 
governance and its possible impact on firms. Consequently, several studies have examined 
the association between corporate governance and firm value (Yermack, 1996; Gompers 
et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006; Renders et al., 2010; Ntim et al., 2012; Kumar & Zattoni, 
2013; Griffin et al., 2014); between CG and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
(Alshammari, 2015; O’Riordan, Zmude & Heinemann, 2015); between CG and earnings 
management (Xie, Davidson & DaDalt, 2003); between CG and compensation (Kaplan, 
2012), and between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003). 
Generally, these studies suggest that CG can impact positively on corporate performance 
or firm value, CSR, earnings management, compensation and voluntary disclosure. The 
relevance of these studies is appreciated, as they highlight the importance of corporate 
governance in examining different aspects of performance. However, by contrast, and 
despite their relevance, studies examining the extent to which CG drives risk-taking (RT), 
credit ratings (CRR) and cost of capital (COC) are rare. More specifically, there is a dearth 
of studies on how different corporate governance mechanisms used by companies influence 
the risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of capital of those companies (Switzer & Wang, 
2013; Matthies, 2013; Tran, 2014). Consequently, this study seeks to contribute to the 
extant literature by addressing the limitations of previous studies via an empirica l 
examination of three main issues as follows. First, the study will examine the relationship 
between corporate governance and risk-taking. Second, the study will investigate the 
association between corporate governance and credit rating. Third, the study will assess 
the link between corporate governance and cost of capital. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 provides the background 
to the study. Section 1.3 outlines the motivation, the problem and the need for the study. 
Section 1.4 discusses research questions. Section 1.5 outlines the research objectives and 
section 1.6 discusses the research contribution. Section 1.7 outlines the thesis organisat ion, 
describing what is covered in each chapter, and section 1.8 gives a brief summary of the 
thesis as a whole. 
1.2 Background 
Background information is important for contextualising this thesis. Corporate governance 
mechanisms are important, considering that corporate governance is about how companies 
use their resources to resolve conflicts among their many stakeholders (Daily et al., 2003). 
However, a distinction must be made between governance mechanisms. On the one hand, 
there are internal governance mechanisms, which are under the direct control of the owners 
of the companies; on the other hand, there are external mechanisms, which are not under 
the control of the owners of the companies, but which reflect the governance characterist ics 
that are unique to countries in which these companies operate (Radebaugh et al., 2006). 
These country characteristics exert a great deal of influence on the corporate governance 
systems under which companies operate. For example, countries have unique legal 
systems, and these systems influence the nature of the corporate rights that companies must 
recognise in doing business. Legal systems are important because of the significant external 
controls that they exert on the companies working within them. Other unique factors that 
play an important role in this study are the particular accounting practices used, the unique 
characteristics of the country and their cultures. 
The key conceptual issues used in this thesis are intended to show how corporate 
governance mechanisms are highly determined by the specific countries in which firms 
operate, and how the specific mechanisms that are found to be useful in the particular 
countries are based on the legal, accounting and auditing practices as well as on the specific 
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ownership and debt issues that are common in those countries. Moreover, culture also 
influences customs, general worldview, attitudes and values, all of which are instrumenta l 
in how firms and their managers carry out their business operations. Wanting to be an 
active participant in the global economy, management strive to invite investors to their 
firms. All of these factors, namely, the legal, accounting and auditing practices, the specific 
ownership forms that dominate, the manner in which debt is handled, and the protection 
that is afforded investors in particular countries, play an important role in determining 
which firms are most attractive to these investors.  
Countries in the OECD differ with respect to their legal, accounting and auditing practices, 
as well as ownership and debt issues. The two major legal systems operating among nations 
in the OECD provide firms with different legal rights based respectively on the common 
law system, as in the US and the UK, and the civil law or code law system, as in Germany 
and France (Radebaugh et al., 2006). While the common law system offers protection to 
small individual shareholders, the civil law system provides excellent protection for large 
institutional shareholders (Radebaugh et al., 2006). The critical differences between the 
two legal systems are the rights and remedies they afford shareholders. Risk-taking, credit 
rating and cost of capital therefore respond differently in the countries using the two major 
legal systems.  
Risk-taking is an important concept in this thesis, because it affects performance, and how 
a firm deals with risk-taking through its corporate governance mechanisms also affects its 
shareholders and debt holders. Weak governance can lead to greater financing costs for 
higher debt. This necessitates shareholders and debt stakeholders being knowledgeab le 
about the rules pertaining to governance in the firm as well as in the country in which they 
are invested. It is therefore in the interests of shareholders and debt stakeholders to know 
that the companies in which they invest have good monitoring systems that ensure that 
management is truly representing their interests. This is in keeping with agency theory. 
However, as Fitch Ratings (2004) point out, although management must be carefully 
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monitored to ensure that the interests of shareholders and stakeholders are protected, 
stakeholders must bear in mind that some elements of corporate governance favour 
shareholders over debt stakeholders. In some situations, shareholders have more rights than 
debt stakeholders (Fitch Ratings, 2004). In other words, in some OECD countries with a 
common law legal system, there is greater protection for shareholders, particularly minor ity 
shareholders, while in countries with civil law systems, there is less protection for 
shareholders, but more for debt stakeholders. 
Additionally, in some OECD countries, corporate governance mechanisms are critical to 
whether and how shareholders can use their voting power to encourage management to 
undertake risky investments or engage in ownership changes that can harm bondholder 
interests. If shareholders consider a certain course of action to be advantageous to them, 
they can put pressure on management to take action. However, taking on riskier projects 
increases the likelihood of default, resulting in lower credit rating and higher cost of capital. 
This could affect bond holders, since any likelihood of default would affect the security of 
their debt. Even when shareholders do not encourage management to undertake risky 
investment, management may see it in their interest to undertake some new investment 
which could also be risky for bond holders.  
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) examined the governance attributes that are designed to 
increase the monitoring of management and discovered that shareholders, through their 
monitoring, were able to improve the decision-making process, prevent management from 
taking action that was not in the interest of shareholders, and decrease the imbalance in the 
information that was available to management and the information to which other 
stakeholders had access (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). In short, in this study, the 
monitoring of management was seen as a critical factor that had to be given ongoing 
consideration and could not be left to chance. 
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Therefore, in this thesis, risk-taking is an important concept, for it can affect firm 
performance, but it also shows how corporate governance mechanisms can be critical in 
protecting shareholders and debtholders in the face of excessive risk-taking. 
Credit rating is another important concept that is critical to firm performance. 
Understanding how corporate governance mechanisms can influence credit rating requires 
an understanding of how credit ratings work. A credit rating is an opinion expressed by 
credit rating agencies as to a company’s ability to meet its financial obligations (Standard 
& Poor’s, 2002). Credit rating is therefore based on how creditworthy the crediting rating 
agency thinks the firm is (Standard & Poor’s, 2002). On deciding the creditworthiness of 
a company, credit rating agencies examine its corporate governance structure. If the 
governance structure is weak, then the credit rating agencies would very likely see the 
firm’s financial position as poor and stakeholders in the company as vulnerable to possible 
losses (Fitch Ratings, 2004). The credit rating agencies, based on this observation, would 
therefore give the company a poor credit rating (Fitch Ratings, 2004). Such a credit rating 
would alert investors and would-be investors that a particular firm has high risk levels; 
while some investors or lenders would see this as an opportunity, they may demand 
premium rates in order to take on such risk. 
In deciding the credit rating of a company, credit rating agencies will take three major 
categories into consideration. The first is the financial ratios and other financial data of the 
company. Next, credit rating agencies will examine the corporate governance mechanisms. 
Third, these agencies would also take into consideration the economic conditions in which 
the company operates. National GDP growth will influence the credit ratings of companies 
in the particular country (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006).  
In terms of the financial ratios and other financial data of the company, credit agencies 
look at several, including leverage, or the total indebtedness of the company, debt to cash 
flow, and net worth, to determine the profitability and performance of the company 
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(Lundholm and Sloan, 2004). These indicate the credit risk of the company, and so are 
relevant for credit agencies. 
Another key concept used in this thesis is cost of capital. Also related to risk-taking and 
credit rating, cost of capital is seen as critical to the performance of a firm. If the cost of 
borrowing funds is high, this will impact firm performance. This concept is also related to 
other country characteristics. A country with a strong and effective legal system will have 
rules and regulations in place to protect the rights of investors. For example, a legal system 
that requires companies to provide their shareholders with timely information and that has 
rules for enforcing contracts would be considered good for investors. Companies in 
countries with this type of legal system would not have to engage in as much monitor ing 
as companies in countries where this information is missing. Therefore, the cost of capital 
in countries with good legal systems would be relatively low (Hail and Leuz, 2006). 
According to these researchers, there are generally lower costs of capital in countries with 
strong securities regulation, and where there are legal mechanisms for enforcing the law 
(Hail and Leuz, 2006). The rationale here is that there are mechanisms in place that would 
ensure that shareholders’ rights are to some degree protected in case of default. Investors 
would rather invest in countries where the rights of investors are prioritised. La Porta et al. 
(2002) examined the equity valuation of firms with different legal systems and discovered 
that firms with strong and effective legal systems tend to have greater equity valuations, 
and more interest from investors. 
When investors decide to invest in a company, they consider their required return and base 
this on the systematic risk of the company. Mitton (2002) found that companies with weak 
corporate governance performed poorly during economic downturns, and this was usually 
associated with a greater cost of capital. This was because investors, realising the additiona l 
risk involved in investing in companies with poor performance, required a premium on 
their investment. It was also the case that with poor governance, shareholders would also 
have to engage in more monitoring in order to protect their interests. The rationale for this 
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poor performance and greater cost of capital can be attributed to the fact that with poor 
governance, there was usually too little monitoring of management. Consequently, 
management was more likely to borrow more funds to support new projects (Mitton, 2002). 
Such action by management would often expose the company to greater risk, increasing 
the cost of capital. 
Credit rating agencies also consider the economic conditions prevailing at the time. If a 
country is undergoing strong growth, then this is seen as a strong environment in which 
companies operate. Credit rating agencies are likely to be influenced to offer a positive 
opinion on a company operating in such an environment (Ashbaugh et al., 2006). Also, if 
a country is experiencing healthy GDP growth, companies operating in this country are 
likely to have more positive credit ratings than companies operating in countries with poor 
GDP growth. 
The key concepts of risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital have been identified as 
important in relation to firm performance and as critical to various forms of corporate 
governance practiced in different OECD countries. This is significant in light of the fact 
that different governance structures are stressed in different OECD countries. By 
identifying the different countries and the legal, accounting, auditing, ownership and debt 
structures supported, the specific country characteristics, such as population size, culture 
and cultural variables, and the individual firms and their governance structures, this study 
is able to suggest firms that are good investment prospects because of their firm practices 
and country characteristics. The country characteristics used in this study include 
prosperity and size of economy, level of investment, level of corruption and inflation rate, 
as well as Hofstede’s cultural variables, which include power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation, all of which affect 
approaches to business (Hofstede, 2015).  
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This study therefore uses these key concepts, namely, risk-taking, credit rating and cost of 
capital, as measures of firm performance. Corporate governance is represented by a 
corporate index drawn from the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Independent 
variables used in this study include Corporate Governance Index (CGI), ownership 
structure and board structure; these variables are used to show what happens to other 
variables. Ownership is further broken down into block ownership, institutional ownership  
and director ownership. Board structure is further broken down into independent directors, 
board size, board diversity and frequency of board meetings.  
These concepts are all taken into consideration, as this study shows the relationships 
between corporate governance and risk-taking, corporate governance and credit rating, and 
corporate governance and cost of capital. This study shows how these affect firm 
performance. 
1.3 The motivation, problem and the need for the study 
This study is motivated by a number of things. First, while a number of studies have 
examined the association between general corporate governance and performance (e.g. 
Beasley, 1996; Hansson et al., 2011; Letza et al., 2004); the evidence relating to the impact 
of corporate governance on risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital is scant (Tran, 
2014). Similarly, the limited evidence on the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
on corporate risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital has mainly been conducted within 
a single country rather a cross-country context (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2004). Arguably, 
this limits the generalisability of the results. Corporate governance is a worldwide subject 
because of the globalisation of organisations. It is recognised as playing a real part in the 
management of organisations in both developed and developing countries. Nevertheless, 
Davies and Schlitzer (2008) note that corporate governance practices are not uniform 
across nations. This study intends to add to the knowledge on the association between 
general corporate governance and performance. 
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Second, since OECD countries differ in the corporate governance structures they use 
(OECD, 1998), and since countries differ in the amount of transparency they provide to 
their shareholders (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2004), rational investors without adequate 
information may consider that there would be additional costs that the company would 
have to undertake, which so this would effectively raise the cost of equity capital (Tran, 
2014). This study intends to show investors what to look for when making decisions about 
investing in firms in different countries. 
Third, recognising the importance of legal and financial institutions in determining 
governance mechanisms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), and the role of government 
regulations in influencing stock exchange rules and takeovers, this study aims to show the 
impact of legal, financial and other country characteristics on corporate governance and its 
influence on firm performance. 
Fourth, the study will perform a comparative analysis of two different traditions: the first 
is a group of Anglo-American countries, including listed companies from the US, Canada, 
the UK, Australia and Ireland. The second is the Continental European or traditiona l 
countries, including listed companies from Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Japan. The 
purpose of this comparative study is to look at the impact of regional differences on 
different arrangements of corporate governance and ownership structures. Moreover, this 
study identifies and compares existing corporate governance codes in those ten countries. 
This study aims to extend the knowledge on the difference between the two traditions that 
are represented in the OECD, and how these are accommodated within the OECD 
Principles of Governance. 
Fifth, there is a need for this study. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the 
first study looking at corporate governance, credit rating, risk-taking and cost of capital. 
The focus is an examination of the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
dependant variables, as this study will perform data regression analysis to estimate the 
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effect of corporate governance mechanisms on different measures of credit rating, risk-
taking and cost of capital. R&D expenditures, R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales and volatility in 
accounting performance measures such as ROA are the measures of risk-taking in this 
study. Although Tran’s (2014) study extends the empirical work on corporate governance 
and financing costs considering multidimensional governance structure amongst German 
firms as a special case, this study will determine the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms on firms’ risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital in ten different countries. 
1.4 Research questions 
The research questions and objectives of this study pertain to the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital in 
various countries and under different accounting systems. 
From the literature, poor governance has been identified as the major cause of recent high-
profile cases of corporate fraud. The main research questions are:  
(a) What is the level of compliance with and disclosure of the OECD corporate governance 
rules?  
(b) What is the relationship among corporate governance and risk-taking as measured by: 
Research and Development Expenditure (R&D), volatility in accounting performance 
measured by Return on Assets? 
(c) What is the relationship among corporate governance and credit ratings? 
(d) What is the relationship among corporate governance and cost of equity or capital?   
In other words, can governance explain observable differences in firm level risk-taking? 
Excessive risk-taking could be a symptom of bad or poor governance, and vice-versa. By 
contrast, well governed firms will be able to strike a fair balance between excessive and 
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sustainable levels of risk - optimal risk assumption level that is able to generate suffic ient 
levels of profit, but does not jeopardise the going concern status of the firm (does not 
increase the firm’s chance of going bankrupt). Excessive risk-taking could have direct 
implications for a firm’s credit rating and thus overall cost of capital. Hence, and in theory, 
excessive risks taking will lead to lower credit ratings and, consequently, a higher cost of 
capital. Arguably, this is what happened in the recent (2007 - 2008/09) global banking or 
financial crisis. 
1.5 Research objectives 
Therefore, the main objective of this thesis is to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. Secondary objectives are to assess the 
levels of compliance with corporate governance principles of 2004 OECD on firms from 
two different traditions, seeks to ascertain whether corporate governance is related to risk-
taking, seeks to ascertain whether corporate governance is related to credit rating, seeks to 
ascertain whether corporate governance is related to cost of capital and to see how these 
relationships are influenced by the different corporate governance mechanisms that 
companies use. 
1.6 Research contributions 
It is expected that this study will make a notable contribution to this field by offering 
information to countries that are not realising the level of investment that they require, and 
could provide suggestions that would help them in making changes and implementing 
mechanisms that would establish good corporate governance, thereby attracting more 
capital based on companies’ performance. 
This study will highlight how good corporate governance was also seen to reduce the risk 
premium that investors were demanding when corporate governance was less effective 
(Morck et al., 1988; Anderson and Reeb, 2004). The degree to which investors are able to 
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make this decision is often based on the extent to which corporate governance structures 
are observable and the degree to which investors are able to detect non-diversifiable risk. 
This study makes a contribution by highlighting good corporate structures and helping 
investors identify risk.  
This research, therefore, seeks to contribute to the extant literature by exploring the effects 
of corporate governance mechanisms on corporate risk-taking, credit rating and cost of 
capital by assessing the levels of compliance with and disclosure of CG princip les 
contained in the 2004 OECD Corporate Governance Code in firms from two different 
traditions: Anglo-American and Continental European. The study will also make a 
contribution by employing firm-level corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., a CG index, 
ownership structure and board structure) by accounting for firm-level and country-leve l 
differences such as firm size, sales growth, audit committee number, corporate governance 
committee number, leverage, capital gain yield, stock market capitalisation, corruption 
index, inflation, GDP per capita, population, masculinity and power distance, and by basing 
the assessment on a multi-theoretical framework that incorporates insights from agency, 
stewardship, resource dependence, legitimacy and institutional theories. 
1.7 Thesis organisation 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into six chapters. As explained, this thesis examines 
the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and risk-taking, credit rating 
and cost of capital, and the financial performance of companies in various countries, with 
different accounting systems. Chapter Two will therefore try to give a working definit ion 
of corporate governance as it is practiced in OECD countries (OECD, 2004). The chapter 
will begin by giving an overview of the OECD, showing how corporate governance 
became an important subject. The chapter will then give a historical overview of how 
corporate governance came to be introduced and adapted to the stakeholding and 
shareholding corporate governance models, taking into consideration the unique 
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characteristics of these models (Krenn, 2014; Aguilera& Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). In 
defining these models, Chapter Two will also examine the accounting, cultural and legal 
systems as well as the ownership and debt structures in these countries that have an impact 
on the different corporate governance mechanisms used.  
Chapter Three gives a theoretical review. It shows how the various theories related to 
corporate governance apply to risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. Chapter Four 
discusses in detail the corporate governance mechanisms and aspects of corporate 
governance that influence risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital in organisat ions 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2004; Elbannan, 2009). Different ownership structures are also 
examined, namely, block ownership, institutional ownership and director ownership, and 
these are examined in terms of their effects on risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. 
Board structure variables as well as frequency of meetings is also examined in terms of 
their influence on risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. 
Chapter Four uses empirical literature to develop the hypotheses that form the basis of this 
study. In short, Chapter Four studies in detail how these various aspects of corporate 
governance, as evident in the corporate governance mechanisms, impact risk-taking, credit 
rating and cost of capital. 
Chapter Five describes the research design. This chapter outlines the research paradigms 
and the positivist approach used. Details are provided for the sample selection, with a 
discussion of the criteria used for the final selection, and the reasons for selecting the final 
200 stratified sample. Data and sources are provided for the selection of the sample. This 
chapter discusses the research methodology and the construction of the corporate 
governance indices used. It justifies the use of unweighted indices by showing the 
advantages and disadvantages of weighted and unweighted indices. Chapter Five also 
shows the relationships between the dependent, independent and control variables that are 
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used to study the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on risk-taking, credit rating 
and cost of capital for the chosen firms. 
Chapter Six reports the empirical results and provides a discussion of the findings. It starts 
by giving descriptive analysis and discussion on the relationships between corporate 
governance and risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. Bivariate or correlation 
analysis is provided, with discussion on the relationship between corporate governance and 
risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. Multivariate regression analyses, results and 
discussion follow, as do robustness, sensitivity and additional analyses. 
Chapter Seven provides conclusions for the study based on the analyses. A summary of the 
research findings is given, followed by implications of the research, the contribution that 
the research makes, and the limitations of the study. Research recommendations are given 
and avenues for future research are suggested. 
1.8 Summary 
This chapter has laid out the plan for this study. It is the beginning of the thesis organisat ion 
which relationship between corporate governance and risk-taking, credit rating and cost of 
capital, and of the corporate governance mechanisms used in past research, as well as the 
different forms of ownership and board structure studied. Based on this literature, the 
following chapter develops the study hypotheses, while Chapter Five designs the empirica l 
study based on multivariate regressions. The findings of the thesis, reported in Chapter Six, 
show that they confirm earlier studies for the most part, thereby showing the importance 
of corporate governance to the success of firms in OECD countries. The last chapter 
highlights the importance of the study, recognises shortcomings, points to the contributions 
and accomplishments, and makes recommendations for further studies. 
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Chapter 2: Corporate Governance in OECD Countries 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses corporate governance, and its main objective is to provide a 
comprehensive description of what corporate governance is, how it came into being, how 
it is evolving, the role the OECD has played and is playing, and the mechanisms of 
corporate governance that are being used for advancing corporate governance in OECD 
and non-OECD countries. This chapter, in order to accomplish this objective, also gives a 
short historical overview of the OECD, how it became involved in corporate governance, 
and also highlights the different corporate governance systems that are in use in the OECD 
countries with the aim of showing how different characteristics of these systems have an 
impact on how corporate governance is realised, and on the mechanisms that are used to 
achieve corporate governance in these systems. 
Section 2.2 gives a background of corporate governance development in OECD countries . 
Section 2.3 provides historical overview of the OECD Section 2.4 focuses on a historica l 
overview of corporate governance reforms within the OECD context. Section 2.5 discusses 
the main corporate governance systems in OECD countries, namely, the Anglo-American 
or Shareholding Corporate Governance model and the Continental European or 
Stakeholding Corporate Governance Model. Section 2.6 discusses the accounting, cultura l 
and legal systems in OECD countries, and Section 2.7 discusses the ownership and debt 
structures in these countries. Section 2.8 outlines the corporate governance mechanisms 
provided in OECD corporate governance reports. While Section 2.9 discusses some 
examples of mechanisms used in some countries to establish corporate governance. A 
summation of this chapter is provided in Section 2.10. 
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2.2 Corporate governance developments in the OECD countries 
Before the development of the OECD Principles of Governance, a few OECD countries 
had seen the need for improved governance structure, and this led to the development of 
national governance codes. According to Krenn (2014), “the U.S. in 1978, and the U.K. in 
1992, were the first major economies to issue codes of good governance” (p. 103). Ninety 
countries around the world had issued codes of good governance by 2008 (Krenn, 2014). 
International organisations were also promoting good governance; these include the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission. The OECD also 
promotes the use of good governance (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). 
In 1978, the U.S. business roundtable was to issue the report, “The role and composition 
of the board of directors of the large publicly owned corporation”. The purpose of this 
report was to make American corporations more concerned about improving their 
corporate governance (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).  
More recently, Britain was the first of these countries to be ravaged by scandal, with the 
failure of Maxwell Publishing Group. Britain took the initiative to establish a governance 
regime to deal with this. The United Kingdom had responded with the Cadbury Report 
(1992), which sought to lay down strict rules outlining what good governance was expected 
to entail. In the meantime, several other situations illustrating fraudulent behaviour or poor 
governance occurred; for example, the cases of Poly Beck, BCCI in the 1990s and, more 
recently, Marconi in Britain. Germany had its share of distress in the failures of Holzman, 
Berliner Bank and Babcok. Australia, with its failure of Ansett Airlines and One Tel, and 
Switzerland, with its failure of Swiss Air, joined the group. Korea had some distress with 
its banking system, and saw the collapse of chaebol in 1997 (Mallin, 2007).  
Several situations took place in the global financial environment that caused serious 
concerns among nations. The failures of Enron, Worldcom and Tyco in the United States 
made headlines, and, as in with some earlier failures, caused some concern (Mallin, 2007). 
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The result was the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), which was considered some 
of the most far-reaching legislation of its kind since the Great Depression (Litvak, 2007). 
These two governance reports, the Cadbury Report (1992) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002), reveal their influence on the OECD Principles, a fact that the OECD acknowledges 
in its publication (OECD, 2004, Principles; Krenn, 2014). 
The development of corporate governance has come about because of a variety of scandals 
in OECD countries. The response of the United Kingdom to scandals in that country was 
the Cadbury Report (1992). The OECD initial response to the lack of good governance that 
led to scandals came in 1999 with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 
1999). The U.S. experience with scandals led to the development of a governance system, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, and a few years later the OECD followed this with its 
improvement of its governance principles with the 2004 Principles of Corporate 
Governance (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Other OECD countries and international organisat ions 
have also contributed to the development of this concept. 
Since its 1999 Principles, the OECD has considered changes that have been introduced to 
corporate governance in its member countries and have incorporated most of these changes 
in its own 2004 Principles of Corporate Governance, thereby taking a forward-looking 
approach. The OECD recognised that improvements and innovations were required to keep 
pace with changing global situations.  
Changes taking place in financial markets were characterised by a greater interest in newer 
forms of institutional investors, a relative decline in banking and increased savings for 
pensions among OECD members (OECD Survey, 2004). These represented a new state of 
affairs which had to be dealt with in the context of the 2004 OECD Principles. It was also 
recognised that as new implementation challenges occurred, new ways to maintain high-
quality governance would be required. The principles were reviewed in 2002 by the OECD 
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Steering Group on Corporate Governance and this eventually resulted in the new Princip les 
of Corporate Governance of 2004. 
As the United Kingdom and the United States are both very strong influences with respect 
to the code, and as the OECD is greatly influenced in its 2004 Principles of Corporate 
Governance, the vast majority of codes developed within the past few years have used the 
Anglo-American style of good governance (Krenn, 2014). The OECD has insisted that its 
Principles be the minimum governance principles used, although nations can choose to 
have more stringent governance principles. 
Commenting on the major characteristics of this governance model, Krenn (2014) 
identifies “best practice provisions regarding board composition, director and auditor 
independence, treatment of shareholders, executive compensation schemes, transparency 
in financial reporting and disclosure, among many other topics” (p. 103). Agency theory 
logic is also stressed as a characteristic of this form of governance system (Krenn, 2014). 
Despite the differences among various codes, what is consistent is the quality of board 
governance in organisations, accountability to shareholders and the maximisation of 
shareholder or stakeholder value (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). The OECD’s 
influence has been great, and has been responsible for many nations accepting many of 
these principles in their governance codes. 
Corporate governance, therefore, became an important measure of a country’s success. It 
has been identified as the key mechanism for improving the confidence of investors, for 
increasing competitiveness and promoting economic growth (Todorovic and Todorovic, 
2012). In fact, James Wolfensohn (1998) sees corporate governance as being a very 
important tool for international development, and is quoted as saying that “the governance 
of the corporation is now as important in the world economy as the government of 
countries.” (Todorovic & Todorovic, 2012, p. 309). 
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Therefore, while corporate governance in OECD countries involves following the rules and 
principles laid down by the OECD, many countries are finding that they have to change 
their legal framework, rules, regulations and standards, as having the right infrastructure is 
necessary for creating the right business environment to protect the rights of shareholders, 
especially minority shareholders, in an organisation (Todorovic & Todorovic, 2012). 
2.3 Historical overview of the OECD 
The OECD, formed on December 14, 1960, started operations on September 30, 1961, 
taking up the mantle left by the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation 
(OEEC). When the OEEC was formed on April 16, 1948, with 18 European nations, it was 
in response to the Marshall Plan, a plan to rehabilitate the European economies that were 
badly ravaged through Europe’s involvement in the war effort. This organisation was 
formed on the recommendation of George C. Marshall, U.S. Secretary of State, who 
maintained that if the American government was to move forward with helping the 
rehabilitation of European economies, there had to be “some agreement among the 
countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries 
themselves will take” (OECD, 2014, Marshall Speech).  
Encountering many difficulties, the countries making up the OEEC saw their organisat ion 
as important but recognised that “broader co-operation will make a vital contribution to 
peaceful and harmonious relations among the people of the world”, and that expansion of 
trade was necessary for “economic development of countries and the improvement of 
international relations”. They agreed to be reconstituted under the banner of the 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2014, History). It was 
with this mission that the OECD was formed, consisting of the 18 members of the OEEC, 
as well as the United States and Canada. 
The OECD provided the means whereby countries could work together on matters of 
common interest, and on issues that arose in their domestic economies that had the potential 
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to influence their relations with other nations. As nations engaged in trade and investment, 
it was expected that they would need common understanding for smooth relations. As the 
OECD (2014) explains, the organisation “provides a forum in which governments can work 
together to share experiences and seek solutions to common problems” (OECD, 2014, Our 
Mission). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, many OECD countries were challenged by financial scandals 
affecting their populace. The OECD recognised this as an area of common concern for its 
member countries. Governments needed to restore confidence in their economies that were 
compromised by scandal. They also needed to establish healthy financial environments for 
sustainable development, and to foster renewed confidence among investors, both 
domestically and globally.   
2.4 Historical overview of corporate governance reforms within the OECD 
context 
In making reforms to the 1999 Principals of Corporate Governance, the OECD held 
consultations with OECD and non-OECD members through the work of the OECD 
Steering Group on Corporate Governance in the period between 2002 and 2003. It also 
drew heavily on the U.K. and U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Following this consultation, the 
OECD introduced some reforms in order to make the Principles more applicable to more 
groups. As Kirkpatrick (2004) points out, the Principles achieved improvements in three 
areas, namely, setting up the basis for an effective corporate governance framework, 
highlighting the importance of ownership, and calling attention to ways of dealing with 
conflicts of interest (Kirkpatrick, 2004). 
With respect to the first of these areas, namely, making the corporate governance 
framework more explicit, Kirkpatrick notes that in many instances the reforms to be made 
to OECD countries is small, but the challenges come from actually implementing and 
enforcing the Principles and inputting the mechanisms to work (Kirkpatrick, 2004).  
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Therefore, the OECD undertook reform to make the new Principles more workable for 
member nations, so that they are better able to get the mechanisms to work. Kirkpatrick 
points out that the new approach to using the Principles is to see the corporate governance 
framework as promoting transparent and efficient markets, and that there should be clear 
divisions of responsibility, that it should be seen as having an impact on economic 
performance, that the governance practices that are introduced “should be consistent with 
the rule of law, transparent and enforceable” (Kirkpatrick, 2004, p. 3) 
Reform was also introduced in the Principles with respect to ownership. Whereas the 
previous Principles dealt primarily with shareholders, the new Principles took into concern 
the fact that there can be lack of effective ownership among OECD countries. The new 
Principles therefore put more attention to voting rights and that more attention should be 
given to the role of ownership and that the importance of board and remuneration for key 
executives have been seen as new areas where attention needed to be focused. Another area 
where reform was forthcoming was in the area of conflict of interests. In recent years, as 
Kirkpatrick explains, it was noted that conflicts of interest were quite widespread and it 
was seen as having the potential to cause harm to shareholders, investors and other 
stakeholders. This led to the OECD looking more closely at the different shareholders, and 
requiring that there should be more disclosure. This reform was to have a tremendous 
impact on how owners are involved in corporate governance. Attention was also given to 
institutional investors, with the requirement that acting in a fiduciary capacity they should 
disclose their own corporate governance policies, and how they decide on using their 
voting rights (Kirkpatrick, 2004, p. 3). 
After a comprehensive survey on evidence-based findings within member states, and in 
light of issues showing poor corporate governance, the OECD put forward a revision, its 
2004 Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2004, Principles). The OECD 
undertook its task of promoting better relations among its member countries with its 
Principles of Corporate Governance. (OECD, 2004, Principles).  
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The thirty nations that supported and endorsed the 2004 Principles of Corporate 
Governance were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the 
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
States (OECD, 2004, Principles). 
But after the 2004 Principles, several countries continue to improve on their codes. The 
U.K. improved on its governance with a series of changes. In 2005, it completed the 
Turnbull Report examined how companies managed risks and international control (Abbas 
& Iqbal, 2012). The U.K. revised its 1998 Combined Code and included Turnbull, Higgs 
and Smith Reports, for both companies and institutional shareholders (Solomon, 2007). 
According to Tricker (2012), in 2006, the U.K revised its Combined Code, which made it 
possible for the chair person to also serve on the remuneration committee and to have the 
facility of voting by proxy, and two years later revised this code to extend the chair person’s 
role to allow for sitting on the audit committee. In 2008, the Smith report was revised 
(Avison & Cowton, 2012). In 2010 the U.K. Corporate Governance Code was established 
and it was revised two years later. This Code included the role of institutional investors 
(Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2013). The U.K. demonstrated that there were many improvements 
that needed to be carried out in order to strengthen its governance regime, and it undertook 
it within the next few years after the revised OECD governance principles. 
The World Bank considered the OECD principles important in terms of shareholder rights, 
actions of stakeholders, transparency and disclosure requirements and responsibilities of 
boards of directors. It began encouraging corporate governance practices, using the OECD 
principles, as it gathered information and highlighted the institutional framework about 
each country’s corporate governance practices. The World Bank also carried out regional 
governance roundtables in Asia, Latin America, Russia, Southeast Europe and Eurasia 
(Kirkpatrick, 2004). The World Bank published its White Papers outlining the corporate 
 38 
 
governance for each of these regions (Kirkpatrick, 2004). The World Bank also used this 
information to develop national corporate governance regulations and practices in each 
country by improving work plans, academic conferences and the amount of practical 
support provided to various countries. 
The Financial Stability Forum endorsed the OECD Principles as one of the key standards 
necessary for financial stability, and the World Bank’s Review of Observance of Standards 
and Codes also endorsed the Principles (Kirkpatrick, 2004). 
The OECD demonstrates the importance of nations working together with the same overall 
goals of improving their governance structures and mechanisms, learning from each other, 
and cooperating on common issues. The 2004 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
are widely used and highly respected as principles that work and that provide the basis for 
good economic performance and global financial stability. The OECD points to the Article 
of its Convention, which authorises it to achieve the highest sustainable growth possible 
and to promote financial stability, economic expansion in world economies and mult i-
lateral trade based on international agreements (OECD, 2014, Principles of Corporate 
Governance). These are the goals that the OECD aspires to with its 2004 Principles of 
Corporate Governance. The OECD also has as its goal to promote democracy and 
employment, raise standards of living and help other countries in economic development 
(OECD, 2004, Principles). 
2.5 The main corporate governance systems in the OECD countries 
With the United Kingdom and the United States being a very strong influence with respect 
to the corporate governance codes, and with the OECD being greatly influenced in its 2004 
Principles of Corporate Governance by the United Kingdom and the United States, the vast 
majority of codes that have developed within the past few years have used the Anglo-
American governance style of good governance (Krenn, 2014). The OECD has insisted 
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that its Principles be the minimum governance principles to be used, although nations could 
have more stringent governance principles. 
However, while some OECD countries were finding it easier to follow the rules and 
principles laid down in the 2004 Principles of Corporate Governance, other countries were 
finding that they had to consider changing their rules, regulations and standards, as having 
the right infrastructure was necessary for creating the right business environment that 
would protect the rights of the shareholders (Todorovic & Todorovic, 2012).  
What became apparent was that the OECD countries were different in terms of their legal 
framework, accounting systems, and culture. Nevertheless, they realised the importance of 
finding ways of promoting corporate governance. There were really two main corporate 
governance systems or models among OECD countries, which are commonplace and that 
oppose each other: the shareholding model and the stakeholder model (Sternberg, 1997; 
Weimer & Pape, 1999; Vinten, 2001; Letza, Sun & Kirkbride, 2004). These two models 
are based on shareholding and stakeholding theories.  For example, the U.K., U.S., Canada, 
Ireland, and Australia were based on the shareholding model, while France, Germany, 
Spain, Italy and Japan followed the stakeholding model.  
In differentiating between these two models, Letza et al. (2004) suggest four views of 
corporate governance that shed light on the differences between stakeholding and 
shareholding perspectives. By examining the various views of corporate governance, Letza 
et al. (2004) highlight the finance, or principal-agent, model, which adheres very closely 
to the shareholder model, and the stakeholder model. The finance or principal-agent model 
deals with “a universal agency problem and how to adopt appropriate incentive systems 
and/or mechanism of takeover to solve this problem” (Letza et al., 2004, p. 244). According 
to the 2004 Principles of Governance, there must be equitable treatment of all shareholders, 
with equal consideration to minority and foreign shareholders, and for the opportunity of 
all shareholders to have the opportunity have violation of their rights redressed (2004 
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Principles of Governance). This shareholder or finance model sees the directors as holding 
the positions of agents to the owners of the corporation. An adversarial relationship is 
assumed, for while the managers are seen as maximising the interests of their owners, they 
are also seen as having the agency-principal problem to contend with (Letza et al., 2004). 
On the other hand, Letza et al. (2004) identifies the stakeholder model, which focuses 
maximising the wealth of stakeholders, and unlike the shareholder model, does not involve 
the stakeholders in governance (Letza et al., 2004, p. 246). The stakeholder model of 
corporate governance takes the position that the company includes more than the 
shareholders, and sees the role of directors and managers as being responsible for looking 
after the interests of all members of the corporation, including not only shareholders, but 
debt holders, bankers and others (Letza et al., 2004). However, the classification of 
stakeholders may be broken down even more, with direct stakeholders being those with 
whom the corporation has formal and contractual agreements, such as creditors, 
employees, customers and suppliers, and with indirect stakeholders including government, 
local communities, and environmental and citizen groups (Gibson, 2000). In the 
stakeholder model, managers are assumed to be trustworthy and on this basis ought to be 
empowered to serve as worthy stewards of the corporation (Letza et al., 2004). The 
stakeholder approach is therefore represented by stewardship theory.   
In criticising the stakeholder model, Sternberg (1997) explains that the concept of the 
stakeholder has grown dramatically. While ‘stakeholder’ was previously used as a term to 
describe one who had a stake in an organisation, it has undergone a “radical shift, from 
those who affect the organisation, to those who are affected by it” (p. 3). Therefore, there 
has been the shift from the stakeholder model, with the promotion of the shareholder model 
as being the workable model (Sternberg, 1997). But Vinten (2001) criticises Sternberg’s 
(1997) “pie-in-the sky universalism” in showing the shareholder model as the universa l 
model (p. 39). According to Vinten (2001), besides having responsibility to its 
stakeholders, an organisation must recognise its “responsibilities to those indirect ly 
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affected by its activities and decisions, past, present and future, and including the natural 
world, with a measured balance achieved” (p. 39). 
According to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, “The corporate governance 
framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or through 
mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and 
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises” (2004, p. 21).   
2.5.1 Continental European or stakeholding corporate governance 
model - Characteristics 
The stakeholding perspective was a model used since the 19th century, and which can be 
found in some European countries in recent times. A characteristic of the stakeholder 
position is the emphasis on maximisation of stakeholder interest, which includes 
employees and other stakeholders, where investment is carried out on a long-term basis, as 
opposed the short-termism that characterises investment in the United States and the U.K. 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). In fact, according to Aguilera and Jackson (2010), the 
stakeholder approach is seen at work in the case of Germany and in Japan, where it is 
characterised by “patient capital” or where capital is invested for the long term. This is to 
be contrasted with the shareholder approach, where capital is invested on a short term basis, 
as seen in the United States and the U.K. (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010).  
Another characteristic of the European, or Continental, stakeholding model is the “team 
production” model as an alternative to the principal-agent approach, which suggests that 
the corporation consists of many stakeholders who jointly give control over their resources 
to a board of directors (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010, p. 553). The stakeholding model also 
gives greater voice of stakeholders. For example, as noted, “control based on ownership 
cannot act as a substitute for cooperation or (for) employee voice in decisions” (Aguilera 
& Jackson, 2010, p. 489). In stakeholding models, unlike in the Anglo-American 
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shareholder model, where there is a one-tier board, there are supervisory and management 
boards, as in the case of Germany (Schilling, 2001). As Schilling (2001) points out, in the 
German two-tiered board structure, the supervisory board functions for making 
appointments and for removing members of the management board. The shareholders in 
the European system are for the most part passive, hold ineffective annual meetings, and 
with most stocks owned by other companies, become part of an interlocking ownership 
system (Schillng, 2001). There is little transparency in the selection process of supervisory 
boards. Many of these characteristics are missing in the Anglo-American system. 
2.5.2 Anglo-American or shareholding corporate governance model - 
Characteristics 
The Anglo-American model takes the shareholding perspective, or the belief that directors 
of companies have as their fiduciary responsibility the maximisation of shareholder value. 
The general thinking is that the major shareholders are to be seen as the privileged group 
in a company, because they are the ones that take the greatest risks, and so must be seen as 
the major owners of the companies (Gamble & Kelly, 2001). The rationale underlying the 
shareholder model of corporate governance is that in the event of organisation failure, 
creditors and the Internal Revenue have the first claim against the assets of the company. 
It is only after these claims against the fixed assets of the corporation are made that the 
shareholders can make a claim against the returns of the corporation (Gamble & Kelly, 
2001). It is on this basis that it is argued that basing corporate governance on shareholder 
values makes sense, since the operation of the corporation is seen as serving the interests 
of the shareholders. 
In the Anglo-American model, which is represented largely by the U.K., the United States, 
Canada, Ireland and Australia, the characteristics in place include managerial directors who 
operate the organisation on behalf of the shareholders, a law that “strongly protects 
shareholders”, security markets where shareholders can buy and sell shares, and a one-tier 
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board of directors, consisting of “executive and supervisory responsibilities” (Weimer & 
Pape, 1999, p. 154). An important characteristic of the Anglo-American, or shareholding, 
model, is the idea that these countries have limited liability, which, according to Gamble 
and Kelly (2001), is thought to provide security to smaller investors and to identify the 
organisation as a legal entity.  
Another characteristic of the Anglo-American model is the more important role played by 
stock markets, in comparison to other governance models. In the Anglo-American model, 
stock markets are used “more intensively” to raise capital for domestic companies (Weimer 
& Paper, 1999, p. 155). Besides, institutions own equity on behalf of a variety of 
shareholders, including present and future retirees and purchasers of mutual funds, thereby 
characterising this aspect of the Anglo-American model as “fiduciary capitalism” (Hawley 
& Williams, 1997, p. 206). But perhaps the best known characteristic of the Anglo -
American corporate governance system model is “an active external market for corporate 
control, often referred to as the takeover market” (Weimer & Paper, 1999, p. 155). In other 
words, if a company does not achieve maximisation of corporate yield, other firms could 
see an opportunity for take-over. Because of the Anglo-American model’s concern with 
corporate control, another characteristic of the Anglo-American system is the short-term 
nature of investments (Gamble & Kelly, 2001). But, as noted, the market for corporate 
control underwent some change with the installation of anti-take-over measures by 
corporations at the end of the 1980s (Hawley & Williams, 997). This gave rise to other 
characteristics, including giving owners more influence on boards and providing initiat ives 
for agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Labour 
to take aggressive action as owners or to allow owners to take action against companies 
that are not aggressive (Hawley & Williams, 1997).  
 44 
 
2.6 Accounting, legal, and cultural systems in the OECD countries 
The origins of the accounting systems in use today can be traced back to several centuries 
B.C. from the Roman period, through the Dark Ages and into modern times. The Industria l 
Revolution had a tremendous impact on business and commercial activities, and greatly 
influenced the development of modern accounting. However, with the rise in globalisat ion, 
businesses are realising the importance of reaching out to foreign companies, and are 
encountering differences based on economic, educational, sociocultural, legal and politica l 
factors. As Radebaugh, Gray and Black (2006) point out, the nature of the accounting 
systems used by different nations depend to a large extent on the influence of these factors, 
for “such systems will, in turn, tend to reinforce established patterns of behaviour” (p. 15). 
2.6.1 Accounting systems 
An understanding of accounting systems involves examining the modern corporation, with 
its separation of ownership from control, and the establishment of limited liability, where 
the public owns shares in the corporation (Hawley & Williams, 1997; Gamble & Kelly, 
2001). Accounting systems in OECD countries are based on professional management, 
security markets, and countries listing on foreign securities markets. The accounting 
systems in OECD countries are based on the need for creditors and investors to have 
accountability and disclosure, but they differ based on who these corporations believe they 
are accountable to, and to whom they need to make disclosures (Radebaugh et al., 2006). 
Shareholder protection is an important consideration, for large and small, as well as 
domestic and foreign, shareholders. (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
2002). Disclosure was important so that shareholders could have access to information 
about the corporation on a regular basis (Radebaugh et al., 2006). 
In OECD countries, there are several different kinds of accounting systems, namely, the 
Anglo-American system, represented by the United States, the U.K. and Australia; the 
Nordic accounting system, represented by the Netherlands and Sweden; the Germanic 
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accounting system, represented by Germany and Switzerland; the accounting systems in 
Latin countries, represented by France, Italy and Spain; and the accounting systems in 
Asian countries, represented by Japan (Radebaugh et al., 2006). Weimer and Pape (1999) 
identify four types of corporate systems, namely, Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Latin and 
Japanese. While these systems all serve a basic function of reporting on the operations of 
various corporations, they differ in that they are influenced by various factors that 
characterise their societies. 
Characteristics of the Anglo-American accounting system include emphasis on the 
importance of information to meet the needs of investors, transparency, and a similar 
language and legal system, adapted from the U.K. accounting system (Radebaugh et al., 
2006). Among the countries that use this accounting system, accounting standards have 
been established through the establishment of accounting boards; for example, the  
Financial Accounting Standards Board in the United States, the International Financia l 
Reporting Standards in the U.K. and the Australian Accounting Standards Board in 
Australia (Radebaugh et al., 2006). But even so, as Radebaugh et al. (2006) point out, there 
are differences among countries using the same accounting system. For example, though 
using the same Anglo-American accounting system, the United States accounting caters to 
large corporations, and is more closely influenced by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) than the U.K. while in Australia, the Public Sector accounting 
Standards is replaced by the Urgent Issues Group (Radebaugh et al., 2006). 
The Nordic accounting system is similar to the Anglo-American system in that emphasis 
is placed on information for investors, but in the Nordic accounting system, information 
must also voluntarily be provided to other stakeholders. Emphasis is also placed on social 
reporting, with disclosure of employment and personnel policies. The Nordic accounting 
system puts special significance on taxation; this is not the case in the Anglo-American 
system. The Nordic accounting system is less transparent than the Anglo-American system, 
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but more so than the Germanic and Latin accounting systems. Some small differences 
remain among countries using the Nordic accounting system (Radebaugh et al., 2006). 
The Germanic accounting system differs markedly from the Anglo-American system in 
that company law and taxation are the most important considerations. Germanic accounting 
tends to be relatively conservative and secretive, which contrasts largely with the Anglo -
American accounting system (Radebaugh et al., 2006). Switzerland tends to have more 
secrecy built into its accounting system than Germany, although both are based on the 
Germanic accounting system (Radebaugh et al., 2006). 
The Latin accounting system is similar to the Germanic system in that it gives preference 
to information for creditors and tax authorities in Germany. Company law influences 
accounting practices (Radebaugh et al., 2006). In France, for example, the accounting 
profession is small and does not hold the status it does in Anglo-American countries. As in 
the Germanic system, the stock market does not influence the accounting profession as it 
does in the Anglo-American system. Like the Germanic accounting system, the Latin 
accounting system is based on corporations receiving “finance from banks, the 
government, and family interests (Radebaugh et al., 2006). 
Asian accounting practice has a tradition distinct from Anglo-American, Nordic, Germanic 
and Latin accounting, as a result of Asia having for the most part a colonial history. 
However, Japan’s accounting practice is greatly influenced by Germany and the United 
States (Radebaugh, 2006) 
In the global economic system, investors pay attention to the different accounting systems 
used, as this has ramifications for their investment. Accounting practices in Anglo -
American accounting differ from those in continental European accounting, and in Asia, 
Latin America and other countries. Financial Accounting Standards Boards (FASB) are 
commonly used in Anglo-American countries, such as the U.K., the United States and 
former U.K. colonies (Radebaugh et al., 2006). These standards are similar and provide 
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investors with a standard way of treating different practices. Accounting practices in the 
different accounting systems differ among themselves and differ from those in the Anglo -
American accounting system. Many developing countries also face difficulties obtaining 
investment because their accounting practices are not transparent or their accounting 
systems are not completely established. Many countries do not have the means of 
developing their own standards. The creation of an international standard, the Internationa l 
Financial Reporting System (IFRS), provides common practices that many developing 
countries can understand and apply (Radebaugh et al., 2006).  
2.6.2 Legal systems 
Understanding the legal systems that operate within OECD countries is important to 
appreciate the level of protection afforded to investors. This information also determines 
why investors are more willing to invest in some countries than others (La Porta et al., 
2002). Legal system also determines the effectiveness of its corporate governance (La Porta 
et al., 2002). The importance of the legal system and the protection it affords investors was 
clearly demonstrated with the recent failures of the corporate system in the U.K. and the 
United States, and the legal responses of these countries to these failures (Daniel, 
Cieslewicz, and Pourjalali, 2012).   
Among the countries that make up the global economy, there are two different legal 
systems, namely, the Anglo-Saxon common law system and the continental civil law 
system. The Anglo-Saxon, or Anglo-American, common law system is considered the 
superior legal system for accommodating corporate governance (La Porta et al., 2002). 
Common law has been described as uncodified law, based on English law that emerged 
after the Norman Conquest in 1066 (University of California, Berkeley, p. 1). It is law that 
was based on courts of law and courts of equity, where case law and precedent were used. 
These principles still dominate the common law system. 
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The common law system is most often found in Anglo-American countries (Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurrra, 2004; La Porta et al., 2002). This system is based on several 
characteristics that are considered important for protecting investors’ interests. According 
to Zattoni and Cuomo (2008), common law is based on equity finance, strong legal 
protection of shareholders, strong regulations in the courts for dealing with bankruptcy, 
dispersed ownership, and shareholders being provided with disclosure on what is 
happening in the corporation. The reason that the common law system is seen as superior 
to the civil law legal system is that the former is an outsider system, meaning that it is based 
on rules and operates on an arm’s-length basis (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). The common law 
legal system is based on laws that “are protective of outside investors and well enforced”, 
and so “investors are willing to finance firms, and financial markets are both broader and 
more valuable” (La Porta et al., 2002, p. 1147). It is mostly in countries whose legal 
systems are based on the common law legal tradition that corporate governance is promoted 
through corporate governance codes (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). The common 
law system is seen at work in the U.K., U.S., Canada, Ireland and Australia. 
Civil law is generally associated with European countries, and was a system of law that 
was codified and based on Roman law. This system was practiced throughout Europe, 
where “the role of local custom as a source of law became increasingly important” 
(University of California, Berkeley, p. 2). In the 18th century, many European countries 
pulled together the various laws existing within their traditions and codified them. For 
example, the codification of France’s laws became known as France’s Civil Code, or the 
Napoleonic Code (University of California, Berkeley, p. 2).  
Civil law was therefore classified as an “insider model” and had unique characterist ics, 
such as heavy bank financing, little legal protection for minority shareholders, concentrated 
ownership, weak disclosure, stakeholders playing a central role in owning and managing 
corporations, and corporations having very little freedom to carry out mergers or 
acquisitions (Djankov, Lopez, La Porta & Shleifer, 2008). As Aguilera and Cuervo-
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Cazurra (2008) point out, the difference between these two legal systems in terms of 
corporate governance is that while civil law uses statutes and codes to make legal rulings, 
common law uses precedents and case law to seek out equity. Besides, as Zattoni and 
Cuomo (2008) explain, civil law rulings tend to be lenient and ambiguous, and not designed 
to improve governance. It is on this basis that La Porta et al. (2002) point out that the 
common law tradition is superior to the civil law tradition, which does not protect investors 
and where financial markets are not well developed. This is the legal system that is used in 
France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Japan. 
2.6.3 Cultural practices 
Culture plays an important part in the business operations of a company and in its corporate 
governance. Organisations and their management are heavily dependent on the cultura l 
practices that take place in a country. This explains why the concept of Western culture 
and its universal modern management methods are no longer considered a reality. As 
Hofstede (1984) points out, this is because although France, Germany, Sweden and the 
U.K. are all seen as “Western”, their types of management differ because of cultural factors 
(p. 81).  
The rationale for taking this position is that it is the specific cultural practices and values 
that determine the goals of a country and the economic and technical resources that would 
be used to achieve the goals (Hofstede, 1984, p. 81). Culture is based on how people behave 
in their particular settings. This being the case, it can be clearly seen that the activities that 
take place in different countries must therefore be determined by the culture of the country.  
Some of the cultural values that influence how people behave, and which seriously impact 
how management works in different countries, are individualism versus collectivism, large 
versus small power distance, strong versus weak uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity 
versus femininity (Hofstede, 1984). Individualism shows a preference of individuals for 
taking care of themselves and their families, while collectivism shows a preference “for a 
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tightly knit social framework in which individuals can expect their relatives, clan, or other 
in-group to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede, 1984, p. 83). 
The Anglo-American model is best described as holding on to individualism, which is 
found to be characteristic in the U.K., U.S., Canada, Australia and Ireland, while the 
collectivism is more marked in the Continental model, particularly in France, Germany, 
Spain, Italy and Japan. 
Power distance refers to how people accept the unequal distribution of power in their 
society, while uncertainty avoidance describes “the degree to which the members of a 
society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity” (Hofstede, 1984, p. 83). Power 
distance is more marked in the Continental model, and is seen in France, Germany, Spain, 
Italy and Japan. While masculinity describes a preference for “achievement, heroism, 
assertiveness, and material success,” femininity describes a preference for “relationships, 
modesty, caring for the weak, and the quality of life” (Hofstede, 1984, p. 84). Masculinity 
is a cultural value that is more marked in the Anglo-American than in the Continenta l 
model, and therefore has implications for corporate governance, and for risk-taking in 
corporate performance more so in U.K., U.S., Canada, Australia and Ireland than in France, 
Germany, Spain, Italy and Japan. 
Hofstede and Bond (1988) demonstrate the importance of cultural practices for economic 
growth by illustrating how Confucian values have greatly influenced the economic growth 
of Asian countries. The authors point to the relative importance of persistence, ordering of 
relationships by status, thrift and having a sense of shame as values making up ‘Confucian 
Dynamism.’ Other values of secondary importance in Asian society are respect for 
tradition, saving face, and personal steadiness and stability (Hofstede & Bond, 1988, p. 
17). These are cultural values that are seen as important in Japan and that therefore play a 
role in the behaviour of firms in this country. 
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Table 1: Accounting, Cultural and Legal Systems in OECD Countries  
Accounting for Anglo American Accounting for Continental 
Shareholding Stakeholding 
Principal- agent approach Team production model 
Short-term basis of investment Long term basis of investment 
One-tier board system Supervisory and management boards  
Owners have more influence on board Shareholder pressure on board 
Protects shareholder, including minority Protects stakeholders- little protection for 
shareholders 
Widely diverse ownership Interlocking ownership 
Transparency in selecting board members  Little transparency in selecting board members  
Use stock market to raise capital Raise capital from family, banks and government 
Culture for Anglo American Culture for Continental 
Individualism Collectivism 
Small power distance Large power distance 
Weak uncertainty avoidance Strong uncertainty avoidance 
Masculinity Femininity 
More risk-taking Less risk-taking 
Legal System for Anglo American Legal System for Continental 
Common Law Civil Law 
Outsider System Insider System 
Diverse Ownership Concentrated Ownership 
Use precedents and case law to achieve equity Use codes and statutes  
Use of corporate governance codes  Little use of corporate governance codes  
Investors finance firms Finance by family and banks  
Strong legal protection for shareholders  Weak protection for shareholders  
Wide disclosure Weak disclosure 
2.7 Ownership and debt structures in the OECD countries 
Examining ownership and debt structures in OECD countries is important in showing the 
differences between shareholding and stake-holding governance structures and between 
the various the countries that are identified as Anglo American, namely, U.K., U.S., 
Canada, Australia and Ireland or with shareholding governance structures, and those that 
are identified as Continental, namely, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Japan, with 
stakeholding governance structures. 
2.7.1 Ownership structures – Characteristics 
The ownership structures among OECD countries using the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model are different from those using the Continental European corporate 
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governance model. In differentiating between the Anglo-American and Continenta l 
European governance models, one must pay attention as to who the owners are, how much 
power these owners possess, and more specifically, to how the shareholders, particular ly 
minority shareholders, are protected from majority shareholders. A common idea is that 
where there is poor shareholder protection, ownership tends to be rather concentrated, with 
minority shareholder rights not protected. Besides, the legal tradition of the countries play 
a major role in determining the ownership structures (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999). These authors contend that “the quality of investor protection, as measured 
either by the shareholder rights score or by legal origin, is a robust determinant of the 
incidence of widely held firms” (La Porta et al., 1999, p. 511). 
Early work on ownership and control of firms was carried out by Berle and Means in 1932, 
and La Porta et al. (1999) set out to look at an updated picture of this topic. Their findings 
reveal different types of ownership and control in the world’s largest firms. The results of 
La Porta et al.’s (1999) study reveal that countries outside the United States that are based 
on civil law generally have poor shareholder protection, as the largest firms also have 
controlling shareholders. These controlling shareholders can be the state, a founding family 
or the descendants of the founder (La Porta et al., 1999). This control may extend beyond 
cash flow rights, and may be held through “pyramid structures” resulting from the owners 
being the managers of the firms (La Porta et al., 1999). 
In their study of global firms, La Porta et al. (1999) noted that “[u]sing the 20% definit ion 
of control”, 36% of firms were widely held, 30% were family-owned, 18% were state-
owned, and 15% were distributed among miscellaneous types of ownership (491). This 
finding contradicts Berle and Means’ contention that corporations are the dominant 
ownership structure (La Porta et al., 1999). It was shown that all 20 firms from the U.K, 
18 out of the 20 from Japan, and 16 out of the 20 from the United States fell into the 
category of widely held firms, but there were some countries, such as Argentina, Greece, 
Austria, Hong Kong, Portugal, Israel and Belgium, with no widely held firms (La Porta et 
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al., 1999). It was further shown that the state owned some of the very large companies in 
some countries, with 70% of the largest traded firms in Austria, 45% in Singapore, and 
40% in Italy and in Israel being “state-owned” (La Porta et al., 1999, p.496). The 
conclusion was that family-controlled firms were the dominant form of ownership 
structure, not corporations or financial institutions (La Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, family 
control is very common. However, countries with common law legal traditions were found 
to have mostly widely held ownership, and provided greater protection for shareholders 
(La Porta et al., 1999). 
2.7.2 Debt structures - Characteristics 
It was shown that the dominant form of ownership in the world’s largest firms is family 
ownership. In these firms, ownership of equity is by families, with banks playing a very 
minor role in financing. It was also shown that only 5% of large banks and insurance 
companies owned equity in most countries. However, it was shown that in Belgium, 
Portugal and Sweden, the largest firms were owned by banks. In other words, banks owned 
the equity in these firms (La Porta et al., 1999). 
La Porta et al. (1999) distinguish between bank-centred financial systems and market-
centred systems (p. 508). In bank-centred systems, there could be great reliance on debt 
finance, and this makes it unnecessary for large shareholders to have to sell their shares so 
that firms can raise funds. Examples of these are found in countries with the Continenta l 
system in place. In these situations, there is also a greater likelihood that in countries with 
poor investor protection there might also be greater reliance on debt rather than equity 
financing (La Porta et al., 1999, p. 508). 
On the other hand, market-centred systems, which are also the countries in which there is 
widely held ownership and common law legal traditions, are more likely to have better 
developed debt markets. Examples of these are in countries with the Anglo-American 
system in place (La Porta et al., 1999). Unlike the ownership concentration in countries 
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with civil law legal systems, and where there is poor shareholder protection, in the United 
States and other common law countries, where there is more diverse ownership, there is 
more likely to be good shareholder protection, making these countries good for investment.   
Table 2: Ownership and Debt Structures  
Anglo American Continental 
Shareholding Stakeholding 
Strong Investor Protection Poor investor protection 
Few controlling shareholders  Strong controlling shareholders  
Owners – Protection for shareholders Little or no protection 
Owners and managers separate Pyramid structures, where owners are managers  
Diverse ownership of shares  Largest firms family-owned 
Widely traded shares Few sales of shares 
Great for Investors Not very good for investors 
2.8 Corporate governance mechanisms contained in the OECD corporate 
governance reports 
In examining the corporate governance mechanisms that are presented in the governance 
reports, one must consider what constitutes corporate governance. According to the 2004 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, “there is no single model of good corporate 
governance”, but based on “work carried out in both OECD and non-OECD countries and 
within the Organisation . . . some common elements that underlie good corporate 
governance” have been identified (OECD, 2004). The Principles are non-binding for a 
purpose, and that is because of the vast differences among countries. Therefore, the 
Principles serve as a “reference point” that countries should use in order to develop their 
own good corporate governance regimes. In addition, the Principles are evolutionary and 
thus will continue to evolve to suit the needs of users. While the Principles are adopted by 
countries, corporations have also put them to use.  
As pointed out in the 2004 OECD Principles,  
“To remain competitive in a changing world, corporations must innovate and adapt 
their corporate governance practice so that they can meet new demands and grasp 
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new opportunities. Similarly, governments have an important responsibility for 
shaping an effective regulatory framework that provides for sufficient flexibi lity to 
allow markets to function effectively and to respond to expectations of shareholders 
and other stakeholder. It is up to governments and market participants to decide 
how to apply these Principles in developing their own frameworks for corporate 
governance, taking into account the costs and benefits of regulation” (OECD, 
2004).  
Therefore, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance provide a variety of mechanisms 
that can be used by countries and corporations in crafting corporate governance regimes  
that would enable them to benefit from the Principles. It is also important to point out that 
while corporations are stressed, the Principles are intended for all organisations. 
The differences between the countries that are based on the Anglo-American system would 
differ from those based on the Continental system, because of accounting, cultural and 
legal systems that already have certain structures in place. 
2.8.1 Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance 
framework 
First, there must be a strong basis on which to establish an effective corporate governance 
framework. This framework must stress the clear division of responsibilities between 
supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities, ensuring that the corporate 
governance framework also promotes transparent and efficient markets, all within the 
framework of the law. Also, there should be legal and regulatory requirements in place that 
are enforceable and transparent. The supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorit ies 
should have the power to carry out their duties, and the timeliness of their rulings must also 
be stressed. These mechanisms are widely used in many OECD countries (OECD Survey, 
2004, pp. 44-51). With the appropriate divisions of responsibilities clearly outlined, with 
the proper mechanisms in place for dispersing these responsibilities, and with clear 
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timelines in place to execute these responsibilities, an efficient mechanism for carrying out 
the duties of providing good governance can be established, provided that there are 
guidelines for ensuring transparency and efficiency in the markets, and all is done within 
the jurisdiction of the law (OECD, 2004, p. 17). 
A look at the Anglo-American system as seen in the U.K., U.S., Canada, Australia and 
Ireland reveals that there are the accounting, cultural and legal systems have allowed for 
greater transparency in operations. Besides, the legal system allows for protection of 
shareholders in the Anglo-American system in a way that has not been provided for in 
countries with the Continental system. 
2.8.2 Rights of shareholders 
Next, the rights of shareholders and the key ownership functions must be clearly outlined 
and delineated within a governance framework. The mechanism that should be used for 
this should clearly lay out the broad rights of shareholders, namely, their rights of 
ownership; their right to participate in decisions pertaining to corporate changes; their right 
to participate in, be informed of and vote on general shareholder matters; the rights of 
certain shareholders to a greater degree of control based on their disproportionate 
investment in the organisation; provisions to allow markets for corporate power to function 
efficiently and transparently; the rights of all shareholders, including constitutiona l 
investors, to be facilitated in exercising ownership; and the right of all shareholders to be 
able to consult with each other, except in cases where exercise of such rights can constitute 
abuse (OECD, 2004, p. 19). 
With respect to the rights of shareholders, the 2004 Principles provide for mechanisms 
which stipulate that shareholders should have their ownership rights secured through 
registration, should have the right to transfer or convey their share, should participate and 
vote in shareholders’ meetings, and should have the right to elect and remove members of 
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the board. This mechanism also provides that shareholders should share in the profits of 
the corporation (OECD, 2004, p. 19). 
Mechanisms must be created to entitle shareholders to terminate a member or members of 
the board, if, in their judgment, this action will serve to maintain good governance in the 
corporation. Shareholders should be properly informed of changes taking place in the 
corporation and must be given the amendments to statutes or articles of informatio n 
authorisation granted by other shareholders as to proposed changes, as well as 
extraordinary transactions that the corporation may have undertaken. This should include 
all assets that must be transferred. Shareholders should participate fully in matters 
pertaining to the shareholders interest, and should have the appropriate roles to guide their 
participation, including voting. They should be included in decision-making processes that 
bring about changes that affect ownership of shares in the corporation, and should have 
sufficient and timely information about meetings. Mechanisms should be in place to ensure 
that shareholders have access to the board, and can ask questions pertaining to the operation 
of the organisation, including matters related to audit. Shareholders should also have the 
opportunity, using the equity aspect, to approve remuneration for board members and key 
executives. Finally, shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and either 
vote should have the same effect (OECD, 2004, p. 19). 
2.8.3 The equitable treatment of shareholders 
Mechanisms to secure equitable treatment of shareholders must ensure that all shareholders 
with the same kinds or series of shares are treated equally. The mechanisms should ensure 
that all shareholders of the same series also have the same rights, and that any changes 
affecting shareholder rights are voted on by other shareholders. Minority shareholders must 
be protected, and impediments to cross-border voting should be eliminated. Any offic ia l 
who engages in insider trading and abusive self-dealing should be prosecuted. All board 
members and key executives must disclose if they have any material interest in any 
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transaction that the organisation may be engaging in, be that material interest direct, 
indirect or on behalf of third parties (OECD, 2004, p. 20). These mechanisms are based on 
equality, equity and fairness. Mechanisms are in place for shareholders’ protection. For 
example, in Belgium, France and Italy, there are corporate networks, voting agreements 
and hierarchical groups, where emphasis is placed on voting power, and not on ownership. 
These types of mechanisms “shield the controlling group from hostile takeovers” but 
expose the system to “abuse by minority shareholders” (OECD Survey, 2004, p. 31). 
2.8.4 The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
Mechanisms should be provided that ensure that the rights of stakeholders are established 
by law and/or mutually agreed upon, and that there should be “performance-enhanc ing 
mechanisms” that permit employee participation in governance. These mechanisms should 
enable these employees to have relevant, adequate and timely information on a regular 
basis. Mechanisms should enable employees and other stakeholders to have a way of 
communicating with board members on practices that are both legal and illegal. The 
corporate governance structure should also be complemented with an “effective, effic ient 
insolvency framework and by effective enforcement of creditor rights” (OECD, 2004, p. 
20). In other words, creditor rights must also be recognised through a mechanism designed 
for that purpose.  
2.8.5 Disclosure and transparency 
The 2004 Principles of Corporate Governance pertain to both financial and non-financ ia l 
matters. The mechanisms that relate to disclosure and transparency cover many areas. 
There are also several mechanisms in place that address these issues. One mechanism is 
that of auditor rotation, where auditors are restricted in the non-audit services they carry 
out in order to reduce the incentives. This allows for the independence of auditors in 
implementing auditing standards. Analysts and rating agencies that report financ ia l 
information are also seen as having conflicts of interest in reporting information. This 
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needs greater disclosure from providing information. Mechanisms are in place for them to 
disclose. Non-financial information, such as HR policies, that may be important to 
stakeholders are also considered as needing more disclosure. 
Mechanisms also ensure disclosure and transparency in the governance system as specified 
in the 2004 Principles of Corporate Governance with respect to financial and all other 
operations. Disclosure must be made with respect to objectives, foreseeable risks, financ ia l 
operations of the organisation and corporate structure and policies used to implement these 
policies. Also, major share ownership and voting rights, remuneration of board members 
and key executives, related party transactions, and issues related to employees and other 
stakeholders must be fully disclosed (OECD Survey, 2004, p. 51). 
Transparency should be stressed in the way that information is prepared and disseminated 
with an annual audit condition, and by auditors that are accountable to shareholders and 
obligated to use professional care in reporting to the company. Information must be 
disseminated in a careful, timely and cost-effective manner to all stakeholders, and the 
corporate governance structure should provide for a complementary system supported by 
reports and analyses of reports, and by analysts, brokers and agencies, in a way that can 
provide helpful information to others. 
2.8.6 Responsibilities of the board 
Corporations must have a mechanism in place that requires a board to exercise diligence 
and care and to act in the interests of shareholders as well as the company. Where different 
shareholders have different rights, the board is required to treat all shareholders fairly and 
to use high ethical standards in all areas, especially when dealing with the interests of 
stakeholders. The board is expected to set the strategy in place, plan, review, set 
performance objectives in place and monitor the implementation of plans. In short, the 
board is responsible for monitoring the effectiveness of the company’s performance and 
can replace key executives (OECD, 2004, p. 24). Board members are also expected to 
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ensure that there are no conflicts of interests and abuses related to transactions, and must 
monitor this carefully. Board members must be able to use good judgement and commit 
themselves wholly to their responsibilities. They are also expected to have full access to 
all the “accurate, relevant, and timely information” of the organisation (OECD, 2004, p. 
25). 
Several mechanisms are at work to spell out board responsibilities. Some of these include 
board audit committees, with some countries introducing public oversight of the setting of 
accounting and auditing standards. Boards are responsible for approving disclosure, and 
board members are independent of management. Boards are in particular required to handle 
matters dealing with board and key executives’ remuneration. Other mechanisms include 
board independence, employee representation on the board, and board committees for 
nominating and electing boards (OECD Factbook, 2014). 
2.9 Examples of mechanisms used in some countries 
A look at the codes that many countries use reveals the diversity and multiplicity of 
mechanisms that are in use in OECD countries to bring about corporate governance. 
Australia, for example, has as its codes the Stock Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council, Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations 
(2003) and the IFSA Corporate Governance (2002). The instruments or mechanisms 
mentioned are ‘comply or explain’; principle balance of authority within the board, 
disclosure of division of responsibility, professional competence of members and the 
ability to exercise independent judgment; separation of chair and CEO, establishment of 
board committees with majority independent directors, ethics oversight, greater  
shareholder involvement, transparent compensation tied to corporate and individua l 
performance, and protection for whistle blowers  (OECD Survey, 2004, p. 44). 
Canada has different codes and instruments. For example, there are disclosure requirements 
and guidelines, which included the Toronto Stock Exchange, March 2002; and General 
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Acceptance of the Saucier Report, except independent board leader as a listing 
requirement, disclosure of governance directives, and shareholder approval of option plans. 
Other instruments include management supervision by the board of directors, boards of 
directors composed of and chaired by outside (non-executive) directors, and establishment 
of audit committees, consisting only of outside directors (OECD Survey 2004, p. 45). 
Finland has only codes, which include the Chamber of Commerce/Confederation of 
Finnish Industry and Employers Code and Ministry of Trade and Industry Guidelines. 
Germany’ codes include the Berlin Initiative Code and Germany Panel rules. The 
instruments or mechanisms used include balance of power within and between 
management and supervisory boards, compensation tied to corporate performance and 
seniority, establishment of supervisory board committees, and facilitation of shareholder 
voting (OECD Survey, 2004, p. 46). Germany also makes use of company and group law 
considering shareholder protection, disclosure and transparency and board composition, 
responsibilities and remuneration. 
In Korea, the code is Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance, 2003. The 
instruments or mechanisms used include improvement of shareholder participat ion, 
information and vote at AGM, at least 1/4 outside directors, cumulative voting to ensure 
representation of minority shareholders, establishment of committees, audit committee 
chaired and consisting of 2/3 outside directors, and disclosure of all information material 
to shareholders’ decisions. In 2003, Korea introduced an update consisting of the new 
mechanisms. These new mechanisms are ‘comply or explain’; listing; different 
requirements for large and small firms; outside directors independent from controlling 
families; minimum number of such directors; fair disclosure and greater role for outside 
directors in audit; and instructions to exercise voting rights and disclose (OECD Survey, 
2004, p. 47). 
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Thomsen and Conyon (2012) point out that there are many governance mechanisms, and 
they call attention to informal governance, which includes social norms, reputation/trust, 
codes, regulation by corporate laws, boards and incentive schemes. These authors also 
mention ownership, which can involve blockholders, shareholder activism and 
stakeholders, and stakeholder pressure, which could be applied through monitoring by 
creditors, auditors, analysts and competition (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). From looking at 
Canada, Finland, Germany, and Korea, one could appreciate the diversity of available 
mechanisms and the creative ways in which companies can use them in order to address 
the variety of issues raised in the 2004 Principles of Corporate Governance. 
Some of the principles that have been outlined by the OECD have been incorporated into 
their codes. The 2004 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance outline the importance 
of reforms to the system as new practices come to the fore. The U.K. has been carrying out 
changes that reflect the changes introduced in the OECD Principles. For example, in the 
OECD Principles, it is noted that there should be a separation of the chair’s position from 
that of the CEO: “Separation of the two posts may be regarded as good practice, as it can 
help to achieve an appropriate balance of power, increase accountability and improve the 
board’s capacity for decision making independent of management” (OECD, 2004, p. 63). 
The U.K. has adopted this policy in its UK Combined Code (2012), where the two roles of 
board chair person and CEO are made separate (U.K. Combined Code, 2012, p. 4). 
The general values underlying corporate governance are those of “fairness, accountability 
and transparency” (Dion, 2005, p. 195). According to Dion (2005), every corporate 
governance system must have “(a) an orientation towards Justice-itself through the 
actualisation of the following values: fairness, integrity and objectivity; (b) an orientation 
towards Truth-itself through the actualisation of values of openness, trustfulness, and 
transparency; (c) the orientation towards harmony through attitudes of collaboration, care 
and diligence” (p. 195). These values are an integral part of the 2004 OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, and the OECD, through collaboration with OECD and non-OECD 
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countries, is able to inspire trustfulness among investors in various nations. When countries 
adopt the Principles, they are hoping to inspire trust in those with whom they have business 
relations. 
2.10 Summary 
Section 2.2 provided a short historical overview of OECD, while Sections 2.3 and 2.4 
described a historical background of corporate governance development in the OECD 
countries and short history of the corporate governance reforms within the OECD context. 
Section 2.5 discussed the two main governance systems in the OECD, namely, the Anglo-
American or Shareholding Corporate governance model and the Continental European or 
Stakeholding Corporate Governance model, with Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 describing these 
systems in greater detail. Section 2.6 and subsections 2.6.1, 2.6.2, and 2.6.3 describe the 
accounting, cultural and legal systems in these models, while Section 2.7, and subsections 
2.7.1 and 2.7.2 described the ownership structures and debt structures associated with the 
Anglo-American and Continental models. Section 2.8 and subsections 2.8.1 to 2.8.6 
describe the corporate governance mechanisms related to OECD corporate governance. 
Section 2.9 discusses examples of mechanisms used in some countries, and Section 2.10 
summarises the chapter. 
This chapter has also considered how the OECD Principles can affect corporate governance 
in countries with different accounting and legal systems, and in terms of cultural practices. 
It has distinguished between the countries that have the Anglo-American system, namely, 
U.K., U.S., Canada, Australia and Ireland, and those that follow the Continental system 
tradition. It has further shown that the Anglo American countries follow the common law, 
which means that its legal accounting, cultural and legal characteristics differ from the 
Continental system tradition and is based on civil law legal traditions and that are 
influenced by the accounting, cultural and legal traditions. These two systems differ in the 
institutions that develop and in the ownership and debt structures that exist in these 
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countries. What has been revealed is that these differences have an impact on existing 
corporate governance. The Anglo-American countries are more aggressive (masculine), 
tend to be individualistic, to provide greater protection for its investors, and are more 
amenable to risks. The continental system countries tend to be more passive (feminine) 
collectivist, to provide less protection for investors, and are less amenable to risks.    
With these different countries utilising the Principles, the OECD has tried to be flexible in 
order to accommodate the different political, cultural, and economic systems that are using 
the Principles. However, with the request for greater guidance with respect to 
implementation, the OECD revised its Principles which have laid out specific mechanisms 
that are useful in implementation. Yet, it must be noted that because of differences in the 
countries, there would be different structures to accommodate these mechanisms. The 
result would be different manifestations of these mechanisms. It was also noted that 
corporate governance depends to a great extent on the relationships that exist among 
stakeholders, with owners increasingly demanding to have a voice in corporate governance 
in some countries, particularly the common law countries and with owners having too 
much control in the civil law countries and thereby having little protection for other 
shareholders. With different stakeholders, the area of developing good governance 
practices is an area in which the Principles would continue to evolve. It was shown that the 
two main discussed, the Anglo-American and the Continental, differ with respect to some 
of the important characteristics of corporate governance. 
The following chapter will discuss how organisations carry out their operations using 
corporate governance functions. Considering the mechanisms that these two systems have 
in place, the following chapter will discuss the theories that help explain how corporate 
governance is achieved. What will be shown in the chapter are the different explanations 
provided by the theories to demonstrate how the organisations from these countries support 
corporate governance. 
 65 
 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses how corporate governance functions as the means for organisat ions 
to manage their operations in a responsible manner. Its main objective is to discuss the 
theories that have been put forward to explain how corporate governance is carried out, 
and to show how the various theories of corporate governance are applied to corporate 
performance. More specifically, the corporate governance theories, namely, agency, 
stewardship, resource dependence, legitimacy and institutional, will be discussed to show 
the relationship between corporate governance and risk-taking, credit rating and cost of 
capital. This chapter therefore looks at internal corporate governance structures and links 
these to the financial performance of organisations. In other words, this chapter examines 
how each particular theoretical lens sees firms being affected in terms of risk-taking, credit 
rating and cost of capital. 
These theories of corporate governance have been drawn from several disciplines, 
including economics and finance (agency theory), sociology and psychology (stewardship 
theory), organisational theory and sociology (resource dependence theory), and 
management (stakeholder theory) (Letting, Wasike, Kinuu, Murgor, Ongeti, & Aosa, 
2012). Legitimacy and institutional theory are seen as important because they provide the 
basis for organisations to institutionalise social norms and values and thereby gain 
legitimacy. But these theories are also shown to be related to resource dependence theory, 
with resource dependence being also based on the relationship between organisations and 
their environment, and with legitimacy providing the basis for a greater flow of resources 
to organisations (Chen & Roberts, 2010). 
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The format that is being taken to discuss these theories include a description of the theory, 
its assumptions and how these are used to show the relationship between corporate 
governance, and risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. Section 3.1.1 further describes 
agency theory, showing how it relates to corporate governance in terms of risk, credit rating 
and cost of capital. Section 3.1.2 deals with stewardship theory, Section 3.1.3 describes 
resource dependence theory, Section 3.1.4 examines legitimacy theory and Section 3.1.5 
describes institutional theory. The sections are further broken down into subsections, which 
go into details as to how the theories relate to corporate governance in terms of risk, credit 
rating and cost of capital. 
3.2 Theoretical literature review 
3.2.1 Agency theory – General discussion of theory 
Agency theory is based on the separation of the roles of owner and manager, or of 
possession and control (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). This theory is based on the principa l-
agent framework. The inference here is that experts are hired as managers to manage the 
corporation, and are expected to look after the interests of the owners (Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003). With the separation of ownership and control, the expectation is that organisat ions 
will be managed expertly, with the managers taking the place of the owners, and keeping 
the owners’ interest as their mission (Hawley & Williams, 1997). When individuals invest 
in organisations, their goal is to maximise their returns, and managers, as their agents, are 
expected to ensure that their returns are maximised (Hawley & Williams, 1997). But this 
is not assumed to follow naturally, since the assumption is made that agents, as individua ls, 
seek their own self-interest at the expense of owners’ interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Abdullah & Valentine, 2009).  
It is on this basis that the assumption is made that agents cannot be trusted to seek the 
maximisation of owners’ returns without having mechanisms in place to monitor the 
operations of the agents (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009). This concern is understandable, as 
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owners, or shareholders, entrust agents to invest large amounts of capital on their behalf. 
Having good corporate governance is considered an important aspect of the shareholders -
manager or owners-agent relationship, in order to ensure that the interests of shareholders 
or owners are given the expected attention (Adams, 2005). 
Agency theory is therefore concerned with investigating the relationship between owners 
and their agents. This theory examines ways to ensure that agents are responsible for their 
actions in looking after the interests of owners (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009). It further 
prescribes certain governance structures to minimise the conflicts in the relationships, 
reduce risks and maximise the wealth of the owners (Adams, 2005; Abdullah & Valentine, 
2009). 
Corporate governance can therefore be seen as a means to address agency problems. The 
problems that arise from the principal-agent relationship pose systemic risks (Garmaise & 
Liu, 2005). However, there is debate concerning whether corporate governance should 
focus on shareholder rather than stakeholder interests. On the one hand, some believe that 
the principal-agent relationship should focus on the shareholder, while others believe that 
agency theory must be applicable to the relationship between management and all 
stakeholders in an organisation (Letza, Sun, & Kirkbride, 2004). 
3.2.1.1 Application of agency theory to CG and risk-taking 
First, stakeholders that have a strong influence on the resources of the organisation would  
necessarily be shown to be more positively affected when there is good corporate 
governance in the organisation (Lai & Chen, 2014; Gamble & Kelly, 2001). Studies done 
using agency theory to measure the performance of organisations provide different results. 
While some studies of corporate governance using the agency lens show that well-
governed organisations have a positive impact on the performance of organisations, others 
refute this, while others are neutral in their findings (Lai & Chen, 2014). But Lai and Chen 
point out that the likely reason for this discrepancy in finding could be because distinct ion 
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is not being made with respect to the stakeholders that are being considered. Lai and Chen 
(2014) point out that there is a necessity to make distinction because of the different 
influences that stakeholders have on the firm. 
Second, as Lai and Chen (2014) point out, major stakeholders or shareholders have been 
seen as more likely to desire little risk and more growth and that stakeholder gains in the 
organisation tended to favour the major shareholders more with better returns than other 
stakeholders. As Gamble and Kelly (2001) point out, shareholders are seen as privileged, 
since the company focuses on protecting the interests of shareholders. Having alliance 
partners as one of the stakeholders in an organisation leads to tough competition in the 
global environment. This competitiveness is seen as making the organisation more 
efficient, very different from firms that face competition as they develop their own know-
how (Lai & Chen, 2014). 
Third, in the context of corporate governance, with strong board independence, it can be 
argued that agency theory sees directors as looking after the interests of the main 
shareholders, and therefore taking fewer risks with the investments of primary stakeholders 
or shareholders (Sternberg, 1997). On the other hand, secondary stakeholders do not have 
the same assurances, and it is likely that they would face greater risks than alliance partners 
or major partners (Lai & Chen, 2014). The rationale for major shareholders having greater 
wealth and less risk stems from the fact that boards of directors are thought to have greater 
fiduciary obligations to major shareholders than to any other stakeholders (Lai & Chen, 
2012).                   
Fourth, Garmaise and Liu point to the fact that managers of organisations, under agency 
theory, are prone to investment, even when there is an indication that conditions may not 
be ideal. Dishonest managers would expose the organisation to systemic risks by taking 
chances and investing when there are indications that it may not be the best decision. In 
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these instances, dishonest or corrupt managers are generally looking out for their own self-
interest. 
Fifth, another risk to the agency theory comes from the stakeholder perspective, which sees 
risk as associated with the failure of corporate governance to take into consideration the 
interests of all stakeholders (Letza et al., 2004). The risks for other stakeholders would be 
greater if corporate governance did not insist on all stakeholders and not just shareholders.  
Therefore, if corporate governance is well established, it is expected that there would be 
little risk-taking with agency theory, as boards and directors would be working to protect 
the interests of the shareholders, as they represent the principal with the managers as their 
agents. 
3.2.1.2 Application of agency theory to CG and credit ratings 
First, it is expected that when agency theory is applied to corporate governance and credit  
rating, credit rating would be positive in the presence of strong governance. Would-be 
lenders are impressed with good corporate governance systems, as agency problems which 
arise between ownership and control, from conflicts of interest between controlling and 
non-controlling shareholders, and from self-interested managers, would be greatly reduced 
or eliminated.   
Second, investors are also concerned with maximising their investments, and they choose  
companies with a good credit rating. A good credit rating is based to a great degree on the 
absence of risk, and, as noted above, where there is much conflict in the principal-agent 
relationship, there is much systemic risk (Garmaise & Liu, 2005). It would follow that a 
company with a good corporate governance structure and with appropriate mechanisms for 
reducing this conflict, would also be a company that would have good credit rating. 
Governments, investors, banks, and brokers all use credit ratings to determine 
creditworthiness. The corporate governance structure of an organisation can therefore 
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indicate to an investor whether a company would make a good investment choice (Ahmad, 
Rashmi, Bakshi, & Saha, 2009). 
Third, it was noted that where there is good corporate governance and a separation of the  
roles of CEO and chair of the board, organisations are more likely to be viewed more 
positively, as the detrimental effect of this duality is removed. In many organisations, the 
removal of this duality brings about better corporate governance. It is expected that credit 
ratings are more positive than where there is better corporate governance (Elbannan, 2009; 
Jiraporn, Kim, Kim, Kitsabunnarat, 2012). 
Fourth, credit ratings are said to affect the ability of an organisation to borrow and so 
organisations that have poor governance and that are highly leveraged would very likely 
have low credit rating. As Elbannan (2009) points out, organisations that have poor 
governance are more likely to have poor credit ratings. According to agency theory, if there 
is good corporate governance, then there is likely to be good credit ratings for the firm. 
3.2.1.3 Application of agency theory to CG and cost of capital 
First, according to Jensen & Meckling (1976), agency costs that are associated with the  
separation of ownership and management involve the expenditures that the principal would 
incur to monitor the operation, the bonding expenditures that the agent would incur, and 
the residual loss that the principal would incur as a result of the agent not looking after the 
interests of the principal. In the context of an organisation with corporate governance 
mechanisms, including a strong board, the board is seen as the monitoring mechanism that 
helps to minimise the problems associated with the principal agency relationship between 
shareholders and managers (Letting et al., 2012). This is why the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance call for outside independent boards and propose the separation of 
the roles of board chair and CEO (OECD 2004).   
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Second, in applying agency theory, Garmaise and Liu (2005) point out that agents or 
managers are more likely to engage in investments. When corporate governance is in the 
hands of managers, managers representing shareholders are more likely to invest heavily, 
sometimes even more heavily than the shareholders would have wanted. If managers are 
dishonest, they can use their knowledge of the situation to hide a weak signal, and in the 
process reduce shareholder wealth (Garmaise & Liu, 2005). Dishonest managers could 
demonstrate ineffective corporate governance and, through corrupt means, increase the 
firm’s exposure to systemic risk and reduced organisational capital.  
Third, another way in which corporate governance in order to overcome agency problems  
could affect firm value is that it could lead to reduce expectation of return on equity, and 
this could lead to lower cost associated with monitoring of shareholders’ equity (Ammann 
et al., 2011). The lower costs could lead to high valuation of the firm, but the costs that are 
associated with implementing the stronger governance mechanisms could be greater than 
the benefits that accrue because of the benefits derived from the lower costs of capital 
(Ammann et al., 2011). In short, it is held that stronger corporate governance mechanisms 
are associated with higher valuation of the firm and lower costs of capital, and so corporate 
governance should be seen as “an opportunity rather than an obligation and pure cost 
factor” (Ammann et al., 2011, p. 54).  
Fourth, better governance is seen as associated with less agency conflict (Jiraporn, Kim, 
Kim, Kitsabunnarat, 2012), better performance, and better valuation, which is further 
associated with greater creditworthiness and so cost of capital is less (Elbannan, 2009). 
3.2.2 Stewardship theory – General discussion of theory 
Stewardship theory takes a different approach to agency theory in that the former sees top 
management and executives as stewards for shareholders. In other words, stewardship 
theory sees no conflict between agents and shareholders, and instead sees stewards taking 
a genuine interest in protecting the interests of owners and shareholders. The motivation of 
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top management and executives is to promote the wellbeing of the organisation, identifying 
with it more on the basis of duty than personal self-interest. Stewards see the success of 
the organisation as conferring independence on them, as shareholders come to trust them 
more. Managers and executives, according to stewardship theory, look after shareholders’ 
interests and effectively control the organisation, which empowers them to maximise the 
profits of the organisation (Abdullah and Valentine, 2009). 
Whereas agency theory holds that outside and independent directors provide the best 
security for organisations and better corporate performance, stewardship theory sees 
corporate performance being superior when there is a dominance of inside directors 
(Letting et al., 2012). The rationale for this position is that inside-dominated boards provide 
greater depth of knowledge, greater access to current information that could benefit the 
operation of the firm, more technical expertise and greater commitment to the organisat ion 
(Letting et al, 2012). 
The major distinction between agency theory and stewardship theory is that the former sees 
the separation of management (CEO) from chairman of the board as important for 
maximising the interests of the shareholder, while stewardship theory sees the 
maximisation of the shareholder as incumbent about the duality of the role of CEO and 
chairman of the board (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The evidence that Donaldson and 
Davis provide for seeing stewardship theory as advantageous is that their study showed 
that shareholder returns or organisational performance were greater with CEO duality, 
which supports stewardship theory. But they also point to the study by Rechner and Dalton 
(1991), which also took a stewardship approach, but found the opposite, thereby supporting 
the agency theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). To Donaldson and Davis (1991), these 
contradictions in findings only serve to highlight the dangers of using agency theory with 
the assumptions of self-interested managers and conflict of interests, as the CEO duality 
could work well. 
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3.2.2.1 Application of stewardship theory to CG and risk-taking 
First, in stewardship theory, where the role of the good steward is that of looking out for 
the well-being of the shareholders and owners, there is no place for the dishonest manager 
as found in agency theory, for the role of the manager in stewardship theory would be to 
increase the shareholder wealth. Consequently, there would be less systemic risk in 
stewardship theory that in agency theory. As Aguilera, Gospel and Jackson (2007) point 
out, stewardship theory has removed the assumption of the behaviour of managers, 
showing the managers as good stewards with very few situations involving conflict of 
interests arising. 
Second, application of stewardship theory to risk-taking will show the directors of the 
organisation as identifying with the organisation, and seeing the success of the organisat ion 
as the same as their success (Clarke, 2007). This behaviour demonstrates that there is little 
risk associated with directors who see themselves as stewards of their organisat ion. 
Therefore, in this setting, shareholders would see their wealth as very likely to be 
maximised, since the problem that is often encountered in the principal-agency relationship 
is missing in stewardship theory (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009).    
3.2.2.2 Application of stewardship theory to CG and credit ratings 
First, in terms of credit ratings, one would expect that since shareholders have great trust  
in a manager, and since the manager, according to this theory, is working to improve 
corporate wealth, then it is likely that credit ratings would also be high. This would be 
supported by the fact that shareholders are pleased with the organisation’s performance and 
with the wealth they are accruing from their investment. Good performance is associated 
with higher credit ratings (Elbannan, 2009). 
Second, it was shown that stronger internal control was also associated with higher credit 
ratings. Firms that have greater internal control would be able to make good decisions about 
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managing their operations (Elbannan, 2009). These firms would be different from firms 
that have speculative-grade rating, that are smaller size, and that have lower profitability 
(Elbannan, 2009). As noted, firms that have weak internal control also have “lower cash 
flows from operating activities, net losses in the current and prior fiscal year, higher income 
variability and higher leverage than firms compared to firm with high-quality controls” 
(Elbannan, 2009, p. 127).   
Third, there would be less cost and therefore higher credit ratings associated with a firm,  
where managers take the stewardship approach, because there would be less need for the 
same stringent corporate governance mechanisms that would be required from firms 
viewed under agency theory. 
3.2.2.3 Application of stewardship theory to CG and cost of capital 
First, one would expect that under stewardship theory the cost of capital may be relative ly 
low. This may be the case since the manager in stewardship theory, unlike the manager in 
agency theory, would not be highly prone to investment, but would ensure that all the 
information indicates that it is the right time to invest. Therefore, there would very likely 
be a more conservative approach to investment under stewardship theory, and could lead 
to lower costs of capital and be a higher valuation of the organisation. 
Second, shareholders would also not incur additional costs associated with monitoring the  
organisation, if it is recognised that the organisation is based on a stewardship model. With 
greater trust in their leaders and directors, and realising that the purely selfish aims of the 
agent are missing from the leaders operating under stewardship theory, shareholders would 
not incur as many costs, and directors would see collaborating with the shareholders as 
being useful to achieve lower costs and greater shareholder wealth (Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson, 1997). 
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3.2.3 Resource dependence theory – General discussion of theory 
Resource dependence theory is also based on the relationship between an organisation and 
society. It starts from the assumption that an organisation is not a self-sufficient entity, but 
one that is dependent on resources from the larger societal environment. The organisat io n 
therefore needs to gain access to these resources through exchanges and transactions with 
other entities that possess these resources. Resource dependence theories take the position 
that while organisations are constrained both by situations and their environment, they are 
able to negotiate to gain access to resources (Chen & Roberts, 2010).   
Resource dependence theory holds that boards of directors are important to the functioning 
and performance of an organisation because the expertise and connections with others in 
the outside environment that individual board members have helps the organisation to 
secure resources (Letting et al., 2012; Abdullah & Valentine, 2009). The corporate board 
and outside directors are therefore seen as important for the organisation’s performance. 
Board member diversity and external networks among board members and other 
organisations are important factors in resource dependence theory (Letting et al., 2012). 
Resource dependence theory also shows that boards of directors with “broad and deep 
levels of knowledge” are in an advantageous position to make use of this knowledge in the 
wider external environment. (Judge et al., 2014).  
3.2.3.1 Application of resource dependence theory to CG and risk-taking 
First, from a resource dependency theory perspective, organisations face risks associated  
with obtaining the needed resources, when they lack the skills and knowledge necessary to 
carry out their operations. This theory holds that organisations are constrained by the 
environment especially by their situations, but that they could engage in exchanges and 
transactions that would allow them to overcome these constraints (Chen & Roberts, 2010). 
Organisations obtain these much needed resources in their acquisitions of directors. 
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Second, when organisations fail to acquire knowledgeable directors, their risk-taking 
increases as they lack contact with others in the external environment who have the 
resources or access to needed resources (Aguilera et al. 2004).  
Third, risk-taking is reduced when organisations are able to attract directors from different 
fields and disciplines would find that they are well protected against many of the risks that 
could affect them negatively (Aguilera et al., 2004).  
3.2.3.2 Application of resource dependence theory to CG and credit ratings 
First, based on having a greater pool of knowledge about different aspects of an 
organisation’s operations, boards of directors are better able to steer an organisation in a 
positive direction for better performance. A firm that has this knowledge base would be a 
firm that is able to attract investors and would have a positive credit rating. 
Second, as Elbannan (2009) points out, “Credit ratings are extensively used in financ ing  
and investment decision-making, and therefore affect resource allocation in an economy. 
Ratings impact the firm cost of debt through influencing bond pricing and yield” (p. 128). 
Therefore, using the resource dependency theory allows for determining the ability of a 
firm to be able to access the resources that are necessary to improve the firm’s performance. 
A good firm performance, which would lead to its creditworthiness being expressed in 
positive credit ratings (Elbannan, 2009). 
3.2.3.3 Application of resource dependence theory to CG and cost of capital 
First, organisations that have access to needed resources are better able to carry out their  
operations because they have the knowledge and resources to do so. It can be argued that 
these organisations would very likely have good performance. Good performance would 
be reflected in meeting expectations and being creditworthy. 
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Firms that are creditworthy, i.e. have good credit ratings, would have little difficulty 
attracting investors, and even less difficulty finding sources of capital. The costs for 
accessing those sources of capital would be lower and thus more attractive than for a firm 
with a poor credit rating.  
Second, it is expected that under resource dependence theory good corporate governance  
would contribute to lower costs of capital. Having access to resources means that it would 
cost less than if one did not have access and had to either do without the resources or pay 
a premium for them.   
Third, resource dependence theory could also mean that an organisation could have  
directors as resources that could be called upon to provide assistance when needed. A 
reciprocal relationship could be developed. As Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) point out, 
one of the goals of applying resource dependence theory is to remove uncertainty: “The 
theory’s central proposition is that organisational survival hinges on the ability to produce 
critical resources from the external environment” (p. 167). It is highly practical for 
organisations to form selective relationships where “they bypass the source of constraint 
by reducing the interest in valued resources, cultivating alternative sources of supply, or 
forming coalitions” (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005, p. 167). Using this and other strategies 
would reduce the cost of capital.      
3.2.4 Legitimacy theory – General discussion of theory 
Legitimacy theory is based on examining whether the organisation meets the expectations 
of society. In other words, organisations declare their value systems, and legitimacy theory 
examines whether the values espoused by the organisation are congruent with the values 
of society. However, as pointed out, this theory does not outline specific means for bringing 
about congruency between an organisation’s value system and that of the society in which 
it operates (Chen & Roberts, 2010). Deegan and Bloomquist (2006) explain that 
organisations strive to show that there is congruence between the social values that they 
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hold or try to display and the social values that are established in their society, using the 
Australian mineral industry and the World Wide Fund to illustrate this. Organisations try 
to legitimise themselves by showing that they are socially responsible.  
In describing legitimacy theory, Chen and Roberts (2010) identify institutional legitimacy 
and strategy legitimacy. The former, which also takes in institutional theory, is based on 
the organisation conforming “to the established patterns of other similar social institutions” 
(p. 653). That is, the organisation gains legitimacy because it acts like similar organisations. 
But strategic legitimacy is achieved in terms of resource dependency theory and 
stakeholder theory. In terms of resource dependency theory, legitimacy is achieved in how 
the organisation is able to gain “access to relevant resources” (Chen & Roberts, 2010, p. 
653). In terms of stakeholder theory, legitimacy is achieved when an organisation is able 
to “balance the conflicting demands of various stakeholders” (Chen & Roberts, 2010, p. 
653).  
3.2.4.1 Application of legitimacy theory to CG and risk-taking 
First, corporate governance is therefore concerned with removing the risk of loss of 
legitimacy. In terms of corporate governance, legitimacy must be maintained in the three 
areas mentioned above. The organisation must be able to access needed resources, and 
legitimacy comes when it is able to do so. This means that the organisation must behave in 
a manner that allows it to attract directors and other relations in the larger external 
environment that would ensure that it is able to carry out necessary exchanges and  
transactions. Risk involves behaving in ways that prevent this. Similarly, the organisat ion 
must be perceived to represent the interests of all of its stakeholders. Failure to do this 
causes the organisation to risk losing its legitimacy.   
Second, organisations recognise that there are certain general ideas that society considers  
appropriate and expects. When organisations do otherwise, they run the risk of alienat ing 
members of society. For example, corporations are expected to be good corporate citizens , 
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and so they try to promote that image. This is why corporate social responsibility is such 
an important concept. As pointed out, “Board members and managers may clearly consider 
multiple constituents when making decisions, so acting to promote the wellbeing of society 
is consistent with the dictates of good corporate governance in these countries” (Devinney, 
Schwalbach, & Williams, 2013, p. 414). 
Third, companies that do not live up to social expectations run the risk of losing the favour  
and support of members of society, many of whom are their customers, suppliers, 
employees and other stakeholders. Deegan and Bloomquist (2006) explain that 
organisations strive to show that they hold the same values as the society in which they 
operate, and these authors illustrate this by pointing to the Australian mineral industry and 
the World Wide Fund to show how both of these have demonstrated their interest in 
protecting the environment.  
In these ways, organisations strike to be socially responsible, so as to legitimise themselves, 
hold on to customers, not alienate the society, but gain the support of the society, if they 
are to reduce their risk-taking. 
3.2.4.2 Application of legitimacy theory to CG and credit ratings 
First, an organisation that loses its legitimacy runs the risk of having lower credit ratings.  
This would happen because it would not behave in socially expected ways, would be unable 
to attract necessary resources and so would be unable to carry out its operations in a manner 
that allows it to achieve expected levels of performance. If an organisation is seen as not 
meeting and balancing the needs of its stakeholders, it would earn a reputation for having 
weak internal control. As mentioned before, “corporate governance strength is positive ly 
related to internal control quality” (Elbannan, 2009, p. 127), but corporate governance is 
also associated with better credit ratings (Elbannan, 2009).  
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Second, good corporate governance is seen as important to maintaining good credit ratings.  
Organisations that show themselves as having legitimacy behave as expected, are good 
corporate citizens and have a reputation for meeting the needs of all their stakeholders. As 
mentioned above, these organisations can balance stakeholders’ needs, showing that they 
are considered legitimate not only by shareholders, but also by employees, customers and 
other stakeholders. For example, this type of organisation is not likely to have labour 
disputes which could present a major operational risk. 
These considerations make legitimacy theory important in considering credit ratings; an 
organisation that is able to gain the support of its stakeholders and that can live up to its 
reputation of being a good corporate citizen will face fewer risks and enjoy good ratings 
from investors, credit agencies and other users of the organisation.  
3.2.4.3 Application of legitimacy theory to CG and cost of capital 
First, legitimacy theory applied to corporate governance would lead to lower cost of capital,  
and this is based on the application of corporate governance to stakeholder theory, resource 
dependence theory and institutional theory. The factors that have led to lower costs of 
capital in all of these theories also apply to legitimacy theory, since all of these theories 
contribute to legitimacy theory. With corporate governance, when organisations behave in 
ways that are socially accepted, when organisations are able to attract resources, and when 
they are able to meet the needs of all of their stakeholders and not just some, then they are 
seen as gaining legitimacy, which translate into higher valuation and lower costs of capital 
(Elbannan, 2009).  
Second, an organisation that has legitimacy would be able to attract skilled workers and  
well-connected managers and directors, and would be respected. It would follow that the 
cost of this legitimacy would be low, because the company would have the reputation of 
behaving in socially expected ways. 
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Third, in some cases, gaining legitimacy would mean that an organisation has to incur costs  
for programmes. For example, an organisation may want to gain legitimacy by showing 
concern for the environment, and so would undertake some programmes that suggest it is 
environmentally friendly. However, in the long run, the cost to build that legitimacy would 
be more than repaid through the goodwill that would emerge as a result of the 
organisation’s legitimacy in this area. Shareholders can play an important role in 
supporting the corporate social responsibility programmes that their organisations are 
involved in (Devinney et al., 2013). 
3.2.5 Institutional theory– General discussion of theory 
Institutional theory also looks at the relationship between organisations and the societal 
environment in which they exist. More specifically, institutional theory examines the 
stability and survival of the organisation, and highlights institutional norms and rules that 
the organisation can incorporate in order to promote its longevity (Chen & Roberts, 2010). 
The link between legitimacy theory and institutional theory can be appreciated by 
recognising that when an organisation adopts institutional norms and rules and experiences 
longevity, it is seen as gaining legitimacy within its society. 
Westphal and Zajac (2014) point to macro and micro levels of analysis, and show how 
these are linked through the behaviour of individual organisation elites, which occur “not 
in a social vacuum, but rather in a socially situated context and by individuals whose 
interpretation of the context is itself socially constructed or constituted” (p. 608). In other 
words, organisation leaders are influenced by the social relationships, networks and 
institutions in which they operate, and their behaviour is influenced by their experience 
and socialisation. Therefore, leaders of elite organisations tend to be influenced by their 
social interaction. For example, these authors point out that through ingratiation, social 
influence is wielded. Also, managers and directors can engage in ingratiatory behaviour 
towards their peers, and this could cause their peers to support the recommendations made 
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by these managers and directors. But this is seen as weakening corporate governance, for 
as these authors maintain, for this could weaken board independence and compensation 
paid to directors (Westphal & Zajac, 2014, p. 611). It was also shown that leaders may 
distance themselves from other leaders that violate existing norms of corporate governance; 
for example, supporting measures to increase the independence of the board from 
management, or dismissing the CEO (Westphal & Zajac, 2014). Leaders that are distanced 
are often excluded from informal gatherings, while their advice is solicited less frequently, 
and they may be actually ostracised (Westphal & Zajac, 2014).   
In this way, one can see that values, norms and rules of an organisation and institutiona l 
changes that are carried out are greatly influenced by leaders and directors of an 
organisation. Through their socially situated and socially constituted behaviour, they have 
the means to influence changes in an organisation. Westphal and Zajac (2014) point out 
that normative views about corporate governance in the financial community, that is, the 
institutional norms and rules governing organisations, are based on “agency logic of 
governance’ (p. 634). 
3.2.5.1 Application of institutional theory to CG and risk-taking 
First, institutional theory shows how managers and directors exert influence on their  
subordinates, peers and even journalists, and this could expose institutional weaknesses. 
Using the “agency logic of governance”, these managers and directors would take measures 
that would reduce their agency cost and promote their self-interest instead of the interests 
of shareholders (Westphal & Zajac, 2014).  For example, as these authors point out, if there 
was a negative appraisal of a company’s performance by security analysts, management 
would appear to follow agency prescriptions of formally increasing the independence of 
the board from management, but in effect “without increasing the board’s social 
independence” (Westphal & Zajac, 2014, p. 635). Another example would be appointing 
board directors that were friends of the CEO (Westphal & Zajac, 2014). In such a situation, 
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the risk-taking on the part of shareholders would be great, if corporate governance was co-
opted through the use of social influence.   
Second, great risk could result when professionals accept each other’s ideas without  
questioning them, because of peer influence. For example, Westphal and Zajac (2014) 
highlight the risk-taking that is involved by pointing to the Parmalat scandal in which 
members of the financial community accepted  reports, presentations and press releases 
because of “institutional ascription” or because these professionals who were 
interconnected probably through boards, simply accepted each other’s words as truth (p. 
638).  
Third, there is risk-taking that could lead to shareholder wealth being compromised. For 
example, if certain norms and rules continued in an institution because certain directors or 
leaders benefited from them, it is unlikely that they would want to change things. The 
wealth portfolios of some leaders and directors could influence risk-taking (Wright, Ferris, 
Sarin & Awasthi, 1996). Those that dare to go against these rules could be ostracised. 
Fourth, but even as some executives and directors are striving to bring about changes that  
would genuinely improve institutional norms and rules, they are faced with “conformity 
pressures in rendering judgements about the effects of organisationa l policy adoptions, and 
their judgements are vulnerable to social psychological biases” (Westphal & Zajac, 2014, 
p. 649). These executives and directors are also still influenced by how other analysts feel 
about the possible changes. Therefore, there is great risk-taking in applying institutiona l 
theory. 
3.2.5.2 Application of institutional theory to CG and credit ratings 
First, institutional theory can be seen as related to corporate governance and credit ratings  
in that the norms that exist in particular countries have an impact on the ability of 
organisations to obtain credit. As Elbannan (2009) notes, credit rating determines to a great 
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extent the “cost of debt capital, capital structure, and hence the range of acceptable 
investment opportunities” (p. 127). Some researchers believe that “credit ratings may be 
affected by internal governance mechanisms instituted by firms and that the quality of 
internal controls is a potential driver of cost of equity capital” (Elbannan, 2009, p. 127). 
Second, it is on this basis that it has been argued that firms with low-quality interna l 
controls generally have low credit ratings. It can be argued that many firms in emerging 
markets are more likely to have low credit ratings because they operate in an environment 
where it is common practice not to have many of these internal controls. But it is also 
possible that some firms may try to improve their credit ratings by undertaking measures 
that are not part of their country’s law or code (Klapper, Laeven & Love, 2006). 
Third, some countries operate without strict corporate governance mechanisms, and it is 
unlikely that firms operating in these countries would have these mechanisms. This would 
contribute to firms having low credit worthiness and therefore low credit rating. 
Fourth, macro institutional framework must be present to support the corporate governance  
measures that a firm could institute. When countries have the proper institutiona l 
framework, firms must focus on having strong internal controls, for these controls can 
cause greater attraction to investors (Elbannan, 2009). Where countries have good 
institutional framework, firms are likely to have good credit ratings. 
3.2.5.3 Application of institutional theory to CG and cost of capital 
First, the institutions that exist in different countries, and the norms and rules that are 
socially accepted, play a role in determining the actions organisations will take to conform 
to the norm. In the case of some emerging markets, such as Brazil, the nature of corporate 
governance that is used and that positively affects firm performance is different from 
corporate governance that is often held as bringing results in the many developed countries. 
For example, in their findings, Black et al. (2012) find that board independence is 
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negatively associated with market value in Brazil and Turkey. With the level of self-dealing 
seen as a common practice in Brazil, for example, outside shareholders may be seen as 
calling for more outside directors to cut down on this practice (Black et al., 2012, p. 22).  
This will contribute to higher cost of capital in this environment. 
Second, where there is strong corporate governance that is widely accepted, for example,  
independence of directors, there would be greater valuation attributed to capital that is 
invested in these countries. Also, the cost of getting capital would be greater because of 
the perception that there is risk associated with the investment, but also because certain 
governance mechanisms that are associated with good performance may not be in place. 
Borrowing funds would also be more expensive for these same reasons. Therefore, the cost 
of capital would be greater for these countries that do not have certain institutions that are 
commonly associated by global investors with strong corporate governance. 
3.3 Summary 
This chapter has discussed agency theory, considering both shareholder and stakeholder 
perspectives; stewardship theory; resource dependence theory; legitimacy theory; and 
institutional theory. These theories define the relationships between the different 
stakeholders within organisations, as well as the relations between organisations and the 
societies in which they operate. Ultimately, these theories aim to show how corporate 
governance mechanisms are connected to organisational performance. 
Section 3.2.1 describes agency theory and this description is further broken down to show 
how it relates to corporate governance in terms of risk, credit rating and cost of capital in 
subsections 3.2.1.1, 3.2.1.2, and 3.2.1.3. Similarly, Section 3.2.2 deals with stewardship 
theory, showing how it relates to corporate governance in terms of risk, credit rating and 
cost of capital in similar subsections. Section 3.2.3 and its subsections describe resource 
dependence theory and how these relate to risk, credit rating and cost of capital. Section 
3.2.4 examines legitimacy theory and Section 3.2.5 describes institutional theory. Both of 
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these sections are further broken down into subsections, which go into detail as to how 
these relate to corporate governance in terms of risk, credit rating and cost of capital. 
This chapter also discussed these theories in terms of risk-taking, credit rating and cost of 
capital. While corporate governance has been associated with good firm or organisationa l 
performance using agency theory, it has been shown that not all organisations demonstrate 
good performance based on agency theory. Agency theory from the shareholding 
perspective is associated with less risk, higher credit rating and lower cost of capital. 
Agency theory from the stakeholding perspective shows more risk, lower credit rating and 
higher cost of capital. Stewardship theory, which has different assumptions from agency 
theory, was also seen to work in some settings. For the most part, stewardship theory is 
associated with less risk-taking, higher credit rating and lower cost of capital. Resource 
dependency theory is seen to work for the most part where organisations are able to have 
good relations with its external environment, with institutional and legitimacy theories also 
showing the importance of organisations interacting well with their environment. Lower 
risk-taking, higher credit rating and lower cost of capital is associated with firms that take 
advantage of this perspective. Legitimacy theory is associated with less risk-taking, higher 
credit rating and lower cost of capital. On the other hand, institutional theory was 
associated for the most part with more risk-taking, lower credit rating, and higher cost of 
capital, although this was dependent on the both country and firm norms. 
All of these theories are shown to be highly related, and using one approach may not yield 
the depth of knowledge necessary. It is for this reason that Chen and Roberts (2010) point 
out that their discussion of the theories may be seen as “demonstrating the possibility of 
incorporating several theories to obtain a more coherent and complete understanding of an 
organisation’s relationship to society,” but their discussion may also reveal “the usefulness 
of investigating a particular social occurrence through more than one theoretical point of 
view” (p. 662). 
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It is important to recognise that all organisations cannot be viewed through the same lens, 
and therefore cannot use the same approach to introducing corporate governance. The 
rationale for this thinking is supplied by “substantial evidence that one size does not always 
fit all firms in all countries” (Black, Carvalho, & Gorga, 2010, p. 2).  
Several factors must be considered with respect to organisations. Country characterist ics, 
firm size and ownership structure, and corporate governance characteristics, includ ing 
board structure, all come into play in explaining the particular theory or theories that may 
be used. Also to be considered are the nature of social relations among managers and 
directors, and the influence this has on the behaviour of these individuals. In short, several 
factors come into play in determining the performance of a firm. Consequently, it is clear 
that no single corporate governance theory can be used to give a complete picture of the 
performance of an organisation. The following chapters show the applicability of these 
different theories to explain the corporate governance mechanisms on risk-taking, credit 
rating and cost of capital across different countries. 
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Chapter 4: Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Risk-Taking, Credit 
Ratings and Cost of Capital: Empirical Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Development 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance, or the rules and practices that a firm uses to direct its operations, is 
important as it indicates to its stakeholders the responsibility and legitimacy of the firm. 
Individuals, organisations, investors and other stakeholders, choosing to do business with 
a firm, can tell from the firm’s corporate governance structure how well management is 
committed to keeping their investments and other interests safe over time. This chapter 
outlines and discusses the corporate governance mechanisms, which are important 
measures that can be used to determine how well a company is being managed, and can 
serve as indicators to individuals, organisations, investors and other stakeholders whether 
their involvement in the firm is sound. From the perspective of the firm, corporate 
governance is therefore seen as the means to inspire investor confidence, as well as promote 
growth and from the perspective of the stakeholder, as a means of identifying good 
management. This chapter identifies the corporate governance mechanisms that will be 
used in this study, namely, corporate governance index, ownership structure and board 
structure. Each of these corporate governance mechanisms would be assessed in terms of 
how they have an impact on firm performance.  
Section 4.2 discusses Corporate Governance Index (CGI) and its impact on risk-taking, 
credit ratings and cost of capital. Section 4.3 discusses ownership structure variables, 
including block ownership, institutional ownership, and director ownership, and their 
impact on risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of capital. Section 4.4 deals with board 
structure variables, including board size, independent directors, board diversity and 
frequency of board meetings, and their impact on risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of 
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capital, while Section 4.5 provides a chapter summary. The objective of this study is to 
show how corporate governance as represented in these different variables have an impact 
on risk-taking, credit ratings, and cost of capital.  
4.2 The corporate governance index and risk- taking, credit ratings and cost of 
capital 
4.2.1 CGI and risk-taking 
Corporate governance, both internal and external, is therefore important to the success of 
organisations, as investors and other stakeholders consider the quality of management that 
a firm has in securing stakeholder interest (World Bank, 1999). According to the World 
Bank (1999), the board of directors could achieve good internal governance and could 
safeguard the interests of shareholders by monitoring the behaviour of management. 
Accountants, investment bankers, suppliers of credit, suppliers of materials, and other 
stakeholders, could also provide effective external governance by monitoring what the 
management of an organisation is doing, and thereby influencing the behaviour of 
management (World Bank, 1999). Therefore, careful attention to corporate governance is  
a high priority for firms that want to attract more investors, as corporate governance 
mechanisms are the indicators to stakeholders that their interests are being given the 
required attention by management. 
Risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of borrowing money are all issues that are important to 
management. Management behaviour would therefore be influenced by actions taken by 
external organisations which might impact the organisation’s risk, credit and ability to 
borrow money at attractive rates. Management behaviour would also be influenced by how 
the actions of these external organisations would affect management’s well-being and 
position in the organisation. Therefore, management would be concerned with both interna l 
and external governance, as its agency role is being scrutinised both internally and 
externally. Therefore, management would consider what characteristics its organisat ion 
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should have in order to elicit favourable actions in terms of risk-taking, credit ratings and 
cost of borrowing money. 
Elbannan’s (2009) research suggests that organisations that receive investment ratings are 
generally organisations with good external corporate governance. This research also 
suggests that when an organisation has poor internal governance, it is also likely not to 
receive an investment ratings, which would lead to higher costs for capital (Elbannan, 
2009). These are facts that management takes seriously, as it reflects how it manages the 
organisation. Elbannan (2009) discovered that organisations with a speculative ratings 
were generally smaller organisations, with low productivity, lower income and higher 
leverage. They were not attractive to capital investors (Elbannan, 2009). This would mean 
that organisations with poor external and internal governance would be seen as having 
higher risk, lower credit ratings and higher costs of borrowing, if they were able to attract 
some capital.  
Management, in its agency role, would strive to improve its external corporate governance, 
so as to receive a higher credit ratings. The rationale for this would be to increase the 
organisation’s credit ratings and so be more likely to have doing this would be more 
desirable to capital investment.  
The theoretical underpinning to hypothesis H1a is based on agency theory that shows that 
corporate governance is essential to promoting the interests of the shareholders, and when 
this governance is missing, it can be expected that there is greater risk to the shareholders 
and to the long term success of the company. According to Sternberg (1997), strong 
monitoring on the part of the board is the result of strong independence. Strong 
independence of the board, a characteristic of agency theory, shows that management 
cannot have its way and pursue its own interest to the detriment of shareholders. Therefore, 
a strong board looks after the interests of the shareholders, and controls risk-taking on the 
part of management. Stewardship theory also applies here because it shows that managers 
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serve an important function, namely, that of protecting the interests of the employees and 
other stakeholders. Therefore, these two theories can be seen as underlying the relationship 
between CGI and risk taking. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.’s (2004) research shows that organisations that were able to 
improve their governance structure over the period studied were also able to lower their 
cost of borrowing. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Easterbrook and Romano 
(1993) and Jensen (1993), studying the corporate governance mechanisms, arrived at 
divergent opinions on the subject.  
The structure and mechanisms of corporate governance have attracted the attention of 
researchers. Ntim et al. (2013) examine how corporate governance is implicated in 
corporate risk disclosure and find there was no significant difference in risk disclosure 
behaviour by corporations during the 2007-2008 period that was noticeably different from 
their behaviour before and after this period. In other words, there was disagreement as to 
whether improving corporate governance really impacted corporate performance. 
The OECD (1999), in its Principles of Corporate Governance, was guided by the 
experiences of national initiatives of member countries. The outstanding work of the 
Cadbury Report, developed in the U.K., contributed principles that became reference points 
and international benchmarks that other OECD members could emulate. The typical 
approach used to promote corporate governance involved analysing each corporate 
governance mechanism to see what contribution it made to the achievement of governance.  
Then, it was thought that the use of a corporate governance index would be an improvement 
over the previous format of looking at each corporate governance mechanism used. A 
corporate governance index (CGI) suggests that a better approach to measuring corporate 
governance is not to use individual corporate mechanisms, but rather to use a 
comprehensive structure of provisions of corporate governance codes. The rationale for 
using these codes is to determine how viable corporate governance is with respect to risk-
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taking, credit ratings and cost of capital. The effectiveness of a corporate governance code 
depends on political, legal and cultural factors. This is the case because countries like the 
U.S. and the U.K. differ on many of these dimensions (Scheifer and Vishny, 1997; Batten, 
2001; Licht, 2001; Roe, 2003; Licht, 2004; Prentice and Spence, 2006; Holm, and Zaman, 
2012). 
In their comprehensive study of corporate governance, Gompers et al. (2003) construct a 
Governance Index (G-Index) covering the level of shareholder rights for 1,500 U.S. firms 
during the 1990s. This G-Index was constructed with 24 provisions related to takeover 
defences and share shareholder rights. The findings reveal that organisations considered 
more democratic were evident from their stronger shareholder rights and higher firm value 
(Gompers et al., 2003). These firms were also more likely to have lower expenditures and 
fewer acquisitions (Gompers et al., 2003). Additionally, Gompers et al. (2004) reveal that 
these firms showed a positive and statistically significant relationship between Corporate 
Governance Index (G-Index) scores and stock returns. Gompers et al. (2003) posit that 
where shareholders’ rights are weak and where democracy is lacking, agency conflicts 
occur, and these conflicts in turn lead over time to weak firm value. The G-Index is 
therefore viable to measure the quality of corporate governance of U.S. firms. The G-Index 
is widely accepted as a good way of measuring the quality of corporate governance in U.S. 
organisations. Various studies have been carried out using the G-Index. 
However, corporate governance mechanisms and structure have been found to differ fro m 
country to country (Aguilera and Cuervo Cazurra, 2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). As 
well, country-specific factors were seen to determine corporate governance mechanisms to 
a great extent (Renders and Gaeremynck, 2006). Bauer et al. (2004) have been criticised 
for not considering corporate governance mechanisms in this light (Renders and 
Gaeremynck, 2006).  
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Consequently, it was found that standard corporate governance ratings, such as the ratings 
of Deminor were deficient in that they did not accurately represent legal systems, 
regulations or cultural and other differences in the corporate governance mechanisms used 
in different countries. The suggestion to be taken into consideration is that standard ratings 
are incapable of showing how provisions of corporate governance codes impact on 
corporate governance in different countries. 
Botosan (1997) discovered that cross-country studies generally had a simple bias, as the 
companies used were generally ranked by analysts. (Botosan, 1997) This usually provides 
a bias in favour of larger companies. This means that smaller companies were often 
excluded from cross-country studies on corporate governance.  
However, given the corporate governance index evidence, both the null and alternate 
hypotheses are tested. Therefore, the respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study 
is: 
H1a: There is no statistically significant relationship between corporate 
governance index and risk-taking. 
4.2.2 CGI and credit ratings 
Basically, the objective here is to determine whether a firm’s corporate governance has any 
bearing on its credit ratings, and whether a firm can achieve investment-grade ratings by 
improving its corporate governance. It was precisely this task that Alali et al. (2012) 
undertook in their study on corporate governance in organisations in the United States. 
Researchers maintained that a firm’s credit rating is affected by the level of corporate 
governance that the firm displays (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Alali et al., 2012). When 
firms improved their corporate governance, this led to improvement in their investment 
grading (Alali et al., 2012). This study also revealed that when corporate governance 
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improved in smaller firms, the improvement in investment was greater than in larger firms 
(Alali et al., 2012).  
The theories that are relevant to hypothesis H1b are legitimacy theory, institutional theory 
and agency theory. In looking at the relationship between corporate governance and credit 
rating, or between CGI and credit rating, Chen and Roberts (2010) sees the legitimacy of 
the company is important as it shows the social values that the organisation supports. 
Legitimacy theory is also important in credit rating and corporate governance index, 
because it deals with the safety and welfare of the employees, environmental issues, 
employees’ pension plans, and has to show that it affects the values of the company. But 
Chen and Roberts (2010) also points to a link between legitimacy theory and institutiona l 
theory, for the reason that the company is seen as legitimate is because it has adopted the 
institutional forms. The CGI shows that the company is legitimate and has the right 
institutions in place (Chen & Roberts, 2010). Agency theory applies to the relationship 
between the owners and shareholders, and to the fact that corporate governance index and 
credit rating are positively related with the interests of the shareholders being given greater 
protection with good corporate governance. Agency theory is also relevant in showing the 
relationship between CGI and credit rating as corporate insiders are seen as agents, and 
their interests, according to agency theory, does not align with the interests of the other 
shareholders. 
Better corporate governance was also found to be related to higher bond ratings, which led 
to the conclusion that with this being the case, then it would follow that the level of 
corporate governance in a firm should have an impact on how the likelihood of default 
would be assessed (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). This, in turn, would ultimately have a 
bearing on the credit ratings that a firm would be given. According to Matthies (2013), 
despite the fact that credit ratings agencies claim that their ratings are merely opinions and 
not intended to serve as recommendations for buying, selling or holding, these opinions 
are taken seriously, in part because credit ratings agencies consider the default probability 
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of a firm in pronouncing their opinions (Matthies, 2013). According to Bo, Lensink and 
Murinde (2009), credit rating agencies look at the overall creditworthiness or default risk 
of a firm. Consequently, credit ratings are found to correlate negatively with future default 
rates. It follows that a firm with a higher credit rating is less likely to default than a firm 
with a lower credit rating (Matthies, 2013; Bo et al., 2009). Therefore, external lenders are 
more attracted to firms with high credit ratings. 
In assessing the impact of corporate governance on credit ratings, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2006) use four elements to represent corporate governance. These elements are the G-
Index; the type of ownership structure of a firm; the degree of financial transparency; and 
the board’s structure and processes of decision-making used in the organisat ion 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). They find that firms with high performance, good cash 
flow and board independence from management had higher credit ratings (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2006). However, it was found that firms with large numbers of block holders, 
where CEO power was excessive and where stockholder rights were strong, tended to have 
lower credit ratings. 
John, Litov and Yeung (2008) show that corporate insiders’ power has an impact on 
investment risk. This was based on the premise that corporate insiders could use the 
resources of the corporation to promote their self-interest, thereby threatening the firm’s 
ability to maximise value (John et al., 2008). These authors contend that any situation that 
presents dominant insiders demonstrates a high positive correlation between corporate risk-
taking and investor protection, and the more protected investors are, the more likely a firm 
to receive a higher credit rating (John et al., 2008). 
Given the corporate governance index evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are 
tested. Therefore, the respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
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H1b: There is no statistically significant relationship between the corporate 
governance index and credit ratings. 
4.2.3 CGI and cost of capital 
The relationship between the cost of capital and CGI is dependent on resource theory, 
which shows that members of the board are important for securing resources. According 
to Abdullah & Valentine (2009), resource theory would apply because as it shows that cost 
of capital would be lower because of corporate governance. The questions that are asked 
are whether the company gives training to directors, but also whether the relationships 
between the directors constitute resources that are important to the success of the company. 
Chen and Roberts (2010) sees the board as serving an important function as it provides for 
greater relationships between directors and the community, and in this away allows for 
resources to flow from the community to the company. In this way, cost of capital is 
decreased because of the availability of resources made possible thought greater corporate 
governance.  
To examine the impact of corporate governance index on cost of capital, Arcot and Bruno 
(2007) built a corporate governance index based on eight provisions of the corporate 
governance code, using a sample of 245 U.K. non-financial firms in the FTSE 350 index 
from 1988 to 2003. They examine corporate performance, measured in terms of return on 
assets, and find that firms that shifted from compliance with the combined code 
outperformed others. Arcot and Bruno (2007) argue that superior performance is not 
guaranteed by merely adhering to generally accepted compliance with good corporate 
governance. 
Al-Malkawi, Pillai and Bhatti (2014) developed an un-weighted corporate governance 
index for use with non-financial firms and applied it to firms listed in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries. The index used thirty attributes covered under governance 
attributes, including disclosure, board effectiveness and shareholder rights. Using listings 
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on the stock exchange as evidence of good performance, these researchers found that 
companies that adhered to at least 69% of the corporate governance attributes tended to 
perform best (Al-Malkawi et al., 2014). These researchers suggest adherence to corporate 
governance leads to superior performance (Al-Malkawi et al., 2014). 
Griffin, Kwok, Guedhami, Li and Shao (2013) construct an index of governance attributes 
using the database Governance Metrics International (GMI), using transparent disclosure, 
minority shareholder protection and corporate policy as proxies for corporate governance. 
Using the research on 4,500 firms in 50 countries covering the period between 2006 and 
2011, Griffin et al. (2013) discovered a positive relationship between adherence to 
corporate governance principles and firm performance.  
Given the corporate governance index evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are 
tested. The respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H1c: There is no statistically significant relationship between the corporate 
governance index and cost of capital. 
4.3 Ownership structure variable and risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of 
capital 
4.3.1 Introduction 
In this section, ownership structure is discussed in terms of risk-taking, credit ratings and 
cost of capital. The objective is to see how different types of ownership are implicated in 
risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of capital. The ownership types that are discussed are 
block ownership, institutional ownership and director ownership. We show how much risk-
taking is involved in each of these ownership types, and how credit ratings and cost of 
capital are affected by block and institutional ownership.   
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Ownership structure was another element that was used to represent governance structure. 
Conflicts have often occurred in large publicly owned firms between the interests of 
stockholders and those of professional managers (Chen et al., 2009; Tran, 2014), based on 
agency theory. These conflicts emerge as stockholders want to maximise the profit of the 
firm over the long term, while also safeguarding their investments. On the other hand, 
managers want to ensure that they are managing the firm’s business so as to ensure job 
security and the prestige of the firm, but they also want to increase their personal wealth. 
These two goals are usually at odds, as agency theory explains, because of the separation 
of ownership and control in these firms. The difference between the objectives of managers 
and those of stockholders leads to conflicts about the strategic direction that the 
organisation should take (Hail and Leuz, 2006).  
Decision-making in strategic direction is usually the area where these conflicts occur, with 
R&D as the area of primary concern (Hail and Leuz, 2006). Stock holders often find a high-
risk-high-return strategy attractive, because of its potentially positive effect on firm 
performance, and how it allows for reduced inherent risk through diversified investment 
portfolios (Lee and O’Neill, 2003). However, executives are likely to oppose this approach, 
because there are often high failure rates with innovative programs; such failure might be 
attributed to them, and these projects do not yield short-term returns (Lee and O’Neill, 
20003). It is also likely that managers could work on long-term projects but leave the 
company before reaping the rewards. Therefore, projects that yield short-term results are 
usually more likely to be supported by executives. 
4.3.2 Block ownership and risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of capital 
4.3.2.1 Block ownership and risk-taking 
Investors with over 5% equity in a firm are defined by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as block holders, because they may have large blocks of stocks in their 
portfolios (Barclay and Holderness, 1989). Having large block ownership in a firm 
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provides outsiders with concentrated control over management as well as private benefits. 
Block holders also have the privilege of using their size and power to obtain benefits that 
smaller investors do not have. For example, Barclay and Holderness (1989) discovered that 
block holders were able to purchase shares at premium prices over subsequent purchases 
by smaller investors. This practice causes firms to take precautions and repurchase stock 
that was priced above market price through transactions carried out by a dissident block 
holder. Some firms use this strategy to prevent a threat of takeover or to discourage a proxy 
fights by block holders (Kosnik, 1990). 
Distinguishing between individual block holders and institutional investors is important, 
as individual block holders are not accountable to any particular client group. However, 
individual large block holders are often directors or officers of the firm (Holderness, 2003). 
Although there are notable differences between individual block holders and institutiona l 
investors, empirical research often ignores the differences, despite potential ramificat ions 
(Mehran, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Block holders could also be enterprises when 
they acquire a minority share of another firm, but this is usually not an accidental 
occurrence. It is often a well-calculated strategy that precedes a takeover bid or that may 
anticipate the impending sale of a firm. 
In the relationship between block ownership and risk taking, Barclay and Holdernees 
(1989) shows that block ownership allows for a group of shareholders to have contorl over 
the company, because they would be in a position to be the majority owenrs and could put 
pressiure on management to receive beneifts that the small shareholders would not be able 
to access. This would also have a negative impact on the firm performance, since the block 
owners would be looking out for their own intersts at the expense of others. Block 
ownership would also allow these owners to purchase shares at premium prices, again to 
their own benefit and in their interests (Barclays and Holderness, 1989). This runs counter 
to the interests of the shareholders as a group, and according to Mehran (1995) and Shleofer 
and Vishny (1997) could allow other companies to purchase shares, therefore putting them 
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in a position where they could take over the existing company. Therefore, agency theory 
could be used to show how block ownership could increase risk taking. Stewardship theory 
could also be invoked here, as block ownership shows that the company does not have 
protection for its assets. 
However, while these are general principles that affect block holders’ influence over firm 
performance, the country in which the firm is located is of great significance. A country’s 
legal system is important in influencing the nature of firm ownership of a firm and the 
governance structure used (Mallin et al., 2010). As highlighted by Mallin et al. (2010), 
countries with common law legal frameworks provide greater protection for their minor ity 
shareholders than countries where civil law regimes exist. 
Shareholders therefore consider a country’s legal system when deciding whether the firm 
they are contemplating investing in is a good choice. Shareholders are motivated to invest 
in countries where there is better shareholder protection, as this results in much capital 
being invested in the country. Countries like Germany, with legal systems based on civil 
law, offer less protection for minority shareholders. This leads to large institutiona l 
investors or family ownership being the major investors in these firms (Bebchuk, 1999). 
The rationale for this trend in countries like Germany is that large investors are provided 
with adequate protection. Potential minority investors would see countries with legal 
systems based on civil law as unattractive, since their rights would not be adequately 
protected. Therefore, as Honore, Munari and de La Potterie (2015) maintain, it is in the 
interest of shareholders to promote corporate governance. The rationale here is that when 
managers are given incentives to engage in R&D, this is in the interest of shareholders, 
particularly minority investors who, through information asymmetry, may not know what 
management is doing (Honore et al., 2015). Agency theory dictates that R&D is a means 
of protecting minority shareholders’ interests. 
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However, it is important to point out that ownership by block holders could have either a 
beneficial or a detrimental effect on the overall performance of the firm. If block holders 
have large equity holdings, this would motivate and empower them to monitor the 
behaviour of management (Jensen, 1993). This would be advantageous to the long- term 
performance of the firm, as these large block holders would ensure that management does 
not steer the company in a strategic direction that does not maximise the performance of 
the firm. 
However, it was found that block ownership could have a negative impact on credit risk, 
as such ownership may imperil minority shareholders and increase the risk-taking of the 
firm (Switzer and Wang, 2013). But it was also found that large block holders also 
increased the firm’s credit risk, because large block holders may have the incentive as well 
as the power to influence management to follow their instructions, and so could extract 
benefits for these block holders. It is also possible for collusion to take place between 
management and large block holders, which would be detrimenta l to minority shareholders. 
On these grounds, credit rating agencies would see the possible influence of large block 
holders as a potential risk for the firm (Switzer and Wang, 2013). 
Given the evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. The respective null 
hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H2a: There is no statistically significant relationship between block ownership and 
risk-taking. 
4.3.2.2 Block ownership and credit ratings 
Block holders are seen as having the potential to negatively impact a firm’s credit rating, 
but small block holders may be thought of as not having the potential for affecting credit 
ratings to any great extent. However, according to Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), the 
number of block holders that owned at least 5% ownership in a firm was negative ly 
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associated with the overall credit ratings of a firm. One possible reason for this is that 
several small block holders could easily join forces and be considered the equivalent of a 
large block holder group. It was also revealed that lower credit ratings were positive ly 
associated with weaker shareholder rights in terms of takeovers by block holders. The 
theories that can be applied here are stewardship theory and agency theory, for good 
governance is expected to show the shaeholders being protected, and to good governance 
preventing the CEO and management form promoting their interests and not those of the 
shareholders. 
The quality of working capital accruals and the timeliness of earnings were also shown to 
be positively associated with credit ratings. Board independence, ownership of stock by 
board members and board expertise were all seen to have possible associations with firm 
governance and credit ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). However, the level of CEO 
power on the board was associated with negative credit ratings. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2006) found that when a firm moves up on the governance scale, it doubles its probability 
of receiving an investment-grade credit ratings. 
Block holders also present risk based on asymmetry problems when corporate governance 
principles are not followed. Agency theory shows that the separation of ownership and 
control brings to the fore the principal-agent problem. Block holders violate this theory, as 
they represent their interests at the expense of minor shareholders. As Matthies et al. (2013) 
observe, agency risk and information risk result, thereby weakening violating governance 
and having a negative impact on credit rating.  
Given the evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. The respective null 
hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H2b: There is no statistically significant relationship between block ownership and 
credit ratings. 
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4.3.2.3 Block ownership and cost of capital 
The theories that explain the relation between board diversity and cost of capital are agency 
and resource dependence theories. Block ownership is seen as having a negative impact on 
cost of capital. According to Tran (2014), blockholders are also founding families that have 
control over the company, for they are in the position where they could terminate 
management. Blockholders could also hold information and not disclose it in a timely 
fashion to shareholders (Ntim et al., 2014). Therefeore, investors are more likely to see 
these companies as being risky and so are less likely to invest in these companies. This 
means that the cost of capital for these firms would be higher than for other companies, 
because investors believe that the risks are higher. According to Shleiger et al. (1997), this 
can have the effect of pushing agency costs up. Agency theory could apply here, since this 
is a case where management has control and would protect their interests rather than the 
interests of shareholders. Resource dependence theory is also applicable in explaining the 
relationship between block ownership and cost of capital, as block owners are seen as 
having resources that could be available to the companies. 
Tran (2014) investigates the extent to which corporate governance could have an effect on 
the cost of debt capital, the capital that a company gets through loans, and equity capital, 
the money that a company invests. Studying the cost of borrowing and the cost of capital 
companies invest in firms listed on the German exchange, Tran (2014) discovered that 
when block holders within the firm are other firms’ managers or founding- family members, 
they are less likely to invest their own capital. This may be related to the fact that block 
ownership is perceived as a credit risk and therefore a threat to the creditworthiness of the 
firm. In their study of block ownership in firms, Ntim et al. (2013) discovered that firms 
that had an increase in block ownership tended to reduce their voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance. This may possibly be because these owners wanted more up-to-date 
information on the performance of their block ownership and so substituted block 
ownership disclosure for corporate governance disclosure. The implication from this study 
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is that block ownership was using this disclosure as a means of achieving greater 
managerial monitoring (Ntim et al., 2013).  
Further studies show that shareholders of various sizes have an interest in monitoring the 
behaviour of management. For example, it was found that dispersed shareholders had an 
incentive for wanting to monitor the behaviour of management. Large investors simila r ly 
had a large enough interest and stake in the firm to be prepared to devote private funds to 
monitoring the behaviour of management (Berle et al., 1932). Block holders were seen to 
have an advantage over investors, in that block holders have the ability to coordinate their 
actions more easily. This ease of coordination was facilitated by the voting powers of block 
holders, and was not split among a highly segmented group of shareholders, as in the case 
of large investors (Shleifer et al., 1997). It was further discovered that if managers acted 
repeatedly against the interests of large investors, they would find that they would be 
quickly replaced (Shleige et al., 1997). Consequently, large block holders were shown to 
differ from small shareholders in that the large block holders had the incentive as well as 
the power to decrease agency costs. 
The effects that different block holders can have on a firm’s performance differ because of 
the divergent incentives and expertise they can wield (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). U.S. 
block holders which were founding family members were found to have a lower cost of 
debt financing than block holders that were not family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). 
According to Anderson and Reeb (2004), this could be attributed to long-term family 
commitment. It was further conjectured that families usually consider their firms an asset 
to be passed on to future generations rather than an undertaking to be consumed during one 
lifetime. 
Creditors also consider financial institutions, including banks, as an ownership group that 
was a good risk (Pindado et al., 2013). The rationale for this is that financial institut ions 
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often have mutually aligned interests, which may be considered advantageous to creditors 
(Pindado et al., 2013). 
In contrast to the findings that see founding family firms as favourable to creditors, Shleifer 
and Summers (1988) and Burkart et al. (2003) did not find such favourable results with 
respect to family firms. These researchers found that such firms tend to act on their own 
behalf, adversely affecting employee productivity (Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Burkart 
et al., 2003). It was further shown that block holders use their power to secure private 
benefits that are not available to minority shareholders and creditors (Barclay and 
Holderness, 1989). 
As pointed out, if this concentrated ownership enables block holders to obtain private 
benefits from these sources, then block holders can be seen to have a positive effect on the 
cost of capital (Burkhart et al., 2003; Matthies et al., 2013). In fact, Matthies et al. (2013) 
show that block holders holding more than 5% are able to exercise undue influence and 
therefore experience private benefits that are not available to other shareholders. 
Consequently, using the private benefits hypothesis, block holders, with their concentrated 
ownership, can be seen to have a negative impact on credit ratings (Matthies et al., 2013). 
Given the evidence on block ownership, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. 
The respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H2c: There is no statistically significant relationship between block ownership and 
cost of capital. 
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4.3.3 Institutional ownership and risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of 
capital 
4.3.3.1 Institutional ownership and risk-taking 
Institutional ownership exists when institutions invest in the shares of an association. 
Institutional investment, which includes insurance companies, pension funds and banks, 
which are institutions with strong fiduciary responsibilities. This explains why many 
institutional investors tend to equip their portfolios with stocks that are considered sound 
or reasonable investments (Del Guercio, 1996). It is therefore highly recommended that 
institutional investors forego investing in organisations that do not pay dividends, because 
stocks that are considered “prudent” tend to have a history of good, solid dividend 
payments (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005). Hutchinson, Seamer and Chapple (2015) 
pointed out from their study that the ability of the institutional owners to influence 
management determines how much the owners are able to monitor the firm-specific risk, 
management policy with respect to risk, and the performance of the firms. Therefor agency 
and stewardship theories are two theories that can be used to discuss this finding about the 
relationship between institutional ownership and risk taking. 
Institutions with strong fiduciary responsibilities are advised to stay away from 
organisations that are poorly governed, because their interests would not be protected, 
including risk of expropriation. A hint that organisations may be poorly governed is that 
they may not be earning fair rates of return on their investments. This could also put 
invested capital at risk. Because of this, institutional investors, because of their 
responsibilities to their clients, have a strong motivation to choose stocks of organisat ions 
that have good governance. The rationale for this is that firms that have a good governance 
structure also required less monitoring of their management. Therefore, institutiona l 
investors tend to choose organisations with better governance mechanisms, rather than 
selecting organisations that have poor governance mechanisms. 
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There are several advantages to choosing organisations that have good governance 
structures. For example, these originations tend to enhance transparency in terms of 
financial and operational matters. This has the effect of reducing the asymmetry of 
information between insiders and outside investors. In other words, there is greater sharing 
of information between insiders and other stakeholders (Chung, Elder, and Kim, 2010). In 
their study, these researchers found that organisations that had better corporate governance 
tended to show higher stock market liquidity as well as lower trading costs (Chung et al, 
2010). 
The existence of corporate governance is based on the premise the reason that dispersed 
shareholders demand that governance mechanisms be in place is so that no one shareholder 
needs to undertake on his own individual monitoring of management. But it follows that 
as a shareholder invests more heavily in a firm, that investor has greater incentives to want 
to monitor management. As Tran (2014) contends, institutional investors, because of their 
fiduciary responsibilities to their clients, reveal greater incentives to want to monitor 
management and policies of a firm. The reason that institutional investors want to carry out 
this monitoring is because of the large investment they make on behalf of their clients. It 
is understandable that institutional investors want to know what management is doing, 
because they have voting power to replace management, if they believe management is 
ineffective.  
In this respect, institutional investors can be seen as providing effective monitoring of 
management. This, in turn, reduces opportunistic behaviour on the part of management and 
has the further effect of being of benefit to all shareholders. This benefit is realised in 
reduction in agency costs as well as in lower cost of equity.  
Despite benefits from institutional investors being actively involved in monitor ing 
management, institutional investors may be unwilling to put out the financial resources for 
monitoring, when they realise that they are not the only ones that would benefit from such 
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monitoring. The fact that monitoring is costly may therefore discourage institutiona l 
investors from incurring the costs for monitoring when other shareholders would also be 
benefitting from a service for which they did not pay.   
However, given the ownership structure- institutional ownership evidence, both the null 
and alternate hypotheses are tested. Therefore, the respective null hypothesis to be tested 
in this study is that: 
H3a: There is no statistically significant relationship between the institutional 
ownership and risk-taking 
4.3.3.2 Institutional ownership and credit ratings 
Institutional owners and outside board members have been discussed in terms of their roles 
in corporate governance. While many research studies have shown that institutional owners 
and external directors monitor the actions of management and take measures to protect 
shareholders, other research studies have failed to show any effect of these corporate 
governance mechanisms on corporate performance. In terms of the relationship between 
institutional owners and credit ratings, previous research shows that institutional owners 
usually invest in companies with high bond yieldngs, but tht it is possible that they could 
be involved with lower ratings and higher bond yields (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). The 
two theories that could be applied here are agency theory and legitimacy theory. But as 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) point out, there are those who believe that institutional owners 
may be sene as promoting greater monitoring of management, but on the other hand, 
because they are institutional onwers, ths monitoring may not necessarily take place.  
Legitimacy theory may also apply, or as Elbannan (2009) shows it is thought that 
companies that have institutional owners may generally invest in companies that have low 
bond yields. 
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Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) conducted a study with a sample of 1,005 industrial bond 
issues collected from the Warga Fixed Income Database from 1991 to 1996. They found 
that firms with more institutional ownership had higher bond ratings and lower bond yie lds 
(Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) discovered that when 
institutional ownership becomes concentrated, it leads to lower ratings and higher yields 
for firms. Further, they found that firms with more outside directors on the board showed 
higher ratings and lower bond yields (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003).  
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) were consistent with their findings that the monitoring of 
management by institutional owners and outside directors contributes to a reduction in 
management opportunism and an improvement in firm value. Their findings are also shown 
to be consistent with an alternative explanation. The argument can also be made that there 
is a positive association between institutional ownership and bond ratings, and a negative 
association between institutional ownership and bond yields. This association comes from 
institutions’ preference for investing in higher rated bonds. Controlling for the potential 
change that institutional owners make based on the relationship between institutiona l 
ownership and bond yields and ratings, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) apply a simultaneous 
equations approach. In this approach, they show that institutional ownership influences 
bond yields and ratings, but is also influenced by bond yields and ratings. Consequently, 
these findings also suggest that institutions invest more in companies that have higher and 
lower bond ratings and yields respectively. However, regardless of the explanation, 
institutional ownership continues to be statistically significant in determining bond ratings 
and yields.  
Given the institutional ownership evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are 
tested. The respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H3b: There is no statistically significant relationship between institutiona l 
ownership and credit ratings.  
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4.3.3.3 Institutional ownership and cost of capital 
A review of studies on the relationship between institutional ownership and credit ratings 
shows that there is no statistically positive relationship. For example, it was found that 
companies with higher levels of institutional ownership in South Africa were more likely 
to disclose voluntarily as part of their corporate governance (Ntim et al., 2013). Also, in 
Germany, the corporate governance system was shown to be very different from other 
governance systems, for example the Anglo-American governance system (Elston, 2003). 
In fact, the governance system in German public companies consists of a two-tier board, 
which is made up of a management board, or Vorstand, and a supervisory board, or 
Aufsichtsrat (Elston, 2003). Institutional ownership was seen as not having an effect on 
German companies, because creditors were protected more than shareholders (Elston, 
2003). This can be seen in the fact that banks have a great deal of control over firms, more 
than one would expect between traditional creditors and lenders. According to Elston 
(2003), banks therefore have control over a firm in three major ways. First, a bank has 
voting rights that are associated with its share in a company’s stock. Second, the bank is 
very much involved in the supervision of the operation of the firm, since it has 
representatives who sit on the supervisory board, and is active in its lending and 
underwriting to the company. Third, through proxy voting rules, banks can vote for their 
depositors (Elston, 2003). The theory that can be used to explain this is the stewardship 
theory, where managers in the organisation are supposed to look out for the shareholders. 
According to Dittman et al. (2010), banks have the power to select managers to sit on 
corporate boards, regardless of the amount of equity the bank has in the firm. The power 
of the bank relative to the company shows there is no significant relationship between 
institutional ownership and credit ratings. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) also find that costs 
of debt of U.S. firms are negatively associated with greater institutional ownership and 
stronger outside control of the board. 
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A firm’s level of risk was seen to affect the firm’s cost of credit. This was likely to reveal 
yearly changes taking place in the firm’s governance, while showing that there was not 
much interference from outside factors that would affect the future profitability of the firm. 
To support this, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2004) show a significant association between a 
firm’s governance and the cost of equity capital that firms experiences. These researchers 
found that concentrated ownership, measured by the number of shares that held by 
institutions, as well as the number of block holders with 5% or more of stock in the firm, 
influence the cost of equity for a firm (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2004).  
Further, Pham et al. (2012) analyse the relationship between governance and the cost of 
capital. In examining a panel data set consisting of data for Australian firms on governance 
and cost of capital for a ten-year period, Pham et al. (2012) discovered that when firms 
show that they have stronger governance features, for example board independence, some 
institutional block holders, and some insider ownership, this contributes to a decline in the 
cost of capital, as well as in higher value for the firm. They also find that cost of capital 
decreases with higher insider ownership, but this was only observed up to a certain level 
of ownership (Pham et al., 2012).   
Several studies emphasise the fact that strong governance has the effect of limit ing 
divergence of cash flows. In contrast, Pham et al. (2012) argue that strong governance 
characteristics lead to a reduction in the cost of capital. The explanation for this is that 
investors recognise that their firm’s level of risk influences its cost of capital (Pham et al., 
2012). It was shown that several potential risks exist when a firm does not put enough 
emphasis on strengthening its corporate governance. For example, it is possible that 
insiders may decide not to pursue value maximising strategies, as external monitoring may 
become more difficult. Instead, insiders may opt for strategies that further entrench their 
positions. Also, insiders may engage in excessive borrowing and expansion aimed at 
empire building, which are typically self-serving and which may expose the firm to risks 
in the marketplace. All of these factors contribute to higher costs of capital. 
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Given the institutional ownership evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are 
tested. The respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H3c: There is no statistically significant relationship between institutiona l 
ownership and cost of capital. 
4.3.4 Director ownership and risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of 
capital 
4.3.4.1 Director ownership and risk-taking 
According to agency theory, boards of directors have the responsibility to monitor the 
activities of management. However, La Porta et al. (1999) point out that ownership 
structure in many countries outside of the U.S. consists of directors owning the majority of 
stock. It was confirmed that this is largely the case in Hong Kong, where members of 
founding families are directors and executives of their firms and own the majority of the 
stock (Ho and Wong, 2001; Chen and Jaggi, 2000). 
Theoretically, when managers own most of the firm’s stocks, this can accentuate the free 
rider issue, in that there is less monitoring of management, and a risk of takeover by 
management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It is also possible that the interests of 
management and shareholders would coincide (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When the 
interests of management and shareholders are more closely aligned, the need for motivat ing 
plans in director-controlled firms is greatly decreased.  
Several studies offer an explanation for the role of directors and management entrenchment 
(Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Short et al., 1999). For example, the 
concept of management entrenchment is evident when management has gained a great deal 
of power that makes it possible for managers to promote their own interests. Management 
entrenchment assumes that when directors hold a small percentage of shares in their firm, 
outside and inside factors serve to align the interests of managers with the best interests of 
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shareholders. However, when directors hold a large percentage of shares, they can make 
decisions to protect their interests against those of their shareholders. In such situations, 
directors find it in their interest not to maximise the wealth of shareholders. This is because 
directors can ensure they obtain higher salaries, compensation and bonuses (Morck et al.,  
1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). With director entrenchment it can be shown that 
director shareholding, or with directors owning a large part of the firm’s shares could be 
detrimental to corporate value. Also, it was shown that putting the assumptions of the 
alignment of interests between directors and shareholders and director entrenchment 
together does not lead show a positive relationship between director shareholdings and 
corporate value (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). It would follow that 
low ownership of stock by directors is positively related to good corporate value.  
In examining the relationship between director shareholdings and Tobin’s Q for U.S. firms 
between 1976 and 1986, McConnell and Servaes (1990) discovered that the relationship 
was curvilinear. According to these researchers, the relationship between these two groups 
continued to be positive until the level of director shareholdings reached between 40% and 
50%. The relationship became negative after this level of director shareholding was 
reached (McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Similar evidence was found among U.K. firms to 
support the curvilinear relationships of direct shareholdings (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1991). Further studies attest to this.  
Between 1988 and 1992, Short and Keasey (1999) examined the relationship between 
director shareholdings and Tobin’s Q in 225 U.K. firms, the fair market value for the 
stocks. Their findings reveal that it took a much higher level of director ownership for 
management to become entrenched in the U.K. than in the U.S. Using return on assets as a 
proxy for corporate governance, Weir and Laing (2000) show a positive relationship 
between director ownership and return on assets. 
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Hillier, linn and McColgan (2005) also reveal a curvilinear relationship between director 
ownership and firm value. Their findings reveal that at director ownership of 7%, Tobin’s 
Q increases, but then decreases when director ownership reaches 26%. In contrast to this 
finding, looking at mandatory disclosure as an aspect of corporate governance, Owusu-
Ansah (1998) shows no curvilinear relationship, as seen in some studies in the U.S. and 
U.K. Instead, this researcher shows that in Zimbabwean listed firms in 1994, there was a 
positive relationship between director shareholdings and mandatory disclosure at all levels 
(Owusu-Ansah, 1998).  
Further, Fama and Jensen (1983) show that insider or management ownership can give rise 
to two behaviours. On the one hand, there could be convergence or alignment of interests 
of insider ownership with shareholders; on the other hand, there could be an entrenchment 
effect (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Earlier studies assert that when there is an increase in 
ownership among directors or managers, owners tend to use company resources less, 
thereby showing a convergence or alignment of their interests with the interests of 
shareholders. In these situations, owners and managers agree on how the firm is managed, 
supporting the hypothesis of alignment of interests between these two groups (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983).  
However, these researchers also argue that managers have a natural tendency to use 
company resources for their own interests, as suggested by agency theory, thereby leading 
to conflicts of interest with external shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). But according 
to Fama and Jensen (1983), when insider ownership increases, conflicts decrease, due to 
the tendency to convergence of their interests.  
Fama and Jensen (1983) also argue that when there are major increases in insider 
ownership, this tends to increase costs. According to this argument, even at low levels of 
insider ownership, managers are induced by market discipline to seek to maximise value, 
even when there are few personal incentives to do so (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Conversely, 
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Fama and Jensen (1983) also argue that when insiders hold a large part of the capital in a 
firm, they have the advantage of greater voting rights, which means they can look after 
their interests and still not maximise value. They can achieve this without compromis ing 
their jobs or their remuneration (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
Given the director ownership evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. 
The respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H4a: There is no statistically significant relationship between director ownership 
and risk-taking. 
4.3.4.2 Director ownership and credit ratings 
The relationship between director owner and credit ratings for as Ho and Wong (2001) 
point out some director also serve as owners, because they own a large part of the stock of 
the companies that they direct, as is commonplace in Japan. This is a situation where these 
companies face severe threats of take over from the directors (Ho & Wong, 2001). The 
effect of this is to have a negative impact on credit ratings. This shows that agency theory 
is an appropriate theory to dicuss the relationship between director owner and credit 
ratings. Researchers have considered the possible impact of agency conflicts on credit 
ratings. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) investigate the relationship between governance 
mechanisms to address agency conflict and credit ratings. They examine how potential 
conflicts between shareholders and other stakeholders could be heightened or lessened 
through governance structures (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). It was shown that the 
interests of shareholders and stakeholders often diverge on issues related to firm 
performance and the investment policies of management (Fitch Rating, 2004). Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2006) show that firms with more shareholder rights usually have lower credit 
ratings, leading to higher costs of borrowing. Gompers et al. (2003) had different findings : 
they show that firms with greater shareholder rights had greater share values and lower 
costs of capital.   
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Given the director ownership evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. 
The respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H4b: There is no statistically significant relationship between director ownership 
and credit ratings.  
4.3.4.3 Director ownership and cost of capital 
The cost of capital is shown to increase when a company becomes more exposed to market-
wide risks. When managers undertake excessive borrowing as a means to promote empire-
building expansions, the company’s cost of capital has the potential to increase, as this 
action increases its risk. This is likely to occur when there is inadequate monitoring of 
insiders (Pham et al., 2012). Stewardship theory appears to be relevant in showing how 
director owners could influence cost of capital as they are seen or not seen as looking after 
the interests of sharehodlers. 
Also, the cost of capital is shown to increase for poorly governed companies, because the 
lack of transparency leads to higher costs. The cost of capital is shown to decrease when 
insider ownership increases, but this only happens up to a certain level of ownership (Pham 
et al., 2012). Amihud and Lev (1981) and Belkhir (2006) take the position that, at times, 
managers that can control board decisions focus on reducing risks more than managers that 
own shares. This may occur when managers aim to maximise job security (Amihud and 
Lev, 1981; Belkhir, 2006). Laeven and Levine (2009) explain this by pointing out that as 
managers accumulate influence and control of the board, they are less likely to undertake 
risky projects.  
Hermalinand Weisbach (1998) suggest that some boards of directors may be less likely to 
monitor management if management has many bargaining rights. The implication here is 
that with more insiders on a board, it is less likely that there will be stringent monitor ing 
of management. This is poor governance, which could lead to managers undertaking riskier 
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investment, which may potentially benefit them greatly. Empirical studies have shown that 
the more insiders there are on a board, the more risk the firm is likely to face (Boone et al., 
2007). In other words, having more insiders on a board is likely to lead to an increase in 
the cost of capital.  
Given the director ownership evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. 
The respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is that: 
H4c: There is no statistically significant relationship between director ownership 
and cost of capital. 
4.4 Board structure variables and risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of capital 
4.4.1 Introduction 
This section deals with board structures and their impact on risk-taking, credit ratings and 
cost of capital. We deal specifically with board size, independent directors, board diversity 
and frequency of meetings. These variables are all examined in terms of how they affect 
risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of capital. 
Because of agency theory, corporations need to have internal control over management in 
order to safeguard the interests of shareholders. This is achieved through the board of 
directors, which is generally made up of different committees. These committees are tasked 
with monitoring different aspects of management’s behaviour. Since managers are agents 
of the owners, it is the owners that appoint board members. Board members may include 
members of management as well as outside members. According to best practices, there 
should be more outside members on the board, who are independent of the influence of 
management (Radebaugh et al., 2006). 
 
The purpose of corporate governance is to reduce agency conflicts and ensue that managers 
focus on the best interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Netter et al., 2009). 
Boards of directors are considered the most important part of corporate governance, with 
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their major responsibilities being to monitor management’s behaviour and safeguard the 
interests of shareholders (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; John and Senbet, 1998; Filatotchev and 
Boyd, 2009). Therefore, boards of directors serve to advise and supervise managers, to help 
in the setting of the firm’s strategic direction, and to ensure that resources are used 
efficiently and effectively (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Brennan, 2006). In order for boards 
of directors to effectively carry out their responsibilities, certain characteristics have been 
identified as important for board performance. Some of the more significant characterist ics 
identified are independence of board directors, size of the board and the experience of 
board directors (Yermack, 1996; Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009).  
An examination of the independence of board directors can be appreciated by looking at 
how different boards attempt to achieve this. There are two main models of boards of 
directors: the German-Japanese model and the Anglo-American model. The German-
Japanese model has two tiers, and is dominated by insiders. This model consists of a 
supervisory board, which is made up of non-executive board members and carries out the 
monitoring function, and a management board, which is made up of executive board 
members (Davidson, 1994). The rationale for this division is to separate the monitor ing 
and decision-making functions of the board, thereby avoiding conflicts of interest between 
owners and managers (Dahya, Karbhari and Xiao, 2002). This model is used in Germany 
and Japan. 
The Anglo-American model is a one-tier board, often referred to as dominated by outsiders 
(Dahya et al., 2002). The major characteristic of the Anglo-American model is that the 
executive and non-executive board members work together, with conflicts of interest and 
power clearly realised in this model (Dahya et al., 2002). This model is used in the U.K. 
and the United States, and in many other countries because of the importance of the U.K. 
and the U.S. worldwide (Davidson, 1994; Solomon and Solomon, 2004). 
There has been much debate over the impact that the board model has on firm performance, 
with more recent debate on how the structure of the board affects performance (Jensen, 
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1993). Researchers have examined theoretical frameworks within which to study the roles 
expected of board directors and the impact that board directors have on the firm (Corbetta 
and Salvato, 2004). Both agency theory and stewardship theory can be used to describe the 
relationships between boards and management (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). However, 
Corbett and Salvato (2004) do not believe that an either/or theoretical framework should 
be used, but that an effort should be made to integrate these theories into explanations to 
understand the different roles that directors must play (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004). 
4.4.2 Board size and risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of capital 
4.4.2.1 Board size and risk-taking 
Corporate governance is exemplified by having an effective board of directors as an 
important governance mechanism. Board effectiveness can be seen in how well the board 
carries out its role of ensuring that managers provide quality information to shareholders 
(Eisenberg et al., 1998). An effective board must therefore be able to monitor management 
and at the same time ensure that the company is being strategic (Davidson et al., 1998, 
Klein 1998).  
The composition of the board is also critical, as it contributes to the capabilities of the 
board. According to Solomon (2007), a board should be made up of professionals drawn 
from diverse and complementary backgrounds and areas of expertise. However, the size of 
the board is also critical; a large board of directors is believed to be undesirable according 
to agency theory (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Sonnenfeld, 2002). According to these authors, 
a smaller board is seen as more effective and better able to motivate management (Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992; Sonnenfeld, 2002). The rationale for not having a large board is that a 
large board requires remuneration and bonuses, thus increasing the cost of having a board. 
Also, the chief executive of a company can dominate a large board because of the need for 
coordination among many board directors (Jensen, 1993). To pre-empt this negative aspect 
of board size, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) recommend limiting the number of directors and 
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thereby preventing social loafing and free riding, as some directors would not put out the 
effort that they could have done in a smaller group. 
In considering the relationship between board size and risk-taking, Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) sees resource theory as the basis for this relationship. The rationale is that when 
there is a board, it contributes by providing resources that are good for the company. On 
the other hand, if the board is small, it cannot be expected to provide many resources.  
However, a large board could be considered a providing more value to the company, as 
John and Senbet, and Yawson (2006) explain. Agency theory could also be used here for 
it can be pointed out that it is the board to monitors management and ensues that the 
interests of the shareholders are promoted.  However, one would argue that possibly a large 
board would mean that there would be more people to monitor management, and prevent 
risk-taking on the part of management.  
Being very specific, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) identify an optimal board size as no more 
than nine directors. These researchers also argue that a maximum number of directors 
should be ten (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). The drawbacks to having more directors include 
slow progress in decision-making, which would not be compensated for by any increased 
monitoring that could result (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Also, it was pointed out that the 
ability of larger boards to effectively monitor managers is eroded because of poor 
communication and poor decision-making (Kajola, 2008). 
Furthermore, a smaller board could make board discussions more productive, as all 
directors would have the opportunity take part (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Yawson (2006) 
suggests that smaller boards are more effective in making decisions. Also, smaller boards 
are able to monitor performance more carefully and make decisions about personne l 
performance more effectively. If there are declines in performance, smaller boards would 
more readily observe and discuss this, and make more effective and time-sensit ive 
decisions. 
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By contrast, suggestions have been made for the desirability of a large board. The argument 
put forward is that a large board would contribute more to a company’s value (John and 
Senbet, 1998; Yawson, 2006). This is because a firm would benefit from having access to 
more skills and experience on a large board (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
It was also thought that a large board would provide more contact with the business 
community, which could reduce business risk and reduce costs related to funds and raw 
materials (Pearce II and Zahra, 1992; Goodstein et al.,1994). This is in keeping with 
resource dependency theory, as firms are seen as benefitting from the expertise and skills 
of board directors (Switzer and Wang, 2013). 
Also making the case for a large board, Yawson (2006) contends that a firm may find more 
experience in a large board that could facilitate better decision-making based on worthy 
advice. Finally, John and Senbet (1998) indicate that a large board could provide better 
monitoring of managers. The reasoning here is that a large number of directors may have 
the experience to carry out monitoring functions more efficiently (Kiel and Nicholson, 
2003). 
Board size was also seen to be effective in other areas of governance. Ntim et al. (2012) 
show that a large board leads to more disclosure, one aspect of good governance. But 
Kajola (2008) confirms that a smaller board is more effective in discharging board duties. 
Technical abilities would likely be increased with more board members, but there is 
disagreement among reports on the importance of insiders and outsiders (Kajola, 2008). 
On the one hand, Kajola (2008) observes that in some cases boards with more outside 
directors perform better, while in other cases the opposite is true.  
The success of firms is dependent on risk-taking, indicating that all firms must take some 
degree of risk. However, some firms will fail primarily because they undertake too many 
risky projects. Because of agency theory and also stewardship theory, many managers will 
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refrain from undertaking risky projects, and some would also not take on risks for fear of 
jeopardising their personal welfare (Fama, 1983; Holmstrom, 1999).  
In investigating the relationship between board size and risk-taking, Wang (2012) looks at 
how different sizes of boards affect a company’s risk-taking. For example, Wang (2012) 
points out that smaller boards give their CEOs greater incentives to take on risk, whereas 
larger boards do not provide the same kinds of incentives that make CEOs take on more 
risk. The explanation that Wang (2012) provides is that smaller boards support CEOs to 
make risky investments in the hope of better-than-average returns. These companies also 
have low leverage and a high future risk (Wang, 2012). Nakano and Nguyen’s (2012) study 
of Japanese companies reveals that companies with larger boards engage in lower risk-
taking and consequently have fewer bankruptcies. While Japan and the U.S. are similar in 
the effect of board size on company risk-taking, it is not as marked in Japan as it is in the 
U.S. (Nakano and Nguyen, 2012). This is because Japanese firms have a low tendency to 
take risks (Nakano and Nguyen, 2012). These researchers also show that the effect of board 
size is not as important for firms with several opportunities to invest as it is for firms with 
very few opportunities (Nakano and Nguyen, 2012). They show that board size varies, and 
that a larger board would not necessarily decide on low-risk projects, especially if the firm 
has many opportunities for investment (Nakano and Nguyen, 2012). 
Given the board size evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. The 
respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H5a: There is no statistically significant relationship between board size and risk-
taking. 
4.4.2.2 Board size and credit ratings 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) question whether board size and composition has an effect 
on credit rating, specifically, whether a mix of inside, outside and affiliated directors could 
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impact how creditworthy companies are assessed. These researchers found support for the 
position that better board structure and processes contribute to boards being better able to 
monitor management more efficiently and thus carry out the board’s responsibility of 
protecting the interests of all stakeholders (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). It was found that 
the more boards were able to provide independent monitoring of management, the better 
their credit rating.  
According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992), when a board is large, there could be too many 
people to make the discussion possible. In other words, they see board size as a factor that 
could hamper the board in its work. (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). But it can also be argued that 
more board members mean more opportunity for monitoring management and looking after 
the interests of the owners, the shareholders. This is supported by agency theory. But 
stewardship theory could also apply, for as Lipton and Lorsch (1992) explain, the board is 
also seen as looking after the interests of stakeholders. The relationship between board size  
and credit rating will depend on whether the size of the board promotes greater benefit or 
disadvantage. 
Bhojraj and Sengupta’s (2003) findings were supported by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006). 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) note that companies with more independent outside board 
directors also had better bond ratings. When boards had more knowledgeable professiona ls, 
their companies had higher credit ratings (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). 
According to Wang (2012), smaller boards are more willing than large boards to support 
risky policies that are associated with shareholder interests. This study shows that smaller 
boards offer managers greater incentives to invest in risky assets; however, while small 
boards tend to support riskier investments, they also tend to restrict aggressive debt policies 
(Wang, 2012). Larger boards focus on improving accountability, and showed lower bond 
yields; they were also seen as supporting less risky investment prospects (Wang 2012). 
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In terms of future risk, Wang (2012) also shows that board size has no effect on future risk. 
However, a matter of concern was that large firms could have large boards and many 
investment opportunities (Wang, 2012). Large firms may appear less risky because they 
have used their varying investments. But his studies show that stock volatility and cash 
flow volatility have a negative relation to current board size (Wang, 2012). 
Given the board size evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. The 
respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H5b: There is no statistically significant relationship between board size and credit 
ratings.  
4.4.2.3 Board size and cost of capital 
Boards of directors serve to provide monitoring of management, in keeping with agency 
theory. In large firms, board committees are established to monitor different management 
functions. Boards usually create subcommittees to carry out specific roles. The board, in 
overseeing the accounting process in a large firm, would delegate this role to the audit 
subcommittee (Klein, 2002). This subcommittee takes on the responsibility of 
recommending external auditors to the full board and has the responsibility of assessing 
the soundness and quality of the firm’s internal accounting process, as well as the control 
processes of the internal accounting system (Klein, 2002). The audit committee also has 
another important role, namely that of ensuring that external auditors mainta in 
independence from senior management (Klein, 2002). In order to maintain the 
independence of directors, major stock exchanges have established regulations that require 
a minimum of three independent directors to serve on an audit committee (Klein, 2002). 
This is to ensure that independence is not compromised on any level. Board size has also 
been found to be related to effective monitoring, with smaller boards said to be more 
cohesive and better able to monitor firms more effectively and create higher firm value 
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(Pham et al., 2012). But it is shown that more effective monitoring and higher firm value 
are also related to lower cost of capital (Pham et al., 2012). 
 
Resource dependence theory can be used to explain the relationship between board size 
and the cost of capital. The rationale for this is based on the idea, as Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) put forward, namely, that a board represents a group of experts. A large board would 
necessarily be seen as a large group of experts that could carry out the roles of a board.  
But as John and Senbert, and Yawson (2006) point out, a large board provides a wide array 
of resources for the company. While there are more resources for the company because of 
the many board members, there is more monitoring and expertise provide to the company 
as well.  
Very little has been written about the relationship between board size and cost of debt. 
According to Anderson and Reeb (2004), board size was found to have no impact on the 
cost of debt financing. Larger boards can carry out greater monitoring of management. Piot 
and Missonier-Piera (2007) find no relationship between board size and the cost of 
borrowing. In contrast, using 1,500 S&P companies, Upadhyay and Sriram (2011) find that 
board size affects the cost of capital, with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) confirming a 
similar finding. Further, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) discovered that an additiona l 
member to a median board reduced the cost of capital by eight base points. 
Given the board size evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. The 
respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H5c: There is no statistically significant relationship between board size and cost 
of capital. 
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4.4.3 Independent directors and risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of 
capital 
4.4.3.1 Independent directors and risk-taking 
The existence of independent board members on companies’ boards has been identified as 
the bastion of good and effective corporate governance. The U.K. Cadbury Code (1992) 
and the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) both put forward the princip le 
that independent board members are important for good and effective corporate 
governance. For clarification, independent board members, as Spira (1999) explains, have 
no connection with the company; such connection may tarnish their ability to exercise 
independent judgment. When the concept of independent board members was introduced 
by the OECD (2004), it was intended as independence from all dominant shareholders. The 
understanding was that independence also extended to board members not acting as 
representatives of, and not having close business ties with, dominant shareholders. As 
Aguilera (2005) points out, it was necessary to have several independent board members 
to minimise the influence of the owners. This practice was also seen as improving 
transparency (Aguilera, 2005).  
Good governance, as established by the OECD (2004), recommends more independent 
members on the board, because this promotes reliability and transparency. More 
independent directors can also mean more meaningful decision-making, as these 
independent directors can bring more objectivity to the evaluation of the performance both 
of the board and management (OECD, 2004). Independent directors may be most useful in 
“areas where the interests of management, the company and its shareholders may diverge 
such as executive remuneration, succession planning, changes of corporate control, take-
over defences, large acquisitions and the audit function” (OECD, 2004). 
The relationship between independent director and risk taking can be defined by agency 
theory and resource dependence theory. According to Lai and Chen (2014) point out that 
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research has shown that independent directors and shareholders can be seen to have 
different interests, so that they are actually in conflict with each other. Independent 
directors are seen as holding the position of looking after the interests of their own interests, 
and can be seen to have similar interests with management. As such, independent directors 
would seem to represent risk for the shareholders and the interests of the shareholders. In 
this case, agency theory would explain this relationship. However, independent directors 
could be seen as having the same expertise as board members, which means that they would 
be looking after the interests of the shareholders, and in this circumstance can be viewed 
as providing resource to the company (Chen & Roberts, 2010). It is in this capacity that 
resource dependence theory applies. 
According to agency theory, independent board members are seen as accountable to 
shareholders, for they are the ones that exercise oversight over management, ensuring that 
management works in the interest of shareholders, and not their own. As noted, 
independent board members are responsible for more efficient monitoring of management, 
as well as ensuring that the earnings of management are not more than they should be (Page 
and Spira, 2005; Xin et al., 2003). 
It has also been pointed out that it is important to have more non-executive directors on the 
board so as to prevent or reduce agency problems and lessen asymmetry of information, 
which gives more power to some shareholders and not others (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; 
Jensen, 1993). While it is important to have non-executive directors on the board, it is also 
desirable to have more executive directors of the board. The rationale for this can be found 
in agency theory, resource dependency theory and information asymmetry (Fama, 1980; 
Sonnenfeld, 2002). Agency theory can help explain why more non-executive directors are 
necessary, since, when they dominate a board, the board is thought to be more accountable, 
as non-executive directors protect the interests of shareholders (Fama, 1980; Sonnenfe ld, 
2002). Resource dependency theory is also applicable, because these non-executive 
directors are thought to possess the skills, expertise and possibly the business network to 
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become additional resources for the company (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Baranchuk and 
Dybvig. 2009). Non-executive directors are also encouraged to provide highly professiona l 
work, since their reputation is recognised in the labour market. 
Like non-executive directors, executive directors are also desirable on a board, as they can 
help with monitoring management (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). However, Fama (1980) 
points out that if there are too many executive directors to non-executive directors, this 
could lead to collusion rather than competition among executive directors. Executive 
directors could also expropriate company resources (Fama, 1980). Fama (1980) explains 
that in order to prevent collusion among executive directors, more non-executive directors 
should be hired. The rationale for this is that non-executive directors can criticise 
management without fear of being fired. Having more NEDs on the board can serve to 
minimise any possible collusion by directors on the board (Jensen, 1993). The explanation 
for this is that the independence of NEDs enables them to criticise management without 
any hesitation or fear of being fired (Jensen, 1993).  
However, not all researchers support the view that more non-executive directors are 
advantageous for corporate governance. Using stewardship theory, some argue that a board 
with too many non-executive directors does not have a positive effect on the company 
(Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Weir and Laing, 2000; Bozec, 2005). For example, Weir 
and Laing (2000) note that non-executive directors know less than executive directors. This 
means that non-executive directors may not have knowledge about the special workings of 
the company. Other research also explains why non-executive directors may not be as good 
as executives in promoting corporate governance. One explanation is that non-executive 
directors are usually part time and may work full time in other companies (Bozec, 2005; 
Jiraporn et al., 2009). Another explanation is that non-executive directors often spend time 
doing other specialised activities and do not have time to monitor managers (Bozec, 2005; 
Jiraporn et al., 2009). Stewardship theory is appropriate here, as it shows executive 
directors as providing good stewardship of company resources. 
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Nicholson and Kiel (2007) believe that non-executive directors are necessary because of 
their role in eliminating or preventing asymmetry of information. These researchers point 
out that a high percentage of non-executive directors on a board have easy access to much 
of the information needed to make accurate and high-quality decisions. Nicholson and Kiel 
(2007) argue that this can positively contribute to corporate performance.  
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) maintain that, despite having access to external sources, non-
executive directors may lack some of the skills executive directors use to obtain pertinent 
information from their informal sources, usually within the organisation. It would follow, 
as Goodstein et al. (1994) argue and as Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) confirm, that a board of 
directors with too many non-executive directors could have the effect of repressing 
strategic plans, while causing the firm to condition too much monitoring of managers 
(Goodstein et al., 1994; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Ntim et al. (2012) conclude that 
transparent information on corporate governance provisions as it relates to corporate boards 
and directors have a stronger influence on firm value than any other provision.  
Given the independent directors evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. 
The respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H6a: There is no statistically significant relationship between independent 
directors and risk-taking. 
4.4.3.2 Independent directors and credit ratings 
Another concern with independent directors was whether they had an impact on credit 
ratings. Davidson et al. (2005) maintain that non-executive directors, as a form of corporate 
governance, showed that they had an influence on the quality of earnings in an 
organisation. It was also noted that when a company has good corporate governance, it is 
able to deal effectively with agency risk as well as with information asymmetry because of 
the impact of corporate governance on management’s behaviour (Davidson et al., 2005). 
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But it was also found that properly monitoring management was likely to reduce agency 
risk as well as mitigate the information asymmetry between a company and its creditors 
(Davidson et al., 2005). As Alali et al. (2012) maintain, with high levels of corporate 
governance, management does not have much opportunity to look after its own interest, 
which promotes more effective decisions. According to Fitch Ratings (2004), corporate 
governance is important in the rating process. It was found that rating agencies are more 
likely to see the reports of companies with strong governance structures and practices as 
more reliable and valid than reports from companies with poor governance structures and 
practices (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). In other words, corporate governance goes a long 
way in promoting a company’s credit rating. 
Agency theory governs the relationship between independent directors and credit ratings, 
for according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the separation of management and ownership 
will involve added costs to owners to monitor their resources. Independent directors would 
more likely monitor the operations of management, and ensure the financial performance 
of the company over the long term, and this could lead to an increase in credit ratings. A 
strong board would ensure that independent directors do not increase risky investments. 
Therefore, independent directors are associated with increase in credit rating (Garmaise & 
Liu, 2005). Resource dependence theory applies to independent directors and credit rating 
for with more resources provided by the independent directors, the company would be 
doing better financially and this would lead to increase in credit ratings.  
In assessing how companies make decisions based on their credit rating, Shah (2006) 
explains that companies anticipating a change in their credit rating take steps to try to 
prevent a downgrade by cutting back on investments and having adequate cash reserves 
for carrying out business operations. Companies that operate in the debt markets are more 
likely to use this strategy. Also, when a firm’s credit rating is upgraded, it strives to 
maintain this improved rating by cutting back on its investments (Shah, 2006). The 
rationale for this is that the company that may be expecting a downgrade or that just 
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received an upgrade wants to maintain its existing position and so cuts back on investments 
so that it does not want to use up its cash reserves (Shah, 2006). This is why financ ia l 
managers are not eager for an upgrade in credit rating, because they realise that trying to 
maintain it could be restricting (Shah, 2006). 
Managers are aware of how credit rating agencies assign ratings to companies, and know 
the implications of upgrades and downgrades to their careers (Holmstrom, 1999). 
Managers who have to make decisions therefore consider their careers, and do not use up 
all the capital that can be used for external financing (Holmstrom, 1999). They are also not 
very eager for their companies to have high credit ratings, because very high credit ratings 
would mean that companies have to be concerned about possible downgrades, and 
downgrades can be seen as showing some deficit on the performance of managers. 
Therefore, managers, wanting to protect their reputation, may manipulate the decision-
making process in the firm (Holmstrom, 1999). The rationale is that when there is a 
downgrade in credit rating, this reflects poorly on managers, and this has the potential of 
damaging the managers’ reputation (Holmstrom, 1999). Downgraded credit ratings could 
have negative implications for a manager, who may be assessed negatively in the job 
market, should that manager be looking for a job in the future (Holmstrom, 1999). 
Given the independent directors evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. 
The respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H6b: There is no statistically significant relationship between independent 
directors and credit rating.  
4.4.3.3 Independent directors and cost of capital 
A firm’s cost of equity capital is significantly associated with the number of governance 
attributes in the firm (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2004). Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2004) find a 
negative relationship between cost of equity and some governance structures. For example, 
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using independence of the board, board ownership and the amount of power management, 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2004) note that the cost of equity rises when these aspects of 
corporate governance were poor.  
In the relationship between independent directors and cost of capital, Dahya et al (2002) 
point out that in the Anglo tradition, boards, being one-tiered, are made up of independent 
directors. These outside or independent directors tend to be interested in promoting the 
interests of the company, namely, the interests of the shareholders. But there would also be 
inside directors, which would identify with management and this would represent directors 
that are in conflict with other board members and that identify with management (Solomon 
& Solomon, 2004). In this latter case, the inside directors would be looking after their own 
interests. Therefore, in either case, it is agency theory that would apply to explaining the 
relationship between independent directors and cost of capital.  
It was also noted that in the two-tiered board of directors used in German companies, 
independence of the board is sometimes not possible. For example, one practice in these 
companies was for the CEO, on retiring, to serve as chair of the supervisory board. 
Criticism of this practice has been raised because of potential conflicts of interest (Andres 
et al., 2013). The rationale for this criticism is based on the fact that the chairman of the 
supervisory board, the former CEO, will monitor his successor and former colleagues 
(Andres et al., 2013). In addition, the practice in such two-tiered boards is for the former 
CEO on the supervisory board to also be involved in setting the pay of his or her successor 
and colleagues (Andres et al., 2013). Andres et al. (2013) point out that in the 150 listed 
companies that they studied over ten years, former CEOs serving as chairs of supervisory 
boards were very lenient in determining pay for the CEO and other executives.   
One of the views held about the board of directors is that it serves to effectively monitor 
the actions of management, according to agency theory (Lorca et al., 2011). It is also held 
that if independent directors are appointed by management, then it follows that these 
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directors would be influenced by their appointment (Lorca et al., 2011). It would therefore 
follow that these independent directors would not be very effective in monitoring the 
actions of managers. According to Lorca et al. (2011), this practice puts the firm at risk, 
and may lead to poor credit ratings. 
Given the independent directors evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. 
The respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H6c: There is no statistically significant relationship between independent 
directors and cost of capital. 
4.4.4 Board diversity and risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of capital 
4.4.4.1 Board diversity and risk-taking 
Board diversity stands out as one of the most significant internal corporate governance 
issues presently facing organisations. Board diversity is seen as representing different 
attributes of directors in a boardroom. These various attributes are thought to influence 
board process. According to Van der Walt and Ingley (2002), board directors bring many 
invaluable attributes to their boards. Board directors, because of their different ages, 
genders, ethnicities and cultures, bring a variety of different perspectives to board decision-
making (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2002). According to these researchers, other important 
attributes of board directors are their religion, the constituency the board directors 
represent, independence, knowledge, educational and professional background, technical 
skills and expertise, commercial and industry experience, and career and life experience 
(Van der Walt and Ingley, 2002).  
Two main positions are put forward to explain the possible impact of board diversity on 
shareholder value. Some argue for more diversity in boardrooms, while others are in favour 
of corporate monoculture and boardroom uniformity. 
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These opposing positions have mixed theoretical suggestions to support different views. 
Agency theory and resource dependence theory are often used to discuss board diversity 
(Goodstein et al., 1994; Carter et al., 2003). According to agency theory, board members 
with diverse backgrounds increase board independence and promote better monitoring of 
management (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2006). The rationale for seeing diversity as making 
boards more effective is that board members with diverse backgrounds may have different 
ideas, experience and knowledge that can enhance the decision-making process 
(Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009). Agency theory also holds that including diverse boards 
can help better evaluate the complexities of the corporate marketplace and its external 
environment (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009). According to Carter et al. (2003), diversity 
can also increase creativity and innovation in the boardroom because of differences in 
cognitive abilities, which can also encourage rational decision-making. These different 
explanations support the use of agency theory in addressing boardroom diversity. 
Resource dependence theory is also applicable to explaining board diversity. From this 
theoretical framework, board diversity is seen to give the company more skills, knowledge 
and connection with the broader business environment (Goodstein et al., 1994). According 
to Rose (2007), diversity on the board could lead to a variety of different skills and 
expertise, which would mean that the more diverse a board, the more skills and expertise 
that are added, and the more resources would a company with a diverse board have. 
Therefore, the resource dependency theory could be used to explain this relationship, as 
the diverse board could be seen as a source of resources available to the company. However 
some disagree with this view, seeing diversity on the board as a source of contention, with 
too many different views on the board leading to less than consensus. From this 
perspective, resource dependence theory still applies as this point of view sees diversity as 
limiting the available sources (Rose, 2007). 
Greater board diversity could also attract well-qualified professionals considering 
employment with the company (Rose, 2007). These professionals may be individuals who 
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are not ordinarily considered for board directorship (Rose, 2007). For example, greater 
diversity could encourage women and members of different ethnic groups to apply for top 
positions with the company and bring much-needed skills and perspectives (Rose, 2007).  
On the other hand, a diverse board does not mean a more effective board, as the monitor ing 
of management may not improve (Rose, 2007). The rationale here is that the appointment 
of diverse board members may involve tokenism, and the true value of the contributions 
these directors could bring may not be appreciated and utilised (Rose, 2007).  
While it has been shown that diversity of board directors could be advantageous to a 
company (Rose, 2007), there is also research showing that board diversity can be 
problematic (Goodstein et al., 1994). It may be problematic because, especially when a 
company’s performance is poor and the financial environment uncertain, decisions may 
need to be made promptly. Diverse board members, representing different constituenc ies, 
may have differing views as to what decisions should be made (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 
2009). In situations like these, board diversity could create factions and prevent the board 
from making unanimous decisions (Goodstein et al., 1994). 
However, companies are increasingly recognising that boards of directors should reflect 
the diversity of the companies’ clientele, whether employees, customers or other 
stakeholders. In short, as Carter et al. (2003) point out, equity and fairness require this. 
Agency theory holds that a more diverse board promotes greater board independence 
(Carter et al., 2003). Diversity is seen as instrumental in promoting better monitoring of 
management. Therefore, having more women and minority members can be seen as 
promoting more effective boards. 
Resource dependence theory also supports board diversity based on gender, ethnic ity 
and/or cultural background (Carter et al., 2003). With greater diversity comes great and 
different resources that can be invaluable to companies (Carter et al., 2003). 
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Carter et al. (2003) and Erhardt et al. (2003), in their studies of diversity and its influence 
on company performance, find conflicting results. For example, they find that in some 
companies, women and African-, Hispanic-, Asian- and Native American board members 
had positive effects on the performance of the companies. However, in other companies, 
this was not the case. These researchers discovered that either there was no effect or there 
was a negative relationship between board diversity and company performance (Carter et 
al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003). 
In addition to agency theory and resource dependence theory, Goodstein et al. (1994) and 
Carter et al. (2003) identify signalling and stake holding theories as supporting board 
diversity. For example, signalling theory underlie the diversity of women in boards. It was 
found that there is a higher proportion of female board members in banks with lower risk 
(de Cabo and Gimeno, 2012). It was also noted that among larger banks, larger boards had 
a high proportion of women (de Cabo and Gimeno, 2012). These observations seem to 
indicate that smaller boards prefer less diversity, while banks with larger boards and greater 
growth potential prefer more (de Cabo and Gimeno, 2012). However, de Cabo and Gimeno 
(2012) observe that while there was a larger proportion of female board members, there 
were no female directors on boards that had higher risk.  
Fonda and Sassalos (2000) argue that more women on the boards that they studied tended 
to be more efficient in protecting shareholder’s interests. The rationale for this was that 
women seem to be more conscientious about their responsibility in monitor ing 
management (Mathisenet al., 2012). Watson et al. (1993) point out that having board 
members from diverse groups is effective in identifying perspectives that were 
problematic, and in coming up with alternative solutions. Milliken and Martins (1996), 
supporting diversity, see it as providing different problem-solving and decision-mak ing 
styles that are instrumental in crafting better decisions. The explanation for this position is 
that diversity brings together more perspectives, more critical analyses of issues and 
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improved communication, all of which give rise to better decisions and outcomes (Milliken 
and Martins, 1996). 
Adams and Ferreira (2007) note that some CEOs prefer to have smaller boards, consisting 
primarily of men. These CEOs quite likely look at women on their boards as disruptive or 
“annoying” (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). The reasoning for this is that such CEOs see their 
boards as being “friendly” and engaging in less scrutiny of management (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2007). A large board with many women could be an indication that the CEO is 
comfortable or may be aware of the value that diversity brings to the board and to decision-
making (Adams and Ferreira, 2007).   
Carter et al. (2003) investigate the role of board diversity in firm financial performance. 
They examine diversity in terms of gender and ethnicity among a sample of 638 American 
Fortune 1000 firms (Carter et al., 2003). Using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for financ ia l 
performance, Carter et al. (2003) discovered a positive relationship between these measures 
of diversity and this measure of financial performance. They found that companies with 
more diverse boards had excellent financial performance. 
Diversity based on gender was also seen as having a positive effect on financ ia l 
performance. Adler (2001) examines a sample of 25 American Fortune 500 companies, 
using return on sales, return on equity, return on assets and return on investment as 
measures of financial performance, to see how firms with top women managers perform 
financially. Adler (2001) finds that companies with more women in higher management 
positions perform better than firms without such diversity. However, Francoeur et al. 
(2008) criticise Adler’s findings on the grounds that Adler (2001) used too small a sample, 
and only considered large firms.  
Given the board diversity evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. The 
respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
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H7a: There is no statistically significant relationship between board diversity and 
risk-taking. 
4.4.4.2 Board diversity and credit ratings 
Several European governments have passed legislation regarding female representation on 
boards. For example, Norway, one of the earliest countries to legislate female 
representation on boards, required that boards should be comprised of at least 40% females 
by 2008, in all public companies (Hoel, 2008). The U.K. government stipulated that for 
companies listed on the FTSE, at least 25% of directors should be women by 2015 (Sealy 
and Vinnicombe, 2012). Similarly, Spain and France have stipulated that by 2015 and 2017 
respectively, a minimum of 40% of board members in publicly held firms should be women 
(de Cabo et al., 2012). Finland and Sweden, among other European countries, strongly 
recommend more women on boards of publicly held companies, but meeting these 
standards remains voluntary (de Cabo et al., 2012). 
The relationship between board diversity and credit rating can also be seen as involving 
resource dependence theory. According to de Cabo et al. (2012), in Germany board 
diversity with heavy female participation is seen as an advantage to companies. This 
condition leads to companies with boards that have a heavy concentration of women being 
more successful than boards that have few or no women. This research finding reveals that 
resource dependence theory is an adequate one to work with respect to the relationship 
between board diversity and credit rating. These companies with high board diversity are 
seen to have higher credit ratings. However, according to Watson et al. (1993), board 
diversity leads to difficulty reaching consensus, and therefore this is seen as a disadvantage 
for the company. Resource dependence theory also applies. But agency theory could also 
apply, if it is reasoned that board diversity leads to greater monitoring of the activities of 
management, thereby promoting the interests of the company, as opposed to the interests 
of shareholders. 
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The underlying reasoning supporting the reform of boards to include more gender diversity 
is the belief that women bring different perspectives that increase the value of companies 
(Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003; Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader, 2003). As the argument 
continues, increased value of firms reduces the risk of company failure (Carter, Simkins 
and Simpson, 2003; Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader, 2003).  
Tanaka (2014) examined corporate bonds issued by 225 Japanese companies between 2005 
and 2009, and found that female board members had a positive impact on yield spread 
among the 839 bonds studied. Tanaka (2014) also discovered that companies with board 
gender diversity had better yield spreads, supporting the position that female board 
directors made better monitors of management, promoting better corporate governance. 
However, by contrast, Tanaka (2014) neither inside nor outside female directors in this 
study showed a positive relationship on yield spreads, with outside female directors 
showing a negative impact on yield spreads. 
Given the board diversity evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. The 
respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H7b: There is no statistically significant relationship between board diversity and 
credit ratings.  
4.4.4.3 Board diversity and cost of capital 
Board diversity is generally expressed in terms of women becoming members of boards, 
and this is very common in Europe. Having women as part of the board has been a concern 
in Europe that has resulted in Norway requiring women to be appointed as members of the 
board in 2008 (Hoel, 2008), and this turned being followed in Span and France as pointed 
out by de Capo et al (2012) and in the U.K. as observed by Sealy and Vinnicombe, 2012). 
Therefore, when speaking about board diversity, it is generally understood that diversity is 
introduced because of the presence of women in the board. Women have been identified 
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as promoting the well-being of companies where they are board members, because they 
provide good advice on how to use resources. More than that, it can be shown that women 
in the Continental tradition can be seen as illustrating how resource dependence theory can 
be applied to board diversity and cost of capital. In this capacity, the relationship between 
board diversity and cost of capital is seen in the reduction in the cost of capital (Anderson 
& Reeb, 2004). But the argument is also made that diversity in the firm of having more 
women on the board adds to the cost if capital, because there is often conflict between the 
men and women on the board, resulting in delays in making decisions (Anderson & Reeb, 
2004). Resource dependence theory can be used, because of the possible impact of diversity 
on assets which in turn influence the cost of capital. Agency theory can also be applied 
here as board members are seen as serving to monitor management’s actions.  
A study of board diversity and cost of capital reveals that companies with female outside 
directors had a lower cost of public debt (Tanaka, 2014). Tanaka (2014) examined Japanese 
corporate bonds while controlling for the various characteristics of the companies, the type 
of bonds and corporate governance. Anderson and Reeb (2004) provided the rationale for 
Tanaka’s finding, noting that women on boards bring different perspectives that improve 
oversight of management. It was also noted that female directors have been found to be 
good at advising managers on how to use their resources more efficiently and how to 
formulate strategy (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). It can be argued that if monitoring and 
advising managers are considered important activities in promoting board effectiveness, 
then having female directors carry out these activities is important to board effectiveness 
and looking after the interests of all stakeholders, which includes bond holders. It would 
follow that in companies where the boards of directors are diverse, and where this diversity 
is based on gender, bond holders could expect to have lower bond yields. 
However, while it has been shown that gender diversity on boards promotes well-being, 
Anderson and Reeb (2004) point out that companies may also have potential costs because 
of their female directors. The rationale is that male and female directors may have different 
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perspectives that can lead to conflicts of interest and thus inhibit decision-making. This can 
lead to board ineffectiveness, which can be seen as not in the interests of bond holders, as 
this could put the company at risk. Bond holders may therefore demand higher yields for 
companies that have gender-diverse boards. Therefore, the discussion of the effect of 
gender diversity on companies’ public debt shows great ambiguity in Japanese companies.  
In examining European banks, de Cabo, Gimeno and Nieto (2012) reveal that board gender 
diversity in these banks contributes to better corporate performance. A higher ratio of 
women to men on the boards was correlated with less risk, and companies that were 
growing were more likely to have women on their boards (de Cabo et al., 2012). Resource 
dependence theory clearly applies here, but human capital theory, agency theory, and social 
psychology are also applicable to explaining the importance of board diversity to 
companies (de Cabo et al., 2012). 
Given the board diversity evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. The 
respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H7c: There is no statistically significant relationship between board diversity and 
cost of capital. 
4.4.5 Frequency of board meetings and risk-taking, credit ratings and 
cost of capital 
4.4.5.1 Frequency of board meetings and risk-taking 
The relationship between the frequency of board meeting and risk-taking can be explained 
in terms of agency theory, resource dependence theory and institutional theory. Frequency 
of board meetings can be discussed in terms of board members meeting more frequently 
and therefore having more opportunity to monitor management more. This could be 
explained in terms of agency theory. Resource dependence theory could also be used as it 
can be shown that more frequent board meetings mean more resources are available to the 
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company. More frequent board meetings can be explained in terms. At the same time, it 
can be argued that more frequent board meetings do not necessarily mean that more work 
would be done, since the very fact of getting together could mean more paper work with 
no more work being done. This could be discussed in terms of resource dependence theory.   
Policy-makers and researchers express concern whether the frequency of board meetings 
is related to financial performance of companies. It was conjectured that more frequent 
board meetings lead to more monitoring of managers, which can improve financ ia l 
performance (Vafeas, 1999). It was also thought that regular meetings allow directors the 
opportunity to discuss strategies, and to more frequently assess how managers are 
performing (Vafeas, 1999). According to Mangena and Tauringana (2006), when meetings 
are held frequently, directors receive timely information about the organisation and have 
the opportunity to address developing problems more promptly. Besides keeping directors 
informed, frequent board meetings develop closer bonds among directors (Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992). Also, conscientious directors attend meetings regularly and participate in 
board activities. 
An opposing view suggests that shareholders do not gain much from board meetings. While 
the board was seen as protecting the interests of shareholders, meetings did not fulfil that 
goal. According to Vafeas (1999), frequency of board meetings does not accomplish much, 
since the amount of time that board members spend together does not really involve much 
genuine exchange that is relevant to shareholders. This is because of the amount of routine 
involved in board meetings (Vafeas, 1999). Vafeas explains that several management 
reports have to be presented, and various formalities have to be acknowledged at board 
meetings (Vafeas, 1999). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) also pointed out that frequent board 
meetings do not help shareholders, because these meetings take time away from monitor ing 
management. It is also noted that frequent board meetings cost the company, in terms of 
expenses to cover travel, refreshments and other board activities (Vafeas, 1999). 
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Given the frequency of board meetings evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses 
are tested. The respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H8a: There is no statistically significant relationship between the frequency of 
board meetings and risk-taking. 
4.4.5.2 Frequency of board meetings and credit ratings 
The relationship between frequency of board meetings and credit ratings can be explained 
in terms of agency theory for in the presence of good corporate governance as exhibited 
through frequent board meetings, there would be more monitoring of management. 
According to Ahmad, Rashmi, Bakshi and Saha (2009), investors would more likely see a 
company as a good risk. Such companies would have better credit ratings, because they 
would be seen as stronger companies. Also, Elbannan (2009) point out that companies that 
have good governance are also companies that have better credit ratings, as compared to 
companies with little governance that are seen to have poor credit ratings. Resource 
dependence theory is applicable here as frequent board meetings are seen as indicat ing 
better board governance, and therefore more skills and expertise available to the company.  
There is little evidence of the relationship between frequency of board meetings and credit 
ratings. One view is that the frequency of meetings reveals how committed board members 
are to their roles and how effective board members are in monitoring management. In this 
view, frequent board meetings would suggest that board members are effectively looking 
after the interests of shareholders through board oversight of management, which would 
ultimately impact the company’s credit rating (Vafeas, 1999). But the opposing view is 
that board meetings are not beneficial to shareholders or to the company’s credit rating 
(Vafeas, 1999). 
Researchers also found that the frequency of different board meetings affects credit ratings 
in different ways. For example, Carcello et al. (2002) studied a sample of 258 Fortune 1000 
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companies and discovered that the frequency of audit committee meetings was reflected in 
higher audit fees paid. This was found to have a negative impact on the companies’ credit 
ratings (Carcello et al., 2002).   
However, when Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) examined the frequency of board meetings 
for 275 U.S. listed companies between 1995 and 2000, they discovered a more positive 
outcome: the more frequent meetings were, the more accurate the forecasts of management 
earnings were. Similarly, Mangena and Tauringana (2006), in examining 157 Zimbabwean 
companies between 2001 and 2003, discovered that the frequency of board meetings 
contributes to good company performance. These examples show that there is merit in 
frequent board meetings, as these results in accurate forecasts of management earnings and 
good company performance, which could also be reflected in good credit ratings. The 
indication here is that more frequent board meetings benefit companies. 
Given the frequency of board meetings evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses 
are tested. The respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
H8b: There is no statistically significant relationship between the frequency of 
board meetings and credit ratings.  
4.4.5.3 Frequency of board meetings and cost of capital 
Frequency of board meetings are related to cost of capital, for according to agency theory, 
boards are seen as indication of good governance, and good governance is seen as look ing 
after the interests of the company. According to Letting et al. (2012), frequency of board 
meetings may suggest a strong board, and a strong board is associated with monitor ing 
management. This is seen as important for eliminating the problems that occur when 
management is too strong and not under surveillance. Agency theory applies because 
frequency of board meeting can be seen as leading to better company performance. This is 
also associated with a lower cost of capital. According to Garmaise and Liu (2005), when 
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managers are too strong with decision making, they often look after their own interests. A 
company with strong board governance is seen as providing resources to the company that 
would ensure the protection of the interests of the shareholders. Resource dependence 
theory can be applied here, since frequency of board meetings could be interpreted as 
meaning more resources to the company. Stewardship theory could also be applied, 
showing that the frequency of board meetings suggest better stewardship of the company’s 
assets and the interests of the shareholders. 
In examining the relationship between frequency of board meetings and cost of capital, 
Vafeas (1999) and Adams (2005) find that the number of board meetings gives some 
indication of the monitoring function of board directors. Similarly, Lorca et al. (2011) hold 
that the number of meetings and their frequency have been seen as a proxy for the board 
carrying out its role of monitoring management (Lorca et al., 2011). 
Menon and Williams (1994) note that when audit committees meet infrequently, it is 
unlikely that they are able to monitor management effectively. But Anderson and Reeb 
(2004) find that when audit committees meet frequently, they have the effect of decreasing 
the costs of debt, as directors are conscientious in monitoring the financial accounting 
process. Lorca et al. (2011) also believe that audit committees lead to lower debt costs. 
Debt holders quite likely welcome frequent board meetings (Anderson and Reeb, 2004).  
By contrast, it was argued that board meetings are not likely to be very useful because in 
the limited time that they were held. The rationale for this is that in board meetings, 
directors have to follow certain routine procedures and tasks that constitute a waste of time, 
thereby leaving the responsibility for setting the agenda for board meetings to CEOs 
(Menon and Williams, 1994; Lorca et al., 2011).   
Given the frequency of board meetings evidence, both the null and alternate hypotheses 
are tested. The respective null hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
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H8c: There is no statistically significant relationship between the frequency of 
board meetings and cost of capital. 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter dealt with risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of capital as measures of firm 
performance. Corporate governance index, ownership structure and board structure were 
the mechanisms representing corporate governance. The objective of this chapter was to 
see how corporate governance, represented by these mechanisms, impacts on firm 
performance. As outlined in the introduction, there are three main sections, dealing with 
the three mechanisms of corporate governance, but these are broken down further into 
specific aspects of these mechanisms. While Section 4.1 deals with CGI and risk-taking, 
credit ratings and cost of capital, Section 4.2 deals with ownership structure, broken down 
into block ownership, institutional ownership and director ownership. Section 3 deals with 
board structure, examining board size, independent directors, board diversity and 
frequency of board meetings as aspects of corporate governance that have a bearing on 
firm performance, measured through risk-taking, credit ratings and cost of capital. 
The literature in all of these sections reveals that the mechanisms chosen were appropriate  
for corporate governance, and that various findings support as well as challenge the impacts 
that these aspects have on firm performance. There is evidence that corporate governance 
positively impacts firm value, although researchers often disagree on the findings of their 
studies of companies in different situations. 
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Chapter 5: Research Design 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research design of this study, which examine how corporate 
governance mechanisms have an effect on corporate performance in terms of risk-taking, 
credit rating and cost of capital. The research design that has been selected is a quantitat ive 
approach, because it has many advantages over a qualitative approach. The rationale for 
choosing quantitative over qualitative is that in order to study corporate governance, it is 
necessary to consider a period of several years. It is also necessary to obtain data from 
secondary sources, including databases and annual reports from the selected firms. The 
quantitative approach, as used in most studies on corporate governance, makes it possible 
to use secondary data, which allows for comparison with previous studies. However, the 
most important reason for using the quantitative approach for this study is that it provides 
accurate findings; these can only be obtained by following a precise procedure that can be 
verified and even replicated (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).  
This chapter is divided into several sections. Section 5.2 discusses research paradigms, 
with Section 5.3 describing the positivist approach, and why this approach is used in this 
study. Section 5.4 describes the sample, the selection of the companies and the manner in 
which the sample was used. Section 5.5 outlines the data and sources used to obtain the 
information in this study. Section 5.5 is further subdivided in Sections 5.5.1, 5.5.2, 5.5.3 
and 5.5.5, which consider corporate governance data, financial data, credit rating data, 
firm-level data and country -level data, respectively. Section 5.6 describes the criteria used 
for selecting the final sample, while Section 5.7 describes the reasons for selecting the final 
200 stratified sample. Section 5.8 describes the research methodology used in the study, 
highlighting the reason for using quantitative research study. Section 5.9 outlines the 
construction of the corporate governance indices that form the basis for studying corporate 
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governance in the study, while Section 5.10 discusses the advantages and disadvantages of 
using weighted and unweighted indices. This section also justifies why unweighted indices 
are used in this study. Section 5.11 discusses the dependent variables, namely, risk-taking, 
credit rating and cost of capital. Section 5.12 discusses the independent variables, includ ing 
corporate governance index, ownership structure and board structure. Section 5.13 
describes the control variables used in this study, namely, firm-level variables and country-
level variables. These control variables form the characteristics that define the companies 
and countries used in this study. Section 5.14 provides the regression models and section 
5.15 provides a summary for the chapter. 
5.2 Research paradigms 
This section discusses the use of research paradigms and how they are selected for a study. 
It also points to the application of different paradigms to different types of research studies, 
showing why a quantitative approach is better suited to this study. This section also 
discusses the positivist approach, its aim, and shows the suitability of the positivist 
approach for this type of study. 
There is some controversy over which research approaches are to be used. On the one hand, 
it is argued that the relationship between the theoretical position, methodology and method 
is causal, and that the epistemological and ontological assumptions underlying the theories 
dictate the methods to be used in a study. From this position, the epistemological and 
ontological assumptions that are associated with positivist theory or approaches are said to 
dictate the use of quantitative research methods, while those associated with the 
interpretivist approach are said to indicate qualitative research methods. On the other hand , 
it is argued that the relationship between theoretical positions, methodologies and methods 
cannot be so easily established. According to this position, it is possible to use quantitat ive 
methods to support an interpretivist position (Blaikie, 1993). As Thietart (2001) holds, 
research aims to give a vision of the world, and so uses a methodology that allows for 
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predicting and explaining this vision. This study carries out business research, which has 
the advantage of drawing knowledge from various disciplines which can provide unique 
insights, and which can develop ideas that can then be applied to real-life situations 
(Saunders et al., 2012). Research paradigms therefore provide inspiration to researchers. 
5.3 Positivist approach 
This section shows why the positivist approach is best for this study. This approach is based 
on the idea that the research process involves logical reasoning and empirical observation. 
While logical reasoning involves statistical and mathematical calculat ions, for example 
multiple regression models, empirical observation involves direct observation, use of 
measurements, analysis and the drawing of conclusions. Therefore, the positivist approach 
is considered more appropriate for carrying out scientific studies where rigour and 
predictability are valued, particularly in forecasting. The generalisability of findings is 
considered highly reliable. One difficulty with this approach is that it does not adequately 
predict behavior. 
 
However, positivists are concerned with examining facts (Thietart, 2001), and not 
particularly concerned with what individuals perceive, for they see reality as independent 
of how it is perceived. What is critical in positivist research is relating what is observed to 
the theoretical framework (Remenyi et al., 2005). Finding a universal law and objective 
truth therefore becomes the goal of positivist research (Thietart, 2001). What is significant 
in positivist research in management is keeping the researcher separate from what is being 
studied. Human activities must be observable, and the link between the events in the 
research process as seen as causal. This means external factors must be seen as causing 
human action. 
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5.4 Sample selection 
Critical to any study is the sample that is selected. Understanding how the sample is chosen 
is also important, for it tells whether this is a process that can be replicated with the same 
results. It also shows other researchers the path taken to arrive at the chosen sample. 
The sampled firms used in this paper are drawn from companies that are listed in the 
World’s Biggest Public Companies listing, FORBES Global 2000 Leading Companies 
(Forbes, 2000). The sample is made up of 200 companies that were taken from ten, or 
29.4%, of the 34 OECD countries. The 200 companies represent both the Anglo-American 
tradition, including companies from Australia, Canada, Ireland, the UK and the US, and 
the Continental European tradition, which includes companies from France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan and Spain. These companies are drawn from ten industries, namely, basic 
materials, consumer goods, consumer services, financials, health care, industrials, oil and 
gas, technology, telecommunications and utilities, as shown in Table 3 below. The period 
of focus is 2010 to 2014, resulting in 1,000 firm-year observations. The study looks at how 
corporate governance mechanisms impact the risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital 
of these firms in the various industries mentioned above.  
The rationale for selecting countries from both traditions, from these various industr ies, 
and for these years is to show how companies from these different traditions and industr ies 
performed after the financial crisis. This information is ascertained using secondary data 
obtained from the websites and financial reports of the companies. The sample was 
stratified, drawn from large, medium and low firms based on their total assets and sales as 
part of the FORBES 2000 information provided. 
The information used examines corporate governance mechanisms with the aim of showing 
how these mechanisms affected the financial characteristics of the firms. The study also 
shows the difference between the traditions with respect to the governance mechanisms 
used, and how this has implications for the firms’ performance during the period of study.   
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An inclusion criterion of the companies taking part in the study was that they had 
experienced the global financial crisis, and data was available for a period after this event. 
An exclusion criterion was that any firms that had independent variables missing that were 
necessary for the analysis would be eliminated from the sample. Utility firms and firms 
from the financial industry were also excluded, as these industries have a different capital 
structure and are heavily regulated, which is likely to impact their governance structures 
differently than firms in other industries (Yermack, 1996; Weir et al., 2002; Cheng, 2008).  
Two French companies were excluded because their annual reports were in French only 
they were replaced with other companies from the sample. Some countries, such as Ireland, 
Italy and Spain, had fewer than 20 firms in FORBES 2000 after excluding utility and  
financial companies. In order to compensate for this, firms that were listed on their stock 
markets were used. 
 
 152 
 
Table 3: Summary of the Sample Selection Procedure 
Panel A: Industrial Composition of all listed firms on the FORBES 2000 as at 31/12/2014  
  USA % Canada % UK % Australia % Ireland % Germany % France % Italy % Japan % Spain % 
Financials 64 11.4 14 26.9 24 25.3 11 32.4 5 26.3 11 20.4 9 14.8 17 56.7 57 26.0 10 37.0 
Industrials 136 24.2 3 5.8 30 31.6 3 8.8 3 15.8 18 33.3 13 21.3 3 10.0 54 24.7 4 14.8 
Basic Materials 22 3.9 8 15.4 5 5.3 1 2.9 2 10.5 1 1.9 5 8.2 1 3.3 24 11.0 0 0 
Consumer Services 96 17.1 5 9.6 17 17.9 6 17.6 1 5.3 5 9.3 8 13.1 2 6.7 19 8.7 4 14.8 
Consumer Goods 47 8.3 5 9.6 6 6.3 3 8.8 2 10.5 8 14.8 11 18.0 1 3.3 23 10.5 1 3.7 
Technology 63 11.2 1 1.9 0 0 3 8.8 2 10.5 2 3.7 4 6.6 0 0.0 15 6.8 0 0 
Health Care 49 8.7 1 1.9 3 3.2 2 5.9 4 21.1 3 5.6 2 3.3 0 0.0 8 3.7 1 3.7 
Telecommunications 10 1.8 4 7.7 3 3.2 1 2.9 0 0 3 5.6 3 4.9 0 0.0 3 1.4 2 7.4 
Oil and Gas 43 7.6 10 19.2 2 2.1 2 5.9 0 0 0 0.0 2 3.3 2 6.7 8 3.7 1 3.7 
Utilities 33 5.9 1 1.9 5 5.3 2 5.9 0 0 3 5.6 4 6.6 4 13.3 8 3.7 4 14.8 
Total Population 563  52  95  34  19  54  61  30  219  27 
 
Less: Financials & 
Utilities 
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Total Sampled Firm 466 82.7 37 71.2 66 69.4 21 61.7 14 73.7 40 74 48 78.6 9 30 154 70.3 13 
 
 
48.2 
Panel B: The Final 200 Stratified Sampled Firms 
  USA % Canada % UK % Australia % Ireland % Germany % France % Italy % Japan % Spain % 
Industrials 136 24.2 3 5.8 30 31.6 3 8.8 3 15.8 18 33.3 13 21.3 3 10.0 54 24.7 4 14.8 
Basic Materials 22 3.9 8 15.4 5 5.3 1 2.9 2 10.5 1 1.9 5 8.2 1 3.3 24 11.0 0 0 
Consumer Services 96 17.1 5 9.6 17 17.9 6 17.6 1 5.3 5 9.3 8 13.1 2 6.7 19 8.7 4 14.8 
Consumer Goods 47 8.3 5 9.6 6 6.3 3 8.8 2 10.5 8 14.8 11 18.0 1 3.3 23 10.5 1 3.7 
Technology 63 11.2 1 1.9 0 0 3 8.8 2 10.5 2 3.7 4 6.6 0 0.0 15 6.8 0 0 
Health Care 49 8.7 1 1.9 3 3.2 2 5.9 4 21.1 3 5.6 2 3.3 0 0.0 8 3.7 1 3.7 
Telecommunications 10 1.8 4 7.7 3 3.2 1 2.9 0 0 3 5.6 3 4.9 0 0.0 3 1.4 2 7.4 
Oil and Gas 43 7.6 10 19.2 2 2.1 2 5.9 0 0 0 0.0 2 3.3 2 6.7 8 3.7 1 3.7 
Total Sample 20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
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5.5 Data and sources 
Data and sources are also critical to a study. Particularly when the quantitative method is 
used, with its positivist objective of getting at the truth, it is necessary that observers be 
able to follow the path taken to obtain the data. A look at the sources is also necessary. The 
data discussed in this section includes corporate governance data, financial data, credit 
rating data, firm-level data and country-level data. All of these data are important to 
investigate the differences in performance among these companies from different 
industries, of different sizes and from difference accounting systems. 
The data and sources collected from these firms between 2010 and 2014 are drawn from 
the 200 firms from the FORBES 2000 list, and are also listed on the stock exchanges of the 
respective countries. It is important to examine the companies’ annual reports, and only 
companies with at least five consecutive years of annual reports are used. The assumption 
is that companies that are accountable to their stakeholders and that have good business 
practices will maintain their annual reports; the rationale for this is that good, solid 
companies would have to report their business practices to their constituents. The exclusio n 
of financial companies from the sample is based on the consensus that these companies, by 
nature, have to adopt practices in keeping with good governance because of the extreme 
risk associated with this industry. The rationale for using the five-year period is that it 
allows us to look at governance practices that companies may undertake, thereby allowing 
for observations of corporate governance changes over time. 
The study uses corporate governance data, financial data, credit rating data, country-leve l 
data and firm-level data. These data sources are critical, as the study focuses on risk-taking, 
credit risk and capital cost for all the sampled firms. The study obtains the annual reports 
of all the sampled firms from the Perfect Information Database and the company websites.  
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5.5.1 Corporate governance data 
This section deals specifically with corporate governance practices and points out how this 
would be operationalised and what sources of information would be used for these. This 
study uses an instrument to examine corporate governance practices in firms. This will be 
obtained by using the OECD Corporate Governance Principles (2004) to examine the 
quality of corporate governance practices in the sampled companies. In examining the 
effect of corporate governance on risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital, different 
types of information had to be obtained for the corporate governance data such as the 
corporate governance variables. The data that is needed will be taken out manually from 
these annual reports. The annual reports are the main source of information for this study, 
as it is assumed that the internal corporate governance variables presented are reliable, as 
the information included in the complete annual reports is information that management 
must provide to shareholders. Therefore, corporate governance data is obtained from the 
annual reports of the 200 sampled companies. 
As noted, the annual reports were obtained from the Perfect Information Database and 
companies’ websites; where some annual reports were missing or not available from the 
Perfect Information Database, every effort was made to contact the company directly, by 
phone or email. Another method was to go through the companies’ websites for either 
electronic copies. Fifteen companies’ annual reports could not be obtained from the 
database, which meant that the companies had to be contacted otherwise. This meant that 
1.5% of the annual reports had to be accessed by phone or email, while 985 or 98.5% of 
the companies’ annual reports, were obtained from the Perfect Information Database. 
5.5.2 Financial data 
This section deals with the financial data used in this study. This data was also drawn from 
the annual reports, specifically from the balance sheets and income statements. The balance 
sheet provides cash and cash equivalents, current assets, current liabilities, total assets, total 
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debts and shareholder’s equity. The income statement provides current year sales, last 
year’s sales, total revenue, gross profit, operating profit, income before tax and net income 
after tax. This data was also obtained for 2010 to 2014. The financial statements provided 
information about the number of shares outstanding, current year’s share price, last year’s 
share price, cash dividends, stock dividends, preferred dividends and earnings per share 
(EPS). 
While the financial data was gleaned from the annual reports, necessary information was 
also obtained from databases, such as DataStream. Analysis was then carried out using the 
data from the annual reports, with support from secondary sources where annual reports 
were unavailable. Phone calls and email reports provided material for companies with 
unavailable annual reports. 
5.5.3 Credit rating data 
This section deals with credit rating data and is not as straightforward as finding this 
information in one place. It is necessary to look at different ways in which credit rating is 
assessed, including the use of credit agencies.  
The measurement of credit ratings can be carried out by examining the default frequencies 
with which companies in the same classification are denied credit, and by investigating the 
changes in credit rating that take place as prices and returns on stocks and bonds are 
adjusted (Jorion & Zhang, 2007). Estimations of default probabilities for individual rating 
categories can therefore be made on the basis of default frequencies. However, when 
agencies assign credit ratings, they define those ratings in terms of the quality of credit the 
individual firm has, and do not use a specific default probability for the individual rating 
categories (Matthies, 2013). 
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Consequently, we decided to assign credit ratings to firms based on Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s, and Fitch’s compilations of long-term issuer credit ratings. Moody’s long- term 
ratings range from Aaa to C. The ratings from best to worst are Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, 
A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2, Baa3, Ba1, Ba2, Ba3, B1, B2, B3, Caa1, Caa2, Caa3, Ca and C, which 
is the default. Standard & Poor’s ratings range from best to worst as follows: AAA, AA+, 
AA, AA-, A+, A-, BBB+, BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, BB-, B+, B, B-, CCC+, CCC, CCC-, 
CC, C, RD, SD and D. It is important to note that rating scales are ordinal, and not cardinal, 
meaning that credit quality is shown to increase as the categories decline down the scale. 
For example, the credit quality between a company that is rated AAA and one that is rated 
AA is different from the credit quality between a firm rated AA and one that is rated A. 
Fitch’s long-term ratings range from AAA to D, and are similar to Standard & Poor’s, the 
only difference being that after the C rating in Fitch, the rating designations are DDD, DD 
and D, corresponding to RD, SD and D in Standard & Poor’s.  
5.5.4 Firm level data 
The firm-level data include firm size, measured by log of total assets, sales growth, audit 
committee number, corporate governance committee number, leverage and capital gain 
yield, as well as year dummies and country dummies. 
5.5.5 Country level data 
This section considers factors in which companies differ, and notes the potential for 
different outcomes for companies based on these different factors. The information 
provided in this study is drawn from country level. This includes stock market 
capitalisation, corruption index, inflation, GDP per capita, Hofstede’s culture variables 
(masculinity and power distance), population and exchange rate. 
The selected companies are drawn from ten different countries; this is significant, as the 
countries are also divided into those that follow the Anglo-American tradition and those 
 157 
 
that follow the Continental European approach. Each country also has their specific 
histories, legal systems and other aspects unique to them. There are 200 companies, 
selected on the basis that they included large and smaller companies, and that they came 
from different industries. In this study, it is important to distinguish the effects that take 
place on the basis of the countries, as well as on the basis of the companies. This will allow 
for an understanding of the impact of country-level factors versus firm-level factors. 
5.6 The criteria for selecting the final sample 
In selecting a sample, it is important to identify the criteria to be used in doing so. This 
section outlines these. To be included in the sample, companies must be large corporations 
operating in the OECD, must be listed on the stock market, and must also be listed in the 
FORBES Global 2000 Leading Companies. They must have annual reports for each year 
from 2010 to 2014, which must be available either from the Perfect Informatio n Database 
or through email, official website or postal delivery. Their financial accounting information 
and corresponding five-year stock market information must be available from annual 
reports or DataStream.  
The rationale for these criteria are that it is necessary to have a full five year stock market 
and accounting information in order to have a balanced panel data analysis, and thereby 
having data for firms from consecutive years (Yermack, 1996; Cheng, 2008). 
Having balanced panel data is shown to have some noted advantages. First, cross-sectional 
observations in a time series used in combination with balanced panel data provide greater 
freedom, and give rise to less collinearity among variables, thereby safeguarding against 
any erratic changes in outcome as a result of a small change in a variable (Gujarati, 2003). 
Other advantages include more variability in cross-sectional observations and in time 
series, more informational data, greater asymptotic efficiency and more firm-leve l 
heterogeneity among variables (Gujarati, 2003). 
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The criteria used in creating this sample has also been encouraged because of its 
advantages. The use of panel data has been promoted as an important research tool in 
corporate governance research, as it reduces problems that are inherent in the use of 
statistical methods. For example, a common problem in corporate governance studies is 
that of endogeneity, where in the regression model the independent variable could become 
correlated to an error term, thereby giving rise to incorrect causation (Borsch-Supan and 
Koke, 2003; Larcker and Rusticus, 2007). 
It is also deemed advantageous to use the time period from 2010 to 2014, because it allows 
for observation over a sufficient time period after the global financial crisis, and therefore 
allows for sufficient data to draw conclusions. Using the five-year panel also ensures that 
there is adequate data to carry out robust statistical analyses. Using data over a five-year 
period instead of over a one-year period allows us to study whether the observed interna l 
corporate governance structures remain effective over time. 
Also, in carrying out this research, it made sense to follow the good pattern used by 
previous researchers that used panel data, such as Yermack (1996), Gompers et al. (2003), 
and Bhagat et al. (2008). Other researchers who not only used panel data but also used a 
five-year period, and who influenced this researcher’s decision to follow suit and use a 
five-year time series, are Boyd (1995) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006). 
The decision to use a stratified sample of 200 firms, with 20 firms from ten OECD 
countries, with five of these countries being from the Anglo-American tradition and five 
from the Continental tradition, and with the large, medium and low companies from a 
variety of industries, makes it possible to draw on a large cross-section of companies with 
different circumstances. 
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5.7 Reasons for selecting the final 200 stratified sample 
This section explains in detail how the final sample was arrived at. The decision to selec t 
the final 200 stratified sample was based on several reasons, some theoretical, some 
empirical and others practical. Several theoretical and empirical studies on accounting 
disclosure point to the importance of company size and industry in influencing outcome 
(Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Verrecchia, 2001; Beattie et al., 2004; Hassan and Marston, 
2008). For example, Lang and Lundholm (1993), with reference to US companies, suggest 
that company size is strongly correlated with accounting disclosure. Further theoretical and 
empirical support is provided by Lang and Lundholm (1993), who point out that accounting 
compliance and disclosure are more readily carried out by larger companies that can afford 
these processes more easily than smaller companies. Also, these authors point out that 
larger companies may also more readily engage in accounting compliance and disclosure 
because they are under pressure from the public, analysts and the financial press to do so 
(Lang and Lundholm, 1993). But Marston and Shrives (1991) believe that the reason why 
larger companies engage more in compliance and disclosure may be because they are more 
complex, and have varied business operations that span not only geographical locations, 
but also different industries, products and markets. Basically, these reasons reveal that 
larger companies, because of their complexities, may find that their activities demand more 
compliance and disclosure than smaller companies. 
However, there are other theoretical and empirical reasons why company size and industry 
are significant in compliance and disclosure. As some researchers have pointed out, 
companies that are cross-listed, that is, listed on different foreign exchanges, are more 
likely to have more disclosure requirements than companies listed only on one exchange 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Black et al., 2006; Melvin and 
Valero, 2009).  
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It was also pointed out that company size is also related to nationalisation, taxation, break-
ups, regulations based on the costs of political requirements and other factors related to the 
company (Andreasson, 2009). Consequently, because of these political costs that have 
implications for nationalisation and regulation, larger companies see the importance of 
reducing the political costs associated with these practices by increasing accounting and 
social disclosures (Marston and Shrives, 1991). By taking these initiatives, larger 
companies attempt to reduce measures that could prevent even more stringent 
requirements. 
The practical reasons motivating the selection of the final 200 stratified sample include the 
finding that larger companies tend to disclose more than smaller companies (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Jiang and Kim, 2004; Margena and Tauringana, 2007). Therefore, if 
company size is thought to influence compliance and disclosure, in order to get a fair and 
balanced picture, this study chose companies from the top, middle and bottom, thereby 
selecting companies that are thought to have more compliance and disclosure and those 
that are likely to have less.  
It was also pointed out that companies differ in disclosure according to the industries in 
which they operate (Gillan et al., 2003). Considering that this study is based on disclosure 
found in annual reports and other sources, it follows that the size and industry of the 
companies selected are also important in studying how these companies behaved before 
and after the financial crisis. 
It is also important to note that the final 200 stratified sampled companies, with 1,000 firm-
year observations, represent a large part of the sample. Practical reasons dictated that the 
sample should include 200 companies, and that these should be taken from 10 of the 34 
OECD countries. The fact that these companies were selected from both Anglo-American 
and Continental European traditions is also significant. The industries selected are very 
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common industries in both traditions, and the exclusion of the utilities and financ ia l 
industries ensures that extreme or unique factors cannot skew the results. 
5.8 Research methodology 
This section discusses in detail the research methodology used and the rationale supporting 
its selection. Deductive research and inductive research are the two methods that dominate 
research methodologies used today, and are based on deduction and induction, respectively 
(Sekaran, 2003). In order to appreciate the differences between these two research 
methodologies, one must recognise the difference between deduction and induction. 
Whereas deductive research focuses on testing hypotheses, inductive research is 
preoccupied with gaining an understanding of the meanings of the phenomenon under 
study (Saunderson, 2007). The strategies used in conducting these research approaches also 
differ. 
Deductive research is considered to be a scientific approach, where hypotheses are 
developed and tested using quantitative data. Thus, quantitative research involves starting 
off with hypotheses, with the aim of developing a theory that is put through rigorous 
testing. It is through that this approach is objective.   
This deductive approach defines hypotheses in terms of relationships between variables. 
Using a highly structured process, researchers using the deductive approach must measure 
variables carefully, with the goal of showing the causal relationships between them. Any 
researcher using the same process is expected to gather objective findings. 
In order for the deductive process to work, the researcher must use a sample that is large 
enough to makes statistical generalisations from the findings. As Thietart (2001) points 
out, deductive research calls for having one or more hypotheses that would be compared 
against a particular reality to assess the validity of the hypotheses. Therefore, quantitat ive 
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research is a methodology that is based on statistical methods, which is thought to yield 
more objective results than qualitative research (Thietart, 2001).  
Inductive research, on the other hand, does not set out to find the causal relationships 
between things. Its goal is to understand the meaning of what is being observed. In other 
words, the researcher makes certain observations and then moves from these to making 
general statements about what was observed. Inductive research is associated with 
qualitative research, which is concerned with making generalisations, in contrast to 
deductive research. Inductive, or qualitative, research is therefore less structured and 
requires a smaller sample. Its major focus is finding meaning from what is being 
researched, understanding the meaning of the problem and formulating a theory (Thietart, 
2001; Saunderson, 2007).  
It is important to point out that a goal of both deductive, or quantitative, research and 
inductive, or qualitative, research is understanding phenomena, but they go about their 
individual processes differently. While in inductive research, observation leads to finding 
meaning or interpreting the phenomenon in terms of what is observed, deductive research 
is concerned with finding the causal relationship between variables (Salomon, 2003). 
Induction can be seen to rely heavily on interpretivism (Saunderson, 2007).  
Salomon (2003) criticises the quantitative research approach on the grounds that 
hypotheses should not be thought of as hypotheses at all, for the simple reason that the data 
have to be analysed in order to come up with the hypotheses. However, this researcher 
notes that quantitative researchers often speak about the generalisability of findings, but 
can only seldom say what the readers of their research take away from these findings 
(Salomon, 2003). 
This study uses the quantitative research methodology and the deductive research process. 
The five steps used in this study follow the deductive research process very closely. These 
steps are developing hypotheses, expressing the hypotheses in operational terms as 
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variables, testing the operational hypotheses, examining the causal relationships that 
emanate from the variables and the specific outcome of the study, and, if necessary, 
modifying the theory based on the findings (Saunders, 2007). 
Regression models are used for risk-taking, constant term, corporate governance index, 
block ownership, institutional ownership, director ownership, board size, board diversity, 
frequency of board meetings, independent directors, firm-level control variables, country-
level control variables and error. Regression models are also used for credit rating and cost 
of capital. 
5.9 Construction of corporate governance indices 
This section describes how corporate governance indices are constructed, to show how 
suitable indices for this study were constructed. In order to carry out this study, it is 
necessary to use cross-country corporate governance measures, and to develop more  
comprehensive indices using the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004). 
However, although some current cross-country governance databases are available, these 
are often lacking in some of the measures needed for this study, and may not cover as ma ny 
years or as many countries as needed (Black et al., 2012). It is for this reason that this study 
constructs new governance indices and an unweighted index, using firm-level corporate 
governance data.   
For each company, this study calculates an overall Corporate Governance Index (CGI) 
score that will be based on an average of all the criteria used. Additionally, using the OECD 
Principles (2004), this study calculates five sub-indexes, all of which also use the average 
score found in each sub-section. The use of weighted or unweighted indices has been 
criticised because of their strengths and weaknesses. Criticism has been levelled against 
using an unweighted index because it assumes that each internal corporate governance 
measure in the index uses an average score, and, as Barako et al. (2006) explain, this is not 
supported either by theory or practice.   
 164 
 
5.10 Advantages and disadvantages of weighted and unweighted indices and 
justify why use unweighted indices 
This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of using weighted and unweighted 
indices, showing why the decision was made to use unweighted indices in this study. In a 
weighted index, different values or scores are assigned to different measures on the basis 
of the importance of the measure. This means that a weighted index is used to evaluate the 
relative importance of each measure as it is applied to studying the different companies. 
The strength of this type of index is that it allows for the findings to be presented in terms 
of the relative importance of each measure. Another strength of the weighted index is that 
it is simple and straightforward to use. It also assumes that there is no change in the 
relationship among measures. 
A disadvantage of the weighted index is that it could lead to interpretations that may be 
misleading when applied to the impact of the different measures on the companies under 
consideration. Weighted index means using scales of 1-5 or 1-7, such as doing the coding 
as 1.2.3.4.5. 
On the other hand, an unweighted index assigns equal value to all measures of corporate 
governance. Unlike a weighted index, which is based on attributing relative weight to the 
measures based on their importance to the whole, the unweighted index does not make this 
distinction. The unweighted index has a notable advantage: the performance of one 
measure will not have a dramatic effect on the performance of the whole index. This allows 
for each measure to be treated equally and for having an index that is more equitable. An 
unweighted index, where the measures have equal value, assumes that all measures are 
equal, but according to Barako et al. (2006), this is not usually the case. An unweighted 
index means coding with zero or one. If the variable is present, the study uses the code one; 
if not, it uses zero. This is the coding used in this study. 
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However, for this study, where the objective is to study the performance of companies of 
different sizes and industries, in the context of Anglo-American and Continental European 
traditions, it makes better sense to use an unweighted index where each corporate 
governance measure is treated equally, and where it is easier to identify the differences in 
the findings that emanate from country and from company difference.  Also, an unweighted 
index seems to be better in evaluating the performance of investments and other aspects of 
accounting performance. Therefore, the CGI constitutes one of the independent variables 
used in this study. The other two independent variables are ownership structure and board 
structure, which are dealt with at length below. 
5.11 The dependent variables 
This section discusses the dependent variables used in this study: risk-taking, credit rating 
and cost of capital. These variables were chosen so as to hopefully throw light on the 
performance of the companies. These dependent variables are operationalised using a 
variety of measures. Risk-taking is measured using expenditure on research and 
development (R&D) by dividing R&D on Total Assets, R&D on Sales and R&D 
Expenditure, as well as volatility in Return on Assets (ROA), which are estimated in 
equation (1). Similarly, following prior studies and assuming that all relations are linear. 
In measuring risk using R&D/Assets, Jiraporn, Chatjuthamard, Tong and Kim provided 
evidence that corporate governance influence corporate risk-taking. Other studies that 
examined risk using R&D/ Assets are Han, Bose, Hu, Qi and Tian (2015) which looked at 
the impact of director impact on corporate R&D investment, while Honore, Munari, and 
de La Potterie (2015) examined corporate governance practices and the impact this had on 
the companies’ R&D intensity. In measuring risk using R&D/Sales, Honore et al. (2015) 
noted how sales could affect the companies’ intensity in investing in R&D, and also how 
risk can have an impact on decision-making around R&D expenditures. 
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The four chosen risk measures are intended to be alternate ways of measuring the same 
type of risk. Thereafter, separate regressions are run to determine the effect of CG on risk-
taking. There are countless ways of measuring risk in all types of firms, it includes concepts 
such as alpha, beta, R-square, standard deviation and Sharpe ratio. Bromiley and Miller 
(1990) suggested several measures with basis in the financial statements, such as volatility 
in ROA and R&D divided by total Sales. Also operational measures such as cash holdings 
and volatility in turnover are common. Furthermore, Johansson (2005), claims total risk to 
be made up of operative and financial risk as measured by ROA and to be able to make 
assumptions about risk, it is required to study the changes in the key ratios over time. A 
higher volatility in ROA corresponds to a lower operative risk.  
In measuring risk using ROA volatility, Faccio, Marchica and Mora (2016) identify 
efficiency in the allocation of capital as influenced by the gender of the CEO, as evident in 
corporate risk-taking. Also, the degree to which bank governance has an effect on risk-
taking is revealed in company performance. In short, ROA is a good measure for risk and 
demonstrates the role of good corporate governance in financial performance of 
companies.  
Data on credit rating is taken from the long-term issuer credit ratings by Moody, Standard 
and Poor’s, and Fitch. Standard and Poor’s, Fitch and Moody have distinctly different 
measures, as mentioned above. Going from highest to lowest, the three agencies agree on 
the following broad ratings: premier, high grade, upper medium grade, lower medium, non-
investment grade, speculative, highly speculative, substantial risks, extremely speculative, 
default imminent, and lastly, in default. They all agree that a premier credit rating is 
reserved for companies with long-term Aaa for Moody’s and AAA for Standard and Poor’s 
and Fitch. However, Standard and Poor’s credit rating system uses the same notation as 
Fitch for practically all levels of credit ratings, and the notations are similar to Moody’s. 
Basically, the three credit agencies agree with respect to companies that are rated in the 
As, Bs and Cs classifications.  
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Ashbaugh-Skaife and LaFond (2006) showed that corporate governance has a positive 
effect on a firm’s credit rating, while Attig, El Ghoul, Guedhami and Suh (2013) revealed 
that corporate social responsibility can lead to better credit ratings for firms that commit to 
this practice. Bo, Lensink, and Murinde (2009) showed a positive link between corporate 
investment and credit ratings, while Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos (2015) found that credit 
ratings in both small and large listed companies revealed a link between corporate 
governance, capital structure and credit ratings. Elbannan (2009) showed that corporate 
governance and the level of internal control within companies had an impact on credit 
ratings. 
Some researchers point to the difference between Japanese and American rating agencies. 
One of the criticism is that there are split ratings between these agencies, with Japanese 
managers believing that the reason for the differences is the fact that American rating 
agencies do not take the uniqueness of Japanese companies into consideration (Shin and  
Moore, 2003). There is also the belief that Japanese agencies give higher ratings to 
Japanese firms than do Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, and that Japanese agencies, 
namely, the Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR) and Rating and Investment Information 
(R&I) seldom rate Japanese companies lower than the American agencies (Shin and 
Moore, 2003). But these researchers point out that in their study, American agencies use 
tougher ratings measures, and it is often argued that because of Japanese keiretsu affilia t ion 
may be seen as contributing to this (Shin and Moore, 2003). But these researchers point 
out that despite the differences between Japanese and American companies, it was found 
that there was not much difference in the ratings between Japanese and American raters in 
terms of financial risk, although there was a difference between ratings with respect to 
business risk (Shin and Moore, 2003). However, the rating process and the use of the letter 
grade system is similar among Japanese and American agencies, and the two Japanese 
agencies use a rating scheme that is similar to Standard and Poor’s (Shin and Moore, 2003).  
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In order to analyse the findings, this study has collapsed the various ratings into 21 credit 
ratings that show the assessment of ordinal risk. The 21 credit ratings are:  D, C, CC, CCC, 
CCC+, B-, B, B+, BB-, BB, BB+, BBB-, BBB, BBB+, A-, A, A+, AA-, AA, AA+ and 
AAA. D has an ordinal risk of zero, while C has an ordinal risk of 1, B an ordinal risk of 6 
and AAA an ordinal risk of 21, which are estimated in equation (2). Similarly, following 
prior studies and assuming that all relations are linear. 
In the cost of capital, companies have to develop measures to do so. It is important to point 
out that the cost of capital to a company includes not only the cost of borrowing new capital 
funds, but also the cost of equity. The cost of borrowing funds is based on what lenders 
demand from companies. The cost of equity is the percentage that a company’s owners 
would require to invest their money in the company. Therefore, cost of capital must be seen 
as involving the costs that both lenders and owners demand. This can be appreciated by 
looking at how publicly owned companies raise their capital. They either borrow money 
directly from a lender or they sell shares in the company. Therefore, the cost of capital 
would have to be based on the cost of debt as well as the cost of equity. 
Therefore, when companies set out to determine the cost of capital, they must develop a 
measure that would allow them to capture cost of equity as well as the cost of debt. The 
cost of equity is sometimes inferred by using the discount rate to determine the present 
value of the dividends expected (Gode and Mohanram, 2003). One way of measuring the 
value of equity is by using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which is really the 
rate of return based on risk (Gode and Mohanram, 2003). But as these authors point out, 
using the CAPM as a measure based on risk premium is weak, as expected returns often 
differ markedly from actual returns (Gode and Mohanram, 2003). 
Another approach is what is referred to as the ex ante approach, where one infers risk from 
looking at the expected dividends in terms of the current price. As these authors contend, 
future dividends are not easily observable, as analysts estimate earnings based on periods, 
and do not have the whole earnings stream on which to base their analysis (Gode and 
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Mohanram, 2003). Easton (2004) puts forward a method of estimating the expected rate of 
return on equity capital, which was shown to be important in determining the cost of 
capital. According to this author, two methods that have been used to evaluate rate of return 
on equity capital, namely, the price-earnings (PE) ratio and the price-earnings ratio divided 
by the short-term earnings rate (PEG ratio), are not accurate because they fail to capture 
the long-term picture. Easton (2004) therefore promotes the Ohlson-Juettner model.  
Gode and Mohanram (2003) explain why the PE and PEG methods do not work well. They 
note that it is difficult to use either of these approaches because certain assumptions have 
to be made about a pattern of payout ratios and the value at the end of the forecast period 
to a perpetual growth rate (Gode and Mohanram, 2003). The model that these authors see 
as taking these assumptions into consideration in evaluating cost of equity is the Ohlson-
Juettner model. This model is based on taking the current price, relating it to earnings per 
share and assuming a perpetual growth rate (Gode and Mohanram, 2003). 
Li and Mohanram (2014) believe that in computing the implied cost of capital, analysts 
encounter difficulty because only about half of the companies have earnings forecasts. 
These researchers explain that research has shown that the relations between measures of 
risk and realised returns are often weak, and in some cases non-existent (Li and Mohanram, 
2013).  
Li and Mohanram (2013) examine work by Gode and Mohanram (2003) and Easton 
(2004), and note that while these researchers have attempted to deal with assumptions using 
the Ohlson and later the Juettner-Nauroth (2005) models, they are still found to be lacking 
because they only work for about half the companies, and because forecasts by analysts are 
often unreliable. They recommend the use of a cross-sectional forecasting approach put 
forward by Hou, van Dijk and Zhang (2012), based on using current information from 
companies and making forecasts based on this information (Li and Mohanram, 2013). 
Consideration of these shortcomings is given adequate attention in this study, which are 
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estimated in equation (3). Similarly, following prior studies and assuming that all relations 
are linear. 
5.12 The independent variables 
As mentioned above, the independent variables used in this study are corporate governance 
index (CGI), ownership structure (OS) and board structure (BS). The measurement of CGI 
is explained above. These variables are critical to the study, as they are varied in order to 
see what impact they have on the dependent variables. 
The measurement of ownership structure is carried out on the basis of block ownership 
(BO), which is measured by the number of shares that the block owns; on the basis of 
institutional ownership (IO), which is measured by the number of shares owned by 
institutional; on the basis of director ownership (DO), which is measured by the number of 
shares owned by the director. 
Difference in ownership structure is seen as important to costs. For example, Anderson, 
Mansi and Reeb (2003) point out that costs are affected by ownership structure. The 
rationale for this is that when there is much manager-shareholder conflict, there is a greater 
need for surveillance, which increases costs (Anderson et al., 2003). In founding family 
ownership situations, agency costs are lower, as the interests of managers and owners 
become more aligned (Anderson et al., 2003). Anderson et al. (2003) find that there were 
fewer conflicts between those who owned the companies and those who were lenders to 
the company. This may be due to the fact that there was significant investment of family 
resources in the companies (Anderson et al., 2003). 
Lin and Shen (2015) note that ownership of family companies tends to have the opportunity 
to influence their credit ratings, because they have the possibility of showing greater 
earnings. However, as these researchers point out, while a family firm may be able to 
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manipulate earnings, if family idiosyncratic risk is observed, this would lessen the 
company’s credit rating (Lin and Shen, 2015). 
Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos (2015) show that capital structure, credit rating and corporate 
governance are closely related in small as well as large Greek companies. Corporate 
governance and credit ratings were seen to significantly affect the structure of the 
organisations. 
Lang and Jagtiani (2010) point out that corporate governance and credit risk management 
were important elements contributing to the 2007 financial crisis. The strains that took 
place as a result of poor risk management and the lack of corporate governance led to the 
collapse of the financial market (Lang and Jagtiani, 2010). 
Board structure is measured on the basis of independent directors (ID), on the basis of 
board size (BS), on the basis of board diversity (BD) and on the basis of the frequency of 
board meetings (FBM). Independent directors refers to directors that are from outside the 
company. Board diversity refers to the number of females on the board, while frequency 
of board meetings refers to how often the board meets. 
5.13 The control variables 
This section describes the control variables used in this study. This study will identify two 
groups of these variables. One group will deal with company characteristics, including the 
size of the company, its sales growth or other measurement of growth, its gearing of 
leverage, as well as industry dummies, year dummies, audit company size and company 
profitability.  
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Table 4: Variable Definitions and Measurement 
Variable Acronym Measurement 
1- CG Mechanisms CGM  
Corporate Governance Index CGI Survey instrument based on the OECD 2004 
Ownership Structure: OS  
Block Ownership BO The ratio of total number of ordinary shares held by block shareholders 
with at least 5%, to the total number of ordinary shares 
Institutional Ownership IO The ratio of total number of ordinary shares held by institutional 
shareholders with at least 5%, to the total number of ordinary shares 
Director Ownership DO The number of common stocks held by directors on the board to the total 
number of outstanding common shares 
Board Structure: BS  
Independent Directors ID The ratio of independent directors on the board to the total board members 
Board Size BZ The total number of directors on the board at the end of a financial year 
Board Diversity BD A binary number of one if a firm’s board has at least one male and one 
female at the end of a financial year, and zero otherwise 
Frequency of Board Meetings FBM A binary number of one if a firm’s board of directors meets at least four 
times in a financial year, and zero otherwise. 
2- Risk-Taking RT  
Research and Development/ 
Assets 
R&D/Assets Natural logarithm of the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets 
Research and Development/ Sales R&D/Sales Natural logarithm of the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales 
Research and Development 
Expenditure 
R&D 
Expenditure 
Natural logarithm of R&D expenditure 
Volatility in ROA VAP Volatility of Return on assets (ROA) 
3- Credit Rating CR Firm long-term credit rating obtained from Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) 
ratings ranging from AAA (highest rating) to D (lowest rating- debt in 
payment default).  
4- Cost of Capital COC The average of the 2 metrics: Modified Price-Earning Growth Model and 
Modified Economy- Wide Growth Model 
5- Control Variables CV  
Sales Growth SG The ratio of current year's sales minus previousyear's sales, all divided by 
previous year's sales 
Firm Size FS Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
Audit Committee No. AC Total number of Audit Committee 
CG Committee No. CGC Total number of Corporate Governance Committee 
Leverage LVG The ratio of total debt to total assets 
Capital Gain Yield CGY The rise in the stock price divided by the original price of the security  
Stock Market Capitalisation SMC The market value of the shares outstanding 
Corruption Index CI The misuse of public power for private benefit 
Inflation INF The rate at which the general level of prices for goods and services is rising 
GDP Per Capita GPRPC Gross domestic product (GDP) divided by number of people in the country  
Population POP People living in a country 
Masculinity MAS A preference in society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and 
material rewards for success 
Power Distance PD The degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and 
expect that power is distributed unequally  
Anglo-American AA A dummy variable for Anglo American countries (1), Continental countries 
(0) 
Country Cont A dummy variable for each country: UK (DU UK)…. US (DU US) 
Year Y A dummy variable for each year of the ten years from 2010-2014  2010 
(DU 10), 2011 (DU11) ... 2014 (DU14) 
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Company size is based on the natural logarithm of the book value of the total assets, while 
sales growth is shown as the ratio of the current year’s sales minus the previous year’s 
sales, all divided by the previous year’s sales. Another company-level factor is capital 
structure, which involves gearing or leverage, which is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
The country dummies for each country are given, with the United Kingdom shown as DU 
UK and the United States shown as DU US. A year dummy is shown for each of the years 
2010 to 2014, with 2010 shown as DU10, 2011 as DU11, and 2014 shown as DU14. Other 
firm-level variables that will be considered include the size of the audit firm responsible 
for auditing the companies. Audit committee members, corporate governance committee 
members and capital gain yield are also control variables, as they distinguish between the 
different companies. 
The second group deals with country-level control variables. These include the country’s 
legal system, whether common law or civil law. Countries with common law systems tend 
to have better protection for shareholders than countries with civil law systems. The 
accounting system used, whether based on international or local accounting standards, is 
also important, as different systems have different reporting requirements and notions of 
acceptable practice. The corporate governance system used, whether Anglo-American or 
Continental-European, also has different requirements and different protections for 
shareholders. A country’s GDP gives an indication of the prosperity and size of the 
economy, and the level of investment in the economy. The level of corruption in the 
country, its inflation rate and the treatment of shareholders’ rights are all factors that are 
significant to investors, affecting the amount of caution that an investor should exercise 
when investing in a particular economy. Population size, culture and cultural variables are 
important factors that shed light on an economy. This information is accessed from the 
World Bank website and other global sources of financial information on countries, as well 
as from the World Federation of Exchanges. Hofstede’s cultural variables also help identify 
the manner in which companies in particular countries approach business dealings. For 
example, countries are compared in terms of cultural factors, such as power distance, 
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individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation and indulgence, 
which influence how companies and their officials relate to business partners (Hofstede, 
2015).Firm-level variables and country-level variables are important as they are provide 
important factors that influence the functioning of the companies being studied. These 
variables were seen to make a major difference in the outcome of this study.  
5.14 Regression models 
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Where: 
RT - Risk-Taking 
𝛼0 - Constant Term 
CGI - Corporate Governance Index 
BO  - Block Ownership 
IO - Institutional Ownership 
DO - Director Ownership 
BS - Board Size 
BD - Board Diversity 
FBM - Frequency of Board Meetings 
ID - Independent Directors 
FCONTROLS - Firm level Control Variables for firm 
size, sales growth, audit committee 
number, corporate committee number, 
leverage, capital gain yield and five 
year dummies for 2010 to 2014 
inclusive. To avoid the dummy variable 
trap, year 2013 is excluded in 
estimating the equation 
CCONTROLS - Country level Control Variables for 
stock market capitalisation, corruption 
index, inflation, GDP per capita, 
Hofstede’s culture variables 
(masculinity and power distance), 
population, exchange rate and the 
(1) 
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country dummies for each country are 
given, with as DU UK, DU US.. 
            Ɛ - Error term 
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Where: 
CR - Credit Rating 
𝛼0 - Constant Term 
CGI - Corporate Governance Index 
BO  - Block Ownership 
IO - Institutional Ownership 
DO - Director Ownership 
BS - Board Size 
BD - Board Diversity 
FBM - Frequency of Board Meetings 
ID - Independent Directors 
FCONTROLS - Firm level Control Variables for firm 
size, sales growth, audit committee 
number, corporate committee number, 
leverage, capital gain yield and five 
year dummies for 2010 to 2014 
inclusive. To avoid the dummy variable 
trap, year 2013 is excluded in 
estimating the equation 
CCONTROLS - Country level Control Variables for 
stock market capitalisation, corruption 
index, inflation, GDP per capita, 
Hofstede’s culture variables 
(masculinity and power distance), 
population, exchange rate and the 
country dummies for each country are 
given, with as DU UK, DU US.. 
Ɛ - Error term 
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Where: 
COC - Cost of Capital 
𝛼0 - Constant Term 
CGI - Corporate Governance Index 
BO  - Block Ownership 
IO - Institutional Ownership 
DO - Director Ownership 
BS - Board Size 
BD - Board Diversity 
FBM - Frequency of Board Meetings 
ID - Independent Directors 
FCONTROLS - Firm level Control Variables for firm size, 
sales growth, audit committee number, 
corporate committee number, leverage, 
capital gain yield and five year dummies for 
2010 to 2014 inclusive. To avoid the 
dummy variable trap, year 2013 is excluded 
in estimating the equation 
CCONTROLS - Country level Control Variables for stock 
market capitalisation, corruption index, 
inflation, GDP per capita, Hofstede’s 
culture variables (masculinity and power 
distance), population, exchange rate and the 
country dummies for each country are 
given, with as DU UK, DU US.. 
Ɛ - Error term 
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5.15 Chapter summary 
This section provides a summary for the chapter, highlighting what was discussed. It points 
to the creation of the research design, indicating some of the potential drawbacks that could 
prevent the study from being generalisable to other examinations of how corporate 
governance mechanisms have an effect on corporate performance in terms of risk-taking, 
credit rating and cost of capital. 
This chapter has discussed the research design used in this study. It outlines the research 
paradigms, pointing out the rationale behind the use of qualitative and quantitative research 
methods and the positivist approach that is part of quantitative research. Based on a 
discussion of what is to be achieved in this study, namely, to examine how corporate 
governance mechanisms have an effect on corporate performance in terms of risk-taking, 
credit rating and cost of capital, this chapter has demonstrated why a quantitative research 
approach is recommended. The positivist approach was also seen to be the type of research 
approach taken in studies in the fields of business, accounting and economics. Based on 
this discussion, it was shown that the research design was well chosen.    
This chapter also discussed the selection of the sample, detailing why the study used 200 
firms from ten OECD countries over a period of five years after the 2007-08 global 
financial crisis, and why it was significant to use five countries from each of Anglo-
American and Continental European accounting systems. In all, 20 companies, both small 
and large, were chosen from both systems in order to provide a good basis for comparison. 
The chosen companies were drawn from common industries, but, in the analysis, 
companies from utilities and financials industries were excluded because they are heavily 
regulated, a factor that would have a major influence on their governance structures and 
financial performance. This chapter also provided the sources from which data was 
obtained. It was shown that there were two main types of data: the first, from interna l 
corporate governance variables, were obtained from annual reports from the Perfect 
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Information Database and the companies’ websites. The second type of data came from 
annual stock market and financial accounting performance variables, and were collected 
from DataStream and annual reports. Data sources were corporate governance data, 
financial data, credit rating data, and country- and firm-level data.  
Information was presented for the selection and justification of the sample. The criteria for 
selecting the sample were given, and reasons were given for the selection of the final 200 
stratified sample. Explanations were given for excluding certain companies from the 
sample, and how other companies were substituted. In short, this chapter explains why the 
particular sample was appropriate for this study. 
The research methodology was provided in detail, with explanation of how the corporate 
indices were developed. Details were provided on how the variables were organised. The 
dependent variables include risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital, and the 
independent variables include corporate governance index, ownership structure and board 
structure. Ownership structure includes block ownership, institutional ownership and 
director ownership; board structure includes independent directors, board size, board 
diversity and frequency of board meetings. Control variables included country-leve l 
variables and firm-level variables. These variables were important in looking at the various 
factors that have an impact on corporate governance and that affect the performance of the 
companies over the study period. 
The design of the study also includes regression models, which would be carried out in 
terms of risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital, and in terms of the variables 
mentioned above. It is with this research design that the next chapter moves into the actual 
research, with the aim of pointing out the procedure followed and the findings that resulted.  
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Chapter 6: Empirical Results and Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 provides the empirical results and discussion of this study. This chapter has four 
main objectives. The first is to describe in detail the OECD Governance Index used in this 
study, and, using descriptive statistics, to show how firms belonging to both the Anglo-
American tradition and the Continental European tradition comply with the OECD Corporate 
Governance Code. This objective also includes looking at the internal corporate governance 
provisions according to tradition and noting how compliant these firms are with the OECD 
corporate governance principles. The second objective is to report on the findings of the study 
using bivariate or correlational analysis and discuss the significance of these findings in terms 
of how corporate governance affects risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital for the firms 
studied. More specifically, to show the impact of the OECD Corporate Governance Index, 
based on firms’ internal characteristics, on risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. The 
third objective is to report on the findings using multivariate regression analyses and discuss 
the significance of these findings with respect to corporate governance impact on risk-taking, 
credit rating and cost of capital. A multivariate regression of the OECD Corporate Governance 
Index is carried out on all control variables to further ascertain the key determinants of the 
Index, as well as its relationship to the other variables. The fourth objective is to report on the 
robustness or sensitivity of these findings.  
The remainder of this chapter is divided according to these objectives. Section 6.1 deals with 
the descriptive statistics of the level of compliance of all firms in this study with the OECD 
Corporate Governance Index. Section 6.2 reports on the bivariate and correlational analysis in 
terms of internal characteristics of the firms and how corporate governance affects risk-taking, 
credit rating and cost of capital. Section 6.3 reports on the multivariate analysis of how 
independent and control variables impact firm performance as measured by risk-taking, credit 
rating and cost of capital. More specifically, the last two objectives involve reporting on the 
findings based on three models, with corporate governance index as the independent variable. 
Section 6.4 deals with the robustness of the study, and Section 6.5 summarises the chapter. 
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6.2 Descriptive statistics based on the full sample 
Table 5 reports on the firms’ level of compliance with the OECD corporate governance 
principles. This study shows that the characteristics included in the CGI are rights of 
shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders in corporate 
governance, disclosure and transparency, and responsibilities of the board. 
In this table, several questions are listed under each of these characteristics, and the compliance 
levels for all firms are shown as percentages for the five years under study. This table therefore 
describes the level of compliance of all firms on different dimensions of the characterist ics. 
The rights of shareholders are seen as important in the literature; it is explained that this level 
of compliance is important for the wellbeing of shareholders. Of the 13 items representing the 
rights of shareholders, one was 100%, three were in the 80s, one in the 70s, one in the 60s and 
one in the 50s. The significance of these findings is that on the most important and common 
characteristics that reveal compliance, there was a high level of compliance. However, the areas 
of low compliance suggest that these may be areas without much conflict. For example, for the 
question, “Does the company have anti-takeover defences, “cross shareholding” is shown as 
having a level of compliance as only between 16.5 and 17.0%. The response to “Is a name list 
of board attendance available” was 10.9%, increasing from 9.6% to 12.0% between 2010 and 
2014. This shows that while there is much compliance among the majority of firms in certain 
areas, there is a low level of compliance in other areas, which may be related to the different 
traditions of the firms. 
With respect to Rights of Shareholders, one of the first questions asked was “Does the company 
provide other ownership rights besides voting?” Based on this question, the level of compliance 
was 99.9% showing that all firms complied fully with OECD principles. The highest scores 
under the Rights of Shareholders section were 84.4% for clarity in dividend policy amount and 
explanation, 83.1% for presentation of board remuneration to shareholders, and 82.5%of 
compliance was achieved among the firms based on the quality of notice for shareholders’ 
meetings in the past year for appointment of directors, with provision of their names and 
background. The level of compliance with all of these characteristics increased over the five 
years under study. 
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Table 5: The Levels of Compliance with the Individual Internal Corporate Governance Provisions among the Sampled Firms. 
Individual Internal Corporate Governance Provisions of OECD CGI  Compliance Levels Among Firms (%) 
All 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Section A -- Rights of Shareholders       
Does the company provide other ownership rights besides voting? 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Do the shareholders approve annually the decision on how much to remunerate board members or executives?  68.6 64.1 65.0 69.0 73.0 73.0 
Are shareholders presented with board remuneration? 83.1 80.3 82.0 84.0 85.0 85.0 
Are the names and backgrounds of the directors appointed presented in a Quality of Notice to call Shareholders Meeting in 
the past one year?  
82.5 78.3 81.0 83.0 84.0 87.0 
Are the names and fees of the auditors appointed presented in a Quality of Notice to call Shareholders Meeting in the past 
one year? 
75.7 72.2 75.0 76.0 78.0 78.0 
Is the amount and explanation for Dividend policy presented in the Quality of Notice to call Shareholders Meeting in the past 
one year?. 
50.2 46.5 49.0 49.0 53.0 55.0 
In the last two years, did the Chairman of the Board attend at least one of the AGMs? 29.7 26.3 27.0 30.0 33.0 34.0 
In the last two years, did the CEO/Managing Director attend at least one of the AGMs? 33.4 30.8 30.0 33.0 36.0 38.0 
 Does the company make available a list of the board members in attendance at AGMs? 8.5 7.6 8.0 9.0 10.0 9.0 
Do the minutes from the AGM show whether shareholders had an opportunity to ask questions or raise issues with respect to 
the past year? 
10.9 9.6 10.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 
Dividend policy amount and explanation for payment are clear 84.4 83.3 85.0 84.0 85.0 86.0 
Does the company have anti-takeover defenses “Cross shareholding’? 16.5 16.2 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 
Board members hold more than 25% of share outstanding 28.6 28.8 29.0 29.0 29.0 28.0 
Section B -- Equitable Treatment of Shareholders        
Is one-share, one-vote a rule that the company uses? 92.0 92.4 92.0 92.0 92.0 92.0 
Is there any mechanism to allow minority shareholders to influence board composition? 10.4 10.6 11.0 11.0 11.0 10.0 
Have there been any cases of insider trading involving company directors and management in the past two years? 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
Are explanations or rationales provided by the company for any related-party transactions affecting the corporation? 88.5 86.9 88.0 89.0 90.0 89.0 
Is the company part of an economic group in which the economic group or controlling shareholder is in control of the key 
suppliers and customers of the company and/or are in similar bus inesses as the company? 
7.6 7.6 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Has the company been involved in any non-compliance case pertaining to related-party transactions in the past one year? 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Does the company facilitate voting by proxy? 86.6 82.2 85.0 87.0 89.0 90.0 
Are the documents needed to give proxy specified in the notice to shareholders? 86.6 82.8 85.0 87.0 89.0 90.0 
Does the company ensure that shareholders receive notice of general shareholders’ meeting 30 days or more in advance of these  
meetings? 
90.2 86.4 88.0 90.0 93.0 94.0 
Section C -- The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance       
Are the safety and welfare of its employees explicitly mentioned by the company? 93.2 92.4 94.0 94.0 94.0 93.0 
Are the role of key stakeholders such as customers or the community at large, including creditors or suppliers mentioned 
explicitly by the company? 
88.8 88.4 89.0 89.0 89.0 89.0 
Are environmental issues explicitly mentioned by the company in its public communications? 94.7 93.9 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 
Are ESOP (employee share option program), or other long-term employee incentive plan linked to shareholder value creation, 
provided to employees by the company? 
77.7 76.8 78.0 78.0 78.0 78.0 
Section D -- Disclosure and Transparency       
Is there a transparent ownership structure available for the company? Breakdown of shareholdings 59.7 59.1 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 
 Is it easy to identify beneficial ownership of the company? 96.9 98.0 97.0 98.0 97.0 96.0 
Does the company disclose director shareholdings? 84.5 84.5 85.0 85.0 85.0 84.0 
 Does the company disclose management shareholding? 45.1 45.5 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 
Does the company possess a dispersed ownership structure? 48.9 48.5 49.0 49.0 49.0 49.0 
Is the company's actual ownership structure obscured by cross-shareholdings? 4.2 5.1 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Is it possible to assess the quality of the annual report, in particular, financial performance? 98.7 98.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 
Is it possible to assess the quality of the annual report, in particular, business operations and the company’s competitive 
position? 
97.8 97.5 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 
Is it possible to assess the quality of the annual report, in particular, the backgrounds of board members? 64.4 63.6 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 
Is it possible to assess the quality of the annual report, in particular, the basis of the remuneration of board members? 84.8 83.8 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 
Is it possible to assess the quality of the annual report, in particular, operating risks? 97.2 96.5 98.0 98.0 98.0 97.0 
Are there any statements requiring directors to report their transactions of company stock? 34.3 33.3 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 
Is the company’s accounting carried out in accordance with an internationally recognised accounting standard?  72.8 65.2 74.0 75.0 76.0 76.0 
Is the company’s auditing carried out in accordance with an internal audit operation that is established as a separate unit in the 
company?  
98.7 98.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 
Does the company perform an annual audit using independent and reputable auditors? 99.2 98.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.0 
Does the audited financial statements have any accounting qualifications apart from the qualification on Uncertainty of 
Situation? 
4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Does the company offer multiple channels of access to information? 99.1 98.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.0 
Does the company disclose the financial report in a timely manner? 99.7 99.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Does the company have a website, disclosing up-to-date information? 87.0 83.3 87.0 86.0 90.0 89.0 
Section E -- Responsibilities of the Board       
Does the company have its own written corporate governance rules? 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Does the company’s board of directors have a code of ethics or statement of business conduct that all directors and employees 
must adhere to? 
98.7 98.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 
Does the company have corporate vision/mission statements? 63.8 64.6 64.0 64.0 64.0 63.0 
Does the regulatory agency have any evidence from the regulatory agency over the past three years that the company has been 
non-compliant with rules and regulations? 
39.7 37.9 38.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 
Is it possible to assess the quality and content of the Audit Committee Report in the annual report for Attendance 64.9 63.6 65.0 65.0 66.0 66.0 
Is it possible to assess the quality and content of the Audit Committee Report in the annual report for Internal control 77.4 76.3 77.0 78.0 79.0 77.0 
 Is it possible to assess the quality and content of the Audit Committee Report in the annual report for Management control 76.5 75.3 76.0 77.0 78.0 77.0 
Is it possible to assess the quality and content of the Audit Committee Report in the annual report for Legal compliance 53.1 52.0 53.0 53.0 55.0 54.0 
Assess the quality and content of the Audit Committee Report in the annual report for Conclusion or opinion 54.7 53.0 54.0 55.0 56.0 56.0 
Have board members participated in the Securities Regulation 
Committee (or equivalent) training on corporate governance? 
22.1 20.2 22.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 
How many board meetings does the company have per year? 99.1 99.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.0 
 Is the chairman and the CEO the same person? 24.9 24.2 26.0 25.0 25.0 26.0 
Does the company provide an option scheme with incentives for top management? 85.3 84.3 86.0 86.0 86.0 85.0 
Does the board appoint independent committees with independent members to carry out various critical responsibilities such as: 
audit, compensation and director nomination? 
90.2 89.4 91.0 91.0 91.0 90.0 
Does the company provide contact details for a specific investor relations person? 58.2 57.6 59.0 59.0 59.0 58.0 
Does the company have a board of directors report? 38.9 37.9 40.0 39.0 39.0 39.0 
Does the company disclose the amounts paid to the independent nonexecutive directors? 97.7 97.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 
Do the company provide training to directors (including executive and nonexecutive directors)? 76.1 74.7 76.0 77.0 77.0 77.0 
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Equitable treatment of shareholders is another important characteristic of the CGI, and firms 
were asked whether they offered a one-share-one-vote policy; 92.0% of firms said they did. 
Except for 2010, when the level was 92.4%, the remaining years were all at 92.0%. When asked 
“Does the company provide rational explanations for related-party transactions affecting the 
corporation?” the level of compliance among the firms with respect to the firms providing 
rational explanations was 88.5%. However, there was some fluctuation on this characterist ic 
over the years, with the figure in 2010 being 86.9%, increasing to 88.0%, 89.0%, 90.0% and 
89.0% in subsequent years. Generally, this level of compliance can be seen as good. Most of 
the firms facilitated voting by proxy, with an overall compliance rate of 86.6%, and a rate of 
90.0% in 2014. Regarding providing documents to give proxy and giving 30 days’ notice of 
shareholders’ meetings, the levels of compliance for all firms were 86.6% and 90.2%, with an 
average of 90% and 94.0% respectively for the five-year study period. 
The levels of compliance on the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure and 
transparency, and responsibilities of the board were high, although there were some areas 
where it was low on many dimensions of characteristics. For example, on the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance, scores were high on all the questions asked, with 93.2% 
for firms explicitly mentioning the safety and welfare of their employees. This percentage 
remained relatively high, fluctuating about one percentage point over the five years. Mention 
of key stakeholders and mention of environmental issues in public communications, as well as 
mention of firms providing long-term employee incentives, were embraced by some firms but 
not others. On the last of these issues, namely long-term employee incentives, there was an 
average compliance level of 77.7%, rising only slightly to 78.0% in 2014.  
However, on the characteristic of disclosure and transparency, there was disparity in 
compliance levels for many of the questions asked. While ease of identifying beneficia l 
ownership had an overall average of 96.9% compliance, only 45.1% of firms complied with 
disclosing management shareholding. With respect to timely disclosure of financial reports, 
100% of firms were in compliance in 2014; this was practically consistent for the five years. 
The level of compliance was low at 4.2% of the companies, showing a decline from 5.1% in 
2010 to 4.0%in the following years. 
In terms of responsibility of the board, levels of compliance ranged from 98.7 % of firms having 
a board of directors that provides a code of ethics, to only 38.9% of companies having a board 
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of directors’ report. Generally, levels of compliance with responsibilities of the board are 
relatively high, with the majority of firms adhering to these responsibilities. Of the 18 
dimensions of these characteristics, only four were below 50%. In the section, boards were 
asked, “Is the chairman and the CEO the same person?” scored only 24.9%, showing that there 
was a high level of compliance among the firms with respect to the chairman also being the 
CEO. This low score demonstrated the importance of agency theory in influencing firms to 
keep these two roles separate. 
Agency, stewardship, resource dependence, legitimacy and institutional theories are all 
important in explaining why these particular characteristics mentioned above were included in 
the CGI for this study (Conheady, McIlkenny, Opong& Pignatel, 2015). The relationship 
between owner and manager is one of principal and agent (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). The 
assumption is often made, and this is evident in real-life situations, that agents often cannot be 
trusted to look after the owners’ interest, when they may see the opportunity to look after their 
own interests. Therefore, the means for monitoring the operation of agents must exist, for it is 
through such action that owners or shareholders would be able to ensure that their interests are 
being safeguarded (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009).  
This theory can also be used to explain the responsibilities of the board, as boards monitor the 
actions and performance of management, thereby protecting the interests of shareholders or 
owners (Sternberg, 1997). Therefore, when there is strong independence of the board, it is 
likely that there will be more monitoring carried out by the board (Sternberg, 1997). Agency 
theory shows that there is a greater risk when corporate governance does not take into 
consideration the wellbeing of stakeholders. Therefore, in considering risk-taking, credit risk 
and cost of capital, it is important to look at the interests of shareholders as well as the 
responsibilities of the board. 
However, stewardship theory can also be applied to the board, for while agency theory sees 
outside or independent board members as carrying out roles that focus on audit, compensation 
and director nomination, stewardship theory sees executives or insider directors as managing 
the interests of shareholders. On the questions under the role of the stakeholders in corporate 
governance, stewardship theory could also apply, as company managers are seen as playing an 
important role of protecting employees and other stakeholders (Letting et al., 2012). The 
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understanding is that internal executives and directors have good knowledge of the firm and its 
shareholders. 
In terms of the board of directors, resource dependence theory points out that individual board 
members help firms secure resources (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009; Letting et al., 2012). In 
this study, about three quarters of the firms see their directors as an important resource. For 
example, in the section, Responsibilities of the Board, one question asked is, “Does the 
company provide training to directors (including executive and nonexecutive directors)?” This 
question is based on discovering how many firms see their directors as providing resources to 
the firm through the interrelations of these directors with other parts of the community, thereby 
providing access to resources to the firms. (Chen & Roberts, 2010). 
The questions asked under the Role of Stakeholders section implicitly highlight the issue of 
legitimacy, as they pertain to how firms deal with the safety and welfare of workers, 
environmental issues, long-term employee incentive plans and key stakeholders in general.  
This can be seen as displaying the importance of legitimacy theory in this CGI. Legitimacy 
theory deals with the institutional legitimacy of the firm, established by firms acting in ways 
that demonstrate their support of social values (Chen & Roberts, 2010). 
Institutional theory also plays an important part in this study, for there is a link between 
legitimacy theory and institutional theory, since a firm can adopt institutional forms and rules 
which give it legitimacy within its environment (Chen & Roberts, 2010). The CGI in this study, 
demonstrates the importance of shareholders, managers, boards and other stakeholders in 
assessing corporate governance.  
Overall, firms showed a consistently high level of compliance with OECD corporate 
governance principles across the five years under study. In terms of disclosure and 
transparency, there appears to be consistency across the years. However, there are different 
levels of compliance among firms; for example, only 34.3% of firms report having a statement 
requesting directors to report their company stock transactions. 
The use of the CGI in this study is supported by other researchers who feel that using an index 
is superior to using individual corporate mechanisms (Gompers et al., 2003; Roe, 2003; Holm 
& Zaman, 2012). The combination of provisions that were included in this CGI have shown 
positive results in the past; as Gompers et al. (2004) observe, where shareholders’ rights are 
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weak and democracy is lacking, agency conflicts are seen as commonplace. Therefore, several 
characteristics are important in establishing corporate governance. Some of the more important 
of these characteristics used in this study are shareholder rights, equitable treatment of 
shareholders, the role of shareholders in corporate governance, disclosure and transparency, 
and responsibilities of the board in how corporate governance could impact risk-taking, credit 
rating, and cost of capital as drawn up in our hypotheses 
In short, Table 5 shows that the countries that have been used in this study shows take the rights 
of the shareholders seriously. Most of the firms demonstrate equitable treatment of 
shareholders. Only a minority of firms demonstrate that they possess mechanisms that allow 
shareholders to influence the composition of the board (10.4%). This number fluctua tes 
slightly, starting at 10.6% and ending at 10.0%. Only a small percentage of firms were involved 
in insider trading involving inside directors and managers; this does not appear to be an ongoing 
problem, as it was observed only in 2013 and 2014, thereby contributing to an overall 
percentage of 0.2% over the five years under study. Similarly, a small number of firms were 
found to be part of an economic group that had control over key suppliers, customers, and 
similar businesses, or who owned similar businesses, thereby reducing equitable treatment of 
shareholders. This percentage is constant at about 8.0. Non-compliance with respect to related-
party transactions within the past year was found only in 1.5% of the firms, showing that the 
majority of firms engage in equitable treatment of shareholders. The majority of firms 
demonstrate their compliance with other good corporate governance practices. The findings 
also reveal evidence that the firms overall support the application of agency, stewardship, 
resource dependence, legitimacy and institutional theories in explaining their adoption of 
corporate governance. 
6.3 Descriptive statistics for level of compliance to OECD CGI based on country 
difference 
While it is important to look at the overall compliance level for the full sample of firms used 
in the study, it is also important to look at the firms based on country affiliation. Table 6 
summarises the descriptive statistics based on country, showing the differences in levels of 
compliance among countries. 
To facilitate comparison for the different countries, the findings reveal the percentage levels of 
compliance for the pooled sample, as well as the percentage level of compliance for each of 
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the five years reported. Applying the OECD CGI to the various firms based on their country 
membership reveals that the mean for each of the five years shows no major variations. These 
findings are shown in Panel A. The mean for all firms between 2010 and 2014 is 39.85, ranging 
from 38.73 in 2010 to 40.51 in 2014. This means that the level of compliance for our sample 
of firms increased, and the standard deviation was about 7.04.  
Although the firms demonstrate high compliance with some practices and low compliance with 
others, the overall level of compliance, as reported in Table 6, shows a level of compliance 
among all firms over the five years from 2010 to 2014 to be higher among U.K firms, where 
the level of compliance was 44.87%. The level of compliance for Ireland firms was 40.66%. 
For France firms, compliance was 44.98%. For Germany firms, level of compliance was 
42.03%, and for Italy firms it was 41.34%. The level of compliance for these firms was higher 
than the mean for all firms in the pooled sample. U.S. firms had a compliance level of 39.44% 
in 2010, which is approximately the level of compliance for the pooled sample. Spain’s 
compliance level is slightly lower, at 36.91%. For Japan, in this period the level of compliance 
with the OECD principles was only 26.83%.  
The results show no substantial change in the level of compliance over the five years, although 
all improved. Compliance increased from 38.73% to 40.51% in 2014. U.K. firms went from 
44.30% to 45.25%, Irish firms from 40.15% to 41.00%, Australian firms from 37.00% to 
42.20%, Canadian firms from 37.05% to 42.20%, French firms from 43.20% to 45.90%, 
German firms from 41.10% to 42.30% and Italian firms from 40.75% to 42.00%. The United 
States firms remained quite constant, from 39.35% to 39.45%, a very small improvement. 
Spanish firms show a change from 34.65% in 2010 to 37.40%, while Japanese firms show a 
change from 26.25% to 28.00%.  
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Table 6: Summary Descriptive Statistics for the OECD Corporate Governance Index 
The OECD CGI Mean T-Test Std. Dev Skew-ness Kurt-osis Mini-mum Maxi-mum 
Panel A: All Firm Years 39.85  7.04 -1.35 2.56 1.00 52.00 
2010 38.73  8.30 -1.66 3.93 1.00 52.00 
2011 39.67  6.84 -1.07 0.99 16.00 52.00 
2012 39.98  6.66 -1.11 1.21 16.00 52.00 
2013 40.37  6.68 -1.19 1.38 16.00 52.00 
2014 40.51  6.49 -1.16 1.31 17.00 52.00 
Panel B: UK Firms 44.87 .086(.000)*** 3.40 -1.07 1.92 36.00 50.00 
2010 44.30 .086(.001)*** 3.89 -0.99 0.55 36.00 50.00 
2011 44.80 .090(.000)*** 3.41 -1.09 1.51 36.00 50.00 
2012 44.70 .083(.001)*** 3.36 -1.07 1.66 36.00 50.00 
2013 45.30 .086(.000)*** 3.13 -1.11 3.15 36.00 50.00 
2014 45.25 .083(.000)*** 3.19 -1.07 2.71 36.00 50.00 
Panel C: Ireland Firms 40.66 .011(.285) 4.65 -0.90 1.08 28.80 47.00 
2010 40.15 .013(.602) 4.77 -0.58 -0.03 29.00 47.00 
2011 40.25 .010(.688) 4.85 -0.96 1.53 27.00 47.00 
2012 40.95 .017(.491) 3.97 -0.26 -0.93 34.00 47.00 
2013 40.95 .010(.683) 4.85 -1.34 2.27 27.00 47.00 
2014 41.00 .008(.719) 4.79 -1.38 2.55 27.00 47.00 
Panel D: USA Firms 39.44 .009(.396) 2.82 -0.53 -0.85 34.00 43.00 
2010 39.35 .000(.981) 2.89 -0.59 -0.77 34.00 43.00 
2011 39.50 .002(.910) 2.76 -0.50 -0.93 34.00 43.00 
2012 39.50 .008(.738) 2.72 -0.49 -0.82 34.00 43.00 
2013 39.40 .017(.495) 2.87 -0.54 -0.90 34.00 43.00 
2014 39.45 .018(.444) 2.84 -0.56 -0.82 34.00 43.00 
Panel E: Australia Firms 40.15 .014(.198) 7.08 -0.79 1.56 22.40 52.00 
2010 37.00 .016(.532) 12.65 -1.74 2.73 4.00 52.00 
2011 40.20 .009(.713) 6.01 -0.34 0.26 27.00 52.00 
2012 40.25 .004(.846) 6.07 -0.33 0.19 27.00 52.00 
2013 41.05 .011(.633) 5.60 -0.47 1.00 27.00 52.00 
2014 42.20 .029(.218) 5.08 -1.06 3.59 27.00 52.00 
Panel F: Canada Firms 40.15 .023(.039)** 7.08 -0.79 1.56 22.40 52.00 
2010 37.05 .019(.447) 12.65 -1.74 2.73 4.00 52.00 
2011 40.20 .027(.275) 6.01 -0.34 0.26 27.00 52.00 
2012 40.25 .026(.281) 6.07 -0.33 0.19 27.00 52.00 
2013 41.05 .021(.387) 5.60 -0.47 1.00 27.00 52.00 
2014 42.20 .019(.426) 5.08 -1.06 3.59 27.00 52.00 
Panel G: France Firms 44.98 .088(.000)*** 4.13 -0.71 1.02 35.60 52.00 
2010 43.20 .067(.009)*** 5.52 -0.48 -0.84 34.00 52.00 
2011 44.30 .081(.001)*** 4.39 -0.69 0.69 34.00 52.00 
2012 44.95 .087(.000)*** 4.36 -1.09 1.43 34.00 52.00 
2013 46.55 .108(.000)*** 2.56 0.21 -0.33 42.00 52.00 
2014 45.90 .095(.000)*** 3.81 -1.48 4.17 34.00 52.00 
Panel H: Germany Firms 42.03 .040(.000)*** 5.30 -0.80 2.18 27.40 51.00 
2010 41.10 .051(.046)** 7.59 -2.03 5.86 16.00 51.00 
2011 42.30 .046(.069)* 4.79 -0.52 1.26 30.00 51.00 
2012 42.15 .038(.124) 4.78 -0.49 1.28 30.00 51.00 
2013 42.30 .034(.174) 4.69 -0.56 1.66 30.00 51.00 
2014 42.30 .031(.192) 4.67 -0.39 0.86 31.00 51.00 
Panel I: Spain Firms 36.91 .046(.000)*** 7.19 -1.20 1.61 17.80 46.00 
2010 34.65 .046(.071)* 10.43 -1.94 4.82 1.00 46.00 
2011 37.35 .040(.111) 6.49 -0.83 0.14 22.00 46.00 
2012 37.70 .040(.107) 6.17 -0.89 0.99 22.00 46.00 
2013 37.45 .051(.039)** 6.44 -1.17 1.05 22.00 46.00 
2014 37.40 .054(.023)** 6.42 -1.17 1.07 22.00 46.00 
Panel J: Italy Firms 41.34 .023(.035)** 5.61 -1.59 2.88 25.60 48.00 
2010 40.75 .024(.351) 5.96 -1.37 1.99 25.00 48.00 
2011 40.55 .015(.543) 6.13 -1.20 1.25 25.00 48.00 
2012 41.50 .026(.281) 5.39 -1.57 2.87 26.00 48.00 
2013 41.90 .026(.281) 5.25 -1.92 4.18 26.00 48.00 
2014 42.00 .024(.311) 5.29 -1.92 4.13 26.00 48.00 
Panel K: Japan Firms 26.83 .231(.000)*** 4.82 -0.49 -0.33 16.40 34.20 
2010 26.25 .231(.000)*** 4.69 -0.45 -0.95 17.00 32.00 
2011 26.15 .238(.000)*** 4.76 -0.54 -0.66 16.00 32.00 
2012 26.55 .236(.000)*** 4.84 -0.35 -0.25 16.00 35.00 
2013 27.20 .232(.000)*** 5.00 -0.55 -0.01 16.00 36.00 
2014 28.00 .219(.000)*** 4.79 -0.56 0.24 17.00 36.00 
Notes: The t-test in column 3 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means. The mean differences in Panels B to 
Ktest for equality of means between each country’s firms and other firms in the sample. A mean difference with (***), (**) 
and (*) indicates that the null hypothesis that the means are equal is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, 
respectively. The skewness and kurtosis test statistics in columns 5 and 6, respectively, test for normal distribution.  
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It is evident from the findings in Table 6 that there were differences in levels of compliance 
among firms following the Anglo American and Continental accounting traditions. The highest 
scores of compliance with OECD principles were found among U.K. and French firms over 
the five years. However, while for U.K. firms the level of compliance was consistent 
throughout the period as evidenced by the T-test that fluctuated between .086 and 0.83, in 
France the difference was more irregular, ranging from .067 to .108 (2013) and then dropping 
back to .095 in 2014. Whereas the T-test showed significance over all five years both in the 
U.K. and France, it was only significant for Spanish firms in 2010 and for the cumulative mean 
score for the five years. This was similar for German firms for 2010, 2011 and its cumulat ive 
mean score, and for the overall mean for Canadian firms for the five years. Since the 
significance as shown in the T-tests results is between zero and 1%, the relationship between 
the variables is very strong. In other words, the compliance by firms with the OECD 
governance practices was strong, and related to the country’s traditions. 
In Table 7, a comparison between the levels of compliance of the firms is strong based on 
individual corporate governance provisions that the countries adhere to according to their 
tradition in achieving corporate governance. In this table the findings show that both countries 
belonging to the Anglo American and Continental countries protect the rights of the 
shareholders, but that those from the Anglo American tradition scored higher on company 
offering of other ownership rights beyond voting, on shareholders approving remuneration for 
board members annually, on presentation of board remuneration to shareholders, on quality of 
notice to shareholders about meeting, and on provision of dividend policy amount and clarity 
in explanation for payment. There is a significant difference between the findings on approval 
for remuneration of board members, presentation of board remuneration to the board, and 
quality of notice to shareholders about meetings. The Continental tradition scored higher than 
the Anglo tradition with respect to the quality of notice to call a shareholders’ meeting for 
dividends, chairs attending board AGMs, having a list of board attendance available, having 
company anti-takeover defences and having board members that hold more than 25 % of shares 
outstanding.  
The findings from the following table, comparing the levels of compliance with individua l 
internal corporate governance provisions by Anglo and Continental traditions, reveal some 
significant differences among governance provisions. 
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Table 7: A Comparison of the levels of Compliance with the Individual Internal Corporate Governance Provisions by Tradition  
Individual Internal Corporate Governance Provisions of  the OECD CGI Compliance Levels between Anglo and Continental Firm 
All Firm Years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Anglo Cont T-Test Anglo Cont Anglo Cont Anglo Cont Anglo Cont Anglo Cont 
Section A -- Rights of  Shareholders              
Does the company provide other ownership rights besides voting? 99.8 99.6 .002(.564) 99.0 99.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Do the shareholders approve annually the decision on how much to remunerate board members or 
executives?  
86.4 50.6 .359(.000)*** 81.0 46.0 83.0 47.0 87.0 50.0 89.0 56.0 92.0 54.5 
Are shareholders presented with board remuneration? 94.2 71.6 .224(.000)*** 91.0 68.0 93.0 71.0 94.0 73.0 95.0 74.0 98.0 72.7 
Are the names and backgrounds of the directors appointed presented in a Quality of Notice to call 
Shareholders Meeting in the past one year?  
93.8 70.8 .228(.000)*** 91.0 64.0 92.0 70.0 93.0 72.0 95.0 73.0 98.0 75.8 
Are the names and fees of the auditors appointed presented in a Quality of Notice to call Shareholders 
Meeting in the past one year? 
79.6 71.6 .078(.004)*** 78.0 65.0 79.0 71.0 81.0 71.0 80.0 76.0 80.0 75.8 
Is the amount and explanation for Dividend policy presented in the 
Quality of Notice to call Shareholders Meeting in the past one year? 
48.0 52.2 .043(.174) 44.0 48.0 46.0 51.0 47.0 50.0 51.0 55.0 52.0 57.6 
In the last two years, did the Chairman of the Board attend at least one of the AGMs? 26.4 32.8 .064(.025)** 24.0 28.0 25.0 28.0 24.0 35.0 28.0 37.0 31.0 36.4 
In the last two years, did the CEO/Managing Director attend at least one of the AGMs? 25.6 41.0 .154(.000)*** 24.0 37.0 24.0 36.0 23.0 42.0 27.0 45.0 30.0 45.5 
 Does the company make available a list of the board members in attendance at AGMs? 3.4 13.6 .102(.000)*** 3.0 12.0 3.0 12.0 3.0 15.0 4.0 15.0 4.0 14.1 
Do the minutes from the AGM show whether shareholders had an opportunity to ask questions or raise 
issues with respect to the past year? 
7.0 14.8 .078(.000)*** 7.0 12.0 7.0 12.0 7.0 16.0 7.0 17.0 7.0 17.2 
Dividend policy amount and explanation for payment are clear 89.2 79.2 .098(.000)*** 86.0 79.0 89.0 80.0 90.0 78.0 90.0 79.0 91.0 80.8 
Does the company have anti-takeover defenses “ Cross shareholding’? 9.2 23.8 .146(.000)*** 9.0 23.0 9.0 24.0 9.0 24.0 9.0 24.0 10.0 24.2 
Board members hold more than 25% of share outstanding 17.0 40.0 .230(.000)*** 17.0 40.0 17.0 41.0 17.0 41.0 17.0 40.0 17.0 38.4 
Section B -- Equitable Treatment of  Shareholders               
Is one-share, one-vote a rule that the company uses?  98.0 85.6 .122(.000)*** 98.0 85.0 98.0 86.0 98.0 86.0 98.0 86.0 98.0 85.9 
Is there any mechanism to allow minority shareholders to influence board composition? 2.0 18.8 .168(.000)*** 2.0 19.0 2.0 19.0 2.0 19.0 2.0 19.0 2.0 18.2 
Have there been any cases of insider trading involving company directors and management in the past two 
years?  
0.0 0.4 .004(.157) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 
Are explanations or rationales provided by the company for any related-party transactions affecting the 
corporation?  
93.8 82.8 .108(.000)*** 92.0 80.0 94.0 81.0 94.0 84.0 95.0 85.0 94.0 84.8 
Is the company part of an economic group in which the economic group or controlling shareholder is in 
control of the key suppliers and customers of the company and/or are in similar businesses as the company?  
6.2 9.0 .028(.093)* 6.0 9.0 6.0 9.0 6.0 9.0 6.0 9.0 7.0 9.1 
Has the company been involved in any non-compliance case pertaining to related-party transactions in the 
past one year?  
2.0 1.0 .009(.195) 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 
Does the company facilitate voting by proxy?  93.2 79.6 .134(.000)*** 90.0 74.0 92.0 77.0 93.0 80.0 94.0 84.0 97.0 83.8 
Are the documents needed to give proxy specified in the notice to shareholders? 93.2 79.6 .134(.000)*** 90.0 74.0 92.0 77.0 93.0 80.0 94.0 84.0 97.0 83.8 
Does the company ensure that shareholders receive notice of general shareholders’ meeting 30 days or more 
in advance of these meetings?  
93.2 86.8 .062(.001)*** 90.0 81.0 92.0 84.0 93.0 87.0 94.0 91.0 97.0 91.9 
Section C -- The Role of  Stakeholders in Corporate Governance              
Are the safety and welfare of its employees explicitly mentioned by the company?  95.6 90.4 .050(.002)*** 94.0 89.0 96.0 91.0 96.0 91.0 96.0 91.0 96.0 90.9 
Are the role of key stakeholders such as customers or the community at large, including creditors or 
suppliers mentioned explicitly by the company?  
92.8 84.4 .082(.000)*** 92.0 83.0 93.0 85.0 93.0 85.0 93.0 85.0 93.0 84.8 
Are environmental issues explicitly mentioned by the company in its public communications?  94.6 94.2 .000(.994) 93.0 93.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 93.9 
Are ESOP (employee share option program), or other long-term employee incentive plan linked to 
shareholder value creation, provided to employees by the company? 
97.6 57.4 .400(.000)*** 96.0 56.0 98.0 58.0 98.0 58.0 98.0 58.0 98.0 57.6 
Section D -- Disclosure and Transparency              
Is there a transparent ownership structure available for the company?  Breakdown of shareholdings  30.8 88.4 .5777(.000)*** 30.0 87.0 31.0 89.0 31.0 89.0 31.0 89.0 31.0 88.9 
 Is it easy to identify beneficial ownership of the company?  98.4 95.0 .032(.004)*** 99.0 95.0 99.0 94.0 98.0 97.0 98.0 95.0 98.0 94.9 
Does the company disclose director shareholdings?  98.6 70.0 .283(.000)*** 97.0 70.0 99.0 70.0 99.0 70.0 99.0 71.0 99.0 69.7 
 Does the company disclose management shareholding? 57.8 32.2 .255(.000)*** 57.0 33.0 58.0 32.0 58.0 32.0 58.0 32.0 58.0 32.3 
Does the company possess a dispersed ownership structure? 34.0 63.6 .297(.000)*** 34.0 62.0 34.0 64.0 34.0 64.0 34.0 64.0 34.0 64.6 
Is the company's actual ownership structure obscured by cross-shareholdings?  1.4 7.0 .056(.000)*** 3.0 7.0 1.0 7.0 1.0 7.0 1.0 7.0 1.0 7.1 
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Is it possible to assess the quality of the annual report, in particular, financial performance?  98.6 98.4 .000(.997) 97.0 97.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 
Is it possible to assess the quality of the annual report, in particular, business operations and the company’s 
competitive position? 
96.8 98.4 .017(.058)* 96.0 97.0 97.0 99.0 97.0 99.0 97.0 99.0 97.0 99.0 
Is it possible to assess the quality of the annual report, in particular, the backgrounds of board members?  60.6 68.0 .075(.013)** 59.0 67.0 61.0 68.0 61.0 68.0 61.0 69.0 61.0 68.7 
Is it possible to assess the quality of the annual report, in particular, the basis of the remuneration of board 
members?  
92.6 76.6 .158(.000)*** 91.0 75.0 93.0 77.0 93.0 77.0 93.0 77.0 93.0 77.8 
Is it possible to assess the quality of the annual report, in particular, operating risks? 97.6 96.4 .0100(.344) 96.0 95.0 98.0 97.0 98.0 97.0 98.0 97.0 98.0 97.0 
Are there any statements requiring directors to report their transactions of company stock?  40.6 27.8 .127(.000)*** 39.0 27.0 41.0 28.0 41.0 28.0 41.0 28.0 41.0 28.3 
Is the company’s accounting carried out in accordance with an internationally recognised accounting 
standard?  
65.2 80.2 .151(.000)*** 52.0 77.0 68.0 79.0 68.0 81.0 69.0 82.0 69.0 82.8 
 Is the company’s auditing carried out in accordance with an internal audit operation that is established as a 
separate unit in the company?  
99.6 97.4 .020(.007)*** 98.0 96.0 100.0 98.0 100.0 98.0 100.0 98.0 100.0 98.0 
Does the company perform an annual audit using independent and reputable auditors? 99.6 98.4 .010(.094)* 98.0 97.0 100.0 99.0 100.0 99.0 100.0 99.0 100.0 99.0 
Does the audited financial statements have any accounting qualifications apart from the qualification on 
Uncertainty of Situation? 
2.0 6.0 .040(.001)*** 2.0 6.0 2.0 6.0 2.0 6.0 2.0 6.0 2.0 6.1 
Does the company offer multiple channels of access to information?  98.6 99.2 .009(.095)* 97.0 98.0 99.0 100.0 99.0 100.0 99.0 100.0 99.0 99.0 
Does the company disclose the financial report in a timely manner?  99.6 99.4 .000(.998) 98.0 98.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Does the company have a website, disclosing up-to-date information?  92.0 81.6 .102(.000)*** 90.0 76.0 92.0 81.0 91.0 81.0 93.0 86.0 94.0 84.8 
Section E -- Responsibilities of  the Board              
Does the company have its own written corporate governance rules? 0.0 1.0 .010(.025)** 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 
Does the company’s board of directors have a code of ethics or statement of business conduct that all 
directors and employees must adhere to?  
98.6 98.4 .000(.997) 97.0 97.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 
Does the company have corporate vision/mission statements?  54.0 73.4 .195(.000)*** 54.0 74.0 54.0 74.0 54.0 74.0 54.0 73.0 54.0 72.7 
Does the regulatory agency have any evidence from the regulatory agency over the past three years that the 
company has been non-compliant with rules and regulations? 
38.8 40.4 .016(.588) 36.0 39.0 36.0 40.0 40.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.4 
Is it possible to assess the quality and content of the Audit Committee Report in the annual report for 
Attendance 
68.8 60.8 .078(.009)*** 67.0 59.0 68.0 61.0 69.0 61.0 70.0 62.0 70.0 61.6 
Is it possible to assess the quality and content of the Audit Committee Report in the annual report for 
Internal control 
91.6 62.8 .286(.000)*** 90.0 61.0 91.0 63.0 92.0 63.0 93.0 64.0 92.0 63.6 
 Is it possible to assess the quality and content of the Audit Committee Report in the annual report for 
Management control 
89.8 62.8 .268(.000)*** 88.0 61.0 89.0 63.0 90.0 63.0 91.0 64.0 91.0 63.6 
Is it possible to assess the quality and content of the Audit  Committee Report in the annual report for Legal 
compliance 
61.8 44.2 .175(.000)*** 60.0 43.0 62.0 43.0 62.0 44.0 63.0 46.0 62.0 45.5 
Assess the quality and content of the Audit Committee Report in the annual report for Conclusion or opinion 71.2 38.0 .331(.000)*** 68.0 37.0 70.0 38.0 72.0 38.0 73.0 39.0 73.0 38.4 
Have board members participated in the Securities Regulation Committee (or equivalent) training on 
corporate governance?  
37.8 6.4 .313(.000)*** 35.0 5.0 37.0 6.0 39.0 7.0 39.0 7.0 39.0 7.1 
How many board meetings does the company have per year?  99.4 98.4 .011(.057)* 99.0 97.0 100.0 99.0 100.0 99.0 100.0 99.0 98.0 99.0 
 Is the chairman and the CEO the same person?  25.0 24.8 .001(.956) 26.0 22.0 27.0 24.0 26.0 24.0 23.0 26.0 23.0 28.3 
Does the company provide an option scheme with incentives for top management?  98.6 71.6 .268(.000)*** 97.0 70.0 99.0 73.0 99.0 72.0 99.0 72.0 99.0 71.7 
Does the board appoint independent committees with independent members to carry out various critical 
responsibilities such as: audit, compensation and director nomination? 
99.6 80.4 .190(.000)*** 98.0 79.0 100.0 81.0 100.0 81.0 100.0 81.0 100.0 80.8 
Does the company provide contact details for a specific investor relations person? 53.6 62.6 .091(.003)*** 52.0 62.0 54.0 63.0 54.0 63.0 54.0 63.0 54.0 62.6 
Does the company have a board of directors report?  46.8 30.8 .159(.000)*** 45.0 30.0 48.0 31.0 47.0 31.0 47.0 31.0 47.0 31.3 
Does the company disclose the amounts paid to the independent nonexecutive directors?  99.6 95.4 .040(.000)*** 98.0 94.0 100.0 96.0 100.0 96.0 100.0 96.0 100.0 96.0 
Do the company provide training to directors (including executive and nonexecutive directors)?  87.0 65.0 .218(.000)*** 85.0 63.0 87.0 65.0 87.0 66.0 88.0 66.0 88.0 65.7 
Notes: The t-test in column 4 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means between all firms in Anglo countries and all firms in Continental countries. A mean difference with (***) 
(**), and (*) indicates that the null hypothesis that the means are equal is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.
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In terms of equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders in corporate 
governance, disclosure and transparency, and responsibilities of the board, as in other measures 
of the rights of shareholders, the Anglo tradition seems, on average, to promote greater 
compliance with the OECD corporate governance than the Continental tradition. It should be 
noted that there are some areas of compliance that appear to be of greater significance to 
Continental countries than to Anglo countries. However, over the period under study, both 
Anglo and Continental firms appear to have increased their level of compliance with the OECD 
corporate governance principles. 
6.4 Multivariate regression analyses, results and discussion 
6.4.1 Models used in the regression and the findings 
The second objective is to report on the relationship between the dependent and all continuous 
independent variables used in bivariate or correlational analysis. The correlation that was 
carried out was based on the relationship between corporate governance and performance. 
Corporate governance was measured in terms of the corporate governance Index, or CGI, 
discussed above. There were also other measures of corporate governance: ownership structure 
and board structure. These were used as independent variables. Performance was measured in 
terms of risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital.  
In Model 1, the CGI was used as an independent variable, with risk-taking, credit rating and 
cost of capital as dependent variables. Basically, in Model 1, risk-taking is measured in terms 
of R&D/Assets as a dependent variable, as R&D/Sales as dependent variable, as R&D 
Expenditure as dependent variable and as ROA as dependent variable. In representing credit 
rating, the study uses S&P only in the analysis as the dependent variable, and cost of capital is 
used as a dependent variable. These dependent variables were correlated with CGI as the 
independent variable. 
In Model 2, ownership structure is used as an independent variable, with risk-taking, credit 
rating and cost of capital. Model 2 uses the same measures for risk-taking as in Model 1. 
Credit rating and cost of capital are also measured in the same way. 
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In Model 3, board structure is used as the independent variable and, as in Models 1 and 2, this 
independent variable is correlated with the same dependent variables represent risk-taking, 
credit rating and cost of capital. 
6.4.2 Multivariate regression analyses, results and discussion: CGI and 
risk-taking 
Table 8 reports findings from the study in which CGI is the independent variable and 
R&D/Assets serves as proxy for risk-taking. 
Hypotheses were drawn up based on the literature review, which revealed prior studies that 
show a relationship between corporate governance and risk-taking (Elbannan, 2009). Based on 
this thinking, prior research suggests that if a firm has poor corporate governance, it is likely 
to be thought of as a firm with poor risk, suggesting that it may be a poor investment risk. 
Elbannan (2009) identifies firms that are smaller, with lower income and productivity, as likely 
to be perceived as poor investment risks. Poor investment risks also meant that it would cost 
more to borrow funds for investment. Based on these observations, it was thought that 
organisations with poor corporate governance would also be seen as having higher risks and 
consequently higher borrowing rates. Some researchers who consider the hypothesis that risk-
taking is linked to corporate governance use a proxy to represent corporate governance. 
In the regression findings shown in Table 8, the F-Value is (3.668***), which indicates that 
the model is significant at 1%. This confirms that the model is fit and can predict the results of 
the OECD CGI on risk-taking based on R&D/Assets. The Adjusted R² is 8.2% shows how the 
independent variable, the CGI, and the control variables, will interpret the dependent variable, 
namely, R&D/Assets by 8.2%. Therefore, any change in the independent and control variables 
will also lead to a change in the dependent variable by R².  
The control country variables that were used include corruption index, inflation, GDP per 
capita, population, masculinity, power distance, stock market capitalisation and Anglo 
America. It is important in considering country characteristics as these are seen as unique to 
countries and therefore as having an impact on the operations of companies with these 
characteristics (Radebaugh et al., 2006). 
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The firm variables were firm size, sales growth, audit committee number, corporate governance 
committee number, leverage and capital gain yield. The control variables that had a significant 
relation with CGI were audit committee number, corporate governance committee number, 
GDP per capita, masculinity and power distance. Using the figures for all firm years, it was 
shown that the corporate governance index has a negative significance to (-1.671*), suggesting 
that there is a negative relationship between the OECD CGI and risk-taking based on 
R&D/Assets. This is based on agency theory that shows greater CGI was leading to less risk 
(Lai & Chen, 2014). 
Audit committee number had a negative effect, significance at 1% level (-3.149***), 
suggesting that an increase in audit committee number will lead to a decrease in risk-taking. 
Corporate governance committee number at (4.509***) had a positive significance at 1% level, 
suggesting that an increase in corporate governance committee number would lead to an 
increase in risk-taking. However, studies on the impact of corporate governance on risk-taking 
reveal that firms with good governance in place tend to have little risk (Lai & Chen, 2014). 
Gamble and Kelly (2001) support the position that firms that are governed well tend to be 
privileged, implying that their risk-taking is low. This is in keeping with agency theory (Lai & 
Chen, 2014). Garmaise and Liu (2005) point out that according to agency theory, the conflict 
between principal and agent contributes to risk. These researchers held that increase in 
corporate governance can also lead to increase in risk-taking, if the managers of organisat ions 
tend to favour investment (Garmaise and Liu, 2005). 
The findings for the country control variables reveal that GDP per capita at (2.429**), 
indicating a positive significance to 5%, and suggesting that a country’s level of wealth 
influences the relationship between CGI and risk-taking based on R&D/Assets. Masculinity, 
which deals with the emotional roles between the genders and the emphasis on aggressiveness 
and competition in a society, also has a positive significance to 1%, with a finding of 
(3.202***), suggesting that there is a higher level of risk-taking among countries that are 
considered highly masculine. Masculinity is seen as an important characteristic; it describes a 
preference for “achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material success,” (Hofstede, 1984, 
p. 84). Power distance, or the degree to which a society supports and expects social inequality, 
was seen at (1.919*) to have a positive significance to 10%, suggesting that firms in such 
societies are also more likely to be high in risk-taking. Power distance was also seen as an 
important cultural factor affecting how countries operate on a global scale (Hofstede, 1984; 
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Hofstede and Bond, 1988). These findings reveal important country differences; as pointed out 
in Chapter 2, there are major differences between Anglo-American and European countries on 
several dimensions, including masculinity and power distance (Hofstede, 1984).   
The findings from Table 8 reveal a significant relation between CGI and risk-taking as 
measured by R&D/Assets. The finding for CGI for all firm years was (-1.671*).  The relation 
was seen to be different for the years under study. While the overall relation was negative, in 
2010 and 2013 it was positive, at (.305) and (.551), respectively. In 2011 it was (-1.078), in 
2012 it was (-1.028) and in 2014 it was (-1.109). Overall, the relation between CGI and risk-
taking as measured by R&D/Assets is significant. In this table, the findings show that there is 
a significant relation between CGI and risk-taking which shows the level of compliance and 
disclosure of the OECD CG rules and risk as measured by R&D/Assets, for as the level of 
compliance and disclosure increases, risk decreases. 
Table 8: OLS Regression Results of OECD CGI on Risk-Taking Based on the 
R&D/Assets (Dependent Variable): 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐  .082 .106 .015 -.013 .091 .080 
Standard Error  .763 .692 .774 .826 .799 .783 
Durbin- Watson  .466 1.979 2.011 1.901 2.077 1.678 
F-Value  3.668(.000)*** 1.883(.034)** 1.117(.351) .900(.566) 1.772(.049)** 1.611(.086)* 
No. of Observations  568 113 116 116 117 106 
Constant  -4.597(.000)*** -2.561(.012)** -2.403(.018)** -1.668(.098)* -.100(.921) -.760(.450) 
Independent Variable 
Corporate Governance 
Index  
- -1.671(.095)* .305(.761) -1.078(.283) -1.028(.306) .551(.583) -1.109(.270) 
 Control Variables 
Firm Size  -1.615(.107) -1.808(.074)* -1.098(.275) -.400(.690) -.735(.464) -.650(.517) 
Sales Growth  .825(.410) 1.106(.271) -.126(.900) .513(.609) -.802(.425) .071(.944) 
Audit Committee No.  -3.149(.002)*** -.915(.362) -1.637(.105) -1.666(.099)* -2.248(.027)** -1.201(.233) 
Corporate Governance 
Committee No. 
 4.509(.000)*** 2.589(.011)** 1.496(.138) 1.738(.085)* 2.509(.014)** 1.978(.051)* 
Leverage  .135(.893) .212(.832) .248(.805) .067(.947) .057(.955) -.257(.797) 
Capital Gain Yield  .263(.793) .504(.616) .829(.409) .832(.407) .400(.690) 1.409(.162) 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
 -.961(.337) .900(.370) -.163(.871) -.471(.639) 1.726(.087)* -.847(.399) 
Corruption Index   1.507(.132) -1.533(.128) 1.224(.224) 1.101(.274) -.154(.878) 1.594(.115) 
Inflation  -1.579(.115) 2.182(.032)** -1.617(.109) -1.135(.259) -3.046(.003)*** -.811(.420) 
GDP Per Capita  2.429(.793)** 3.295(.001)*** -.466(.642) -.673(.503) -.088(.930) .188(.851) 
Population  1.458(.145) 1.326(.188) -.120(.905) -.018(.985) -.799(.426) 1.200(.233) 
Masculinity  3.202(.001)*** -1.672(.098)* 1.753(.083)* 1.285(.202) -.389(.698) .653(.515) 
Power Distance  1.919(.055)* -.986(.327) 1.527(.130) 1.155(.251) -1.060(.292) .749(.456) 
Anglo American  -.945(.345) -1.852(.067)* .764(.447) .568(.571) -1.521(.131) -.294(.770) 
2010  .889(.374) - - - - - 
2011  -.023(.982) - - - - - 
2012  .184(.854) - - - - - 
2014  -.384(.701) - - - - - 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Also, year 2013 are excluded from the regression analyses. It is used as base year, respectively, for 
purposes of comparison. 
Hypothesis H1a, drawn up to test the relation between CGI and risk-taking, was that there was 
no statistically significant relationship between CGI and risk-taking. The findings do not 
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support the null hypothesis, as an increase in CGI leads to a decrease in risk-taking. Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2004) show that when governance structure improves and when greater corporate 
governance is achieved, firms are able to borrow at lower costs. This is in keeping with agency 
theory, which suggests that managers tend to look after their own interests, which differ from 
those of shareholders. Therefore, greater corporate governance, which is seen as protecting the 
rights of shareholders against managers, is believed to lead to less risk-taking (Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Abdullah & Valentine (2009), 
agents, in this case managers, are thought to hold control and to manage firms in a manner that 
could be risky. With more corporate governance, it is assumed that there would be less risk, 
and therefore more protection for shareholders. Good corporate governance is seen as helping 
lower risk and therefore lower the cost of borrowing.  
In Table 9, for the regression between CGI and risk-taking, with risk measured as R&D/Sales, 
the F-Value is (3.530***), which shows that the model is significant at 1%. This confirms that 
the model is fit and can predict the results of the OECD CGI on risk-taking based on 
R&D/Sales. The Adjusted R² of 7.8% reveals how the independent variable, the CGI, and the 
control variables will interpret the dependent variable, R&D/Sales, by R²%. Any change that 
takes place in the independent and control variables leads to a change in the dependent variable 
by R².  
The findings show that CGI, as an independent variable for all firm years, is negative and 
significant. For all firm years, the relation between CGI and risk-taking as measured by 
R&D/Sales was (-3.529***), which is negative and significant at the 1% level. This suggests 
that an increase in CGI would lead to a decrease in risk-taking (Lai & Chen, 2014). 
The control variables that were significant and related to firms were audit committee number, 
and corporate governance committee number. The country variables that were significant were 
GDP per capita, population, masculinity and power distance. Audit committee number, with a 
value of (-3.529***) was negative and significant at 1%, indicating that there is a negative 
relation between OECD CGI and risk-taking based on R&D/Sales. This finding could be 
supported by earlier literature which shows that according to stewardship theory, when there 
were more directors, they maintained good stewardship over corporate performance (Letting 
et al., 2012; Abdullah and Valentine, 2009). However, Rechner and Dalton (1989), who take a 
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stewardship approach to studying corporate governance, find that directors on committees do 
not necessarily lead to improvement in firm performance. 
The corporate governance committee rise was also associated with less risk. Past studies show 
that when there is greater shareholder protection through better governance, there is less risk 
and higher firm valuation (Ammann et al., 2013). With lower risk-taking, the firm would 
maintain more of its resources. Garmaise and Liu (2005) show how greater CGI could lead to 
increased risk, as management is often inclined to favour investment. 
While these findings reveal that the audit committee number and governance committee 
number variables are significant for risk-taking, it was seen that the above-mentioned country 
control variables also have significance. GDP per capita at (2.741***) at significance or 1% is 
positive, which suggests that country wealth positively influences the relationship between CGI 
and risk-taking based on R&D/Assets. In other words, the level of compliance and disclosure 
practiced within a country affects risk-taking, based on the GDP per capita of the country. 
Population was also seen to have a positive significance at (1.812*) at a significance level of 
10%. This suggests that as population increases, risks increase as well. It follows that with 
increased population, there would be more people to share in the wealth of the country, which 
would also be related to GDP per capita.  
Masculinity was also related to the CGI in terms of risk-taking based on R&D/Sales, and was 
seen to be positively significant at (2.494**) at 5%. Similarly, power distance was also 
positively significant at (2.223**) at 5%. Compliance and disclosure as CGI was shown to be 
positively related to power distance, or the expectation of unequal distribution in the country. 
Hofstede (1984) shows that both masculinity and power distance are country control variables 
that influence the impact of CGI on risk-taking as measured by R&D/Sales. Studies on 
corporate governance mechanisms reveal that they have an impact on companies’ risk-taking 
(Switzer and Wang, 2013; Matthias, 2013; Tran, 2014). According to Tran, in countries with 
insufficient shareholder, where it appears that there are not strong enough controls to protect 
the shareholders, shareholders will be reluctant to invest. Therefore, rational investors thinking 
about risk-taking and the costs that companies would have to undertake, consider that 
companies in these countries would have greater costs (Tran, 2014). Therefore, it is important 
to recognise that there are certain countries where there would be more risk attached to 
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borrowing money, because of the governance mechanisms that may be absent from the 
countries’ corporate governance structure. 
Table 9: OLS Regression Results of OECD CGI on Risk-Taking Based on R&D/Sales 
(Dependent Variable): 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐  .078 .071 -.012 -.017 .059 .050 
Standard Error  .763 .707 .792 .825 .814 .784 
Durbin- Watson  .522 2.043 2.129 2.012 2.111 1.652 
F-Value  3.530(.000)*** 1.574(.095)* .910(.556) .868(.601) 1.486(.124) 1.368(.181) 
No. of Observations  568 113 116 116 117 106 
Constant  -4.590(.000)*** -2.868(.005)*** -2.268(.025)** -1.451(.150) -.357(.722) -.607(.545) 
Independent Variable 
Corporate Governance 
Index  
- -2.402(.017)** -.314(.754) -1.109(.270) -1.331(.186) -.017(.987) -1.308(.194) 
Control Variables 
Firm Size  .916(.360) -.620(.536) -.016(.988) .623(.534) .482(.631) .552(.582) 
Sales Growth  1.126(.261) .671(.504) .371(.711) .410(.683) .081(.935) .739(.462) 
Audit Committee No.  -3.529(.000)*** -1.495(.138) -1.465(.146) -1.895(.061)* -2.387(.019)** -.824(.412) 
Corporate Governance 
Committee No. 
 4.678(.000)*** 2.811(.006)*** 1.633(.106) 1.811(.073)* 2.227(.028)** 1.856(.067)* 
Leverage  -1.455(.146) -.365(.716) -.475(.636) -.564(574) -.659(.512) -1.017(.312) 
Capital Gain Yield  .083(.934) .255(.799) .652(.516) .598(.551) .038(.970) 1.143(.256) 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
 -1.642(.101) -.154(.878) -.316(.753) -.686(.494) 1.250(.214) -.765(.446) 
Corruption Index   .824(.410) -.902(.369) .727(.469) .592(.555) -.278(.782) 1.004(.318) 
Inflation  -1.636(.102) 1.250(.214) -1.231(.221) -.729(.467) -2.358(.020)** -.796(.428) 
GDP Per Capita  2.741(.006)*** 2.909(.004)*** -.051(.960) -.105(.917) .251(.803) .197(.844) 
Population  1.812(.070)* 1.706(.091)* .108(.914) .495(.621) -.568(.571) 1.064(.290) 
Masculinity  2.494(.013)** -.992(.324) 1.278(.204) .799(.426) -.327(.744) .396(.693) 
Power Distance  2.223(.027)** -.992(.840) 1.218(.226) .780(.437) -.595(.553) .631(.529) 
Anglo American  -.128(.898) -.820(.414) .663(.509) .474(.637) -1.212(.229) -.175(.861) 
2010  .827(.408) - - - - - 
2011  -.405(.686) - - - - - 
2012  .120(.905) - - - - - 
2014  -.326(.744) - - - - - 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Also, year 2013 are excluded from the regression analyses. It  is used as base year, respectively, for 
purposes of comparison. 
In Table 10, OLS Regression Results of OECD CGI on Risk-Taking Based on R&D 
Expenditure (Dependent Variable), the F-Value is (20.878***), which shows that the model is 
significant at 1%. This model is a fit and can predict how the sought-after relationships. The 
Adjusted R²% shows how the independent variable, the CGI, and the control variables will 
interpret the dependent variable, R&D expenditure, by R² 40%. This suggests that any change 
in the independent and control variables lead to a change in the dependent variable by R².  
The findings reveal that the relation between CGI and risk-taking as measured by R&D 
expenditure is negative and significant for all firm years. The finding was (-1.676*), showing 
that the null hypothesis is rejected at 10%. However, when looking at individual years, we see 
that 2010 and 2013 had positive relations. 
This finding reveals some significant results among the firm control variables and country 
control variables. Firm size, audit committee number, and corporate governance committee 
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number were the three firm control variables; the significant country control variables were 
GDP per capita, masculinity and power distance. 
Table 10: OLS Regression Results of OECD CGI on Risk-Taking Based on R&D Expenditure 
(Dependent Variable): 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐  .400 .429 .356 .332 .388 .415 
Standard Error  .763 .692 .774 .826 .799 .783 
Durbin- Watson  .466 1.980 2.011 1.901 2.077 1.678 
F-Value  20.878(.000)*** 6.606(.000)*** 5.237(.000)*** 4.802(.000)*** 5.903(.000)*** 5.970(.000)*** 
No. of 
Observations 
 568 113 116 116 117 106 
Constant  -4.597(.000)*** -2.569(.012)** -2.403(.018)** -1.668(.098)* -.100(.921) -.760(.450) 
Independent Variable 
Corporate 
Governance Index 
(Independent 
Variable) 
- -1.676(.094)* .293(.770) -1.078(.283) -1.028(.306) .551(.583) -1.109(.355) 
Control Variables 
Firm Size  14.297(.000)*** 5.775(.000)*** 6.034(.000)*** 6.094(.000)*** 5.805(.000)*** 5.821(.000)*** 
Sales Growth  .826(.409) 1.100(.274) -.126(.900) .513(.609) -.802(.425) .071(.944) 
Audit Committee 
No. 
 -3.155(.002)*** -.928(.356) -1.637(.105) -1.666(.099)* -2.248(.027)** -1.201(.233) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee No. 
 4.510(.000)*** 2.586(.011)** 1.496(.138) 1.738(.085)* 2.509(.014)** 1.978(.051)* 
Leverage  .136(.892) .223(.824) .248(.805) .067(.947) .057(.955) -.257(.797) 
Capital Gain 
Yield 
 .265(.791) .501(617) .829(.409) .832(.407) .400(.690) 1.409(.162) 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
 -.950(.343) .894(.374) -.163(.871) -.471(.639) 1.726(.087)* -.847(.399) 
Corruption Index   1.506(.133) -1.515(.133) 1.224(.224) 1.101(.274) -.154(.878) 1.594(.115) 
Inflation  -1.597(.111) 2.157(.033)** -1.617(.109) -1.135(.259) -3.046(.003)*** -.811(.420) 
GDP Per Capita  2.427(.016)** 3.284(.001)*** -.466(.642) -.673(.503) -.088(.930) .188(.851) 
Population  1.455(.146) 1.328(.187) -.120(.905) -.018(.985) -.799(.426) 1.200(.233) 
Masculinity  3.203(.001)*** -1.654(.101) 1.753(.083)* 1.285(.202) -.389(.698) .653(.515) 
Power Distance  1.920(.055)* -.969(.335) 1.527(.130) 1.155(.251) -1.060(.292) .749(.456) 
Anglo American  -.950(.342) -1.840(.069)* .764(.447) .568(.571) -1.521(.131) -.294(.770) 
2010  .887(.376) - - - - - 
2011  -.016(.987) - - - - - 
2012  .189(.850) - - - - - 
2014  -.383(.702) - - - - - 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Also, year 2013 are excluded from the regression analyses. It is used as base year, respectively, for 
purposes of comparison. 
Firm size was shown to be important in this study. The findings reveal that firm size as 
(14.297***) with significance at 1% and positive. This suggests that the size of a firm is 
positively related to the risk-taking based on R&D expenditure. The larger the company, the 
greater the risk involved based on R&D expenditure. This is a critical factor in assessing risk-
taking, and the literature points out that organisations cannot all use the same corporate 
governance mechanisms, because they all differ. As pointed out, there is “substantial evidence 
that one size does not always fit all firms in all countries” (Black et al., 2010, p. 2). The findings 
of this study are therefore supported by Black et al. (2010). 
While audit committee number at (-3.155***) had a negative relation, significant at 1%, 
corporate governance committee at (4.510***) had a positive relationship at 1%, GDP per capita 
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had a positive relation, significant at 5%, while masculinity had a positive relation at (3.203***) 
at 1%, and power distance, at (1.920*), had a positive relation, significant at 10%. The audit 
committee number showed the relationship, which could be described in terms of agency 
theory and the relationship between the manager and the shareholders (Garmaise and Liu, 
2005). 
In Table 11, OLS Regression Results of OECD CGI on Risk-Taking Based on ROA, the F-
Value is (11.488***), indicating that the model is significant at 1%. This model is a fit and can 
predict the sought-after relationships. The Adjusted R² % shows how the independent variable, 
the CGI, and the control variables will interpret the dependent variable, ROA, by R² 17.4%. 
This suggests that any change in the independent and control variables leads to a change in the 
dependent variable by R².  
This study looks at the relation between CGI and risk-taking as measured by ROA (return on 
assets). This table shows that for all firm years, the relation between CGI and ROA was 
(2.229**), positively significant at 5%. For 2010, the findings reveal a positive significant 
relation at (2.091**), and in 2012, the finding was (2.101**). In 2011 and 2013, the findings 
were positive, at (1.372) and (1.530), respectively. In 2014, the figure was much smaller and 
positive, but not significant.  
The firm control variables that are significant are firm size, sales growth, leverage and stock 
market capitalisation. The country control variables that are significant are GDP per capita, 
masculinity and power distance. 
Firm size was significant in this study. The findings reveal that firm size as (3.801***) with 
significance at 1%. This suggests that firm size has a negative impact when considering the 
relationship between CGI and risk-taking measured by ROA. Therefore, an increase in firm 
size would lead to an increase in ROA volatility and a decrease in risk-taking. This relates to 
the literature which points out that all organisations use different corporate governance 
mechanisms, because they are different and use different corporate governance mechanisms 
(Black et al., 2010). This negative significant relationship between firm size and risk-taking 
based on ROA means that when the level of compliance and disclosure increases, the volatility 
of ROA will increase and risk will decrease. Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos (2015) show that 
capital structure has an impact on risk. Sales growth also has a significant relationship with 
risk-taking and ROA. The relationship is positive and significant at 1%. This suggests that an 
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increase in sales growth would lead to an increase in ROA volatility and decrease in Risk. 
Leverage, at (-8.887***), is significant at 1% and negative, showing that as leverage increases, 
risk-taking increases. Stock market capitalisation, at (3.405***), is significant at 1% but is 
positive, suggesting that as stock market capitalisation increases, risk-taking decreases. The 
suggestion is that as compliance and disclosure of CGI increase, the volatility of ROA 
increases, giving rise to the decrease in risk-taking. In his study of German firms, Tran (2014) 
shows how these aspects of volatility of ROA and ROE affect risk-taking.  
Table 11: OLS Regression Results of OECD CGI on Risk-Taking Based on ROA (Dependent 
Variable) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐  .174 .250 .191 .338 .204 .071 
Standard Error  .0601 .048 .059 .053 .063 .067 
Durbin- Watson  .996 2.012 2.288 1.970 2.274 2.191 
F-Value  11.488(.000)*** 5.193(.000)*** 3.986(.000)*** 7.479(.000)*** 4.248(.000)*** 1.936(.023)** 
No. of Observations  947 190 191 191 191 184 
Constant  4.096(.000)*** 2.874(.005)*** 2.038(.043)** 1.691(.093)* 3.002(.003)*** 1.040(.300) 
Independent Variable 
Corporate 
Governance Index  
+ 2.229(.026)** 2.091(.038)** 1.372(.172) 2.101(.037)** 1.530(.128) .201(.841) 
Control Variables 
Firm Size  -3.801(.000)*** -2.874(.005)*** -.746(.457) -2.925(.004)*** -3.149(.002)*** -.313(.755) 
Sales Growth  3.269(.001)*** 1.885(.061)* -.816(416) 3.226(.002)*** 1.886(.061)* 1.634(.104) 
Audit Committee 
No. 
 .172(.863) .016(.987) -.253(.801) -.557(.578) .547(.585) -1.021(.309) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee No. 
 -1.488(.137) -.536(.593) -.878(.381) -.456(.649) .384(.701) -.948(.344) 
Leverage  -8.887(.000)*** -4.074(.000)*** -4.983(.000)*** -4.697(.000)*** -2.653(.009)*** -3.259(.001)*** 
Capital Gain Yield  .388(.698) .152(.880) 1.691(.093)* 4.791(.000)*** 4.724(.000)*** 1.701(.091)* 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
 3.405(.001)*** 3.823(.000)*** .919(.359) 2.176(.031)** 3.052(.003)*** .497(.620) 
Corruption Index   .044(.965) -2.433(.016)** -.500(.618) -.162(.872) -.673(.502) .796(.427) 
Inflation  .148(.883) 2.860(.005)*** .774(.440) .573(.567) -1.182(.239) -.664(.507) 
GDP Per Capita  2.996(.003)*** .221(.825) -.239(.811) -.753(.452) -2.581(.011)** -1.191(.235) 
Population  -1.499(.134) -1.302(.195) .268(.789) -1.456(.147) -2.711(.007)*** -.029(.977) 
Masculinity  1.891(.059)* -3.258(.001)*** -1.114(.267) -.415(.679) -.642(.522) -.908(.356) 
Power Distance  -2.320(.021)** -2.842(.005)*** -1.186(237) -.618(.537) -1.045(.298) -1.074(.284) 
Anglo American  1.120(.263) -1.609(.109) -.055(.956) -.030(.976) -.650(.517) .539(.591) 
2010  1.231(.219) - - - - - 
2011  1.591(.112) - - - - - 
2012  1.309(.191) - - - - - 
2014  .461(.645)  - - - - - 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Also, year 2013 are excluded from the regression analyses. It is used as base year, respectively, for 
purposes of comparison. 
The company variables that are significant are GDP per capita, masculinity and power distance. 
GDP per capita at (2.996***) is significant at 1% and has a positive relation based on ROA. This 
suggests that an increase in GDP per capita is related to an increse in ROA and decrease in 
Risk-Taking. Masculinity, at (1.891*), is significant at 10% and positive, suggesting that an 
increase in masculinity leads to increase in ROA and decrease in Risk-Taking. Power distance, 
at (-2.320*), is significant at 5% and is negative, suggesting that an increase in power distance 
is associated with a decrease in ROA and increase in Risk-Taking. These country variables are 
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significant, as they represent different characteristics associated with countries (Hofstede, 
2015). This shows that there would be differences among countries on the basis of the kind of 
accounting system they have in place. Therefore, this finding shows that the level of 
compliance with and disclosure of OECD rules increases the volatility of ROA, leading to a 
decrease in risk. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
The relation between CGI and risk-taking based on R&D/Assets, the overall findings for all 
firm years was negative and significant, that based on R&D/Sales was also negative and 
significant, and that based on R&D Expenditure was negative and significant. When ROA was 
used to represent risk-taking, there was a large significant relation between CGI and risk-
taking. What this shows is that when one speaks of risk-taking, it would matter what measure 
of firm performance was being used. 
Several researchers studying the relation between CGI and risk-taking discovered divergent 
findings (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Jensen, 1993). This study, using different measures of firm 
performance, also has divergent findings. Using different measures to construct the CGI also 
had an impact on the relation between CGI and risk-taking. When Ntim et al. (2013) studied 
the impact of disclosure on performance they found no significant difference in the 
organisations’ performance for some years. With respect to the mechanism of corporate 
disclosure, they found no major differences in risk disclosure behaviour. This also suggests 
that there is no agreement as to whether improving corporate governance has an effect on 
corporate performance (Ntim et al., 2013). 
These four tables reveal different findings because of the different measures used. Several 
researchers point out that the measures of corporate governance or corporate performance that 
are used have an impact on the findings. The implication is that different studies could show 
different findings if researchers were to use individual mechanisms for studying risk or 
corporate governance. 
The use of the CGI is highly recommended and confirmed by prior researchers. The rationale 
is that the use of individual mechanisms could yield different results; this is particula r ly 
important when studying firms that are more heavily compliant with some mechanisms than 
others, as in the case of the U.K. and U.S. (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Batten, 2001; Licht, 2001). 
But this is even more noticeable when studying countries that follow different traditions. 
Gompers et al. (2003), using a governance index consisting of 24 dimensions, included 
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shareholder rights and takeover defences Gompers et al.’s (2003) findings reveal that the 
differences between firms’ corporate governance were noticeable: firms with more corporate  
governance were more democratic, promoted more shareholder rights, were larger, and had 
larger firm value, and lower expenditures and acquisitions. Using a corporate governance index 
with many dimensions allowed for comparing corporate governance index and risk-taking, for 
example in terms of firm performance. 
In terms of the relation between CGI and risk-taking, despite the differences in the individua l 
measurements of firm performance, in the case of R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales, R&D expenditure 
and ROA volatility, the overall finding is that the relation was negative. The findings reveal a 
significant negative relation between CGI and risk-taking. The relationship is significant, 
showing that CGI and risk-taking are sometimes related, as explained by agency theory. When 
disclosures of corporate governance increase, risk decreases. This is again explained by agency 
theory. However, in different years the relation is different. By using these different measures 
of firm performance, our findings reveal the importance of using a corporate governance index 
rather than individual dimensions, and using different measurements of firm performance. 
6.4.3 Multivariate regression analyses, results, and discussion: CGI and 
credit ratings 
In Table 12, OLS Regression Results of OECD CGI on Credit Rating (dependent variable), the 
F-Value is (23.197***), indicating that the model is positive and significant at 1%. This model 
is a good fit in predicting the relationships. The Adjusted R²% of 36.6% shows how the 
independent variable, the CGI, and the control variables will interpret the dependent variable, 
by R²%. This suggests that any change in the independent and control variables will lead to a 
change in the dependent variable by R².  
The findings in Table 12 show that the overall relation for all firm years is (1.836*). For 2010 
and 2013, the relation is (2.203**) and (2.396**), respectively, showing that in these two years 
the relation was significant. However, in the other years the relation was positive, showing that 
if disclosure increases, credit rating will also increase. This finding for the relation between 
CGI and credit rating for all firm years is measured by S&P, and is seen to be positive and 
significant. It shows that the hypothesis is supported by previous research. The theory that 
supports this finding is agency theory; as pointed out, when corporate insiders have a lot of 
power, they will very likely pursue their own interests. The explanation here is that corporate 
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insiders are agents, and while there is an agency relationship between shareholders and owners, 
it is more likely that the interests of agents would not be aligned with those of shareholders and 
owners. In this situation credit ratings are likely to be lower. However, when corporate 
governance is strong and when there is evidence and disclosure that shareholders are protected, 
a firm is likely to have a higher credit rating (John et al., 2008).  
As noted above, there were changes in the different years. While there was significance in the 
relation between CGI and credit ratings for 2010 and 2013, for 2011, 2012 and 2014 were 
smaller at (.994), (1.654) and (1.406), respectively. The suggestion is that although a similar 
trend could be seen, the effects were not felt strongly enough to make a difference. 
The significant findings of this study reveal that credit ratings were measured by firm level 
factors including firm size, sales growth, and leverage. Firm size, at (11.008***), is positive and 
significant at 1% and suggests that an increase in firm size also increases credit rating, as the 
size of the firm is shown to make a difference (Black et al., 2010). Sales growth, at (-1.779*), 
is negative and significant at 10% was also made a difference among firms as increase in sales 
growth was seen to be associated with a decline in credit rating. Leverage is (-7.621***) and 
significant at 1%. The negative relationship suggests that as leverage increases, credit ratings 
decrease.  
In terms of the country variables, namely, corruption index, masculinity, power distance and 
Anglo-American, the relationship between these variables and credit ratings were positive. 
Corruption index is (2.819***), suggesting that an increase in corruption is related to an increase 
in credit ratings. The explanation here is that when investors are reluctant to invest in countries 
with high levels of corruption. Also, other sources of credit would cost much more. According 
to Ahmad, Rashmi, Bakshi and Saha (2009), investors, issuers, investment bankers use credit 
ratings to determine the creditworthiness of companies. In countries where corruption is high, 
firms will find that this is a factor limiting investment: “For creditors, credit rating agencies 
increase the range of investment alternatives and easy to use measurements of relative credit 
risk, thereby increase the supply of total risk capital in the market, making it very efficient” 
(Ahmad, Rashmi, Bakshi & Saha, 2009). The relationship between corruption level and credit 
ratings is negative. It is also shown that when managers are dishonest, they try to show that 
their operations were successful, and hide their knowledge of the true conditions in an effort to 
avoid signaling weakness. This could lead to a reduction in shareholder wealth (Garmaise & 
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Liu, 2005). In effect, dishonest managers demonstrate poor corporate governance and, through 
corruption, could increase the firm’s exposure to systemic risk, as well as reduce the 
organisation’s capital (Garmaise and Liu, 2005). 
Masculinity is (8.770***), significant at 1% and positive. Since masculinity shows the emotiona l 
roles between genders with emphasis on aggressiveness and competition in society, this 
suggests that countries with high masculinity levels are more likely to have higher risks 
(Hofstede, 1984). Power balance shows the acceptance of unequal relations, which is also 
related to greater risk among countries with higher power balance (Hofstede, 1984).   
On the issue of Anglo-American, the finding was also positive, but it was smaller and 
significant at 5%.  Anglo-American firms were more likely to show a positive relationship with 
credit rating. The Anglo-American tradition was shown as having a legal system promoting 
greater corporate governance, which was seen as relating to better credit rating. Governments 
could also impose legislation requiring firms to maintain certain corporate ownership practices 
(Jenkinson and Mayer, 2012). The legal and accounting systems in place influence the 
corporate governance of a country (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This higher level of corporate 
governance would inspire a higher level of trust, increasing credit ratings for the country as a 
whole.  
Table 12 reports the findings of the relation between CGI and credit ratings. This study set out 
to discover whether the corporate governance practiced in a firm had an impact on its credit 
ratings. Prior research has found that improving corporate governance leads to better credit 
ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). Alali et al. (2012) studied the relationship between 
corporate governance and credit rating and found that when firms improved their corporate 
governance structures, this had the effect of increasing their investment grading. This was 
particularly true in smaller firms (Alali et al., 2012). It was also shown that a firm’s credit rating 
is also dependent on its corporate governance, despite the fact that credit rating organisat ions 
try to give the impression that all they do is give an opinion (Matthies, 2013). The fact is these 
opinions sway external lenders, who are influenced by high credit ratings (Matthies, 2013). 
Hypothesis 1b states: “There is no statistically significant relationship between corporate 
governance index and credit rating”. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 12: OLS Regression Results of OECD CGI on Credit Rating (Dependent Variable) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐  .366 .357 .334 0.341 .439 .348 
Standard Error  2.261 2.305 2.282 2.320 2.131 2.306 
Durbin- Watson  .520 2.289 2.022 2.033 2.286 2.152 
F-Value  23.197(.000)*** 6.408(.000)*** 5.905(.000)*** 6.079(.000)*** 8.663(.000)*** 6.019(.000)*** 
No. of Observations  733 147 148 148 148 142 
Constant  -4.255(.000)*** -1.505 -.564 .188(.851) 1.123(.263) -2.931(.004)*** 
Independent Variable 
Corporate 
Governance Index  
+ 1.836(.067)* 2.203(.029)** .994(.322) 1.654(.101) 2.398(.018)** 1.406(.162) 
Control Variables 
Firm Size  11.088(.000)*** 4.505(.000)*** 4.663(.000)*** 4.234(.000)*** 4.396(.000)*** 4.199(.000)*** 
Sales Growth  -1.779(.076)* -1.320(.189) -2.055(.042)** .627(.532) -.657(.513) -.432(.667) 
Audit Committee 
No. 
 -.583(.560) -1.250(.214) -.657(.512) 1.017(.311) .038(.969) -.398(.691) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee No. 
 1.497(.135) .839(.403) .544(.588) .943(.348) 1.393(.166) .197(.844) 
Leverage  -7.621(.000)*** -2.750(.007)*** -2.558(.012)** -3.087(.002)*** -4.136(.000)*** -3.327(.001)*** 
Capital Gain Yield  -1.089(.276) -1.561(.121) 1.435(.154) -.418(.677) 1.664(.098)** 1.965(.052)* 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
 .439(.661) 1.699(.092)* .807(.421) 1.045(.298) 3.260(.001)*** -2.345(.021)** 
Corruption Index   2.819(.005)*** -.717(.474) .007(.994) .011(.991) 1.065(.289) 1.765(.080)* 
Inflation  .547(.585) 2.637(.009)*** .472(.638) .686(.494) -3.319(.001)*** 1.717(.088)* 
GDP Per Capita  1.283(.200) 1.672(.097)* .420(.675) .029(.977) -1.982(.050)** 2.361(.020)** 
Population  -1.146(.252) -.274(.785) -.976(.331) -1.630(.105) -3.321(.001)*** 2.470(.015)** 
Masculinity  8.770(.000)*** .752(.454) .640(.523) .169(.866) 2.342(.021)** 3.720(.000)*** 
Power Distance  4.174(.000)*** .195(.845) .326(.745) .054(.957) -.011(.991) 2.746(.007)*** 
Anglo American  1.963(.050)** -.706(.482) .345(.731) .208(.836) -.858(.393) 1.121(.265) 
2010  1.216(.224) - - - - - 
2011  .553(.581) - - - - - 
2012  .374(.709) - - - - - 
2014  .155(.877) - - - - - 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Also, year 2013 are excluded from the regression analyses. It is used as base year, respectively, for 
purposes of comparison. 
6.4.4 Multivariate regression analyses, results, and discussion: CGI and cost 
of capital 
Table 13 reports the findings on the relation between CGI and cost of capital. The hypothesis 
developed for this relation was H1c, which states: “There is no statistically significant 
relationship between corporate governance index and cost of capital”. The findings reveal that 
the relation is (-6.793***) for all firm years; the relationship is highly significant and negative. 
A look at the five years individually shows that they were all strongly significant and negative. 
From 2010 to 2014, the findings are (-3.138***), (-2.673***), (-3.240***) and (-2.253**), 
respectively. It was shown that throughout the years, there was a strong relation between CGI 
and cost of capital, but the findings are negative, as expected. The reasoning behind these 
findings is that increasing corporate governance leads to a decline in cost of capital.   
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Table 13: OLS Regression of OECD CGI on Cost of Capital (Dependent Variable) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐  .359 .29 .559 .341 .465 .293 
Standard Error  .187 .229 .127 .155 .172 .229 
Durbin- Watson  1.170 1.945 2.195 1.794 1.587 1.889 
F-Value  24.668(.000)*** 5.302(.000)*** 14.461(.000)*** 6.591(.000)*** 10.380(.000)*** 5.337(.000)*** 
No. of 
Observations 
 803 159 160 163 163 158 
Constant  -3.902(.000)*** -.086(.932) -1.601(.112) .188(.851) -1.373(.172) -.852(.396) 
Independent Variable 
Corporate 
Governance 
Index  
- -6.793(.000)*** -3.138(.002)*** -2.673(.008)*** -1.042(.299) -3.240(.001)*** -2.253(.026)** 
Control Variables 
Firm Size  3.504(.000)*** .810(.419) .590(.556) 1.810(.072)* 2.194(.030)** 1.729(.086)* 
Sales Growth  .142(.887) 1.241(.217) -1.136(.258) -.297(.767) -.109(.914) -.858(.392) 
Audit 
Committee No. 
 -.667(.505) .051(.959) -.179(.858) -.050(.960) -.222(.824) -1.223(.223) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee No. 
 -.953(.341) 1.667(.098)* .562(.575) -1.191(.236) -1.133(.259) -1.230(.221) 
Leverage  .031(.975) -.195(.846) .553(.581) .290(.772) .422(.674) -1.277(.204) 
Capital Gain 
Yield 
 2.859(.004)*** 2.374(.019)** -3.562(.000)*** .313(.754) 2.515(.013)** 1.613(.109) 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
 -2.465(.014)** -1.206(.230) -1.283(.202) .224(.823) -1.190(.236) -.299(.765) 
Corruption 
Index 
 7.147(.000)*** 1.189(.236) 2.088(.039)** -.194(.847) 4.527(.000)*** 2.030(.044)** 
Inflation  -.255(.798) -.214(.831) 1.211(.228) 1.517(.131) -.518(.605) .770(.443) 
GDP Per Capita  -3.016(.003)*** -1.765(.080)* -.820(.413) .601(.549) -2.316(.022)** .095(.924) 
Population  -.385(.700) -.454(.651) .217(.829) .325(.745) -.468(.641) -.294(.769) 
Masculinity  11.515(.000)*** 2.607(.010)*** 1.747(.083)** -.418(.676) 6.073(.000)*** 2.213(.028)** 
Power Distance  7.545(.000)*** 2.367(.019)** 1.829(.069)* -.434(.665) 3.481(.001)*** 1.576(.117) 
Anglo American  2.169(.030)** .978(.330) .306(.760) -.555(.580) 1.400(.164) .378(.706) 
2010  -804(.422) - - - - - 
2011  -.674(.501) - - - - - 
2012  -.647(.518) - - - - - 
2014  .431(.666) - - - - - 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Also, year 2013 are excluded from the regression analyses. It is used as base year, respectively, for 
purposes of comparison. 
According to some prior research, firms obtain funds through loans as well as through equity 
capital and investments, and these all have a cost depending on the source. In firms where the 
owners are the dominant shareholders, it is sometimes unlikely that they would invest their 
own money into their firm. In fact, as Tran (2014) points out, these firms often do not disclose 
their corporate governance structure. Without disclosing their corporate governance structure, 
these firms are expected to pay more for their loans. In other words, with little corporate 
governance displayed, firms are likely to have higher costs of capital. On the other hand, if 
firms are willing to disclose their corporate governance structure, it would be available to 
would-be lenders, who could then assess whether the firm is a good risk. Closely associated 
with credit rating is cost of capital, as the credit lending establishment is also affected by a 
firm’s level of corporate governance. As noted above, weak corporate governance structure is 
associated with a higher cost of capital. 
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In looking at CGI and firm performance, using CGI as an independent variable and several 
proxies for firm performance, we can see a relation between the two. There is a significant 
relationship between CGI and firm performance in terms of the risk-taking, credit rating and 
cost of capital. We show mostly a negative and significant relationship for risk-taking and cost 
of capital. The use of the CGI and proxies for firm performance show a stronger reliance on 
the findingsbecause the important elements of CG are included in the CGI, and various 
measures are used to test risk-taking. Credit rating and cost of capital were seen to be different: 
while both are significant, for credit ratings the relation is positive, and for cost of capital it is 
negative. The finding here is that if greater corporate governance were disclosed, it would lead 
to a decrease in the cost of capital. The findings reveal that as risk-taking increases, credit rating 
decreases, raising the cost of capital. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
6.5 Descriptive statistics of the dependent and all continuous independent variables 
based on all (200) firm- year observations 
Table 14 discusses the dependent variables and all continuous independent variables based on 
all 200 firm-year observations. Standard deviation describes how spread out the data is from 
the mean. Skewnessand kurtosis test statistics, shown in Columns 4 and 5, respectively, reveal 
a test for normal distribution.  
 
6.5.1 Descriptive statistics of the financial performance measures 
Panels A to F describe the financial performance measures. Panels A and B of Table 14 give 
the summary statistics for the variables used in this study. Across the years 2010 to 2014, 
Panels A to F give the descriptive statistics of the variables used as proxies for the relation 
between CGI and risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. Panels G to M describe the 
mechanisms used to measure corporate governance. 
Panel A of Table 14 shows that R&D/Total Assets ranges from a minimum of (.000107) to a 
maximum of (.189341), with an average of (0.26) for the overall sample period. The standard 
deviation is 0.31, indicating that there is a relatively small deviation in R&D/Total Assets 
among the firms. The average and standard deviation are consistent for each individual year as 
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well as for all firm years. The skewness varies only a little, showing that these figures are within 
normal range. However, while the minimums declined for the years 2010 to 2014, the 
maximums increased over the same period. Yet, these were within normal distribution, so the 
means remain similar. In 2014, while the minimum was (.00037), the maximum reached its 
highest, at (.189341), resulting in a slightly smaller mean. This is the largest skewness and 
largest kurtosis, at (2.3320) and (7.623), respectively, in the whole set. This can be seen as a 
good proxy for firm performance, since there were no wide variations, as evidenced by the 
small standard deviation in all cases. This measure was relevant and appropriate in all firms 
and was a good measure of firm performance. Corporate governance was associated with 
superior firm performance (Al-Malkawi et al., 2014). 
Panel B gives summary descriptive statistics for R&D/Total Sales. In Table 14, the findings 
show that R&D/Total Sales ranges from a minimum of (.000029) to a maximum of (1.094466), 
with an average of (.045) for the overall sample period of 2010 to 2014. The standard deviation 
is (0.96), which does not represent a major range. The mean is relatively stable over the period, 
except in 2014, where it is relatively smaller. The standard deviation fluctuates over the period. 
For example, in 2010, the standard deviation is (.103); it increases to (.113) in 2011, to (.100) 
in 2012, to (.105) in 2013 and to (.046) in 2014. The skewness and kurtosis are (7.173) and 
(62.654), respectively, which shows that this proxy for firm performance is outside its normal 
distribution. This was supported by the variations in the minimum and maximums for 
R&D/Total Sales for the period. For example, in 2010, the minimum was (.222) and the 
maximum was (.798401). In 2011 to 2014, the minimums were (.000094), (.000029), (.000078) 
and (.000105), respectively, and the maximums for the same years were (1.094466), (.919255), 
(1.028318) and (.226596), respectively. An explanation for these differences may be the 
different levels of investment in R&D that were undertaken relevant to the amount earned in 
total sales. 
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Table 14: Summary Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent and all Continuous Independent Variables Based on All (200) 
Firm- Year O bservations 
Dependent/Independent Variables Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Mini-mum Maxi-mum 
Panel A: R&D/Total Assets  .026 .031 1.935 4.494 .000107 .189341 
2010 .027 .030 1.54 1.80 .000107 .122782 
2011 .026 .031 1.934 4.534 .000033 .175098 
2012 .026 .031 1.942 4.529 .000010 .173760 
2013 .026   .031 2.018 4.988 .000019 .179727 
2014 .025 .030 2.332 7.623 .000037 .189341 
Panel B: R&D/Total Sales .045 .096 7.173 62.654 .000029 1.094466 
2010 .047 .103 6.032 40.778 .000222 .798401 
2011 .046 .113 7.401 63.689 .000094 1.094466 
2012 .046 .100 6.611 51.834 .000029 .919255 
2013 .047 .105 7.224 62.882 .000078 1.028318 
2014 .038 .046 1.851 3.265 .000105 .226596 
Panel C: R&D Expenditure  1446.569 2381.188 2.288 5.453 .103093 15313.702 
2010 1324.134 2169.901 2.139 4.012 .878146 9483.000 
2011 1435.068 2331.373 2.048 3.511 .309278 10061.196 
2012 1443.175 2359.039 2.179 4.457 .103093 11376.606 
2013 1450.149 2402.535 2.415 6.464 .384615 13527.224 
2014 1585.152 2660.118 2.516 7.273 .360360 15313.702 
Panel D: Return on Assets (ROA) .053 .065 .493 6.359 -.336107 .487689 
2010 .059 .056 1.579 4.792 -.079364 .357272 
2011 .059 .064 .131 5.666 -.276689 .351716 
2012 .054 .064 .726 3.230 -.149412 .328323 
2013 .046 .0702 -.754 7.165 -.336107 .292414 
2014 .048 .069 1.455 8.902 -.164164 .487689 
Panel E: Credit Rating S&P  16.12 2.881 .108 -.159 9 23 
2010 16.19 2.911 .086 -.242 10 23 
2011 16.17 2.844 .182 -.188 10 23 
2012 16.12 2.888 .130 -.187 9 23 
2013 16.04 2.889 .107 -.089 9 23 
2014 16.07 2.905 .044 .032 9 23 
Panel F: Cost of Capital .167 .271 3.887 16.568 .012487 2.131678 
2010 .161 .276 4.463 22.563 .016883 2.131678 
2011 .162 .229 3.544 13.176 .019131 1.380530 
2012 .156 .216 3.591 14.012 .020761 1.515556 
2013 .169 .285 3.362 14.212 .018470 1.988958 
2014 .186 .333 3.548 12.605 .012487 2.105843 
Panel G: Block Ownership (BO) .435 .245 .170 -.859 .050440 1.000 
2010 .438 .243 .179 -.763 .054100 .959000 
2011 .440 .250 .188 -.825 .055400 1.000 
2012 .439 .249 .099 -.933 .050440 1..000 
2013 .425 .245 .175 -.840 -.050440 1.000 
2014 .432 .245 .232 -.825 .060000 1.000 
Panel H: Institutional Ownership (IO) .165 .119 2.066 7.404 .05000 1.057360 
2010 .181 .132 1.704 3.685 .05000 .7688 
2011 .163 .122 1.744 3.387 .050520 .649400 
2012 .160 .108 1.538 2.303 .050100 .561350 
2013 .153 .094 1.039 .567 .05000 .480700 
2014 .169 .133 3.142 16.522 .05000 1.057360 
Panel I: Director Ownership (DO) .021 .067 6.734 67.538 .000 1.000853 
2010 .020 .062 5.614 40.321 .00030 3.429923 
2011 .021 .065 5.285 34.801 .000 .569800 
2012 .019 .054 4.036 17.382 .000 .340400 
2013 .018 .056 4.487 22.869 .000 .419500 
2014 .025 .096 7.460 68.895 .000 1.000853 
Panel J: Independent Directors (ID) .616 .231 -.461 -.803 .071429 1.000 
2010 .608 .232 -.431 -.785 .071429 1.000 
2011 .616 .232 -.380 -.909 .076923 1.000 
2012 .620 .228 -.452 -.752 .083333 1.000  
2013 .618 .233 -.538 -.721 .100000 1.000 
2014 .619 .234 -.512 -.805 .100000 1.000 
Panel K: Board Size (BS) 12.23 3.41 .691 .133 5 22 
2010 12.25 3.524 .695 .005 5 22 
2011 12.27 3.472 .633 .110 5 22 
2012 12.28 3.442 .772 .314 6 22 
2013 12.25 3.361 .698 .200 6 22 
2014 12.10 3.307 .667 .138 6 22 
Panel L: Board Diversity (BD) .79 .413 -1.227 .710 0 1 
2010 .73 .445 -1.044 -.919 0 1 
2011 .76 .431 -1.195 -.578 0 1 
2012 .80 .405 -1.473 .170 0 1 
2013 .84 .368 -1.869 1.508 0 1 
2014 .84 .406 -.710 4.316 0 1 
Panel M: Frequency of Board Meetings (FBM) 8.08 3.957 .307 2.375 0 35 
2010 7.98 4.420 1.260 7.249 0 35 
2011 7.75 3.800 -.073 .505 0 18 
2012 8.07 3.774 -.106 .278 0 19 
2013 8.11 3.792 .065 .433 0 19 
2014 8.50 3.962 -.101 -.007 0 18 
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Panel C discusses R&D expenditure as a proxy for firm performance. The average that was 
spent on R&D was (1446.569), and the standard deviation was (2381.188), which shows that 
there was a relatively large deviation from the average for the overall sample period. The 
minimum and maximum for the overall sample period were (.103093) and (15313.702), 
respectively. The minimums and maximums for the individual years vary greatly, which 
supporting the sizes of the skewness and kurtosis. In other words, there was inconsistency 
among the firms in how they invested in R&D. These findings show that different firms made 
their decisions to spend on R&D based on their specific characteristics. 
Panel D deals with return on assets (ROA). Over the sample period, the average is (.053) and 
the standard deviation is (.065). For the following years, the mean was (.059) in 2010 and 2011, 
and declined to (.054) in 2012 and (.046) in 2013. It increased to (.048) in 2014. The standard 
deviation shows a noted increase in 2013 and a decline in 2014. The minimums are inconsistent 
over the years, while the maximums are more consistent.  
In Table 14, Panel E deals with credit rating using S&P. These findings are more consistent. 
While the minimum was (9) and the maximum (23), the average was (16.12), with a standard 
deviation of (2.881); skewness and kurtosis were (-.159) for the overall sample period. This 
shows that the standard deviation was not great; this is supported by the skewness and kurtosis, 
with the kurtosis also showing the negative relation to the credit rating. The findings for credit 
ratings are consistent in all areas: the mean and the deviation did not change drastically, and 
the same could be said about the minimums and maximums for all the years. There was 
consistency in how credit rating performed as a proxy for firm performance. 
Panel F deals with cost of capital, and the findings reveal some deviations in the means.  
Skewness and kurtosis show that some of the findings were outside the normal distribution. 
There are also wide variations between the minimums and maximums, which are reflected in 
the variations in the means and standard deviations. This shows that some of the findings are 
within the normal range, but many others are not. 
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6.5.2 Descriptive statistics of the independent/alternative governance 
mechanisms 
Panel G shows the findings regarding block ownership. In Panel G, the mean is (.435), with a 
standard deviation of (.245) over the overall sample period. There is not much variation over 
the individual years from 2010 to 2014. The minimum for the overall period is (.050440) and 
the maximum is (1.000). There were small variations among these figures over the years, 
showing that there is consistency in this area. While there is some variation in the skewness 
and kurtosis, these are within normal distribution. In terms of block ownership, the literature 
holds that it is possible for block owners with large blocks of stocks to have an advantage over 
other shareholders (Barclay and Holderness, 1989). The Securities and Exchange Commiss ion 
considers investors with over 5% of equity as block holders (Barclay and Holderness, 1989). 
These block owners are seen to be an outside group with concentrated power over managers 
and private holders who, because of their size, could enjoy benefits that other shareholders do 
not. For example, it was shown that block owners could have an advantage over other 
shareholders by having the right to buy shares at premium prices (Barclay and Holderness, 
1989).   
Block owners could also be companies with minority interests in other companies, or 
individuals or directors holding a relatively large amount of stock in a company. Since block 
owners could be made up of different individuals, it is clear that they could have different 
effects on a firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Mehran, 1995). It is important to consider this as 
a key corporate governance mechanism, because block owners could have a detrimental or a 
beneficial impact on firm performance (Jensen, 1993). This is an important measure of 
corporate governance, considering that this study deals with a variety of countries from Anglo 
and Continental traditions, where accounting and legal systems differ (Mallin et al., 2010). 
Panel H deals with institutional owners, and shows that there are variations in the mean and 
the standard deviation in the overall study period. For example, while the average is (.165), the 
standard deviation is (.119). Skewness is (2.066) and kurtosis is (7.404). These figures are 
outside normal distribution. The minimum for the overall period is (.0500), and the maximum 
is (1.057360). However, for the individual years, while the minimum appears to be consistent, 
the maximum varies greatly, from (.7688) in 2010 to (.649400) in 2011, (561350) in 2012, 
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(.480700) in 2013 and (1.057360) in 2014. This seems to suggest that certain firms have heavy 
institutional investments, while other firms do not. This may also vary for individual years. 
The issue of institutional ownership was seen as important, as some institutions invest only in 
certain companies. These institutional owners have a fiduciary responsibility to their investors 
to engage with firms that provide good or reasonable investment. Institutional investors are 
encouraged not to invest in firms which do not pay dividends (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005). 
Companies that are considered good, sound investment choices pay dividends. Therefore, 
including block owners as a corporate governance mechanism was a good choice, as 
institutional owners are seen as having a positive impact on management, as they determine 
the extent to which management is monitored, in order to lower risk (Grinstein and Michaely, 
2005). Agency theory is relevant for explaining what is happening here, as it promotes greater 
monitoring of management to ensure that shareholders’ rights are properly managed and 
protected. 
Panel I deals with director ownership. Director ownership is an important corporate governance 
mechanism because directors are considered necessary for monitoring the actions of 
management. Since this study looks at firms outside the Anglo tradition, examining director 
ownership is important because in many Continental countries, ownership of firms includes 
many directors (La Porta et al., 1999). In countries from a Continental tradition, many founding 
members still own the firms, or at least the majority of shares (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Ho and 
Wong, 2001).    
In Panel I, the overall period has a mean of (.21) and a standard deviation of (0.067). The 
minimum for this period is (.000) and the maximum is (1.00853). The other minimums are also 
roughly (.000), but the maximums vary a great deal. For example, while the average is 
(1.000853) over the whole period, for 2010 the maximum is (3.429923), for 2011 it is only 
(.569800), for 2012 it is (.419500) and for 2014 it is (1.00853), the same as the overall period. 
The skewness and kurtosis show that the range is outside the normal distribution. 
These findings are supported by other research studies that show that in cases where directors 
own their majority shares in their companies, they tend not to have as much corporate 
governance as is found in other companies without directors as owners.  Since in many of these 
instances owners and managers are the same people, there may be no need to motivate 
managers. The interests of agent and owners coalesce in the same person. The problem that 
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could arise here is that of the free rider issue, where the firm is not monitored as much, which 
encourages other firms the opportunity to take over. Director owners managing the company 
could present a threat to other shareholders; it is accepted that owners will look after their 
interests, and this could disadvantage other shareholders. According to Morck et al. (1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1999), director owners could ensure that they have higher salaries and 
receive advantageous bonuses and compensation. In the case of low director ownership, it 
would follow that there is likely to be better corporate ownership (McConnell and Servaes, 
1990). 
Panel J deals with independent directors. The findings reveal that the overall sample period 
shows an average of (.616) and a standard deviation of (.231). The average and standard 
deviation for the individual years are basically the same, showing that there is not much range 
here. The minimum differs, but the maximum is the same at (1.000). The skewness and kurtosis 
reveal that the findings are within normal distribution. 
According to the literature, independent directors are important for safeguarding the interests 
of shareholders. Having independent directors on the board means that there is less of a 
likelihood of a relationship with management. Independent directors are considered to be free 
of the influence of management, and therefore more likely to protect the interests of 
shareholders (Radebaugh et al., 2006). Therefore, firms with more independent directors are 
more likely to be considered better firms in which to invest. The explanation of the role of 
independent directors would flow from the fact that board directors play an important role in 
cutting down on conflicts between management and shareholders (Meckling, 1976; Netter et 
al., 2009). This explains the use of agency theory. However, independent directors stand out as 
being able to serve as a resource for advising and supervising managers. This would use 
resource theory or independent directors are seen as bringing with them knowledge from the 
outside that could be an asset to the firm. 
Independent directors are critical to this study, particularly as it deals with the Anglo and 
Continental traditions. Previous studies point out that in the Anglo tradition, boards consist of 
one tier, which is made up of primarily outside or independent directors (Dahya et al., 2002). 
But this type of board also consists of inside directors, resulting in conflicts of interest on the 
board. (Solomon and Solomon, 2004; Davidson, 1994). Agency theory would apply to an 
understanding of the relationship between independent and inside directors. Resource 
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dependence theory would apply in discussing the relationship between independent directors 
and management. 
On the other hand, the Continental model consists of two tiers, with the upper tier comprising 
supervisory nonexecutive members whose major role is monitoring management, and the lower 
tier comprising executive members, or management (Davidson, 1994). This prevents the 
conflicts of interest found in the Anglo model. Therefore, the importance of studying 
independent directors can be seen in terms of the role they play in protecting shareholders’ 
interests.  
Panel K deals with board size. The minimum size of all firms is (5), while the largest is (22). 
These are the same statistics for the overall period as well as for each year; the boards studied 
remained the same throughout. The average size for the overall period was (12.23), and this 
fluctuated only a little over the period, with the least being (12.10) in 2006 and the greatest 
being (12.28) in 2012. The skewness and kurtosis show that these findings are within normal 
distribution.  
Previous studies reveal that boards can be too large or too small. If they are too small, it is 
expected that they will not be able to carry out the responsibilities that would allow them to 
monitor management adequately. Boards that are too large could also be hampered by the 
number of members. Studies have shown that there are optimal sizes for boards (Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992). According to these researchers, nine is the optimal number of board members, 
although they recognise that having one more could also work (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). 
Beyond this, it becomes difficult to discuss a matter efficiently, and decision making is 
hampered through the number of people taking part in the discussion (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992). More board members could prevent monitoring, since the number of board members 
could contribute to poor communication (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). This explanation supports 
agency theory and stewardship theory.  
However, some researchers believe that a large board is advisable because it means that there 
would be more experts to provide advice, thereby acting as resources for the firm (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006). This is supported by resource theory. Those who support the idea of a large 
board explain that a large board provides more value to the firm (John and Senbet; Yawson, 
2006). This explanation could also be seen as supporting resource theory. Better monitor ing 
and more expertise and skills are seen as advantages to having a larger board.  
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Panel L deals with board diversity. The overall sample period has an average of (.79), with a 
standard deviation of (.413). The minimum for this period is (0) and the maximum is (1); these 
figures were also accurate for individual years. The means for the individual years are (.73), 
(.76), (.80), (.84) and (84), respectively. The standard deviation ranges from (.368) in 2013 to 
(.445) in 2010. Over this period, diversity increased. Only 2013 was noticeably below the 
others, but there were different ranges of deviation. The skewness and kurtosis are negative, 
showing that all was not within normal range. Some ranges are negative and some are positive, 
but the relationship is largely negative. 
According to some researchers, having a diverse board is advantageous because it means 
having a wealth of different perspectives on the board (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2002). While 
age, gender, ethnicities and cultures are important, it was noted that religion could also be 
included in the desired types of diversity (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2002). It was further 
argued, using agency theory, that diverse board members could increase board independence, 
which could increase monitoring of management (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2002). It was 
argued that this would promote better protection of shareholders’ rights, therefore appealing to 
agency theory. However, those who argued that diversity would lead to better decision making 
appealed to resource dependence theory, as they saw diversity as leading to greater expertise 
for the firm. 
Other researchers believe that having a monoculture is important to boardroom uniformity, and 
therefore they oppose diversity. They see diversity as leading to different viewpoints that could 
compromise decision making, which may even retard monitoring of management (Rose, 2007). 
Another criticism of board diversity is that it may contribute to tokenism and that the focus 
may be so much on diversity that the true value of what diverse board members add may not 
even be appreciated (Rose, 2007). 
Panel M deals with the frequency of board meetings. According to the findings, the minimum 
number of meetings was (0) and the maximum was (35) in the overall sample period. The 
average over the sample period is (8.08) and the standard deviation is (3.957). The skewness 
and kurtosis are (.307) and (2.375), suggesting that these are within normal range. A look at 
the individual years reveals that the smallest frequency was in 2011 at (7.75) and the largest 
was in 2014. The standard deviations from 2010 to 2014 are (4.420), (3.800), (3.774), (3.792) 
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and (3.962). There was more deviation in 2010, but the other values decreased from 2010 to 
2012 and then increased from 2013 to 2014. 
The literature on the relationship between frequency of board meetings and firm performance, 
particularly with respect to risk-taking, is not conclusive. According to Vafeas (1999), some 
believe that frequent board meetings would ultimately have a positive impact on a firm’s risk-
taking, credit rating and cost of capital, but another view holds that board meetings do not 
benefit shareholders or the credit rating of a firm. However, there appears to be more support 
for frequent board meetings benefitting forecasts of management earnings (Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005). Another study shows that frequent meetings contribute to improved firm 
performance (Mangena and Tauringana, 2006).  
6.5.3 Summary descriptive statistics of the firm and country level control 
variables based on all (200) firm- year observations 
In looking at the firm-level control variables in Table 15, there are wide differences with respect 
to firm size. Over the sample period, the minimum firm size is (2.464) and the maximum is 
(5,875). The standard deviation is (.617) and skewness and kurtosis are (0.59) and (-.210), 
respectively. The standard deviation was similar to the average in each year. The maximum 
and minimum are also consistent. The skewness and kurtosis suggest that firm size are within 
the normal range, except that the kurtosis is negative, indicating that the distribution is flat. The 
firm size is relatively constant. 
Sales growth shows erratic behaviour. For the overall sample period, the average sales growth 
is (0.75), with a standard deviation of (.177), a minimum of (-.431) and a maximum of (2.386). 
Throughout the individual years, the minimum is a negative value and varies widely from year 
to year, dropping first from (-.288) to (-.229), rising to (-.431), and declining to (-.323) in 2013 
and to (-.182) in 2014. The maximum was just as erratic. The standard deviation varies for the 
different years. Skewness and kurtosis range widely, indicating that the sales were not in the 
normal range. Sales growth therefore varied widely among the firms, and this may be the result 
of the wide range of firms used, not only in terms of size but in terms of different firm 
characteristics. 
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Table 15: Summary Descriptive Statistics of the Firm and Country Level Control Variables Based on All (200) Firm- Year Observations 
Dependent/Independent Variables Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Mini-mum Maxi-mum 
Firm Level Control Variables 
Firm Size 4.272 .617 .059 -.210 2.464 5.875 
2010 4.223 .630 .082 -.333 2.561 5.875 
2011 4.270 .622 .064 -.233 2.549 5.855 
2012 4.277 .615 .048 -.135 2.521 5.835 
2013 4.284 .612 .054 -.139 2.499 5.817 
2014 4.306 .607 .064 -.092 2.464 5.811 
Sales Growth .075 .177 4.467 42.102 -.431 2.386 
2010 .115 .267 4.724 33.767 -.288 2.386 
2011 .151 .193 2.488 8.166 -.229 1.114 
2012 .056 .110 .242 4.451 -.431 .467 
2013 .019 .118 1.703 7.911 -.323 .715 
2014 .033 .099 1.389 3.919 -.182 .505 
Audit Committee No.  4.28 1.114 .766 .693 2 8 
2010 4.19 1.105 .661 .280 2 8 
2011 4.23 1.112 .678 .394 2 8 
2012 4.29 1.159 .883 .855 2 8 
2013 4.37 1.118 .865 1.068 2 8 
2014 4.35 1.075 .772 .954 2 8 
Corporate Governance Committee No.  3.75 1.328 .619 .535 1 9 
2010 3.71 1.332 .623 .627 1 9 
2011 3.74 1.351 .655 .658 1 9 
2012 3.76 1.336 .651 .756 1 9 
2013 3.77 1.314 .617 .468 1 8 
2014 3.78 1.321 .566 .330 1 8 
Leverage .604 .176 -.144 -.164 .025 1.254 
2010 .599 .172 -.151 -.261 .141 1.091 
2011 .598 .176 -.2800 -.184 .075 1.017 
2012 .605 .178 -.331 -.212 .025 .956 
2013 .604 .175 -.112 -.360 .169 1.025 
2014 .612 .180 .129 .179 .164 1.254 
Capital Gain Yield .416 6.652 28.944 883.055 -1.000 204.130 
2010 1.763 14.784 13.066 178.827 -1.000 204.130 
2011 .229 .842 7.447 76.613 -1.000 9.540 
2012 .059 .466 2.773 22.571 -1.000 3.780 
2013 .071 .420 4.247 39.751 -1.000 4.000 
2014 -.043 .394 -1.005 2.052 -1.000 1.270 
Country Level Control Variables  
Stock Market Capitalisation 3684933.023 5849817.325 2.705 6.303 6368.310 26330589 
2010 3351718.241 4810517.271 2.382 4.291 60368.310 17283452.00 
2011 2987674.7 4355689.989 2.410 4.374 108393.2 15640707 
2012 3404301.259 5213576.655 2.478 4.602 108989.2 18668333 
2013 4275871.070 6754489.74 2.473 4.575 170122.7 24034854 
2014 4405099.844 7437773.459 2.542 4.804 143465.8 26330589 
Corruption Index 71.920 12.303 -1.362 1.369 39 89 
2010 72.800 13.817 -1.250 1.045 39 89 
2011 73 13.591 -1.364 1.342 39 88 
2012 71.6 11.554 -1.414 1.769 42 85 
2013 70.8 11.053 -1.537 1.409 43 81 
2014 71.4 11.183 -1.598 1.505 43 81 
Inflation .0169 .011 -.196 -.172 -.009 .045 
2010 .0138 .0125 .055 -.417 -.009 .033 
2011 .026 .011 -1.129 1.550 -.003 .045 
2012 .019 .007 -1.108 1.263 .000 .030 
2013 .013 .006 .536 -.691 .004 .026 
2014 .011 .009 .203 -1.335 -.001 .027 
GDP Per Capita 45217.858 8931.178 .374 .101 28992.6 67524.800 
2010 42606.68 6166.426 -.359 -.764 30736 51800.900 
2011 46287.77 7944.420 .157 -.136 31975 62133.7 
2012 45651.90 10033.099 .502 .250 28992.6 67524.8 
2013 45794.44 10083.090 .536 -.021 29863.2 67458.4 
2014 45748.50 9388.996 -.053 -.950 30262.2 61887 
Population 82042575.4 83685858.43 2.007 3.060 4560155 318857056 
2010 81279473.40 82707764 1.997 3.070 4560155 309326295 
2011 81718174 83283697.06 2.004 3.093 4576794 311582564 
2012 81959953.2 83834034.17 2.020 3.145 4586897 313873685 
2013 82357779.9 84378066.80 2.031 3.179 4595281 316128839 
2014 82897496.5 85037054.6 2.040 3.215 4612719 318857056 
Masculinity 62.5 14.460 .598 .397 42 95 
2010 62.5 14.460 .598 .397 42 95 
2011 62.5 14.460 .598 .397 42 95 
2012 62.5 14.460 .598 .397 42 95 
2013 62.5 14.460 .598 .397 42 95 
2014 62.5 14.460 .598 .397 42 95 
Power Distance 44.2 11.877 .614 -.720 28 68 
2010 44.2 11.877 .614 -.720 28 68 
2011 44.2 11.877 .614 -.720 28 68 
2012 44.2 11.877 .614 -.720 28 68 
2013 44.2 11.877 .614 -.720 28 68 
2014 44.2 11.877 .614 -.720 28 68 
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The audit committee number demonstrated more consistency: while the minimum is 2, the 
maximum is 8; this was consistent not only for the overall sample period, but for each year. 
The standard deviation was average. The skewness and kurtosis reveal that the audit 
committees were not all within the same range. The standard deviation is average. The 
skewness and kurtosis reveal that the committees were within normal range with normal 
distribution. Leverage was shown to vary among firms, with the standard deviation with a small 
range, from a low of (.172) in 2010 to a high of (.180) in 2014.  However, skewness and kurtosis 
are both negative. Leverage was not shown as being within a normal range. This may be 
because of the differences between firms. 
For the country-level control variables, the figures show major differences in the average and 
standard deviation, although the skewness and kurtosis are within normal range and positive . 
Minimums and maximums also differ; this was based on the fact that the countries had different 
rules for capitalisation. 
Corruption index varied among firms from average minimums of 39 over the whole sample 
period with the highest being 89. The figures for the individual years were within range, with 
the lowest being (39) and the highest (43). The average over the period for the corruption index 
was (71,920), and for 2010 it was also very high at (72,800). This suggests that there was a 
particular situation of corruption that developed with certain firms during the period. From 
2011 to 2014, the average was (73) in 2011, (71.6), (70.8), and (71.4) for the remaining years. 
The corruption index, except for that particularly glaring situation, was approximate ly (71). 
The standard deviation was high, between (11.053) in 2013 and (13.817) in 2010. The 
skewness and kurtosis suggest that there were no great differences, but that the figures are 
negatively skewed. The kurtosis shows abnormal distribution. 
Inflation was erratic during this period: the average inflation was (.0169), with a standard 
deviation of only (.011). The rates are negatively skewed and kurtosis is also negative at (-
.172). The lowest inflation is (0.009) and the highest is (.045). However, inflation fell to (.0138) 
in 2010 and (.011) in 2014. The standard deviation was relatively small during this period, with 
the skewness being negative for 2011 and 2012 at (-1.129) and (-1.108), respectively. 
GDP per capita did not change dramatically between 2010 and 2014, although standard 
deviation fluctuated. The minimum did not change markedly, although there were changes in 
the maximum. The skewness and kurtosis were negative, suggesting that these were not within 
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normal range. The explanation for this is that the different countries studied did not change 
their GDP per capita markedly during this period.  
The population figure did not change markedly over this period. Between 2010, with a 
population of (81,279,473), and 2014, with a population of (82,897,496), the population growth 
was a little over (1.6) million people. The minimum was (45,600,155) and the maximum was 
(309,326,295) in 2010 and the difference was in 2014 with minimum of (4,612,719) and the 
maximum was (318,857,056) people. All the minimums are comparable, as are the maximums. 
The skewness and kurtosis are within normal range and positive.  
The characteristics of masculinity and power distance remain constant throughout the period 
and for the individual years. For all the years from 2010 to 2014, masculinity is (62.5), the 
minimum is (42) and the maximum is (.95). Similarly, the figure for power distance is (44.2) 
for all years. The minimum from 2010 to 2014 is (28), and the maximum is (68). Skewness is 
(.614) and kurtosis is (-.720) for all years. These country characteristics were important to the 
various countries and demonstrated the influence that the countries had over these different 
variables and over the effect that these variables had on the operation of firms within these 
countries. 
6.6 Pearson’s and spearman’s correlation matrix of financial performance and all 
continuous corporate governance variables for all (200) firm years 
Table 16 compares Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation matrix of financial performance and 
all continuous corporate governance variables for all 200 firm years. With the Pearson’s 
parametric correlation coefficients presented on the left and the Spearman’s non-paramedic 
correlation coefficients presented on the upper right side, it is possible to tell whether the 
correlation between variables is significant or not. A comparison of the relations between the 
Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix shows that the financial performance and the 
corporate governance variables used in the study are strongly correlated; this is evident from 
looking at the closeness in the scores along the clear line representing perfect correlation. We 
can see that R&D/Assets and R&D/Sales are highly significant at 5%. R&D/Assets is 
correlated to R&D/Sales at (.939**), and R&D/Assets is correlated to R&D expenditure at 
(.713**). R&D expenditure is correlated to R&D/Sales at (.744**), and R&D expenditure is 
correlated to ROA at (.008). In Table 16, the correlation shows that there are significant 
relations at about 5% between most of the financial performance and corporate governance 
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variables. For example, there is positive significance between R&D/Assets and R&D/sales, as 
noted, and between R&D expenditure and R&D/Sales. But the correlation between ROA and 
R&D expenditure is not significant. The correlation between RA S&P and ROA is positive and 
significant; this is evident with the (.254**) and (.222**), respectively. Other positive and 
significant correlations are between independent directors and board size, between corruption 
index and stock market capitalism, at (.248**) and (.292**), between inflation and corruption 
index, at (.184**) and (.141**), between audit committee number and governance committee 
number at (.156**) and (.156**), and between audit committee number and firm size, at (.303**) 
and (.320**). 
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Table 16: Pearson’s and Spearman’s Correlation Matrix of Financial Performance and All Continuous Corporate Governance Variables for All (200) Firm 
Variable 
RD 
Assets 
RD 
Sales 
RD   
Expo 
ROA 
RA  
S&P 
AVG 
ICC 
BS FBM BO DO IO BD ID CGI SMC 
COR
R IDX 
INFL 
GDPC POP 
MASCU POWE
R D 
CGC 
NO 
AC FS SG LVG CGY 
RD Assets  .954** .779** .114** .170** .113** -.083* -.205** -.126** -.034 -.030 .060 .087* -.125** .076 .110** .037 .102* .032 .174** -.021 .027 -.064 -.038 .047 -.069 .044 
RD Sales .939**  .793** .073 .185** .096* -.080* -.170** -.120** -.057 -.044 .069 .085 -.105** .072 .082* .021 .096* .031 .138** .004 .034 -.085* .043 .050 -.096* .034 
RD Expo .713** .744**  .015 .366** .132** .171** -.161** -.116** -.182** .008 .091* .105* .027 .233** .075 .005 .078 .175** .158** .076 .120** .091* .597** -.052 .087* .060 
ROA .162** .104* .008  .222** -.111** -.178** .027 .041 -.055 -.092** .040 .127** .075* .023 .121** -.027 .095** -.081* -.072* -.148** -.055 -.067* -.218** .162** -.331** -.016 
RA S&P .198** .195** .368** .254**  .201** .082* -.153** -.013 -.121** -.122** .028 .007 -.095** .208** .162** .152** .177** .002 .331** .001 .040 .135** .373** -.089* -.300** .035 
AVG ICC -.017 -.039 -.006 -.206** -.018  -.053 -.395** -.002 .068* -.029 -.223** -.368** -.503** .123** .050 .255** -.095** .054 .439** .206** -.253** .092** .118** -.010 -.027 .146** 
BS -.083* -.051 .188** -.196** .091* -.022  -.033 -.153** -.087** .019 .229** -.206** .185** .087** -.030 -.033 -.165** .279** -.069* .111** .246** .303** .445** -.082** .258** .008 
FBM -.204** -.147** -.100* -.097** -.096** -.022 -.081*  .066* -.153** .110** .237** .276** .418** -.098** -.065* -.234** .092** -.122** -.348** -.117** .155** -.073* -.042 -.015 .075* .012 
BO -.015 -.033 .002 .084** .129** .004 -.191** .051  -.069* -.109** -.038 .246** -.063* .054 .114** -.010 .134** -.026 .005 -.108** .058 .020 -.011 .031 -.064* .024 
DO -.026 -.050 -.214** -.088** -.148** .021 -.085** -.069* -.131**  .106** -.283** -.339** -.272** -.070* -.359** .036 -.287** .189** .154** .167** -.212** -.142** -.210** .085** .060 -.034 
IO -.028 -.019 .026 -.095** -.114** .007 .029 .105** -.240** .094**  -.063* -.144** -.008 -.066* -.036 -.059 -.042 .053 -.136** .059 -.001 -.014 -.040 .017 -.008 -.023 
BD .090* .101* .105** .106** .024 -.124** .213** .101** -.012 -.262** -.065*  .290** .322** .057 .147** -.186** .078* -.058 -.314** -.066* .263** .106** .178** -.053 .083** .015 
ID .081 .089* .091* .241** .053 -.212** -.210** .001 .404** -.282** -.144** .263**  .333** .090** .306** -.231** .568** -.219** -.129** -.503** .406** .036 .086** .040 -.080* -.039 
CGI -.133** -.117** .049 .083** -.007 -.222** .164** .147** -.113** -.195** -.019 .288** .100**  -.118** -.031 -.369** .100** -.055 -.388** -.186** .287** -.032 .140** -.024 .061 -.066* 
SMC .136** .113** .278** .062* .247** .021 .080* -.083** .232** -.096** -.099** .033 .112** -.101**  .292** .030 .113** .611** .038 .239** .102** .336** .320** -.076* -.002 .029 
CORR 
IDX 
.053 .037 -.042 .127** .120** -.001 -.100** -.065* .199** -.284** .049 .057 .350** -.024 .248**  .141** .614** -.241** .019 -.412** .296** .319** .014 .016 -.169** .025 
INFL -.027 -.054 -.064 .045 .099** .141** -.118** .000 .053 -.022 -.055 -.089** -.105** -.185** .058 .184**  -.057 .003 .237** .104** -.132** .063* .014 .033 -.023 .115** 
GDPC .114** .111** .060 .229** .156** -.094** -.179** .019 .228** -.248** -.026 .088** .610** -.009 .154** .668** -.041  -.486** .213** -.581** .323** .112** -.046 .013 -.216** .001 
POP .001 .010 .174** -.130** -.044 -.012 .301** -.103** -.050 .166** .055 -.063* -.229** -.028 .536** -.305** -.079* -.495**  -.110** .514** -.092** .182** .270** -.031 .154** .014 
MASCU .188** .136** .130** -.115** .273** .166** -.056 -.181** .009 .190** -.128** -.330** -.132** -.193** -.014 -.014 .078* -.014 -.089**  -.349** -.081* .087** .018 -.030 -.039 .087** 
POWER 
D 
-.046 -.015 .077 -.187** -.005 .122** .094** .068* -.128** .138** .052 -.064* -.437** -.172** .178** -.524** .002 -.512** .501** -.354**  -.370** -.020 .211** -.063* .079* .029 
CGC NO .046 .074 .136** -.002 .061 -.166** .230** .040 .064* -.201** .000 .263** .392** .218** .086** .311** -.058 .333** -.097** -.139** -.350**  .156** .224** -.044 .045 -.037 
AC -.039 -.037 .105** -.027 .145** .041 .289** -.038 .096** -.146** -.010 .105** .065 -.013 .393** .211** .014 .107** .182** -.008 -.026 .156**  .320** -.102** .116** -.036 
FS -.038 .064 .630** -.200** .371** .080* .442** .035 .061 -.253** -.032 .173** .069* .180** .269** -.060 -.015 -.068* .239** -.024 .194** .227** .303**  -.110** .214** .052 
SG .019 .026 -.065 .214** -.032 -.113** -.086** -.072* -.015 .079* .033 -.066* .063 .006 -.155** .039 .138** .055 -.107** -.020 -.088** -.043 -.101** -.116**  -.090** -.011 
LVG -.082* -.096* .065 -.410** -.299** .080* .266** .092** -.081* .069* .000 .057 -.115** .054 -.043 -.198** -.036 -.227** .160** .028 .063* .022 .108** .196** -.101**  .023 
CGY .094* .076 .090* .345** .274** -.022 .006 -.052 .036 -.066* -.061 .045 .116** .049 .104** .106** .015 .165** -.014 .058 -.099** .037 .115** .038 .114** -.133**  
Notes: the bottom left half of the table presents Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whilst the upper right half of the table presents Spearman’s non-parametric correlation  
coefficients. ** and * denote correlation is significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: R&D divided by assets (RD Assets), R&D divided by 
sales (RD Sales), R&D Expenditures (RD Expo), Return on Assets (ROA), Credit Rating (RA S&P), Cost of Capital (AVG ICC), Board Size (BS), Frequencies of Board Meeting 
(FBM), Block Ownership (BO), Director Ownership (DO), Institutional Ownership (IO) Board Diversity (BD) Independent Directors (ID), Corporate Governance Index (CGI), 
Stock Market Capitalisation (SMC), Corruption Index (CORR IDX), Inflation ( INFL), GDP per Capita (GDPC), Population (POP), Masculinity (MASCU), Power Distance 
(POWER D), Corporate Governance Committee No. (CGC NO), Audit Committee No. (AC), Firm Size (FS), Sales Growth (SG), Leverage (LVG), Capital Gain Yield (CGY) 
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The findings show that there is a significant negative correlation between board size and 
institutional ownership, at (- .065) and (-.063). A similar correlation exists between stock 
market capitalisation and CGI, at (-.101) and (-.118); between population and GDP per 
capita, at (.495) and (-.486); between masculinity and population, at (-.089) and (-.110); 
between power distance and masculinity, at (-.354) and (-.349); and between corporate 
governance committee number and power distance, at (-350) and (-370). 
Table 16 shows the matrix of financial performance and other corporate governance 
variables and the level of correlation between them. It shows where there is a positive 
relation between the variables, which are significant and which are negative. 
For example, masculinity and power distance are negatively correlated, indicating that 
these two characteristics are not normally found to complement each other in the same 
environment. While masculinity is based on characteristics such as assertiveness, 
achievement, heroism and material rewards, power distance is based on the idea that there 
is an unequal distribution of power. Corporate governance committee Number is also 
negatively correlated with power distance, indicating that corporate governance is about 
promoting equality while power distance is about recognising inequality. The negative 
relationship between population and GDP per capita is based on the idea that an increase 
in population leads to a decline in GDP per capita. Similarly, by looking at the Pearson’s 
and Spearman’s correlation matrix, one can establish where there is strong correlation, and 
whether it is positive or negative. 
6.7 Multivariate regression analyses, results and discussion 
This section reports on the multivariate analyses of how independent and control variables 
impact firm performance as seen in risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. 
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6.7.1 Multivariate analysis and discussion: ownership structure and 
board structure and risk-taking measured by R&D/Assets 
In Table 17, OLS Regression Results of Ownership Structure and Board Structure on Risk-
taking based on the R&D/Assets (dependent variable), the F-Value is (.585***), indicat ing 
that the model is positive and significant at 1%, although the number is small. The Adjusted 
R²% at 19.4% shows how the independent variables, ownership structure and board 
structure, and the control variables will interpret the dependent variable, by R²%. This 
suggests that any change in the independent and control variables will lead to a change in 
the dependent variable by R².  
The findings reveal that control variables that were significant were frequency of board 
meetings, firm size, audit committee number and corporate governance committee number. 
The significant country variables were corruption index, masculinity and Anglo-American. 
6.7.1.1 Multivariate analysis and discussion: block ownership and risk-taking 
measured by R&D/Assets 
The significant independent variables were block ownership and independent directors. 
These findings reveal a strong negative relationship between block ownership and risk-
taking as measured by R&D/Assets. The findings for block ownership for all firm years 
was (-2982***), significant at 1%. The relation between block ownership and risk-taking 
for each individual year was also negative. 
For 2010 through 2014, this relation was (-1.093), (-688), (-1.639), (-1.481) and (-1.509), 
respectively. The year in which this relation was most marked is 2012. Overall, for the 
period, the relation between block ownership and risk-taking is strongly significant and 
negative. Changes took place over years, showing that in 2010, the negative significant 
relation was about 5%, and that declined in number, but also in degree of significance. For 
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2010, 2013 and 2014, the relation was negative, but not significant. This finding predicts 
that if block ownership increases, risk will decrease.  
The literature used to draw up the hypothesis showed that block owners allowed outsiders 
to have some control over a firm, as they would have control over management, a 
circumstance that would come about as they could use their size and power to gain benefits 
to which smaller shareholders did not have access (Barclay and Holderness, 1989). It was 
also pointed out that block owners were able to purchase shares at premium prices, unlike 
other shareholders. This condition led to firms using caution and repurchasing any shares 
that were priced higher than the market price when some disaffected block owners may try 
to put these on the market (Kosnik, 1990). According to Kosnik (1990), dealing with block 
owners is a risk, and some firms that see a take-over threat coming would try to prevent 
this and prevent proxy fights from taking place between block owners. In this respect, it 
was thought that the relation between block owners and risk-taking would be positive, 
although not significant. In fact, according to Mehran (1995), Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) 
and Holderness (2003), a threat that some contend exist for block ownership and risk-
taking is the fact that block owners could be other firms buying shares in another firm. 
While the purchase could simply be to hold shares in a particular company, in other cases 
it could be a strategy that some firms use to take over others. On this basis, it was argued 
that block holders have a positive relation with risk-taking (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Some researchers believe that block owners could have a beneficial effect on firms, so that 
in their minds, block owners would have a negative relation with risk-taking, which is the 
findings from this study. According to Jensen (1993), the beneficial effect could be more 
monitoring of management, as block owners would be interested in keeping abreast of how 
the firm was operating. Such monitoring would contribute to the long-term performance of 
the firm, this would be in keeping with agency theory. 
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Table 17: OLS Regression Results of Ownership Structure & Board Structure on Risk-
Taking Based on the R&D/Assets (Dependent Variable): 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐  .194 .130 .124 .114 .199 .236 
Standard Error  .721 .684 .741 .778 .755 .719 
Durbin- Watson  .558 2.146 1.956 2.075 2.210 1.845 
F-Value  .585(.000)*** 1.682(.053)* 1.660(.057)* 1.637(.060)* 2.256(.005)*** 2.399(.003)*** 
No. of Observations  504 97 99 105 107 96 
Constant  -
3.433(.001)*** 
-2.415(.018)** -1.832(.071)* -1.135(.260) .151(.880) -1.711(.091)* 
Independent Variables 
Block Ownership  +/- -
2.982(.003)*** 
-1.093(.278) -.688(.493) -1.639(.105) -1.481(.142) -1.509(.135) 
Institutional Ownership - -.702(.483) -1.068(.289) -.394(.695) 1.962(.053)* .381(.704) -1.651(.103) 
Director Ownership + .300(.764) .180(.858) -.463(.645) .342(.733) -.499(.619) -.436(.664) 
Independent Directors +/- 3.698(.000)*** -.299(.766) .136(.892) 2.551(.013)** 1.245(.216) 2.077(.041)** 
Board Size +/- -1.564(.118) -1.811(.074)* -1.745(.085)* -.324(.747) -1.104(.273) -1.631(.107) 
Board Diversity +/- 1.468(.143) 1.130(.262) 1.312(.193) 1.492(.139) 1.785(.078)* -.314(.754) 
Frequency of Board 
Meetings 
- -
4.293(.000)*** 
-.375(.709) -
2.771(.007)*** 
-1.714(.090)* -1.735(.086)* -2.667(.009)*** 
Control Variables 
Firm Size  -2.100(.036)** -1.189(.238) -.944(.348) -.690(.492) -.317(.752) -.669(.506) 
Sales Growth  .376(.707) -.159(.874) -.122(.903) .533(.596) -.877(.383) .564(.575) 
Audit Committee No.  -1.838(.067)* -.018(.986) -1.338(.185) -1.175(.243) -2.296(.024)** -.054(.957) 
Corporate Governance 
Committee No. 
 5.045(.000)*** 2.247(.028)** 1.858(.067)* 1.960(.053)* 2.796(.006)*** 3.015(.004)*** 
Leverage  .577(.564) .300(.765) 1.527(.131) -.058(.954) -.372(.711) .393(.695) 
Capital Gain Yield  .451(.652) .354(.725) 2.281(.025)** .253(.801) .309(.758) -.584(.561) 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
 -.865(.387) .515(.608) -.150(.881) -.039(.969) 1.688(.095)* -2.002(.049)** 
Corruption Index   2.397(.017)** -1.310(.194) .290(.773) 1.265(.208) -.254(.800) 2.999(.004)*** 
Inflation  -.797(.426) 1.878(.064)* -1.094(.277) -.880(.381) -
3.219(.002)*** 
-.210(.834) 
GDP Per Capita  .757(.449) 2.977(.004)*** .329(.743) -1.236(.220) -.271(.787) .320(.750) 
Population  1.551(.122) 2.014(.048)** .505(.615) -.602(.549) -.355(.723) 2.467(.016)** 
Masculinity  3.494(.001)*** -1.426(.158) .992(.324) 1.397(.166) -.317(.752) 2.009(.048)** 
Power Distance  1.219(.224) -1.345(.183) .634(.528) 1.228(.223) -1.157(.250) 1.669(.099)* 
Anglo American  -
2.686(.007)*** 
-2.247(.030)** -.254(.800) .186(.853) -1.715(.090)* -1.270(.208) 
2010  1.221(.223) - - - - - 
2011  .568(.570) - - - - - 
2012  .418(.676) - - - - - 
2014  -.517(.605) - - - - - 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. Also, year 2013 are excluded from the regression analyses. It is used as base year, respectively, 
for purposes of comparison. 
 
Agency theory can be used to explain the findings in this study. This theory suggests that 
with increasing block ownership, risk would decrease. According to Lai and Chen (2014), 
more governance would lead to less risk-taking through more monitoring. According to 
our findings, as well as to Jensen (1993), the more monitoring that management has, the 
better for shareholders. If block owners are seen as bringing about more monitoring, they 
would be helping to protect the wellbeing of shareholders. Therefore, agency theory could 
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be used to show the relation between block owners and risk-taking as shown in the findings 
of this study.  
For independent directors, the finding is (3.698***). Unlike the finding for block ownership, 
which is significant at 1% and negative, the finding for independent directors is significant 
at 1%but positive. The findings reveal that an increase in independent directors contributes 
to increased risk-taking. The literature reveals that independent directors provide the best 
security for organisations, which gives rise to better corporate performance, and 
stewardship theory holds the opposite, namely, that if inside directors dominate, 
performance will improve (Letting et al., 2012, p. 783). The literature therefore provides 
ambiguous results, as it depends on which theory is used to explain the role of directors. 
This study reveals that independent directors lead to increased risk-taking. The rationale 
used to support stewardship theory is that inside-dominated boards have greater knowledge 
about the operations of the company, and with this knowledge and expertise would set out 
to protect the interests of the firm (Letting et al., 2012). 
Frequency of board meetings has a negative relationship with risk-taking, significant at 
1%, at (-4.293***), suggesting that the more board meetings are held, the lower the risk-
taking. This relationship is based on the idea that frequent board meetings mean greater 
monitoring of management. According to agency theory, board members protect 
shareholders’ interests through their surveillance of management (Vafeas 1999; Mangena 
and Tauringana, 2006). Firm size is also significant, but at 5% and negative. Firm size 
mattered, as firms of different sizes had different corporate governance structures. 
Differences in firm size affected risk-taking. In terms of audit committees, here was also a 
negative relationship, significant at 10%. This meant that an increase in audit committee 
led to a reduction in risk-taking. Significance to corporate governance committee number 
was (5.045***) significant at 1%. This suggests that when corporate governance increases, 
so does the likelihood of investment in R&D (Black et al., 2010). Audit committees would 
lead to an increase in the creditworthiness of the company, as these committees carry out 
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more surveillance of firms, leading to better protection of shareholders’ interests (Gamble 
and Kelly, 2001; Lai & Chen, 2014).  
With the country variables, corruption index, masculinity and Anglo-American have 
relations with risk-taking that are significant at 1%. While corruption index and masculinity 
have a positive relationship, Anglo-American has a negative one. The findings are (2.397**) 
for corruption index, (3.494***) for masculinity and (-2.686***) for Anglo-American. An 
increase in corruption index and masculinity led to increase in risk-taking. The negative 
significance for Anglo-American means that firms from Continental countries perform 
better in terms of risk-taking than firms from Anglo countries. This may reflect the fact 
that this system is greatly influenced by company law and taxation, and that the accounting 
system used prioritises creditors and tax authorities, as observed in Germany (Radebaugh 
et al., 2006). On the other hand, the Anglo-American system gives preferential treatment 
to large corporations and investors (Radebaugh et al., 2006). However, there is research 
that supports the position that increase in corporate governance in Anglo-American 
accounting tradition leads to a decline in risk and ultimately in credit risk. According to 
research, since the Anglo-American tradition has rigid corporate governance mechanisms 
established by country practices, heavy emphasis is placed on compliance and disclosure, 
leading to reduced risk-taking (Jenkinson and Mayer, 2012). This finding was significant 
and negatively related to risk-taking as measured by R&D/Assets, as expected, showing 
that there is a relation and that the null hypothesis is rejected. 
6.7.1.2 Multivariate analysis and discussion: institutional ownership and risk-
taking measured by R&D/Assets 
Hypothesis H3a states that “There is no statistical relationship between institutiona l 
ownership and risk-taking.” Our findings reveal that there is no significant relation between 
institutional ownership and risk-taking, as measured by R&D/Assets. Based on the 
statistics provided, the null hypothesis is accepted. In fact, the relation for all firm years is 
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(-.702) and negative. For the years 2010 to 2014, the relation is (-1.068), (-.394) and 
(1.962), which is significant at 10%, (.381) and (1.651), respectively. It is apparent that, 
while there is one significant relation, there are also positive relations, significantly in 2012 
and insignificantly in 2013. The findings show that there is no relation. 
A look at the literature on institutional ownership and risk-taking measured by R&D/Assets 
shows that since these institutions are primarily insurance companies, pension funds and 
banks, the focus is protecting their client portfolios with firms that have good investments 
(Del Guercio, 1996). These institutional owners focus on reducing risk and reaping good 
dividends (Hutchinson, Seamer and Chapple, 2015). These owners are usually very active 
in monitoring the firms in which they invest (Hutchinson, Seamer and Chapple, 2015). The 
result is a negative relation between institutional investors and risk-taking (Grinstein and 
Michaely, 2005). These findings are supported by agency theory, as institutional owners 
promote the well-being of shareholders (Lai and Chen, 2014). Stewardship theory is also 
relevant, as it is based on the dominance of insiders and management’s role to promote 
good corporate performance; since these firms manage their clients’ portfolios, they are 
seen as good stewards (Letting et al., 2012). Institutional owners are seen as heavily 
influencing management and ensuring that management does what is good for the well-
being of shareholders (Hutchinson, Seamer and Chapple, 2015). 
6.7.1.3 Multivariate analysis and discussion: director ownership and risk-
taking measured by R&D/Assets 
Hypothesis H4a looks at director ownership and risk-taking, stating: “There is no 
statistically significant relationship between director ownership and risk-taking”. 
According to our findings, there is no relation and so the null hypothesis is accepted.  
For the years 2010 to 2014, the relation is (.180), (-.463), (.342), (-.499) and (-.436), 
respectively. There is no significant relationship between director ownership and risk-
taking measured by R&D/Assets. 
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According to La Porta et al. (1999), many countries have different ownership structures 
than those in North America. For example, in Hong Kong, founders of firms are also their 
directors. This gives rise to the free rider problem, and there is not as much monitoring as 
there would be in companies where the roles of managers and directors are separate. These 
firms are seen as more likely to take risks (Chen & Jaggi, 2000). These kinds of companies 
can be easily subject to take-over, which makes them closely correlated with risk-taking 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). According to previous research, what could result when there 
are director owners is that management entrenchment occurs, thereby allowing these 
director owners to manage the company in a way that promotes their self-interest 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasey, 1999). In situations like this, director 
owners do not maximise the wealth of shareholders, but look to obtain high salaries, 
bonuses and compensation (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). 
A theory that can be used to explain the findings for the relation between director 
ownership and risk-taking is agency theory; director owners pursuing their interests to the 
disadvantage of other shareholders clearly describes the agency relationship. However, 
another possibly suitable theory is stewardship theory; if there is not too much director 
ownership, this could lead to owners who are interested in the well-being of the firm and 
see managers as good stewards (Letting et al., 2012) 
6.7.1.4 Multivariate analysis and discussion: independent directors and risk-
taking measured by R&D/Assets 
Independent directors are board directors that are responsible for monitoring managers.  
Since these directors are from outside the firm, they are not indebted to management in any 
respect, and so monitor the executives. Independent directors were seen as having no close 
relationships with shareholders. In other words, independent directors do not have 
relationships either with management or with shareholders (Aguilera, 2004). These 
directors are seen as the core of good governance. Independent directors are therefore in a 
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position to ensure that management does not engage in behaviour that puts the interests of 
shareholders at risk. But it was also shown that too many independent directors could have 
a negative impact on the firm and could therefore be seen as repressing strategic plans, and 
could also lead to too much monitoring of management (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
However, Ntim et al. (2012) argue that corporate boards and directors could influence firm 
value. In other words, independent directors could have a negative as well as a positive 
impact on a company. Based on these findings, this study tested Hypothesis H6a, namely, 
that “There is no statistically significant relationship between independent directors and 
risk-taking”. 
A look at the findings of this study reveal a strong significant positive relationship at less 
than 1% between independent directors and risk-taking. While the average for all firm 
years was (3.698***), significant at 1%, for the following years there was a (-.299) for 2010, 
(.136) for 2011, (2.551**) at the 5% level in 2012, (1.245) in 2013, and (2.077**) at the 5% 
level. These findings are supported by literature which shows independent directors could 
be helpful in giving value to the company, but it could also hurt the company through over 
monitoring and through repressing strategy plans (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
Agency theory and resource dependence theory could apply in this case. While the conflict 
between the interests of independent directors and shareholders support agency theory (Lai 
and Chen, 2014), resource dependence theory can be applied to independent directors who 
turn out to be extra resources that firms can depend on (Chen and Roberts, 2010). This 
study supports the literature and shows that there are significant relationships. 
6.7.1.5 Multivariate analysis and discussion: board size and risk-taking 
measured by R&D/Assets 
The hypothesis drawn up for board size was H5a, which states: “There is no statistica l ly 
significant relationship between board size and risk-taking”. Our findings reveal that there 
is no significant relation for all firm years. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
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But for 2010 and 2011, there was a significant negative relationship, with value of (-1.811) 
and (-1.745), respectively. The negative relationship is seen for the next three years at (-
.324), (-1.104), and (-1.631). Board size is critical not only for monitoring management but 
also for ensuring that the other activities of the firm are strategically carried out (Davidson 
et al., 1998; Klein, 1998). Board size is said to be important, with Lipton and Lorsch 
showing (9) members as optimal for the effective functioning of this body, but with some 
arguing that boards should be larger (Yawson, 2006; John and Senbet, 1998). 
However, according to the overall average for all firm years, there was no significant 
relationship. A too-small board becomes a risk if it is unable to carry out monitoring and 
attend to other company business. The result could be loss of assets or the poor performance 
of the company. If the board is too large, as some have pointed out, this could lead to poor 
performance. 
The theories that can be used to discuss the relationship between board size and risk-taking 
are agency theory, to explain protecting the rights of shareholders, and resource 
dependence theory, as board members are seen as an important resource that adds value to 
the company and allows it to access expertise and other resources. 
6.7.1.6 Multivariate analysis and discussion: board diversity and risk-taking 
measured by R&D/Assets 
Board diversity is said to be an important value to a firm. Hypothesis H7a states, “There is 
no statistically significant relationship between board diversity and risk-taking”. It was 
thought that having a diverse board allows for greater exchange of ideas and different 
viewpoints and contributes to a better organisation with better corporate performance. 
Women were seen as the group that was often left out of boards; many European countries 
have decided to take action to rectify this.  
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Several countries in Europe have mandated that boards should be diverse, with special 
emphasis on putting women on boards. It was stipulated that, in U.K. companies, at least 
25% of directors had to be female by (Sealy and Vinnicombe, 2012). In Norway, the 
stipulation was that at least 40% of board members should be women by 2008, (Hoel, 
2008), while Spain and France stipulated that at least 40% of directors should be women 
by 2015 and 2017, respectively (de Cabo et al., 2012). Diverse boards are seen as added 
resources that increase firm value (Rose, 2007). However, some studies show that it is 
preferable to have a board that does not stress diversity, because there would be fewer 
viewpoints, thus preventing unanimity on certain issues (Rose, 2007). 
Our findings show no relationship between board diversity and risk-taking measured by 
R&D/Assets. This finding is in keeping with research that shows board diversity is not 
important for the wellbeing of an organisation. The theory that is applicable to studying 
this relation is resource dependence theory. 
6.7.1.7 Multivariate analysis and discussion: frequency of board meetings and 
risk-taking measured by R&D/Assets 
Hypothesis H8a states: “There is no statistically significant relationship between the 
frequency of board meetings and risk-taking.” Our findings show a strong (at 1%) negative 
relationship between frequency of board meetings and risk-taking measured by 
R&D/Assets. Basically, this means that if a firm does not hold frequent board meetings, it 
is more likely to perform poorly.  
The overall average for all firm years is (-4.293***) for frequency of board meetings. This 
finding shows that there is a negative relationship between frequency of board meetings 
and risk-taking, significant to 1%. This suggests that when meetings are more frequent, 
risk-taking will decrease. However, for 2010 to 2014, our findings are inconsistent. In 
2010, the findings show (-.375), in 2011 (-2.771***), in 2012 (-1.714*), in 2013 (-1.735*), 
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and in 2014 (-.2.667***); these are all negative, though the amounts differ. There is no 
relationship; therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
This finding supports studies including Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), who show that 
among 275 U.S. listed companies, frequent board meetings had a positive effect. However, 
another view is that more frequent boards meetings result in higher costs for boards and 
firms, eventually leading to poor performance. The theories that can be used to discuss this 
relation between frequency of board meetings and risk-taking is agency theory, which 
shows the importance of looking after the interests of shareholders and promoting firm 
performance; resource dependence theory, since the board serves as a resource, improving 
firm value; and institutional theory, which is based on the idea that managers and directors 
will take measures that would help them to influence others. More frequent meetings may 
help give the impression that the firm has a board that is actively working; however, there 
is no relation and the null hypothesis is rejected. 
6.7.2 Multivariate analysis and discussion: ownership structure and 
board structure and control variables and risk-taking (measured by 
R&D/Sales) 
In Table 18, OLS Regression Results of Ownership Structure and Board Structure on Risk-
taking measured by R&D/Sales (dependent variable), the F-Value is (4.902***), indicat ing 
that the model is positive and significant at 1%. This model is a fit in predicting the sought -
after relationships. The Adjusted R²% at 16.2% shows how the independent variable, the 
ownership structure, board structure and the control variables, will interpret the dependent 
variable, by R²%. This suggests that any change in the independent and control variables 
will lead to a change in the dependent variable by R².  
In Table 18, the significant findings are in block ownership, at (-3.411***), significant to 
1% and negative; independent directors, at (2.764***), significant at 1% and positive; board 
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size at (-2.481**) and significant to 5%; and frequency of board meetings, at (-3.399***), 
significant at 1% and negative. 
6.7.2.1 Multivariate analysis and discussion: block ownership structure and 
risk-taking (measured by R&D/Sales) 
This section discusses block ownership structure and risk-taking as measured by 
R&D/Sales. The hypothesis that was developed to show the relation between block 
ownership and risk-taking (measured by R&D/Sales) is Hypothesis H2a, which states that 
“There is no statistically significant relationship between block ownership and risk-
taking.” The findings from Table 18 reveal a significant negative relationship as evidenced 
in the correlation for all firm years at (-3.411***), at a significance of less than 1%. For the 
years of the study, there was a negative correlation, but there was only significance at about 
10 % for 2012, at (-1.840*). The trend shows that while 2011 had a lower negative relation, 
at (-.902), that the other three years had a rising, then a declining and then a rising 
correlation at (1.617). These findings are partially supported by the literature. According 
to Holderness (2003), block owners are seen as posing a threat to firm performance, since 
block owners could have special benefits unavailable to other shareholders, as they could 
have special control over management, and as they can use their position for firm takeover 
(Barclay and Holderness, 1989). These block owners could also be directors of the firm 
(Holderness, 2003). Block owners are also seen having the potential to be beneficial to 
firms, since they could require more monitoring of the firm as they seek more information 
about their investments (Jensen, 1993). It is also the case that the national legal systems 
influence the kinds of ownership rights that firms within a country could hold (Mallin et 
al., 2010). Agency theory can be used to discuss the relationship between block ownership 
and risk-taking as measured by R&D/Sales.  
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6.7.2.2 Multivariate analysis and discussion: institutional ownership and risk-
taking (measured by R&D/Sales) 
Hypothesis H3a shows the predicted outcome that was drawn up for the relationship 
between institutional ownership and risk-taking. H3a reads: “There is no statistica l 
relationship between institutional ownership and risk-taking”. Representing CGI, 
institutional ownership is supposed to show how it affects performance measured in 
R&D/Sales. The findings in Table 18 show a negative relationship between institutiona l 
ownership and risk-taking. There is no statistically relationship. This can be the result of 
institutional investors such as banks and other fiduciary institutions making decisions to 
protect their clients’ portfolios. It is possible that they change the firms in which they 
invest. As Del Guercio (1989) suggests, these institutional owners make decisions based 
on what they perceive as good investments. Hutchinson, Seamer and Chappie (2015) show 
how institutional investors could influence management, as management considers that 
such investors require relevant information about risks. The negative relationship between 
institutional investors and risk-taking suggests that institutional investors do not tolerate 
risk. 
The theories that can be used to explain this relation are agency theory and stewardship 
theory, based on institutional owners being aware of the importance of monitor ing 
management, and their recognition that the best managed firms are under good stewardship 
of management (Lai and Chen, 2014). 
6.7.2.3 Multivariate analysis and discussion: director ownership and risk-
taking (measured by R&D/Sales) 
H4a reads: “There is no statistically significant relationship between direct ownership and 
risk-taking”. Our findings show no statistically significant relation, and so the hypothesis 
is accepted. The correlation for all firm years is (.494) and the figures for 2010 to 2014 are 
(.233). (.497), (.215), (.454) and (.268) respectively. There is a difference between Anglo 
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and Continental countries with respect to how directors could hold shares. In the 
Continental tradition, many owners are also directors, so that the agent and owner roles are 
joined. This has led to directors not adhering to corporate governance in terms of reporting; 
the implication is that these director owners run the companies without much oversight, 
Therefore, these companies are thought to be closely associated with risk-taking, because 
there is little adherence to corporate governance with respect to promoting the interests of 
other shareholders (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; McConnell and Servaes, 1999). Agency theory 
is used to discuss this relation.  
6.7.2.4 Multivariate analysis and discussion: independent directors and risk-
taking (measured by R&D/Sales) 
Independent directors are independent of management and shareholders (Aguilera, 2005).  
They can monitor management effectively and ensure that management is promoting sales 
and ensuring firm growth. The hypothesis that links independent directors and risk-taking 
is H7, which states that “There is no statistically significant relationship between 
independent directors and risk-taking”. This is because independent directors make sure 
that no action is taken by management or any group of block owners that could affect 
shareholders’ wellbeing. Not having enough independent directors means that there could 
be a preponderance of insider directors, many of whom could have their self-interest at 
heart. Not having an adequate number means that the board could fail to carry out its 
responsibility effectively. But having too many independent directors could be just as 
harmful, since they could hindering strategic plans and doing too much monitoring to be 
effective (Ntim et al., 2012). Independent directors could bring important value to the firm. 
Our findings reveal a strong relationship between independent directors and risk-taking, 
but for 2010 and 2011, the relationship is negative, while for 2012 to 2014 it is positive, 
with 2014 having a strong relation of at least 5 %. This finding shows that there have been 
inconsistent relations over the study period. This may be taken to reflect the different 
impacts that independent directors can have. According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), 
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independent directors can be seen as an important resource. The theories to be used in 
discussing this relation are agency theory and resource dependence theory. 
6.7.2.5 Multivariate analysis and discussion: board size and risk-taking 
(measured by R&D/Sales) 
Board size has been identified as an important factor in board success and firm 
performance, but some have argued that either size does not matter, or that a too-large 
board could be detrimental. Hypothesis H5a states that “There is no statistically significant 
relationship between board size and risk-taking”. The findings show a negative 
relationship. The correlation figure for all firm years is large, negative and significant at 
5%. The understanding is that there is an optimal board size, which is nine people (Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992). A board that is the right size can monitor management and carry out its 
other pertinent duties (Davidson et al., 1998).   
The findings show a negative relationship between board size and risk-taking, as shown in 
the overall relation for all firm years of (-.2481**). While this relation is negative throughout 
the years, it is significant for all firm years and for 2010 and 2011 at (-2.021) and (-2.270), 
respectively. For the other three years, the negative relationships increases, but is not 
significant. A negative result shows that a strong board has a negative impact on risk-
taking, by protecting shareholders’ interests and keeping management from pursuing their 
own interests. The theories used in explaining this finding are agency theory and resource 
dependence theory. 
6.7.2.6 Multivariate analysis and discussion: board diversity and risk-taking 
(measured by R&D/Sales) 
Hypothesis H7a states: “There is no statistically significant relationship between board 
diversity and risk-taking”. We find that there is no significant relation in board diversity 
and risk-taking as measured in R&D/Sales. The correlation for all firm years is (1.271), but 
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the changes that have taken place show that diversity has increased over the years, but that 
in 2014, the relationship was negative, with a much small figure of (-869). The findings in 
Table 18 reveal that there are different perspectives on how board diversity is related to 
risk-taking. The theory that has been used to explain the findings is resource dependence 
theory. Board diversity can help provide different perspectives which can be viewed as 
adding value to a firm, and thus can be seen as resources available to the firm (Rose, 2007). 
But some believe that diversity contributes to lack of unity in decision making because of 
too many different ideas (Rose, 2007). It was shown that some firms in the Continenta l 
tradition require compulsory diversity involving women; this is not the case in firms in the 
Anglo tradition (Hoel, 2008; de Cabo et al., 2012). However, this finding supported the 
hypothesis that was tested. 
6.7.2.7 Multivariate analysis and discussion: frequency of board meetings and 
risk-taking (measured by R&D/Sales) 
Hypothesis H8a states that “There is no statistically significant relationship between the 
frequency of board meetings and risk-taking”. According to the findings in Table 18, there 
is a strong negative statistically significant relationship between board meetings and risk-
taking in the ‘all firm years’ column of (-3.399***), with a significance of less than 1%. The 
results for 2010 to 2014 are inconsistent; in 2010, the correlation is (.044), in 2011 it is (-
2.303**), significant at 5%, and in 2012 it is (-1.383). The 2013 correlation is (-1.236) and 
the 2014 figure is (-2.270**). The relation is only positive in 2010. Frequency of meetings 
was seen to be negatively related to risk-taking as measured by R&D/Sales. Previous 
studies show that frequent board meetings do not promote firm performance, but rather 
lead to increased costs of hosting these meetings (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). The 
theories used are resource dependence theory and institutional theory, based on the idea 
that board members are a valuable resource for the firm. 
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Table 18: OLS Regression Results of Ownership Structure & Board Structure on Risk-
Taking Based on R&D/Sales (Dependent Variable) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐  .162 .090 .064 .072 .160 .193 
Standard Error  .724 .692 .757 .784 .767 .719 
Durbin- Watson  .595 2.270 2.048 2.131 2.294 1.857 
F-Value  4.902(.000)*** 1.452(.122) 1.321(.189) 1.386(.149) 1.961(.016)** 2.080(.011)** 
No. of Observations  504 97 99 105 107 96 
Constant  -3.555(.000)*** -2.857(.006)*** -1.812(.074)* -.824(.412) -.119(.906) -1.607(.112) 
Independent Variables 
Block Ownership  +/- -3.411(.001)*** -1.261(.211) -.902(.370) -1.840(.069)* -1.524(.131) -1.617(.110) 
Institutional 
Ownership 
- -1.211(.227) -1.476(.144) -.769(.444) 1.547(.126) -.062(.951) -1.772(.080)* 
Director Ownership + .494(.622) .233(.816) -.497(.621) .215(.830) -.454(.651) -.268(.789) 
Independent Directors +/- 2.764(.006)*** -.654(.515) -.460(.647) 1.836(.070)* .893(.374) 2.226(.029)** 
Board Size +/- -2.481(.013)** -2.021(.047)** -2.270(.026)** -1.131(.261) -1.366(.175) -1.539(.128) 
Board Diversity +/- 1.271(.204) .806(.423) 1.448(.152) 1.559(.123) 2.036(.045)** -.869(.388) 
Frequency of Board 
Meetings 
- -3.399(.001)*** .044(.965) -2.303(.024)** -1.383(.170) -1.236(.220) -2.270(.026)** 
Control Variables 
Firm Size  .332(.740) -.311(.757) .207(.837) .396(.693) .621(.536) .340(.734) 
Sales Growth  .755(.451) -.357(.722) .280(.780) .376(.708) .132(.895) 1.077(.285) 
Audit Committee No.  -2.082(.038)** -.347(.730) -1.260(.211) -1.285(.203) -2.322(.023)** .504(.616) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee No. 
 4.968(.000)*** 2.397(.019)** 1.865(.066)* 1.976(.051)* 2.380(.020)** 2.705(.008)*** 
Leverage  -1.095(.274) -.343(.733) .709(.480) -.582(.562) -1.056(.294) -.500(.618) 
Capital Gain Yield  .295(.768) .142(.887) 2.081(.041)** .227(.821) -.128(.899) -.922(.359) 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
 -1.496(.135) -.312(.756) -.333(.740) -.221(.825) 1.403(.164) -2.039(.045)** 
Corruption Index   1.903(.058)* -.797(.428) -.315(.754) .547(.586) -.369(.713) 2.467(.016)** 
Inflation  -.797(.426) 1.256(.213) -.591(.557) -.269(.789) -2.839(.006)*** -.028(.977) 
GDP Per Capita  1.292(.197) 2.977(.004)*** .923(.359) -.363(.718) .088(.930) .391(.697) 
Population  2.037(.042)** 2.467(.016)** .961(.340) .132(.895) -.162(.872) 2.424(.018)** 
Masculinity  2.632(.009)*** -1.091(.279) .365(.716) .646(.520) -.373(.710) 1.768(.081)* 
Power Distance  1.203(.230) -.919(.361) .151(.880) .542(.590) -1.037(.302) 1.580(.118) 
Anglo American  -2.049(.041)** -1.612(.111) -.339(.735) -.121(.904) -1.703(.092)* -1.156(.251) 
2010  1.081(.280) - - - - - 
2011  .151(.880) - - - - - 
2012  .323(.747) - - - - - 
2014  -.571(.568) - - - - - 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. Also, year 2013 are excluded from the regression analyses. It is used as base year, respectively, 
for purposes of comparison. 
6.7.3 Multivariate analysis and discussion: ownership structure and 
board structure and risk-taking measured by R&D Expenditure 
Table 19 shows the relation between corporate governance and risk-taking, as measured 
by R&D/Assets, and Table 18 presents the relation between corporate governance and risk-
taking, as measured by R&D/Sales. Table 19 presents the relationship between corporate 
governance and risk-taking, measured by R&D expenditure. As analysed in detail for 
Tables 17 and 18, Table 19 also examines the relations of corporate governance that is 
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proxies through block ownership, institutional ownership, director ownership, and 
independent directors, and board structure, which has been closely linked with good 
corporate governance, through board size, board diversity and frequency of board 
meetings. These are the same variables used in the analysis of Tables 17 and 18. 
The F-Value is (18.256***), indicating that the model is positive and significant at 1%. This 
model is a fit in predicting the relationships. The adjusted R²% at 46.2% shows how the 
independent variables, ownership structure and board structure, and the control variables, 
will interpret the dependent variable, by R²%. This suggests that any change in the 
independent and control variables will lead to a change in the dependent variable by R².  
The significant findings for firm level variables are for firm size, at (11.362***), which is 
positive and significant at 1% audit committee number, at (-1.843*), which is negative and 
significant at 10% and corporate governance committee number, at (5.045***), which is 
positive and significant at 1%. The country-level findings that are significant are for 
corruption index, at (2.394**), which is positive and significant at 5% masculinity, at 
(3.492***), which is positive and significant at 1% and Anglo-American, at (-2.689***), 
which is negative and significant at 1%. The findings reveal that frequent board meetings 
are negatively related to risk-taking. In other words, the more often meetings are held, the 
less risk-taking occurs and the better the organisation performs. This finding is supported 
by Mangena and Tauringana’s (2006) work with Zimbabwean companies between 2001 
and 2003, which shows that company performance improved with frequent board meetings. 
There was a positive relationship between firm size and risk-taking. Studies have shown, 
though, that firm size varies in importance depending on the countries involved (Black et 
al., 2010). Audit committees are also seen as important in reducing risk-taking, and are 
based on the idea that more monitoring leads to more oversight of management. 
Corruption index was also significant, with the findings suggesting that corruption is 
related to an increase in risk-taking. Westphal and Zajac (2014) highlight that risk-taking 
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could occur when reports are made up and distributed to officials and accepted without 
question, and where professionals take each other’s word. Masculinity has been shown to 
be an important factor that influences the general approach of assertiveness and dominance 
of male values. The findings also show that Anglo-American is a negative figure, 
suggesting that it is opposite to the Continental system which may be performing better 
than the Anglo-American system, primarily because of the difference in the accounting and 
legal systems. 
6.7.3.1 Multivariate analysis and discussion: block ownership and risk-taking 
measured by R&D Expenditure 
In Table 19, there is a strong significant relation between block ownership and risk-taking 
as measured by R&D expenditure of (-2.983***), which is significant at 1%. The literature 
review shows that there is a relationship between block ownership and risk-taking, because 
in some cases, block holders could be directors of a firm (Holderness, 2003). Depending 
on the country in which a firm is located, block holders have great influence over the firm’s 
performance. The legal system of a country could determine whether block holders have 
great or little influence over the firm’s performance. In countries whose legal system 
follows the common law tradition, there is greater protection for minority sharehold ers 
(Mallin et al., 2010). It would follow that in these countries block holders would not have 
as great an impact on risk-taking as in countries with fewer laws protecting minor ity 
shareholders (Mallin et al., 2010). For example, in Germany, with its civil law legal 
tradition, there is less protection for minority shareholders (Bebchuk, 1999). This finding 
is supported by previous studies, as pointed out above. 
6.7.3.2 Multivariate analysis and discussion: institutional ownership and risk-
taking measured by R&D Expenditure 
Our findings show that the relationship between institutional ownership and risk-taking is 
not significant. With a finding of (-.704), the study is based on the literature which shows 
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that institutional owners do not have tolerance for risk-taking (Del Guercio, 1996). The 
rationale for this is that institutional owners invest funds for others, and so part of their 
fiduciary responsibility is to make sure that these investments are safeguarded.  Therefore, 
institutional owners often hold portfolios of reasonable or good stocks (Del Guercio), 
usually in firms that pay dividends on a regular basis (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005). 
Institutional owners often try to influence the management of firms by monitoring firm-
specific risk and noting how management deals with this (Hutchinson et al., 2015). The 
literature therefore shows that institutional owners are very cautious about risk, and 
participate as little as possible in risky firms. Therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
6.7.3.3 Multivariate analysis and discussion: director ownership and risk-
taking measured by R&D Expenditure 
Our findings show no significant relationship between director ownership and risk-taking, 
with the findings revealed as (.297). Although the relationship is positive, it is not 
significant, showing that it is possible that in some instances, an increase in director 
ownership could lead to an increase in risk-taking, but this is not a critical finding for this 
study. It is important to point out that there are different rules in different countries 
governing how directors can own stock (La Porta et al., 1999). In some companies, for 
example in Hong Kong, founding families are owners and directors, and they own the 
majority of the stocks (Ho and Wong, 2001; Chen and Jaggi, 2000). The literature shows 
different relationships, such as the free rider problem, surfacing when founding families 
serve as directors and CEOs and when there is virtually no monitoring of management. In 
Anglo-American countries, for example, this is not the case, and other countries have 
different arrangements (La Porta et al., 1999). Consequently, in this study, director 
ownership had no significant relation with risk-taking, for while some directors would be 
interested in investing in research and development, others would be more interested in 
activities that may boost their reputations, while still others may be interested in what they 
could get from the firm rather than what they could invest for the longer term. 
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6.7.3.4 Multivariate analysis and discussion: independent directors and risk-
taking measured by R&D Expenditure 
For independent directors, there is a strong positive relation to less than 1% at (3.687***). 
This finding is the opposite of what was expected, so the null hypothesis is rejected. The 
explanation for this relationship is that independent directors or independent board 
members are seen as providing good corporate governance (Spira, 1999) since they are not 
related or connected to management, and so they would tend to be objective monitors of 
management. It is also necessary to have independent directors that would lessen the 
impact of owners on risk-taking (Aguilera, 2005). On the other hand, according to the 
literature, too many independent directors could negatively impact firms and lead to too 
much monitoring of management, which could be counterproductive (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006). But other research shows that corporate boards and directors could lead to increased 
firm value (Ntim et al., 2012). Therefore, the significance of this finding is that independent 
directors play an important role in firm performance, as they reduce risk-taking in firms. 
This is based on agency theory. 
6.7.3.5 Multivariate analysis and discussion: board size and risk-taking 
measured by R&D Expenditure 
The finding of the relationship between board size and risk-taking is (-1.566), which 
reveals that the relationship is not significant. Previous studies show that risk-taking is 
influenced by the size of boards, which provide different levels of incentives and so have 
a different effects on risk-taking. For example, one study shows that smaller boards provide 
greater incentives to their CEOs to assume greater risks, the rationale being that greater 
risks bring about greater returns (Wang, 2012). On the other hand, larger boards are not 
motivated to take on greater risks in the hopes of larger returns, because they may already 
have huge returns and are motivated to have less risk and more stable returns (Wang, 2012). 
Nakano and Nguyen (2012) point to the disparities between board size and returns by 
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pointing out that while both the United States and Japan have smaller firms taking on more 
risk, this is not marked in the case of Japan. At the same time, it was noted that larger 
boards had lower levels of risk, evidenced by fewer bankruptcies (Nakano and Nguyen, 
2012). The null hypothesis is accepted. 
6.7.3.6 Multivariate analysis and discussion: board diversity and risk-taking 
measured by R&D Expenditure 
The finding on the relationship between board diversity and risk-taking is (1.466). This is 
not significant and so the null hypothesis is accepted. This finding does not agree with 
some of the previous studies. For example, some studies note that board diversity is 
important in promoting the wellbeing of firms, because diverse board members bring many 
skills, talents and knowledge to the board, and their different ethnicities, genders, 
educational and professional backgrounds, religion, and other diversities all enrich the 
decision making on the board (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2002). 
Goodsteinet al. (1994) and Carter et al., (2003) report that diversity supports both agency 
and resource dependence theories. The rationale is that with more diversity, more effective  
monitoring of management can take place, increasing the independence of the board to 
promote and safeguard the interests of shareholders (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2002). 
Others see board diversity as enhancing the decision making process (Baranchuk and 
Dybvig, 2009). On the other hand, others contend that diversity could be a drawback, with 
too much diversity leading to difficulty reaching consensus on issues and contributing to a 
less effective board (Rose, 2007). According to this argument, this could cost organisat ions 
and contribute to tokenism, with members of certain groups taken as board members only 
as a token gesture (Rose, 2007). 
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6.7.3.7 Multivariate analysis and discussion: frequency of board meetings and 
risk-taking measured by R&D Expenditure 
Table 19: OLS Regression Results of Ownership Structure & Board Structure on Risk-
Taking Based on R&D Expenditure (Dependent Variable) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐  .462 .442 .417 .402 .445 .500 
Standard Error  .721 .684 .741 .778 .755 .719 
Durbin- Watson  .558 2.154 1.956 2.075 2.210 1.845 
F-Value  18.256(.000)*** 4.617(.000)*** 4.342(.000)*** 4.331(.000)*** 5.055(.000)*** 5.521(.000)*** 
No. of 
Observations 
 504 97 99 105 107 96 
Constant  -3.436(.001)*** -2.438(.017)** -1.832(.071)* -1.135(.260) .151(.880) -1.711(.091)* 
Independent Variables 
Block 
Ownership  
+/- -2.983(.003)*** -1.093(.278) -.688(.493) -1.639(.105) -1.481(.142) -1.509(.135) 
Institutional 
Ownership 
- -.704(.482) -1.083(.282) -.394(.695) 1.962(.053)* .381(.704) -1.651(.103) 
Director 
Ownership 
+ .297(.767) .177(.860) -.463(.645) .342(.733) -.499(.619) -.436(.664) 
Independent 
Directors 
+/- 3.687(.000)*** -.320(.750) .136(.892) 2.551(.013)** 1.245(.216) 2.077(.041)** 
Board Size +/- -1.566(.118) -1.820(.073)* -1.745(.085)* -.324(.747) -1.104(.273) -1.631(.107) 
Board Diversity +/- 1.466(.143) 1.137(.259) 1.312(.193) 1.492(.139) 1.785(.078)* -.314(.754) 
Frequency of 
Board Meetings 
- -4.288(.000)*** -.358(.722) -2.771(.007)*** -1.714(.090)* -1.735(.086)* -2.667(.009)*** 
Control Variables 
Firm Size  11.362(.000)*** 4.815(.000)*** 4.755(.000)*** 4.941(.000)*** 5.409(.000)*** 4.515(.000)*** 
Sales Growth  .378(.705) -.164(.870) -.122(.903) .533(.596) -.877(.383) .564(.575) 
Audit 
Committee No. 
 -1.843(.066)* -.026(.980) -1.338(.185) -1.175(.243) -2.296(.024)** -.054(.957) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee No. 
 5.045(.000)*** 2.243(.028)** 1.858(.067)* 1.960(.053)* 2.796(.006)*** 3.015(.004)*** 
Leverage  .580(.562) .311(.757) 1.527(.131) -.058(.954) -.372(.711) .393(.695) 
Capital Gain 
Yield 
 .454(.650) .346(.730) 2.281(.025)** .253(.801) .309(.758) -.584(.561) 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
 -.853(.394) .509(.612) -.150(.881) -.039(.969) 1.688(.095)* -2.002(.049)** 
Corruption 
Index 
 2.394(.017)** -1.296(.199) .290(.773) 1.265(.209) -.254(.800) 2.999(.004)*** 
Inflation  -.818(.414) 1.856(.067)* -1.094(.277) -.880(.381) -3.219(.002)*** -.210(.834) 
GDP Per Capita  .761(.447) 2.987(.004)*** .329(.743) -1.236(.220) -.271(.787) .320(.750) 
Population  1.549(.122) 2.027(.046)** .505(.615) -.602(.549) -.355(.723) 2.467(.016)** 
Masculinity  3.492(.001)*** -1.414(.161) .992(.324) 1.397(.166) -.317(.752) 2.009(.048)** 
Power Distance  1.216(.224) -1.339(.185) .634(.528) 1.228(.223) -1.157(.250) 1.669(.099)* 
Anglo American  -2.689(.007)*** -2.209(.030)** -.254(.800) .186(.853) -1.715(.090)* -1.270(.208) 
2010  1.219(.224) - - - - - 
2011  .576(.565) - - - - - 
2012  .425(.671) - - - - - 
2014  -.516(.606) - - - - - 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. Also, year 2013 are excluded from the regression analyses. It is used as base year, respectively, 
for purposes of comparison. 
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Frequency of board meetings is significant at 1% at (-4.288***), and negative. This statistic 
supports the position that the more often board meetings are held, the less risk there is. The 
literature shows that frequent meetings can lead to a reduction in risk (Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005). This may be because more frequent board meetings mean more monitor ing 
of management, thereby reducing risk-taking (Vafeas, 1999). This is based on the idea that 
there is more strategising at board meetings, thereby promoting more creative solutions to 
problems (Vafeas, 1999). Frequent board meetings were also thought to be effective in 
promoting closer ties between members (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). But Vafeas (1999) 
suggests that the argument can be made that more frequent board meetings do not help, 
because more costs are associated with holding these meetings. 
6.7.4 Multivariate analysis and discussion: ownership structure and 
board structure and risk-taking measured by ROA 
An examination of Table 20 reveals the relationship between corporate governance and the 
various firm-level and country variables as measured by ROA. In the table, OLS 
Regression Results of Ownership Structure and Board Structure on Risk-Taking based on 
ROA (dependent variable), the F-Value is (8.538***), indicating that the model is positive 
and significant at 1%. This model is a fit in predicting the relationships. The Adjusted R²% 
of 17.8% shows how the independent variable, the ownership structure, board structure, 
and the control variables, will interpret the dependent variable, by R²%. This suggests that 
any change in the independent and control variables will lead to a change in the dependent 
variable by R².  
The significant independent variable is institutional ownership, at (-3.3362***), which is 
significant at 1% and negative. The significant firm level variable is firm size, at (-3.001), 
which is significant at 1% and negative, suggesting that firm size is negatively related to 
risk-taking when risk-taking is measured as ROA. Research shows that volatility in 
accounting performance measures such as ROA and ROE are measures that are negative ly 
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related to risk-taking (Tran, 2014). Frequency of board meetings, at (-2.216**), which is 
significant at 5%, is negatively related to ROA, and is based on agency theory, which shows 
that more board meetings can affect performance. Sales growth, at (2.381**), is also positive 
and significant at 5%. Leverage is significant, at (-7.749***), and negative at 1%. Country-
level control variables are stock market capitalisation, at (3.205***), significant at 1%; GDP 
per capita, at (-1.879*), significant at 10%; and masculinity and power distance, at (-
3.473***) and (-3.282***) respectively, significant at 1% and negative.  
6.7.4.1 Multivariate analysis and discussion: block ownership and risk-taking 
measured by ROA 
Hypothesis H2a holds that “there is no statistically significant relationship between block 
ownership and risk-taking.” The literature shows that block owners can be seen to have 
both negative and positive impacts on firm performance; as Holderness (2003) points out, 
block owners can have a positive effect on risk-taking, because they can use their power to 
benefit more than others. They could also use their power for company take-over bids 
(Kosnik, 1990). On the other hand, block owners could be positive by providing more 
monitoring of management. The theories used to explain these findings are agency theory 
and stewardship theory. In this study, there is no relationship between block ownership and 
risk-taking. Therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted.  
The findings suggest that as block holding increases, so does ROA. Firms with a large 
number of block holders were more likely to have low risk-taking. The rationale for this is 
that block holders, especially those over 5% of stocks, were able to monitor management 
effectively.  
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6.7.4.2 Multivariate analysis and discussion: institutional ownership and risk-
taking measured by ROA 
Hypothesis H3a states that “there is no statistical relationship between institutiona l 
ownership and risk-taking”. Using ROA as the measure of firm performance, the findings 
reveal that there is no tolerance for risk-taking among institutional owners, with a strong 
positive relation of (3.3362***), significant at 1% as in the other measures of risk-taking. 
The years 2010 to 2014 show a similar relation as in the other measures. The findings 
reveal that there is a relationship; therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. Institutiona l 
owners tend to take steps to reduce risk and agency costs, thereby promoting their own 
interests (Westphal & Zajac, 2014). 
 
6.7.4.3 Multivariate analysis and discussion: director ownership and risk-
taking measured by ROA 
Hypothesis H4a holds that “there is no statistically significant relationship between director 
ownership and risk-taking”. The findings show that there is no significant relationship 
between director ownership and risk-taking based on ROA. The null hypothesis is 
accepted. 
Previous studies reveal that director ownership could be problematic if there is director 
retrenchment; this could have an impact on firm value (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990). Director ownership could constitute a risk to good corporate value (Morck 
et al., 1998). In some countries, for example Hong Kong, where there is much ownership 
by directors, director owners look after their own self-interest rather than shareholders’ 
(Chen and Jaggi, 2000). In this respect, director ownership does not promote firm value. 
The theories that can explain this relation are agency theory and stewardship theory. This 
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study finds no relation between directorship ownership and risk-taking as measured by 
ROA.   
Our findings reveal no significant relation at (-.144). The findings from previous studies 
differ: one study shows a curvilinear relationship between director ownership and 
performance (Davies et al., 2005), while Owusu- Ansah’s (1998) research in U.S. and U.K 
companies shows no curvilinear relationship. 
6.7.4.4 Multivariate analysis and discussion: independent director and risk-
taking measured by ROA 
Hypothesis H6a states that “there is no statistically significant relationship between 
independent directors and risk-taking”. From the findings, the all firm years’ relation is 
(.248), showing that there is no significant relationship between independent directors and 
risk-taking as measured by ROA. The relation between independent directors and risk-
taking shows that having independent directors prevents much risk when firm performance 
is measured by ROA, as independent directors monitor management to the point that risk 
is virtually eliminated. According to Davidson et al. (2005), independent directors reduce 
agency risk. Agency theory and resource dependence theory are used to explain this 
relation. Since this study does not show any significant relationship, the null hypothesis is 
accepted. 
This finding means that independent directors do not have a significant impact on risk-
taking. While in some firms independent directors may have some impact, in others they 
do not. Therefore, overall the finding shows no significance in terms of return on assets. 
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6.7.4.5 Multivariate analysis and discussion: board size and risk-taking 
measured by ROA 
In terms of board size and its relation to risk-taking, hypothesis used was H5a which holds 
that “there is no statistically significant relationship between the board and risk-taking”. 
The findings in Table 20 show no significant relation. Previous research confirms that 
board size can have a negative impact on firm value, and it is important to have a board of 
adequate size to monitor management and effectively carry out board functions (Klein, 
1998). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) point out that a board with more than nine or ten members 
could be detrimental to efficiency (Yawson, 2006; John and Senbet, 1998). The theories 
used to discuss the relation between board size and risk-taking are agency theory and 
resource dependence theory, as boards monitor management and serve as extra resources. 
However, this study shows no significant relationship between board size and risk-taking; 
therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
While this study does not show any significant findings on board size, some believe that 
board size makes a difference. The argument for this is that on overly large boards, more 
time is spent on doing board business and not enough time on doing what boards are 
supposed to do, for example managing the management. 
 
6.7.4.6 Multivariate analysis and discussion: board diversity and risk-taking 
measured by ROA 
The relation of Board diversity on risk-taking using the measure of ROA was studied using 
the hypothesis H7a states that “there is no statistically significant relationship between 
board diversity and risk-taking”. In Table 20 the findings show a negative relation between 
board diversity and risk-taking; however, these findings are not significant. Researchers 
have pointed out that board diversity is thought to bring many different skill sets and 
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attributes to a board (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2002), and to offer different perspectives 
that could help in decision making (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2002). Agency theory can be 
used to explain the importance of board diversity to a board, because it is believed that 
diversity also leads to better monitoring of management (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2002; 
Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009). But some researchers prefer to forgo diversity on the 
grounds that it does not help, but rather hurts the running of the company (Baranchuk and 
Dybvig, 2009). In this study, there is no significant relationship between board diversity 
and risk. The null hypothesis was accepted. 
Some have argued that board diversity is an important firm resource, as diversity allows 
firms to draw on the knowledge of board members from different groups. The theory that 
is applicable here is resource dependence theory (Goodstein et al., 1994). In this study, 
diversity did not seem to matter. 
6.7.4.7 Multivariate analysis and discussion: frequency of board meetings and 
risk-taking measured by ROA 
Hypothesis H8a states that “there is no statistically significant relation between the 
frequency of board meetings an risk-taking”. The findings in Table 20 reveal a strong 
negative relation with ROA, significant at 5%, for frequency of board meetings. Frequency 
of board meetings, at (2.216**). Studies have shown that frequent board meetings have 
positively affected companies’ forecasting on earnings (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), but 
some research has argued that frequent board meetings incur costs for the running the 
meetings, while not accomplishing much more than could have been accomplished with 
fewer meetings (Vafeas, 1999). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) explain that some have criticised 
frequent board meetings for taking time away from monitoring management. The theories  
used to explain these include agency theory and resource dependence theory. The findings 
on frequency of board meetings reveal a negative relationship with ROA and positive with 
risk-taking. Since there is a relation, the null hypothesis is rejected.  
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Table 20: OLS Regression Results of Ownership Structure & Board Structure on Risk-
Taking Based on ROA (Dependent Variable) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐  .178 .203 .159 .317 .190 .082 
Standard Error  .060 .050 .060 .054 .065 .068 
Durbin- Watson  1.021 2.032 2.363 2.059 2.249 2.090 
F-Value  8.538(.000)*** 3.080(.000)*** 2.54(.001)*** 4.881(.000)*** 2.986(.000)*** 1.730(.032)** 
No. of Observations  872 172 172 177 179 172 
Constant  4.353(.000)*** 1.991(.048)** 1.764(.080)* 1.062(.290) 2.542(.012)** 1.504(.135) 
Independent Variables 
Block Ownership  +/- .009(.993) -.410(.682) .400(.690) -.266(.791) -.613(.541) .321(.748) 
Institutional 
Ownership 
- 3.3362(.001)*** -1.447(.150) -1.471(.143) -1.860(.065)* -.381(.704) -1.319(.189) 
Director Ownership + -.144(.886) .037(.970) .077(.939) .355(.723) -.248(.805) -1.472(.143) 
Independent 
Directors 
+/- .248(.804) -.073(.942) .055(.956) -.217(.829) 1.078(.283) -.119(.906) 
Board Size +/- -.901(.368) -.949(.344) -.383(.702) -.789(.431) -.293(.770) -.119(.905) 
Board Diversity +/- -.563(.573) .849(.397) .118(.907) -.867(.387) -1.203(.231) -.001(.999) 
Frequency of Board 
Meetings 
+/- -2.216(.027)** .280(.780) -.879(.381) -.307(.759) -.678(.499) -2.324(.021)** 
Control Variables 
Firm Size  -3.001(.003)*** -1.988(.049)** -.296(.768) -1.818(.071)* -2.766(.006)*** -.418(.677) 
Sales Growth  2.381(.017)** .553(.581) -.799(.426) 2.415(.017)** 1.939(.054)* 1.907(.058)* 
Audit Committee 
No. 
 .618(.537) .348(.728) -.229(.819) -.368(.714) .973(.332) -.780(.437) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee No. 
 -.729(.466) -.190(.849) -.676(.500) .300(.765) .761(.448) -.656(.513) 
Leverage  -7.749(.000)*** -3.630(.000)*** -4.138(.000)*** -4.062(.000)*** -2.051(.042)** -
3.131(.002)**
* 
Capital Gain Yield  .398(.691) .009(.993) 1.696(.092)* 4.392(.000)*** 4.524(.000)*** 1.889(.061)* 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
 3.205(.001)*** 2.965(.004)*** .770(.443) 1.360(.176) 2.241(.026)** .736(.463) 
Corruption Index   -.288(.773) -1.863(.064)* -.252(.801) .338(.736) -.214(.831) -.163(.871) 
Inflation  -.150(.881) 1.848(.067)* .316(.752) -.224(.823) -.268(.789) -.769(.443) 
GDP Per Capita  -1.879(.061)* .731(.466) -.173(.863) -.833(.406) -1.963(.051)* -1.193(.235) 
Population  -.785(.433) -.116(.907) .576(.565) -.660(.510) -1.979(.050)** -.200(.842) 
Masculinity  -3.473(.001)*** -2.932(.004)*** -1.103(.272) .019(.985) -.499(.618) -1.569(.119) 
Power Distance  -3.282(.001)*** -2.847(.005)*** -1.262(.209) -.271(.787) -.671(.503) -1.385(.168) 
Anglo American  -.762(.446) -1.922(.056)* -.402(.688) -.090(.928) -.867(.387) .180(.857) 
2010  1.557(.120) - - - - - 
2011  1.726(.085)* - - - - - 
2012  1.549(.122) - - - - - 
2014  .475(.635) - - - - - 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. Also, year 2013 are excluded from the regression analyses. It is used as base year, respectively, 
for purposes of comparison. 
6.7.5 Multivariate analysis and discussion: ownership structure and 
board structure on credit rating 
Table 21 presents the statistics used in analysing and discussing corporate governance and 
its relation to credit rating. Block ownership, institutional ownership, director ownership, 
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independent directors, board size, board diversity and frequency of board meetings are used 
to represent corporate governance. 
In Table 21, OLS Regression Results of Ownership Structure and Board Structure on Risk-
taking based on ROA (dependent variable), the F-Value is (17.810***), indicating that the 
model is positive and significant at 1%. This model is a fit in predicting the relationships. 
The Adjusted R²% at 38.2% shows how the independent variable, the ownership structure, 
board structure and the control variables, will interpret the dependent variable, by R²%. 
This suggests that any change in the independent and control variables will lead to a change 
in the dependent variable by R².  
The significant findings in Table 21 are institutional ownership, at (3.389***), which is 
significant at 1% and positive; independent directors, at (1.517**), which is significant at 
5% and positive; board diversity, at (2.441**), which is significant at 5%; and frequency of 
board meetings, at (1.872*), which is significant at 10% and positive. 
6.7.5.1 Multivariate analysis and discussion: block ownership on credit rating 
Hypothesis H2b addresses the relationship between block ownership and credit rating, 
stating: “There is no statistically significant relationship between block ownership and 
credit rating”.  
It was shown that there was a negative value for the impact of block ownership on credit 
rating, except in 2014. This is evident in all firm years and throughout the individual years 
under consideration. There is no significant relation between block ownership and credit 
rating; therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
Previous studies show that block holders with more than 5% of shares are considered to 
have a negative impact on a firm’s credit rating (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). The 
reasoning behind this is that several block holders could get together and be considered 
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comparable to a vast group, thereby weakening shareholder rights overall (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2006). Credit rating is essential to the operation of some companies. A low 
credit rating could lead to the company not having the opportunity to fulfil their 
commitments (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). However, according to Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al. (2006), it is possible for board members to hold small blocks of shares can also be seen 
as associated with good governance and good credit ratings, but block ownership by the 
CEO may be seen as having a negative impact on credit rating. The rationale for this is that 
while board members that have small number of shares in company, this may be seen as 
evidence of good governance, and stewardship theory could be used to explain this. 
However, it is possible to see action taken by CEO that could pursue their interests at the 
expense of other shareholders’, as explained by agency theory. Block holders may also be 
are able to gain more information. The theories that can be used to describe this relation 
are stewardship theory and agency theory. 
6.7.5.2 Multivariate analysis and discussion: institutional owners on credit 
rating 
The hypothesis that looks at individual ownership and credit ratings is H3b, which states 
that “there is no statistically significant relationship between institutional ownership and 
credit rating”. The findings in Table 21 reveal a strong significant relation. The significant 
relations for all firm years are those for institutional ownership, independent directors, 
board diversity and frequency of board meetings.   
This suggests that institutional owners have a positive impact on credit rating for the 
period; the results show a significant relationship at (3.389***), significant at 1%. This 
shows that there is a relation between institutional ownership and credit rating. Previous 
studies point out that firms with large institutional owners tend to have higher bond ratings, 
but lower bond yields (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). It is also argued that institutiona l 
ownership could be associated with lower ratings and higher bond yields (Bhojraj and 
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Sengupta, 2003). These studies suggest that institutional owners tend to invest in firms with 
higher bond ratings and lower yields (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). The theories that are 
relevant for explaining this relationship are agency theory and legitimacy theory. Agency 
theory can be used, although some believe that institutional owners may or may not 
contribute to more monitoring of management (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). Legitimacy 
theory may apply, as it is thought that firms with many institutional owners may invest in 
companies with low bond yields (Elbannan, 2009). Maintaining a good credit rating shows 
good internal control and good governance. Too many institutional owners could lead to 
investors viewing a firm negatively.  
Our findings confirm earlier work; we show that despite the investment choices of 
institutional owners, they have an impact on firm performance. Institutional owners are 
shown to invest in firms with higher bond ratings and lower bond ratings, consequently 
having both higher and lower bond yields. This also means that institutional owners 
influence bond ratings as well as bond yields. As a result, institutional owners not only 
influence, but themselves are influenced by, bond ratings and yields. Therefore, the 
findings support previous studies showing that institutional owners are significant (Bhojraj 
and Sengupta, 2003).  
6.7.5.3 Multivariate analysis and discussion: director owners on credit rating 
Hypothesis H4b reads: “There is no statistically relationship between director ownership 
and credit rating”. The findings in Table 21 support this hypothesis, because these were 
shown as (-.491). This finding demonstrates that there is no significant relationship. The 
explanation for this is shown in earlier studies that point out that some directors owners 
also operate as owners (Ho and Wong, 2001). In these situations, the director owns the 
majority of the stocks; this is common in Japan. Firms that have directors as managers 
sometimes face the threat of takeover by directors, showing that agency theory figures 
heavily in considering the effect of director ownership on credit rating (Chen & Jaggi, 
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2000). This situation also contributes to conflicts between director owners and other 
stakeholders in the firms, as directors could often be looking after their own interests to the 
disadvantage of other stakeholders.   
6.7.5.4 Multivariate analysis and discussion: independent directors on credit 
rating 
Independent directors are held in high regard because they are seen as providing excellent 
monitoring of management. Since they owe no allegiance either to management or 
shareholders, independent directors are thought to provide greater value to the company as 
well as engaging greater monitoring of management. Hypothesis H6b holds that “there is 
no statistically significant relationship between independent directors and credit rating”. 
The findings in Table 21 reveal a statistically significant relation at 5% at (1.517**) as the 
relation for the independent directors and credit rating as seen in the all firm years. This 
suggests that an increase in independent directors also leads to increased credit rating. 
Previous studies suggest that independent directors promote corporate governance because 
of their monitoring of management (Davidson et al., 2005; Alali, 2012). Ashbaugh-Ska ife 
et al. (2006) point out that credit rating companies tend to provide better ratings for firms 
with strong corporate governance. The relevant theories here are agency theory and 
resource dependence theory. 
These findings are significant because it means that more independent directors would be 
recognised as better monitoring the actions of management, thereby reducing the conflict 
between management and shareholders. The more independent directors that a firm has, 
the more likely it is to maintain better corporate governance and receive higher credit 
ratings. This further means a lower cost of borrowing. At the same time, it was shown that 
managers do not like their firms to experience downgrades in their credit ratings, as this 
reflects poorly on managers, and negatively impacts their careers (Holmstrom, 1999). 
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Independent directors play a significant role in ensuring that managers recognise the 
importance of managing their firms responsibly in order to maintain high credit ratings. 
6.7.5.5 Multivariate analysis and discussion: board size on credit rating 
Table 21 provides statistics for analysing and discussing the findings on the relationship 
between board size and credit rating. Hypothesis H5b was used to develop this relation. 
From the findings, there is no significant relation between board size and credit rating. The 
relation for all firm years is (1.125), revealing no significant relation between board size 
and credit rating. While some research reveals the importance of board size to the credit 
rating of firms, others find board size insignificant to credit ratings. On the one hand, Pham, 
Suchard and Zein (2012) point out that board size contributes to effectiveness, as firms 
with larger boards are better able to properly monitor management. This is seen as 
contributing to higher firm value (Pham et al., 2012). This could lead to firms with more 
monitoring being considered as having more governance, and thus having better credit 
ratings. On the other hand, some researchers discovered that board size has no impact on 
credit rating (Upadhyay and Sriram, 2011; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). Theories that are 
relevant to discussing this relation are agency theory and resource dependence theory. The 
null hypothesis was accepted. 
6.7.5.6 Multivariate analysis and discussion: board diversity on credit rating 
The relation between board diversity and credit rating was studied through Hypothesis H7b 
holds that “there is no statistically significant relationship between board diversity and 
credit rating”. Previous studies show that gender diversity contributes to the increased 
value of firms (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader, 2003). This led to many 
European countries deciding to hire more female board members, with Norway, France, 
Germany and Spain establishing quotas to this end (Hoel, 2008; de Cabo et al., 2012; Sealy 
and Vinnicombe, 2012). However, not all researchers agree that board diversity makes a 
difference (Goodstein et al., 1994). Theories to consider when studying board diversity are 
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agency theory and resource dependence theory. Our findings show a statistically significant 
relationship at 5% for all firm years; in 2013 the significance was at 10% and in 2014 to 
5%. The findings in Table 21 reveal large relation in all firm years to significance of 10% 
with reading of (2.441**). Similar high reading for significant positive relationship was 
found in 2013 (1.956*) and that of (2.076**) in 2014. The theories used to explain the 
relation are agency and resource dependence theories. As mentioned above, de Cabo et al. 
(2012) find that board diversity is significant in Germany, with more women being on 
boards and with firms performing much better. Resource dependence theory can be used 
to explain this. De Cabo et al.’s research supports this finding. However, Watson et al. 
(1993) show that greater diversity led to difficulty in identifying perspectives, ultima te ly 
causing problems in reaching consensus. The conclusion of the relationship between board 
diversity and credit rating is that there is positive relation. Therefore, the null hypothesis is 
rejected. 
6.7.5.7 Multivariate analysis and discussion: frequency of board meetings on 
credit rating 
Hypothesis H8c predicts that “there is no statistically significant relationship between the 
frequency of board meetings and credit rating.” The findings show that there was 
significance to 10% in the all firm years at (1.872*) which is statistically significant positive 
relationship. Previous studies show that frequent board meetings contribute to board 
members helping to produce better earnings predictions, and possibly doing more 
monitoring of management (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). But some have argued that 
frequent meetings could increase costs to the company, without providing much benefit 
(Carcelo et al., 2002). Agency theory and resource dependence theory are relevant here. 
There is a positive and significant relationship between frequency of board meetings and 
credit ratings. The more frequently meetings are held, the higher the credit rating a firm 
has. 
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Table 21: OLS Regression Results of Ownership Structure & Board Structure on Cre dit 
Rating (Dependent Variable) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐  .382 .325 .335 .330 .429 .380 
Standard Error  2.246 2.405 2.318 2.348 2.147 2.241 
Durbin- Watson  .542 2.212 2.128 2.088 2.290 2.157 
F-Value  17.810(.000)*** 4.056(.000)*** 4.217(.000)*** 4.215(.000)*** 5.974(.000)*** 4.890(.000)*** 
No. of 
Observations 
 681 134 135 138 140 134 
Constant  -3.642(.000)*** -1.425(.157) -.861(.391) -.173(.862) .870(.386) -2.875(.005)*** 
Independent Variables 
Block Ownership  - -.566(.572) -.563(.575) -.757(.451) -.811(.419) .343(.732) 1.284(202) 
Institutional 
Ownership 
+ 3.389(.001)*** -.842(.401) -1.535(.128) -.406(.685) -.739(.461) -2.228(.028)** 
Director 
Ownership 
+/- -.491(.624) -.965(.337) .811(.419) .578(.564) -1.067(.288) -1.717(.089)* 
Independent 
Directors 
+ 1.517(.013)** .185(.854) .310(.757) 1.685(.095)* .896(.372) .069(.945) 
Board Size + 1.125(.261) .599(.550) .072(.943) -.021(.983) -.207(.837) .915(.362) 
Board Diversity +/- 2.441(.015)** 1.248(.215) 1.310(.193) 1.273(.206) 1.956(.053)* 2.076(.040)** 
Frequency of 
Board Meetings 
+ 1.872(.062)* -.278(.782) -1.334(.185) -1.325(.188) -.259(.796) -.498(.620) 
Control Variables 
Firm Size  8.493(.000)*** 3.787(.000)*** 4.496(.000)*** 3.954(.000)*** 3.469(.001)*** 2.165(.033)** 
Sales Growth  -2.171(.030)** -1.604(.111) -1.971(.051)* .162(.871) -.496(.621) -.463(.644) 
Audit Committee 
No. 
 -.644(.519) -1.391(.167) -.907(.366) .369(.713) .032(.974) -.121(.904) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee No. 
 1.643(.101) .298(.767) .356(.722) 1.142(.256) 1.558(.122) .877(.382) 
Leverage  -7.968(.000)*** -2.628(.001)*** -2.390(.019)** -3.529(.001)*** -4.719(.000)*** -3.734(.000)*** 
Capital Gain 
Yield 
 -1.245(.214) -1.841(.068)* 1.830(.070)* -.788(.432) 1.678(.096)* 2.597(.011)** 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
 .345(.730) .708(.480) .331(.741) .312(.756) 2.489(.014)** -1.932(.056)* 
Corruption 
Index 
 2.021(.044)** -.442(.660) .103(.918) .639(.524) .687(.494) .436(.664) 
Inflation  .655(.513) 1.793(.076)* .054(.957) .056(.956) -2.476(.015)** 1.635(.105) 
GDP Per Capita  1.184(.237) 1.027(.306) .469(.640) -.663(.509) -1.423(.157) 2.215(.029)** 
Population  -.784(.434) .215(.830) -.470(.639) -1.225(.223) -2.245(.027)** 1.968(.052)* 
Masculinity  6.888(.000)*** 1.108(.270) .738(.462) .787(.433) 1.822(.071)* 4.183(.000)*** 
Power Distance  2.658(.008)*** .659(.511) .431(.667) .658(.512) -.058(.954) 2.464(.015)** 
Anglo American  .314(.753) .261(.795) .445(.657) .492(.624) -1.025(.307) .181(.856) 
2010  1.644(.101) - - - - - 
2011  .825(.410) - - - - - 
2012  .547(.585) - - - - - 
2014  .179(.858) - - - - - 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Also, year 2013 are excluded from the regression analyses. It  is used as base year, respectively, for purposes of comparison.  
However, some research shows that frequent board meetings promote better credit rating 
for firms. As pointed out in the literature, more frequent board meetings have been seen to 
lead to better monitoring of management (Lorca et al., 2011). When board meetings were 
infrequently held, not enough monitoring of management took place (Menon and Williams, 
1994).  
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6.7.6 Multivariate analysis and discussion: ownership structure and 
board structure on cost of capital 
This section analyses and discusses corporate governance as it relates to cost of capital. 
The same variables used in the other sections are also used here. Table 22 provides the 
statistics for this analysis and discussion. The F-Value is (14.309***), indicating that the 
model is positive and significant at 1%. This model is a fit for predicting the relationships. 
The Adjusted R²%, at 31.1%, shows how the independent variable, the Ownership 
Structure, Board Structure, and the control variables, will interpret the dependent variable, 
by R²%. This suggests that any change in the independent and control variables will lead 
to a change in the dependent variable by R².  
The finding reveals significance in block ownership, institutional ownership, director 
ownership, independent directors and frequency of board meetings. 
6.7.6.1 Multivariate analysis and discussion: block ownership on cost of 
capital 
Hypothesis H2c holds that “there is no statistically relationship between block ownership 
and cost of capital”. The findings from Table 22 show that there is a strong and significant 
relation between the two in all firm years at (3.237***), significant at 1% and positive. The 
suggestion is that increased block ownership also leads to increased cost of capital.  
According to Tran (2014), when block holders are founding-family members, or other 
firms that it is generally the case that these founding family members do not invest their 
own capital. They therefore borrow, but the nature of block holders and the fact that they 
have some control that other shareholders do not have, gives them control over 
management (Tran, 2014). These block holders show that they are reluctant to voluntar i ly 
disclose (Ntim et al., 2014). This contributes to firms with block holders being seen as 
more risky and therefore as credit risks. This means that they would have to pay more for 
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borrowing, and so cost of capital increases. Agency theory is used to explain the 
relationship. 
Block holders, because of their advantage in voting in blocks, can easily coordinate their 
efforts and are usually large shareholders that can protect their interests (Shleifer et al., 
1997). Managers realise the power of block holders, who can easily terminate a manager 
who is not working in their interests, and can influence agency costs. However, block 
holders can also help to keep agency costs down, by monitoring the role of managers 
(Shleifer et al., 1997). Since block holders differ from family firms, they tend to have better 
costs of borrowing (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). But where block holders were seen as 
associated with family finds, the reverse was seen, as family firms were seen as not likely 
to invest their own funds, and therefore not good credit risks. Therefore, their costs of 
borrowing was usually high. Matthies (2013) observes that keeping block holders to a 
maximum of 5 % of shares is effective in preventing undue influence on their part. 
6.7.6.2 Multivariate analysis and discussion: institutional owners on cost of 
capital 
Hypothesis H3C examines the relation between institutional ownership and cost of capital, 
stating: “There is no statistically significant relationship between institutional membership 
and cost of capital”. The findings in Table 22 show that there is a significance relationship 
between institutional ownership and cost of capital. In fact, there exist instances of 
statistically positive relationships between institutional ownership and cost of capital. The 
relation for all firm years shows a significant positive relationship to 10% with (2.521**).  
Previous studies for the most part show no statistically positive relationship between 
institutional owners and cost of capital. The explanation is that companies with higher 
levels of institutional ownership tend to disclose voluntarily. In South Africa, this 
contributed to better corporate governance and lower cost of capital (Ntim et al., 2012). In 
the Continental tradition, as in Germany, where there is a two-tiered board, it was found 
 262 
 
that banks had much control over firms, more than was found between traditional lenders 
and borrowers (Elston, 2003). This control included control over shareholders’ voting 
rights, which were greatly supervised the firms (Elston, 2003). With representatives from 
the banks sitting on the supervisory level of the board and proxy voting rules, and with the 
different country rules, it is evident that cost of capital would depend on the rules governing 
borrowing and ending in the different countries. But in most Anglo settings, firms 
demonstrating good governance rules usually receive a positive cost of capital rating (Pham 
et al., 2012). But when institutional ownership increases, the cost of capital will also 
increase. The findings of this study showing that there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and cost of capital, while other studies have 
shown that cost of capital decreases with increased institutional ownership.  
6.7.6.3 Multivariate analysis and discussion: director owners on cost of capital 
Hypothesis H4c states: “There is no statistically significant relationship between director 
ownership and cost of capital”. Our findings show that there is a highly statistica l ly 
significant relation for all firm years for director owners and cost of capital. The suggestion 
is that there is a positive relation between director owners and cost of capital, because they 
pay a higher cost of capital because of their condition. 
Studies on this relationship maintain that in instances where director owners borrow 
excessively in order to build up their wealth, they are charged a higher cost of capital (Pham 
et al., 2012). The reason for this stems from the fact the director owners could be family 
founders. They focus on owning and managing, which means that they are looking after 
their interests as opposed to the interests of other shareholders. Without much corporate 
governance, lenders see these companies as highly risky. Therefore, costs of capital are 
generally higher for director owners.  
Our findings also show that there was a negative relationship, at (-1.660), between director 
owners and cost of capital, significant at 10%. This finding is important because it suggests 
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that as director ownership increases, cost of capital decreases. It was noted that when there 
is little governance, capital costs increase, because of higher costs related with a shortage 
of transparency (Pham et al., 2012). Part of the explanation for higher costs as shown in 
research was that at times managers worked to increase job security (Amihud and Leve, 
1981; Belkhir, 2006). However, according to Laeven and Levine (2009), managers who 
had power on the board were more interested in exposing the firms to risky projects.  
Amihud and Lev (1981) and Belkhir (2006) take the position that, at times, managers that 
can control board decisions focus on reducing risks more than managers that own shares. 
This may occur when managers aim to maximise job security (Amihud and Lev, 1981; 
Belkhir, 2006). Laeven and Levine (2009) explain this by pointing out that as managers 
accumulate influence and control of the board, they are less likely to undertake risky 
projects. But while some believe that more directors would lead to more monitoring and 
therefore lower costs of capital, others argue that with more directors, there would be less 
monitoring, leading to higher costs (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). This finding shows 
that there is a significant relationship; therefore, we reject the null hypothesis.   
6.7.6.4 Multivariate analysis and discussion: independent directors cost of 
capital 
Hypothesis H6c predicts: “There is no statistically significant relationship between 
independent directors and cost of capital”. Table 22 reveals the findings relating to this 
hypothesis; they show a negative relationship between independent directors and cost of 
capital for all firm years, significant at 1%. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Previous studies show that independent directors are considered to add to a firm’s value 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2004). As the independent directors increase in number in a firm, 
the firm is seen as increasing in value, because of the extra resources that it receives, but 
also because independent directors also contribute to better corporate governance 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2004). It follows that as independent directors increase, the cost 
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of capital will decrease. The theories that explain this are agency theory and resource 
dependence theory. 
However, Andres et al. (2013) discovered that in firms in Continental countries where there 
were two-tiered boards, as in Germany, board independence as promoted in Anglo -
American firms could not be achieved, as the retiring CEO also served as the chairman of 
the supervisory board, thereby bringing the management and supervision of management 
together in a role that shows conflict of interest (Andres et al., 2013). Since the chairman 
also sets the wages for the CEO, this practice among Continental firms is highly criticised 
(Andres et al., 2013). Therefore, there is a difference in governance between Continenta l 
firms and Anglo-American firms, which would be reflected in the cost of capital for these 
different firms. 
6.7.6.5 Multivariate analysis and discussion: board size on cost of capital 
Board size and cost of capital are represented in Hypothesis H5c. This hypothesis reads: 
“There is no statistically significant relationship between the board size and cost of 
capital.” The findings in this study supports this hypothesis, for although there were 
position relations, these were not significant. Previous research has shown the relationship 
between board size and cost of capital. According to Klein (2002), boards are generally 
made up of committees, and there is usually the audit committee, that is a board committee 
that has the responsibility of ensuring that the accounting process works well. This 
committee ensures that the control processes are working well and that external auditors 
maintain independence from senior management (Klein, 2002). The findings for the 
relationship between board size and cost of capital reveals that while the overall total for 
all firm years was (-.717). The results showed that there was no relation between board size 
and cost of capital. What this suggests is that there was no statistically significant positive 
relationship. The null hypothesis was accepted. 
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Table 22: OLS Regression of Ownership Structure & Board Structure on Cost of Capital 
(Dependent Variable) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐  .311 .214 .444 .329 .452 .319 
Standard 
Error 
 .191 .229 .118 .157 .179 .232 
Durbin- 
Watson 
 1.183 2.171 2.556 2.006 1.670 1.868 
F-Value  14.309(.000)*** 2.840(.000)*** 6.448(.000)*** 4.502(.000)*** 6.98(.000)*** 4.280(.000)*** 
No. of 
Observations 
 739 143 144 151 153 148 
Constant  -2.790(.005)*** .271(.787) -.558(.578) .455(.650) -.520(.604) -2.012(.046)** 
Independent Variables 
Block 
Ownership  
+/- 3.237(.001)*** .734(.464) 2.598(.011)** 1.379(.170) .848(.398) 1.461(.146) 
Institutional 
Ownership 
+/- 2.521(.012)** -1.321(.189) .546(.586) 2.736(.007)*** 1.287(.201) 2.308(.023)** 
Director 
Ownership 
- -1.660(.097)* -.194(.846) .793(.430) .201(.841) -1.396(.165) -1.030(.305) 
Independent 
Directors 
- -2.986(.003)*** -.476(.635) -1.060(.291) -.873(.384) -1.479(.142) -1.365(.175) 
Board Size - -.717(.474) 1.339(.183) -.512(.609) -.171(.865) -1.217(.226) -1.068(.288) 
Board 
Diversity 
+/- -.157(.875) -.492(.624) -.520(604) 1.138(.257) -1.537(.127) .631(.529) 
Frequency of 
Board 
Meetings 
- -4.243(.000)*** -1.849(.067)* -2.467(.015)** -1.283(.202) -.664(.508) -2.590(.011)** 
Control Variables 
Firm Size  1.934(.053)* -.125(.900) .702(.484) 1.649(.102) 1.607(.110) 1.400(.164) 
Sales Growth  .684(.494) 1.763(.080)* -1.567(.120) -.436(.663) -.264(.792) -.356(.722) 
Audit 
Committee 
No. 
 -.642(.521) -.017(.987) -.500(.618) -.343(.732) .316(.752) -1.584(.116) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee 
No. 
 -.836(.403) 1.164(.247) 1.024(.308) -1.577(.117) -.877(.382) -1.108(.270) 
Leverage  .534(.594) -.319(.750) .712(.478) .133(.895) 1.109(.270) -.603(.548) 
Capital Gain 
Yield 
 3.397(.001)*** 3.407(.001)*** -2.110(.037)** .657(.512) 2.122(.036)** 1.819(.071)* 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
 -.301(.763) -.614(.541) -.130(.897) 1.167(.246) .293(.770) -1.228(.222) 
Corruption 
Index 
 4.691(.000)*** .383(.702) 1.442(.152) -.034(.973) 2.675(.008)*** 1.911(.058)* 
Inflation  -.475(.635) -.147(.883) 1.469(.144) 1.406(.162) -1.712(.089)* 2.100(.038)** 
GDP Per 
Capita 
 -2.360(.019)** -1.074(.285) -.316(.753) .157(.875) -1.993(.048)** 1.003(.318) 
Population  -1.573(.116) -.985(.327) -.487(.627) -.628(.531) -1.357(.177) .946(.346) 
Masculinity  9.021(.000)*** 1.351(.179) .864(.389) -.250(.803) 4.382(.000)*** 3.834(.000)*** 
Power 
Distance 
 4.793(.000)*** 1.420(.158) .685(.495) -.360(.719) 1.877(.063)* 2.283(.024)** 
Anglo 
American 
 1.127(.260) .685(.495) -.709(.480) -.458(.648) .428(.669) .496(.621) 
2010  -.998(.319) - - - - - 
2011  -.727(.467) - - - - - 
2012  -.429(.668) - - - - - 
2014  .673(.501) - - - - - 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. Also, year 2013 are excluded from the regression analyses. It is used as base year, respectively, 
for purposes of comparison. 
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6.7.6.6 Multivariate analysis and discussion: board diversity on cost of capital 
Hypothesis H7c reads: “There is no statistically significant relationship between board 
diversity and cost of capital”. The findings show that the relation for all firm years is (-
.157), and the findings for 2010 to 2104 are (-.492), (-.520), (-1.138), (-1.537) and (.631), 
respectively. This shows that there is no significant relationship between board diversity 
and cost of capital. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
While previous studies point out that diversity could bring in different viewpoints and 
approaches, the diversity that is stressed is that of gender: women on the board. It has 
become such an issue that many European countries have made it compulsory for a 
particular number of board members to be women, with Norway being one of the first 
countries to do so in 2008 (Hoel, 2008). Spain, France (de Capo et al., 2012) and the U.K. 
(Sealy and Vinnicombe, 2012) have taken similar steps. Women have played an increased 
role on boards in Europe; this is different from the Anglo tradition, where there are no such 
rules. There have not been many studies on the impact of women board members on cost 
of capital. According to Anderson and Reeb (2004), women board members are good at 
advising managers on how to use resources more efficiently, and promoting board 
effectiveness. However, some believe that gender diversity could be costly, as it could lead 
to conflicts of interest between the genders that could inhibit decision making (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2004). The theories that explain the relation between board diversity and cost of 
capital are agency and resource dependence theories.  
6.7.6.7 Multivariate analysis and discussion: frequency of board meetings on 
cost of capital 
The hypothesis used to study the relationship between frequency of board meetings and 
cost of capital is H8c: “There is no statistically relationship between the frequency of board 
meetings and cost of capital”. The findings reveal a strong negative relationship between 
frequency of board meetings and cost of capital, for the all firm years has a relation of (-
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4.243***), significant at less than 1%. While all the years show a negative relation, 2010 
and 2011 have (-1.849) at 10% significance and (-2.467**) at 5%, respectively. For 2014, 
the relation is (-2.590**), significant at 5%. This negative relation is in keeping with prior 
research. 
According to previous studies, board meetings have been recognised as an important aspect 
of corporate governance (OECD Corporate Governance Principles, 2004). Frequent board 
meetings have been promoted as a means of achieving good firm performance, as they 
allow board members to carry out all the functions expected of boards (Vafeas 1999; 
Adams, 2005). Similarly, Lorca et al. (2011) see frequent board meetings as contributing 
to a more involved board. When boards meet less frequently, it is argued that they do not 
have the time to monitor as much as they should (Menon and Williams, 1994). Frequent 
board meetings are also said to contribute to a lower cost of debt, as audit committees and 
other directors would be more committed to monitoring management and the financ ia l 
accounting process (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Therefore, frequent board meetings were 
seen as leading to lower costs of capital. However, some argue that frequent board meetings 
do not accomplish much because meetings have to be run according to protocol, leaving 
less time to monitor management (Menon and Williams, 1994). 
6.8 Robustness or sensitivity or additional analyses 
6.8.1 Introduction 
Section 6.8 discusses the robustness or sensitivity analysis of this study. More specifica lly, 
it shows the extent to which the reported results are robust or sensitive to the potential 
endogeneities and interdependencies that may exist among the governance mechanisms 
used. This involves discussing any concerns of endogeneity in the study, looking at the 
relation between the endogenous or dependent variables and the exogenous or independent 
variables in the equations used, and identifying where there could be potential problems, 
such as where variables have been omitted. As Larcker and Rusticus (2008) point out, it is 
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important to use a lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure, an 
instrumental variable model, a two-stage least squares model and a changes model. It is 
also suggested to demonstrate that any of the instruments used as a proxy for the origina l 
variable be considered a relevant and valid instrument (Larcker and Rusticus, 2008). 
Checking for endogeneity involves comparing the magnitude, as well as the statistica l 
significance and signs, of the OLS and the endogeneity corrected estimations, to see 
whether they are robust or sensitive to endogeneity problems. 
The endogeneity tests used are the two-stage least squares, the lagged reports and the fixed 
effects reports. 
6.8.2 Two-stage least squares 
The two-stage least squares test is used with the OLS regression in order to correlate the 
errors that may occur in the dependent variables with the independent variable. By carrying 
out this study, one is able to test for endogeneity problems. Therefore, in this study, Tables 
23 and 24 were used to test for endogeneity problems between the dependent and 
independent variables. 
Previous corporate governance studies examine the effects of individual corporate 
governance structures and mechanisms on the financial wellbeing of firms (Morck et al., 
1988; Yermack, 1996; Vefeas, 1999). While this is the general approach in the literature, 
in practice, shareholders are more likely to monitor the behaviour of managers by looking 
at several mechanisms of corporate governance. The fact that there are alternate 
governance structures would suggest that it is possible to leave out important variables 
when carrying out OLS regression studies on the financial performance of firms on single 
corporate governance mechanisms, thereby introducing variable bias and spurious 
correlations (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996: Beiner et al., 2006). This could create 
interactions (or a lack thereof) among alternate corporate government structures while 
trying to maximise effectiveness and efficiency. It is because of this possibility that the 
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study uses different measures of financial performance, as well as different models. This 
study therefore set out to solve any endogeneity problem that may appear by examining 
the relations between the corporate governance index and the proxies used for firm 
financial performance, namely, between corporate governance index and R&D/Assets, 
between corporate governance index and R&D/Sales, and between corporate governance 
index and R&D expenditure, ROA, credit rating and cost of capital. In short, the results of 
the study reveal the relations between corporate governance and firm financ ia l 
performance, using proxies for both corporate governance and financial performance. This 
study also shows that there are no endogeneity problems with the proxies used. 
In reporting on the endogeneity problem, the findings in Table 23 reveal that the 
relationship between the corporate governance index and R&D/Assets is (-2.276), 
significant at 5%. It is important here to recognise that the same negative sign was observed 
earlier. This shows that there was a negative relation between corporate governance and 
financial performance of the firm as measured by R&D/Assets. In Table 8, the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance as measured by R&D/Assets is 
(-.1.671), significant at 10%. It is important that both had a negative sign, showing the 
relationship between these two variables. 
In examining the relation between corporate governance index and R&D/Sales in this table, 
the study shows that there is a negative significant relation between these at (-2.72), 
significant at 1%. In Table 9, the finding on the relationship between corporate governance 
index and R&D/Sales is (-2.402), significant at 5%. What is important here for showing no 
endogeneity problems is that the sign is negative. Both are also significant. 
When the relation between corporate governance index and R&D expenditure was 
examined, it was found that the results showed a significance of (-2.278) significant at 5%. 
This result shows that the relation is negative. This is similar to the finding of the relation 
between corporate governance index and R&D expenditure, where the result is (-1.676), 
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significant at 10%. In both of these findings, the signs were the same and significant, 
suggesting no endogeneity problem. This relation is similar to the relations between 
corporate governance index and R&D/Assets and R&D/Sales. In these three instances, the 
negative sign reported here is also reported earlier in the findings in Tables 8, 9 and 10, 
respectively. 
When the relation between corporate governance index and ROA is examined, the results 
show that the significance is (2.775), significant at 1% and positive. The sign is similar to 
what is reported earlier. In Table 11, the relationship between corporate governance index 
and ROA is shown as (2.229), positive and significant at 5%. These two reports are similar 
in having the same sign, which is most important, but they are also significant and the 
values are also very similar. 
In examining the relation between corporate governance index and credit rating, the study 
reveals a positive relation between the two and that there is significance of (3.8580) at 1%. 
There was a similar finding in the relationship between corporate governance and credit 
rating in Table 12, where the results show a reading of (1.836), significant at 10%. In both 
cases, the results show that the relation is both positive and significant. 
Examination of the relation between the corporate governance index and cost of capital 
shows that it is significant (-8.625) at 1%, which is similar to the finding reported earlier. 
In Table 13, the finding is (-6.793), where there two findings which were negative, 
significant to 1%. These findings suggest that there is no endogeneity problem. 
The study uses ownership structure and board structure to deal with possible endogeneity 
problems. These results are shown in Table 24. In examining the relation between block 
ownership and R&D/Assets, the significance of (-3406), significant to 1%. This was the 
same finding that there was a negative relationship between these block ownership and 
R&D/Assets. In Table 17, the finding of the relationship between block ownership and 
R&D/Assets is (-.2.982); the sign is negative, but also significant at 1%. 
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For the relation between block ownership and R&D/Sales, the result is (-3.205) at 1% 
significance, and negative, which is the same relation identified earlier between the two 
variables. In Table 18, the relation between block ownership and R&D/Sales is (-3.411). 
The sign is negative and the relationship is significant at 1%, with the readings very close 
in number. 
Table 23: OLS Regression Results of Instrumental Variable Estimates OECD CGI on Risk-
Taking, Credit Rating and Cost of Capital 
 R&D/Assets R&D/Sales R&D 
Expenditure 
ROA Credit Rating Cost of Capital 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐 .079 .070 .398 .170 .363 .322 
Standard 
Error 
.764 .767 .764 .060 2.265 .193 
Durbin- 
Watson 
.455 .505 .455 .989 .518 1.127 
F-Value 3.705(.000)*** 3.376(.000)*** 21.81(.000)*** 11.8(.000)*** 24.218(.000)*** 22.196(.000)*** 
No. of 
Observations 
568 568 568 947 733 803 
Constant -4.065(.000)*** -3.801(.000)*** -4.064(.000)*** 3.102(.002)*** -2.077(.038)** .421(.674) 
Independent Variable 
Corporate 
Governance 
Index  
-2.276(.023)** -2.72(.007)*** -2.278(.023)** 2.775(.006)*** 3.858(.000)*** -8.625(.000)*** 
Control Variables 
Firm Size .457(.648) 2.424(.016)** 11.459(.000)*** -4.546(.000)*** 10.686(.000)*** 8.46(.000)*** 
Sales Growth .247(.805) .463(.644) .248(.804) 3.9(.000)*** -2.91(.000)*** -2.307(.021)** 
Audit 
Committee 
No. 
-3.13(.002)*** -3.455(.001)*** -3.135(.002)*** .328(.743) -.956(.339) -1.124(.261) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee 
No. 
4.412(.000)*** 4.613(.000)*** 4.413(.000)*** -1.903(.057)* 2.349(.019)** .909(.364) 
Leverage .126(.900) -1.437(.151) .128(.899) -8.731(.000)*** -8.031(.000)*** -.158(.875) 
Capital Gain 
Yield 
.221(.825) .035(.972) .223(.824) .433(.665) -1.173(.241) 2.521(.012)** 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
-1.353(.176) -1.974(.049)** -1.345(.179) 3.44(.001)*** -1.11(.267) -3.881(.000)*** 
Corruption 
Index 
.113(.910) -.809(.419) .112(.911) 1.975(.049)** -.406(.685) .999(.318) 
Inflation -2.153(.032)** -2.351(.019)** -2.166(.031)** 1.507(.132) -2.045(.041)** -4.069(.000)*** 
GDP Per 
Capita 
3.019(.003)*** 3.399(.001)*** 3.018(.003)*** 3.914(.000)*** 3.267(.001)*** 1.768(.077)* 
Population 1.965(.050)** 2.363(.018)** 1.963(.050)** 2.313(.021)** 1.016(.310) 3.14(.002)*** 
Masculinity -.068(.946) -1.025(.306) -.067(.946) 1.767(.078)* 1.118(.264) -1.51(.131) 
Power 
Distance 
- - - - - - 
Anglo 
American 
-.686(.493) .146(.884) -.690(.491) .888(.375) 2.186(.029)** 2.13(.033)** 
2010 1.193(.233) 1.173(.241) 1.191(.234) .753(.451) 1.99(.047)** .822(.412) 
2011 .170(.865) -.177(.860) .177(.859) 1.338(.181) 1.005(.315) .079(.937) 
2012 .374(.709) .336(.737) .379(.705) 1.027(.305) .850(.396) .214(.830) 
2014 -.368(.713) -.304(.761) -.366(.714) .448(.654) .176(.860) .421(.674) 
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For the relation between block ownership and R&D expenditure, the result is a negative 
relation of (-3.401), significant at 1%. This was the same negative relation that was 
identified earlier between the two variables. In Table 19, the relationship between block 
ownership and R&D expenditure is (-2.983), which is negative as well as significant at 1%; 
the readings for both tables are close in number. 
For the relation between block ownership and ROA expenditure, the significance was 
(2.050) to 5% significance. This is the same positive relation that was previously identified 
between the two variables earlier. In Table 20, the relationship between block ownership 
and ROA is shown as positive but not significant (009).  
In Table 24, the relation between block ownership and credit rating is shown not to be 
significant at (.380); similar significance was noted in earlier identification of the relation 
between block ownership and credit rating in Table 21, where the reading is (-.566). 
However, the signs are different, with Table 24 being positive and Table 21 being negative. 
The results show that the relation between block ownership and cost of capital is not  
significant at (1.382). In Table 22, the reading is positive and significant at 1%.  
The relations between block ownership and the various proxies for firm financ ia l 
performance as reported in this table are similar to those reported earlier, suggesting no 
endogeneity problem.  
The study also uses the relationship between institutional ownership and the proxies for 
firm financial performance in order to solve the endogeneity problem. The results are 
shown in Table 24.  
For the relation between institutional ownership and R&D/Assets, the results show a 
negative relation (-5.722) significant at 1%. The result in Table 17 shows the relation 
between institutional ownership and R&D/Assets as (-2.982), significant at 1%. This 
relationship is similar to that shown in Table 24, where both are negative and significant at 
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1%. What is most important here is that the same negative relation that is shown between 
institutional ownership and R&D/Assets is observed earlier between these two variables. 
A look at the relation between institutional ownership and R&D/Sales in Table 24 reveals 
that the results are significant at (-5.68) to 1%, and that the relation is negative. In Table 
18, the finding is (-1.211), and the relation is negative but not significant. It is significa nt 
here that both relations are negative. 
Similarly, the relation between institutional ownership and R&D expenditure is found to 
be (-5.717), significant at 1%. In Table 19, the relation between these two variables is (-
.704), It is important that the relation between institutional ownership and R&D 
expenditure is negative, although the two results have different significance. 
The relation between institutional ownership and ROA is not significant at (1.495), but it 
is important that this positive relation is the same as the earlier relation between these 
variables. The earlier reading in Table 20 shows the relationship between institutiona l 
ownership and ROA at (3.3362), significant at 1%. In Table 20, the reading is significant 
at 1%, but the two readings are similar in that both are negative. 
In Table 24, the relation between institutional ownership and credit rating is found to be 
not significant at (.843), but positive. This is the same sign that is found to exist earlier in 
the finding of the relationship between institutional ownership and credit rating. In Table 
21, the relationship between institutional ownership and credit rate is (3.389), positive and 
significant at 1%. While both readings are positive, the latter is significant. 
The relation between institutional ownership and cost of capital in Table 24 is positive and 
not significant at (311). In Table 22, the reading for the relation between these two variables 
is (2.521), significant at 5%. The two relations are different in that they have different 
signs, with both readings being positive. 
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Table 24: OLS Regression Results of Instrumental Variable Estimates OECD Ownership 
Structure & Board Structure on Risk-Taking, Credit Rating and Cost of Capital 
 R&D/Assets R&D/Sales R&D 
Expenditure 
ROA Credit Rating Cost of Capital 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐 .194 .162 .462 .178 .382 .311 
Standard Error .721 .724 .721 .060 2.246 .191 
Durbin- Watson .558 .595 .558 1.021 .542 1.183 
F-Value 5.852(.000)*** 4.902(.000)*** 18.256(.000)*** 8.538(.000)*** 17.81(.000)*** 14.309(.000)*** 
No. of 
Observations 
504 504 504 872 681 739 
Constant 3.653(.000)*** 3.859(.000)*** 3.651(.000)*** 2.480(.013)** -.632(.528) -.178(.859) 
Independent Variable 
Block 
Ownership  
-3.406(.001)*** -3.205(.001)*** -3.401(.001)*** 2.050(.041)** .380(.704) -1.382(.168) 
Institutional 
Ownership 
-5.722(.000)*** -5.68(.000)*** -5.717(.000)*** 1.495(.135) .843(.399) -.311(.756) 
Director 
Ownership 
-.144(.886) -.007(.995) -.140(.889) -.833(.405) -.520(.604) .386(.699) 
Independent 
Directors 
1.433(.153) 1.458(.146) 1.435(.152) .114(.910) -.335(.738) -.816(.415) 
Board Size -1.374(.170) -1.013(.312) -1.373(.170) -1.723(.085)* .583(.560) .617(.538) 
Board Diversity .342(.733) .313(.754) .337(.736) -.8538(.402) .710(.478) -.272(.786) 
Frequency of 
Board Meetings 
2.394(.001)*** 2.512(.012)** 2.394(.017)** -3.863(.000)*** 2.008(.045)** -1.968(.049) 
Control Variables 
Firm Size 2.626(.009)*** 2.704(.007)*** 3.440(.001)*** -.002(.999) .207(.836) 1.312(.190) 
Sales Growth -2.044(.042)** -2.034(.043)** -2.046(.041)** .270(.787) .064(.949) -.758(.449) 
Audit 
Committee No. 
1.202(.230) .886(.376) 1.195(.233) 1.483(.139) .156(.876) .619(.536) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee No. 
2.908(.004)*** 2.761(.006)*** 2.902(.004)*** .437(.662) .608(.543) -.533(.594) 
Leverage 2.038(.042)** 1.454(.146) 2.033(.043)** -1.637(.102) -2.165(.031)** -.209(.834) 
Capital Gain 
Yield 
4.664(.000)*** 4.586(.000)*** 4.663(.000)*** 1.117(.264) -.430(.667) 2.722(.007)*** 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
-.450(.653) -.285(.776) -.443(.658) -.326(.745) -.489(.625) -.631(.528) 
Corruption 
Index 
1.463(.144) 1.424(.155) 1.467(.143) -.019(.985) -.191(.848) 1.997(.046)** 
Inflation -2.01(.045)** -1.839(.067)* -2.018(.044)** 1.007(.314) .943(.346) .340(.734) 
GDP Per Capita .256(.798) .182(.856) .258(.797) -1.891(.059)* -.577(.564) -.623(.534) 
Population -.624(.533) -.825(.410) -.629(.530) .075(.940) .167(.867) -.296(.767) 
Masculinity -2.209(.028)** -2.234(.026)** -2.21(.028)** .218(.827) .867(.386) .018(.986) 
Power Distance -1.197(.232) -1.227(.220) -1.199(.231) .310(.757) .709(.478) .005(.996) 
Anglo American -800(.424) -.825(.410) -.804(.422) .382(.703) .483(.629) -.346(.730) 
2010 1.284(.200) 1.216(.224) 1.286(.199) -.168(.867) -.027(979) .193(.847) 
2011 1.397(.163) 1.285(.199) 1.403(.161) .612(.541) .077(.939) .211(.833) 
2012 1.167(.244) .928(.354) 1.171(.242) .301(.763) .098(.922) -.724(.469) 
2014 .706(.480) .819(.413) .704(.482) .382(.703) .300(.765) -.741(.459) 
These findings show that the same signs exist between institutional ownership and most of 
the proxies as in earlier tables, suggesting that there is no endogeneity problem. 
The study also sets out to solve the endogeneity problem with respect to director ownership 
and the proxies for firm financial performance. This is also shown in Table 24. The relation 
between director ownership and R&D/Assets, shown in Table 24, is negative and not 
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significant at (-1.44). In Table 19, this relation is shown to be (.300). The signs are different, 
but the amounts are relatively small. The findings were not significant in any case. 
In Table 24, the relation between director ownership and R&D/Sales is shown to be 
positive and not significant at (.007). In Table 20, the relation is shown as (.494). Both 
readings are positive and not significant. Similarly, the relation between director ownership 
and R&D expenditure is positive and not significant at (.1.40) in Table 24. In Table 19, the 
reading is (.297). Both readings are positive and not significant. But the relation between 
director ownership and ROA is negative and not significant at (.833), as shown in Table 
24. In Table 20, the relation is (-.144), which is very small and very close to the relation 
between these two variables in Table 24. Neither finding is significant.  
Similarly, there is a negative and insignificant relation between director ownership and 
credit rating, at (-.520), which is the same negative relation observed earlier in Table 21, 
where the relationship between these two variables was (-.491). These results are similar 
in all respects. 
The relation between director ownership and cost of capital is positive and not significant 
at (.386), as shown in Table 24. In Table 22, the relationship is (-1.660), significant at 10%. 
This relationship is different in Table 24, since the signs and significance are different.  
This study of the relation between director ownership and the proxies for firm financ ia l 
performance suggest that there are no endogeneity problems, because most of the signs 
found in the tables are similar.  
Table 24 also shows that this study has endeavoured to solve the endogeneity problem by 
showing the relation between independent directors and the proxies for firm financ ia l 
performance. The study reports a positive relation between independent directors and 
R&D/Assets, but the finding is not significant at (1.433), as shown in Table 24. In Table 
17, the relation between independent directors and R&D/Assets is (3.698), significant at 
 276 
 
5%. This relation is positive and significant. It is important that this is the same positive 
sign found in the earlier report of the relationship between these two variables. 
The relation between independent directors and R&D/Sales is also positive and not 
significant at (1.458) in Table 24. In Table 18, the relationship between independent 
directors and R&D/Sales is (2.764), significant at 1%. This finding shows a positive and 
significant relationship. The relation in both cases has the same sign, which is most 
important in suggesting no endogeneity problem. 
Similarly, the relation between independent directors and R&D expenditure is also positive 
and not significant at (1.435). In Table 19, the relationship is (3.687), which is positive and 
significant at 1%. The positive signs reported in both cases suggest no endogeneity problem 
with respect to independent directors and R&D expenditure. 
In Table 24, the relation between independent directors and ROA is shown to be positive 
and significant at (.114). This was the same positive relation between these two variables 
reported earlier in Table 20, where the relation was shown as (.248). 
The relation between independent directors and credit rating was reported as negative but 
not significant at (-335), and in Table 21, this relation is shown as (1.517), positive and 
significant at 5%. A comparison between these two readings shows that the signs and the 
levels of significance are also different.  
Similarly, a negative relation between independent directors and cost of capital was 
reported, but it is not significant at (-.816), as shown in Table 24. In Table 22, the relation 
is shown as (-2.986), which is negative and significant at 1%. A comparison between these 
two relations shows that they had a common negative sign, but Table 22 shows a significant 
relation. It is also important that the negative sign was the same as in earlier reporting on 
the relationship between independent directors and cost of capital, suggesting no 
endogeneity problem. 
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In Table 24, the study tried to solve the endogeneity problem with respect to board size and 
the proxies for firm financial performance. The relation between board size and 
R&D/Assets is negative and not significant at (-1.374) in Table 24. In Table 19, the relation 
between these two variables is (-1.564). Neither of these relations is significant. This is the 
same sign as in the earlier report of the relationship between these two variables.  
Similarly, the relation between board size and R&D/Sales is negative and not significant 
at (-1.013); this is the same negative relation of (-2.481) reported earlier in Table 18. The 
relation between board size and R&D expenditure is negative and not significant at (-
1.373), very close to the finding for these two variables in Table 19, of (-1.566). The fact 
that the same sign is found in both tables for board size and R&D expenditure shows that 
there is no endogeneity problem. 
The relation between board size and ROA is seen as negative but significant at (-1.723) at 
10% in Table 24. In Table 20, the reading for the relation between these two variables is (-
.901). It is important that the same negative sign was reported in both accounts of the 
relationship between these two variables.  
The findings in Table 24 show a positive relation between board size and credit rating, 
which is not significant at (.583). In Table 21, the relation between these two variables is 
shown as (1.125). The important point here is that this relationship had the same positive 
sign in Table 24, reporting on the relationship between board size and credit rating. 
The relation between board size and cost of capital is found to be positive and not 
significant at (.617) in Table 24. In Table 22, the relation between these two variables is (-
.717). The signs are different in both cases, although the numbers are similar. The fact that 
in most cases related to board size, most of the signs for the relationship between board 
size and the proxies for firm financial performance suggests that there are no endogeneity 
problems. 
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Table 24 also shows that there are no endogeneity problems related to board diversity and 
the proxies for firm financial performance. The relation between board diversity and 
R&D/Assets is shown to be positive and not significant at (.342). In Table 17, this relation 
is shown as (1.468). Although both readings are not significant, the signs were the same as 
a positive. In Table 17, it was seen that the relation could also be shown as negative. 
Similarly, there is a positive relation between board diversity and R&D/Sales, but the 
relation is not significant at (.313) in Table 24. In Table 18, the relation is shown as (1.271). 
It is important for showing no endogeneity problem as the positive sign in this relation was 
the same positive sign found in Table 24 in the relation between board diversity and 
R&D/Sales.  
The relation between board diversity and R&D expenditure is reported in Table 24 as 
positive but not significant at (.337). In Table 19, the relation is (1.466), which is similar. 
In Table 24, the relation between board diversity and ROA is found to be negative but not 
significant at (-.8538). In Table 20, the relation is (-.563), which is the same sign as found 
earlier.  
However, examination of the relation between board diversity and credit rating shows a 
positive but not significant relationship at (.710) in Table 24. In Table 21, the relation is 
(2.441). The positive sign is important because it suggests no endogeneity, as the sign of 
the relationship between these two variables shown in Table 24 is the same sign.  
In Table 24, the relation between board diversity and cost of capital is negative and but not 
significant at (-.272). In Table 22, the relation is (-.157), similar to that in Table 24. It is 
important that the relationship between these two variables in Table 22 is negative. 
In checking for endogeneity problems, this study compares the findings in Table 24 with 
reports of the relations between the frequency of board meetings and the proxies for firm 
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financial performance. It is evident that the signs for the majority of readings are the same. 
The relation between frequency of board meetings and R&D/Assets shows a negative and 
significant finding at (-3.406), significant at 5% in Table 24. In Table 17, this relation is 
shown as (-4.293). What is important is that both of the reports of the relationship between 
these two variables show the same negative sign and are both significant. 
The relation between frequency of board meetings and R&D/Sales is positive but 
significant (2.512) at 5% in Table 24. In Table 18, the relation is shown as (-3.399). It is 
important to note that while the sign is different from the earlier report, the finding is 
significant, as in earlier reporting of this relation. 
The relation between frequency of board meetings and R&D expenditure is positive but 
not significant at (2.394), as reported in Table 24. In Table 19, the relation is (-4.288). The 
findings are similar between both reports. 
Table 24 shows a negative relation of (-3.863) between frequency of board meetings and 
ROA, significant at 1%. In Table 20, the relation is (-2.216), negative and significant at 
5%. Both relations are negative and significant. 
The finding for the relation between frequency of board meetings and credit rating is 
positive and significant at 5% (2.008). In Table 21, the relation is (1.872), which is positive 
and significant at 10%. Both relations have the same sign and are significant.  
A negative relation is found between frequency of board meetings and cost of capital, but 
it is not significant at (-1.968) in Table 24. In Table 22, this relationship is shown as (-
4.243). Both findings have the same negative sign. 
The two-stage least squares test, in correlating the possible errors between the dependent 
and independent variables, demonstrates that there are no endogeneity problems. 
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6.8.3 Lagged 
This section discusses the results of the study to estimate a lagged financial Performance 
corporate governance structure which would deal with any endogeneity problems that may 
come about because of a time-lag that may occur in the financial performance-corporate 
governance relationship. Tables 25 and 26 reveal the findings that deal specifically with 
the endogeneity problem. 
Table 25: OLS Regression Results of Lagged OECD CGI on Risk-Taking, Credit Rating 
and Cost of Capital 
 R&D/Assets R&D/Sales R&D 
Expenditure 
ROA Credit Rating Cost of Capital 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐 .075 .063 .391 .144 .409 .484 
Standard 
Error 
.770 .770 .776 .062 2.210 .194 
Durbin- 
Watson 
.560 .602 .561 1.157 .678 1.051 
F-Value 3.214(.000)*** 2.83(.000)*** 18.445(.000)*** 8.472(.000)*** 25.072(.000)*** 36.46(.000)*** 
No. of 
Observations 
490 490 490 800 627 681 
Constant .374(.321) -.002(.125) .555(.001)*** 4.395(.000)*** .944(.418) -6.827(.001)*** 
Independent Variable 
Corporate 
Governance 
Index  
1.222(.657) .064(.852) 1.079(.479) 3.061(.000)*** 3.85(.000)*** -5.9(.000)*** 
Control Variables 
Firm Size -.911(.878) 1.438(.474) 13.387(.005)*** -3.994(.000)*** 9.595(.008)*** 3.447(.000)*** 
Sales Growth .911(.291) .942(.329) 1.204(.535) 1.649(.620) -1.779(.087)* -.041(.872) 
Audit 
Committee 
No. 
-2.666(.000)*** -3.339(.008)*** -2.820(.045)** -.283(.225) -.752(.201) -.482(.847) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee 
No. 
.962(.987) .704(.519) .957(.874) 3.020(.001)*** .448(.008)*** -2.202(.035)** 
Leverage -.833(.637) -2.021(.015)** -.987(.691) -5.531(.000)*** -7.357(.009)*** .875(.921) 
Capital Gain 
Yield 
.222(.796) -.005(.821) .252(.358) .726(.596) -.945(.632) .647(.281) 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
2.922(.000)*** 1.84(.061)* 2.892(.005)*** 4.781(.000)*** 5.58(.000)*** -1.313(.459) 
Corruption 
Index 
-.985(.510) -1.041(.994) -.982(.843) -.903(.592) .535(.291) 7.397(.000)*** 
Inflation -4.501(.001)*** -3.635(.000)*** -4.429(.006)*** -2.743(.001)*** -5.739(.009)*** .367(.304) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
-1.037(.681) -.195(.351) -1.092(.239) -3.871(.000)*** -3.28(.002)*** -2.127(.025)** 
Population -1.184(.375) -.431(.315) -1.24(.638) -3.372(.000)*** -5.286(.003)*** -.715(.529) 
Masculinity .197(.521) -.206(.971) .11(.008)*** -2.512(.021)** 5.074(.000)*** 11.723(.000)*** 
Power 
Distance 
-2.089(.034)** -1.562(.171) -2.158(.013)** -2.952(.002)*** .636(.128) 7.306(.000)*** 
Anglo 
American 
-1.542(.281) -.863(.638) -1.492(.258) .952(.283) .989(.204) 1.504(.386) 
2010 - - - 1.042(.538) - .078(.140) 
2011 2.681(.001)*** 2.086(.031)** 2.356(.071)** -.282(.465) 3.452(.000)*** - 
2012 1.697(.061)* 1.429(.980) 1.311(.929) 1.1(.778) 1.047(.835) 1.122(.193) 
2013 -.169(.969) .134(.657) -.326(.157) - -1.346(.648) 2.139(.021)** 
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In Table 25, the adjusted R² for the various proxies used to represent performance are 
robust, as the F-Value for all show the same significance at 1%, and all are positive, 
although the sizes of the figures differ. In Table 25, the F-Values for R&D/Assets, 
R&D/Sales, R&D expenditure, ROA, credit rating and cost of capital are (3.214), 2.83, 
18.445, 8.472, 25.072 and 36.46, respectively. Since these proxies maintain the same 
degree of significance and the same sign (positive), it can be said that there are no 
endogeneity problems here. All of the Adjusted R Square are positive and not significant. 
In terms of the Corporate Governance Index in Table 25, there are no endogeneity 
problems, as only three of the proxies have findings significant at 1%, namely, ROA at 
(3.061), credit rating at (3.85) and cost of capital at (-5.9), and only one of these is negative. 
The others are positive, at (1.222), (.064) and (1.079) for R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales and 
R&D expenditure, respectively.   
In the lagged reports in this study, ownership structure and board structure are used to deal 
with any possible endogeneity problem; the results are shown in Table 26. With respect to 
risk-taking based on R&D/Assets, the relationship between block ownership and 
R&D/Assets in the lagged report is calculated as (-3.25). In Table 17, the relationship 
between block ownership and R&D/Assets is (-2.982). These two findings are similar, as 
both have a negative sign and are significant at 1%.  
The lagged reports for block ownership show that the relationship between block 
ownership and R&D/Sales is (-3.467) in Table 26. In Table 18, that relationship is (-3.411). 
The similarity between the regular and the lagged report with respect to R&D/Sales shows 
that the same negative signs and the same degree of significance, 1%, were observed, 
suggesting no endogeneity problem. 
In Table 26, the lagged relationship between block ownership and R&D expenditure is (-
3.306); in Table 19 that relationship is shown as (-2.983). These two findings have the 
same negative sign and the same degree of significance of 1 %. 
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 In the lagged reports in Table 26, the relationship between block ownership and ROA is 
(.327). In Table 20, the relationship between block ownership and ROA is (.009). These 
two findings are similar, as both have the positive sign and both are not significant.  
Table 26: OLS Regression Results of Lagged OECD Ownership Structure & Board Structure on 
Risk-Taking, Credit Rating and Cost of Capital 
 the R&D/Assets R&D/Sales R&D 
Expenditure 
ROA Credit Rating Cost of Capital 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐 .180 .150 .446 .139 .409 .459 
Standard 
Error 
.735 .736 .74 .064 2.211 .190 
Durbin- 
Watson 
.663 .694 .664 1.154 .669 1.201 
F-Value 4.873(.000)*** 4.127(.000)*** 15.241(.000)*** 5.845(.000)*** 17.411(.000)*** 22.615(.000)*** 
No. of 
Observations 
425 425 425 723 569 613 
Constant -.334(.124) -.293(.400) -.187(.482) 4.444(.001)*** .160(.301) -4.383(.000)*** 
Independent Variable 
Block 
Ownership  
-3.25(.007)*** -3.467(.002)*** -3.306(.001)*** .327(.567) -.595(923) 1.867(.063)* 
Institutional 
Ownership 
.344(.423) -.630(.133) .255(.986) 3.033(.001)*** -1.581(.345) 1.342(.254) 
Director 
Ownership 
-.597(.350) -.248(.657) -.420(.450) .342(.164) 1.006(.127) -.327(.963) 
Independent 
Directors 
3.947(.004)*** 2.65(.008)*** 4.034(.000)*** .582(.877) 2.2(.038)** -3.711(.008)*** 
Board Size -1.412(.123) -2.341(.038)** -1.419(.234) -1.177(.271) 1.144(.987) -1.982(.045)** 
Board 
Diversity 
2.697(.002)*** 2.707(.000)*** 2.765(.006)*** -.143(.589) 3.046(.003)*** -.210(.387) 
Frequency of 
Board 
Meetings 
-2.936(.000)*** -2.346(.017)** -2.944(.000)*** -.342(.535) -.949(.889) -3.967(.003)*** 
Control Variables 
Firm Size -.946(.811) 1.281(.196) 10.944(.009)*** -2.598(.000)*** 8.663(.001)*** 2.895(.000)*** 
Sales Growth .517(.653) .464(.548) .694(.534) .828(.411) -2.365(.047)** -.092(.265) 
Audit 
Committee 
No. 
-2.136(.021)** -2.55(.021)** -2.27(.036)** -.040(654) -1.369(.936) -.135(.800) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee 
No. 
1.4(.136) .954(.985) 1.322(.159) -2.412(.044)** -.196(.241) -1.815(.067)* 
Leverage -.359(.944) -1.623(.242) -.554(.146) -4.688(.000)*** -8.063(.001)*** 1.116(.214) 
Capital Gain 
Yield 
.239(.583) .025(.707) .287(.580) .702(.486) -1.287(.257) .954(.165) 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
2.315(.043)** 1.443(.193) 2.327(.042)** 3.548(.003)*** 4.009(.000)*** .803(.580) 
Corruption 
Index 
-.466(.229) -.577(.674) -.414(.909) -.585(.536) .999(.546) 5.231(.009)*** 
Inflation -4.273(.000)*** -3.860(.005)*** -4.246(.000)*** -1.623(.895) -4.165(.000)*** -1.618(.567) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
-1.618(.533) -.561(.127) -1.738(.089)* -2.44(.038)** -2.399(.032)** -1.714(.065)* 
Population -.478(.301) .365(.865) -.579(.624) -1.692(.091)* -3.822(.002)*** -1.688(.071)* 
Masculinity 1.209(.140) .419(.321) 1.153(.426) -3.303(.008)*** 4.124(.001)*** 8.22(.002)*** 
Power 
Distance 
1.263(.554) -1.396(.429) -1.309(.400) -3.078(.004)*** .509(.185) 4.009(.000)*** 
Anglo 
American 
-2.253(.032)** -1.828(.069)* -2.228(.031)** -.345(.985) .12(.149) .65(.587) 
2010 .713(.320) .519(.354) .86(.276) 1.138(.296) 1.526(.299) -1.134(.343) 
2011 3.014(.001)*** 2.457(.048)** 2.87(.005)*** 1.836(.045)** 3.434(.006)*** .435(.504) 
2012 1.994(.627) 1.624(.653) 1.764(.078)* .666(.998) 1.737(.071)* .732(.315) 
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The lagged report in Table 26 shows the relationship between block ownership and credit 
rating at (-.595). In this table, the finding for block ownership and credit rating is (-.566). 
Both of these findings are not significant and have the same negative sign, and the numbers 
are very close, suggesting no endogeneity problem. 
The lagged report for block ownership with respect to cost of capital in Table 26 shows the 
relationship at (1.867), significant at 1%. In Table 22, the relationship between block 
ownership and cost of capital is shown as (3.237), significant at 1%. What is apparent here 
is that there is a similarity of sign and significance in both findings. This suggests that there 
is no endogeneity problem. 
A study of block ownership with the proxies for firm financial performance shows that the 
majority of the relationships were similar between the lagged reports and the regular 
reports, therefore suggesting that there was no endogeneity problem. In Table 26, the 
findings for the relationship between institutional ownership and R&D/Assets in the lagged 
reports show a positive relationship of .344. In Table 17, that relationship is (-.702) and 
negative. The findings were shown as similar in not being significant, although the signs 
were different. The lagged report for the relationship between institutional change and 
R&D/Sales is (-.630) in Table 26; in Table 18, that reading is (-1.211). Both findings have 
a negative sign and neither is significant. 
The lagged report in Table 26 shows a finding of (.255) for the relationship between 
institutional ownership and R&D expenditure; in Table 19, that finding is (-.704). In the 
lagged report in Table 26, the relationship between institutional ownership and ROA is 
(3.033), significant at 1%. In Table 20, the relationship between institutional ownership 
and ROA is (-3.3362), also significant at 1%. Both findings have the same negative sign, 
both are significant at 1% and both are similar in size. There is no evidence of endogeneity.  
The lagged report in Table 26 for the relationship between institutional ownership and 
credit rating is (-1.581). In Table 21, this relationship is (3.389), significant at 1%. There 
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is a difference between these findings, with the lagged report having a negative 
relationship, and the regular report showing a positive sign and significance at 1%.  But 
the lagged report in Table 26 for the relationship between institutional ownership and cost 
of capital shows (1.342). In Table 22, this relationship is (2.531). These findings are 
positive and not significant. This suggests that most of the findings in Table 26 for 
institutional ownership and the proxies for firm financial performance show no 
endogeneity problem.  
A look at the other independent variables, namely, director ownership, independent 
directors, board size, board diversity and frequency of board meetings, and their 
relationships with the dependent variables, namely, R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales, R&D 
expenditure, ROA, credit rating and cost of capital, reveals that the findings in the lagged 
report in Table 26 are largely similar to the findings in Tables 17 to 22, respectively. For 
example, when one looks at director ownership in the lagged report in Table 26, one 
observes that the findings in terms of R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales, R&D expenditure, ROA, 
credit rating and cost of capital, are (-.597), (-.248). (-.420), (.342), (1.006) and (-.327), 
respectively. When one looks at the regular findings of the relationships between director 
ownership and R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales, R&D expenditure, ROA, credit rating and cost 
of capital, the findings are (.300), (.180), (-.463), (.342), (-.499) and (-.436), in Tables 17 
to 22, respectively. A direct one-to-one comparison between the lagged and regular 
findings reveals that there is no significance in these findings and that most of the signs are 
negative. The suggestion is that, with respect to the relationship between director 
ownership and firm financial performance, there is no endogeneity problem. 
The relationships between independent directors and R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales, R&D 
expenditure, ROA, credit rating and cost of capital in the lagged report in Table 26 are 
(3.937), (2.65) and (4.034), all significant at 1%; (.582), not significant; (2.2), significant 
at 5%  and (-3.711), significant at 1%, respectively. In the regular reports, the findings 
reveal that the relationship between independent directors and R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales, 
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R&D expenditure, ROA, credit rating and cost of capital are (3.698), (2.764), (3.687), all 
significant at 1%; (.248), not significant; (1.517), significant at 5%; and (-4.243), 
significant at 1%, in Tables 17 to 22, respectively. This reveals that there is similarity of 
signs and significance in most of the findings in both the lagged and regular reports, 
suggesting no problem with endogeneity. 
There were similar findings for the independent variables, board size, board diversity and 
frequency of board meetings. When these regular findings were compared to the lagged 
findings, as with the other findings noted above, there were similarities. This suggests that 
there is no endogeneity problem in the relationships between the independent variables and 
the dependent variables in the regular and lagged reports. 
6.8.4 Fixed affect 
The third test of endogeneity in this study is that of fixed effects. Table 27 points to the 
results of fixed effects OECD on risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. The adjusted 
R2 is (.974), for Durbin-Watson it is (1.76), and the F-Value which is significant at 1% 
place is at (158.07). The effect of the corporate governance index in terms of R&D/Assets, 
R&D/Sales, R&D Expenditure, ROA, credit rating and cost of capital, respectively is (-
.293), (-.273), (-.308), (.013), (.113) and (-.550), respectively. 
Table 28 gives the breakdown in the relationship between the independent variables and 
the dependent variables with respect to fixed effect on ownership structure and board 
structure. In terms of the relationship between block ownership and the firm financ ia l 
performance proxies based on fixed effects, the findings are similar to previous results. For 
example, in terms of the findings of the fixed effects with respect to the relationship 
between block ownership and R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales, R&D expenditure, ROA, credit 
rating and cost of capital, the findings are (-.149), (-.388), (-.154), (.155), (-.321) and 
(.091), respectively. This is similar to the findings in Tables 15 to 20, which are (-2.982), 
(-3.411), (-2.983), all significant at 1%; (.009), (-.566), not significant; and (3.237), 
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significant at 1%, respectively. These findings provide evidence that in terms of fixed 
effects, there is no endogeneity problem. 
Table 27: OLS Regression Results of Fixed Effect OECD CGI on Risk-Taking, Credit Rating and Cost of 
Capital 
 the 
R&D/Assets 
R&D/Sales R&D 
Expenditure 
ROA Credit Rating Cost of Capital 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐 .974 .971 .983 .639 .952 .697 
Standard 
Error 
.128 .134 .128 .039 .625 .129 
Durbin- 
Watson 
1.76 1.718 1.76 2.073 1.496 2.07 
F-Value 158.07(.000)*** 143.76(.000)*** 243.558(.000)*** 9.128(.000)*** 89.161(.000)*** 11.348(.000)*** 
No. of 
Observations 
568 568 568 947 733 803 
Constant -.721(.471) -1.352(.177) -.702(.483) .090(.928) 1.413(.158) 2.574(.010)** 
Independent Variable 
Corporate 
Governance 
Index  
-.293(.770) -.273(.785) -.308(.758) .013(.990) .113(.910) -.550(.965) 
Control Variables 
Firm Size -2.629(.009)*** 2.152(.032)** 9.434(.000)*** -3.253(.001)*** 2.004(.046)** -1.288(.198) 
Sales Growth -.857(.392) -2.178(.030)** -.867(.386) 7.083(.000)*** -.354(.723) 1.079(.281) 
Audit 
Committee 
No. 
1.133(.258) 1.487(.138) 1.148(.252) -1.083(.279) -1.019(.309) -.462(.644) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee 
No. 
-1.636(.103) -.991(.322) -1.641(.102) .083(.934) -2.093(.037)** -1.687(.092)* 
Leverage 2.719(.007)*** 1.678(.094)* 2.75(.006)*** -9.884(.000)*** -3.555(.000)*** 1.121(.263) 
Capital Gain 
Yield 
.176(.861) .008(.994) .185(.854) -.554(.580) -2.778(.006)*** 2.771(.006)*** 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
1.157(.248) .347(.729) 1.27(.205) .788(.431) .361(.718) -3.202(.001)*** 
Corruption 
Index 
-.480(.632) -.772(.440) -.586(.558) .25(.803) -1.447(.149) -.550(.582) 
Inflation .468(.640) -.588(.557) .446(.656) -.856(.392) .091(.927) -2.989(.003)*** 
GDP Per 
Capita 
.731(.465) .657(.512) .746(.456) 1.099(.272) .935(.350) -.699(.485) 
Population -2.238(.026)** -1.747(.081)* -2.253(.025)** -.727(.467) 2.254(.025)** .709(.479) 
Masculinity - - - - - - 
Power 
Distance 
- - - - - - 
Anglo 
American 
- - - - - - 
2010 .833(.405) 2.293(.022)** .855(.393) 1.483(.139) 2.471(.014)** -1.255(.210) 
2011 1.669(.096)* 1.353(.177) 1.764(.078)* .879(.380) 1.466(.143) -1.416(.157) 
2012 .601(.548) .554(.580) .68(.497) 1.825(.068)* 1.272(.204) -.894(.371) 
2014 .924(.356) 1.457(.146) .948(.344) 1.009(.313) -.531(.596) .770(.442) 
In terms of institutional ownership, the finding for the relationship between institutiona l 
ownership and R&D/Assets is (-.702) in Table 17. Similarly, the finding for the 
relationship between institutional ownership and risk-taking based on R&D/Sales is shown 
in Table 18 as (-1.211). For the relationship between institutional ownership and R&D 
expenditure, the finding is (-.704) in Table 19. In Table 20, the relationship between 
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institutional ownership and ROA with respect to credit rating is (3.389), and in Table 22, 
the relationship between this variable and cost of capital is (2.521) and significant at 5%. 
A look at the corresponding finding in Table 28 for the relationship between institutiona l 
ownership and the dependent variables of R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales, R&D expenditure, 
ROA, credit rating and cost of capital, reveals similarities with the findings in Tables 17 to 
22 for this relationship. The findings in Table 28 for R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales, R&D 
expenditure, ROA, credit rating and cost of capital, in terms of fixed effects, are (-1.553), 
(-1.53), (-1.568), (-.177), (.817) and (.775), respectively. The signs and significance are 
similar between the regular findings in Tables 17 to 22 and those in Table 28. The fact that 
the signs and significance for most of the findings are the same suggests that there is no 
endogeneity in this study. 
A similar trend is observed in terms of the proxies for corporate governance in the use of 
independent directors, board size, board diversity and frequency of board meetings. As 
outlined earlier, these findings have a similar trend to the fixed effects findings. A similar 
pattern, with similar signs and degrees of significance, suggests that there is no 
endogeneity.  
As mentioned earlier, endogeneity tests involved two-stage least squares, lagged reports 
and fixed effects findings. Our findings on the relationships between the independent 
variables, namely, block ownership, institutional ownership, director ownership,  
independent directors, board size, board diversity and frequency of board meetings, and 
the dependent variables, namely, R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales, R&D expenditure, ROA, credit 
rating and cost of capital, from two-stage least squares, lagged reports and fixed effect tests 
show major similarities in signs and significance. The similarities of the signs are most 
important because they suggest the same relationships hold between the independent and 
dependent variables, regardless of the endogeneity test used. Therefore, we conclude that 
regardless of the proxy used for corporate governance, and regardless of the proxy used for 
firm financial performance, the relationship between corporate governance and risk-taking, 
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credit rating and cost of capital holds true. This proves that there are no endogeneity 
problems in this study. 
Table 28: OLS Regression Results of Fixed Effect OECD Ownership Structure & Board 
Structure on Risk-Taking, Credit Rating and Cost of Capital 
 the R&D/Assets R&D/Sales R&D 
Expenditure 
ROA Credit Rating Cost of Capital 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐 .972 .970 .981 .635 .951 .672 
Standard 
Error 
.133 .136 .133 .040 .634 .132 
Durbin- 
Watson 
1.79 1.787 1.798 2.07 1.490 2.06 
F-Value 136.235(.000)*** 126.463(.000)*** 205.444(.000)*** 8.549(.000)*** 82.664(.000)*** 9.688(.000)*** 
No. of 
Observations 
504 504 504 872 681 739 
Constant -.775(.439) -2.155(.032)** -.76(.448) .031(.975) .552(.581) 2.987(.003)*** 
Independent Variable 
Block 
Ownership  
-.149(.881) -.388(.698) -.154(.877) .155(.877) -.321(.748) .091(.927) 
Institutional 
Ownership 
-1.553(.121) -1.53(.127) -1.568(.118) .117(.907) .817(.414) .775(.439) 
Director 
Ownership 
.213(.831) .052(.958) .157(.875) -.137(.891) -1.065(.288) -.026(.979) 
Independent 
Directors 
.018(.985) .847(.397) .023(.982) .440(.660) 1.139(.255) -.538(.590) 
Board Size -.834(.405) -.942(.347) -.829(.408) -.088(.930) 1.956(.051)* -.48(.631) 
Board 
Diversity 
1.744(.082)* 2.515(.012)** 1.754(.080)* -.374(.708) 1.176(.240) -.169(.866) 
Frequency of 
Board 
Meetings 
-.842(0.400) -.155(.868) -.806(.421) -.484(.628) 1.524(.128) -.673(.502) 
Control Variables 
Firm Size -2.204(.028)** 2.284(.023)** 8.737(.000)*** -3.162(.002)*** 1.487(.138) -1.23(.219) 
Sales Growth -1.16(.247) -2.704(.007)*** -1.161(.246) 6.627(.000)*** -.545(.586) .838(.402) 
Audit 
Committee 
No. 
1.00(.318) 1.299(.195) 1.017(.310) -1.006(.315) -1.45(.148) -.394(.694) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee 
No. 
-1.324(.186) -.673(.501) -1.335(.183) -.330(.741) -1.503(.133) -1.669(.096)* 
Leverage 3.308(.001)*** 2.741(.006)*** 3.328(.001)*** -9.652(.000)*** -3.448(.001)*** 1.458(.146) 
Capital Gain 
Yield 
.098(.922) -.211(.833) .107(.914) -.649(.516) -2.666(.008)*** 2.664(.008)*** 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation 
1.335(.183) 1.232(.219) 1.433(.153) 1.17(.242) .422(.673) -2.968(.003)*** 
Corruption 
Index 
-.008(.994) .072(.943) -.108(.914) .211(.833) -1.141(.254) -.617(.538) 
Inflation .359(.720) -.146(.884) .342(.732) -.377(.706) -.237(.813) -2.694(.007)*** 
GDP Per 
Capita 
.089(.929) .343(.732) .111(.912) 1.295(.196) .507(.613) -.526(.599) 
Population -1.974(.049)** -1.785(.075)* -1.987(.048)** -.839(.402) 2.319(.021)** .712(.476) 
Masculinity - - - - - - 
Power 
Distance 
- - - - - - 
Anglo 
American 
- - - - - - 
2010 1.003(.317) 2.811(.005)*** 1.017(.310) 1.656(.098)* 2.502(.013)** -.977(.329) 
2011 1.847(.066)* 1.970(.050)** 1.925(.055)* 1.035(.301) 1.65(.100) -1.25(.212) 
2012 .85(.396) .964(.336) .915(.361) 1.906(.057)* 1.482(.139) -.695(.487) 
2014 .998(.319) 1.538(.125) 1.011(.313) .883(.377) -.341(.734) .680(.497) 
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6.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides, analyses and discusses the empirical results of the study. It has 
accomplished the four main objectives set out at the start of the study, namely, to give a 
detailed description of the OECD Governance Index used in this study, and, using 
descriptive statistics, to show how the different firms, belonging to either Anglo or 
Continental European traditions, comply with the OECD Corporate Governance Code; to 
report on the findings of the study, using bivariate or correlational analysis and to discuss 
the significance of these findings in terms of how corporate governance affects risk-taking, 
credit rating and cost of capital; to report on the findings using multivariate regression 
analyses and to discuss the significance of these findings, with respect to how corporate 
governance impacts risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital; and lastly to report on the 
robustness or sensitivity of these findings. 
This chapter is broken down into sections. Section 6.2 outlines the descriptive statistics of 
the level of compliance of the full sample of firms with the OECD Corporate Governance 
Index. This section shows the firms’ level of compliance with OECD corporate 
governance. The findings reveal a high level of compliance among all firms, consistent 
across the five years studied. Section 6.3 looks more closely at the comparison between 
Anglo-American and Continental firms, finding that they differ with respect to compliance 
on some of the CGI characteristics, yet they all increased their levels of corporate 
governance over the five years studied. In Section 6.4 three models are used. Model 1 
measures risk-taking in terms of R&D/Assets as a dependent variable, R&D/Sales as a 
dependent variable and R&D expenditure as a dependent variable; risk-taking is also 
measured based on ROA as a dependent variable. In this model, to measure credit rating, 
S&P was used as a dependent variable. Cost of capital was also used as dependent variable. 
In all of these, CGI is used as the independent variable. Model 2 uses ownership structure 
as an independent variable and risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital as dependent 
variables. Model 3 uses board structure as an independent variable, and risk-taking, credit 
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rating and cost of capital as dependent variables. These variables were used in the following 
subsections of Section 6.4. 
Section 6.4.2 examines CGI and risk-taking, while Section 6.4.3 measures CGI and credit 
ratings. Section6.4.4 shows the relationship between CGI and cost of capital. The findings 
reveal that CGI compliance lessened risk-taking. Section 6.5.1 and its subsections examine 
firm financial performance. Section 6.5.2 shows the summary descriptive statistics of the 
firm and country-level control variables based on all (200) firm-year observations. It 
reveals that although the firm sizes vary, their performance was not outside the normal 
range. Section 6.5.3 also shows that although there are differences among the firms, their 
performance is within the normal range. 
Section 6.6 reports on the bivariate and correlational analysis in terms of interna l 
characteristics of the firms and how corporate governance affects risk-taking, credit rating 
and cost of capital. 
 Section 6.7 reports on the multivariate analysis in terms of how independent and control 
variables impact firm performance as seen in risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital, 
and in terms of how independent and control variables impact firm performance as seen in 
risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. The subsections of Section 6.7 deal with the 
relationship between the OECD mechanisms and risk-taking as measured by R&D/Assets, 
R&D/Sales, R&D expenditure and ROA. Credit rating is assessed in terms of the impact 
of characteristics of CGI on firm performance and in terms of the relationship between 
ownership structure and board structure on credit rating; and in terms of the impact of 
compliance with OECD principles on cost of capital. Section 6.8 discusses the robustness 
of the study, while Section 6.9 highlights the chapter summary.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the conclusions for the study carried out in this thesis, and sets out 
to achieve five major objectives. First, this chapter summarises the findings of this research 
study, regarding the levels of compliance with, and disclosure of, the corporate governance 
principles in the 2004 OECD Corporate Governance Code by firms following the Anglo -
American tradition and the Continental Europe tradition; and findings of the effect of 
corporate governance on corporate risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital in firms 
belonging to the two traditions. The findings would show how companies belonging to 
different traditions are able to achieve compliance, and how this compliance through 
different corporate governance mechanisms may impact firm performance as evidenced 
through risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. Second, this chapter examines and 
discusses the policy implications of these findings. Third, it cites the contribution of these 
findings to the field. Fourth, this chapter discusses the limitations of the study. Fifth, it 
highlights recommendations and avenues for future research. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 presents a summary of 
the research findings. Section 7.3 discusses the implications of this study for policy 
decisions. Section 7.4 discusses the contributions of this research for the field. Section 7.5 
discusses the limitations of the study. Section 7.6 highlights recommendations based on 
the findings of this study, and recognises avenues for future research, with the expectation 
that there will be further improvement on these research findings. Section 7.7 provides a 
chapter summary. 
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7.2 Summary of research findings 
This chapter reports on the findings of this study relative to the objectives outlined in 
Chapter 1. The original study objectives were to assess the level of compliance with the 
corporate governance principles of the 2004 OECD on firms from two different traditions, 
to ascertain whether corporate governance is related to risk-taking, whether corporate 
governance is related to credit rating, and whether corporate governance is related to cost 
of capital. The study set about to achieve these objectives in a logical and consistent 
manner. It therefore outlined the history of how corporate governance developed and how 
various principles came to be included, and then showed how this became a global concern 
attracting the attention of companies in many countries. The study then explained the 
methodology used and the findings of the relationship between corporate governance as 
represented by a corporate governance index and firm performance as represented by 
various proxies. The overall finding of this study is that the more firms embrace corporate 
governance, the better their financial performance is, and is considered within the context 
of the different countries and the traditions that they follow, as well as cultural, legal and 
accounting systems used in the different countries. The study’s implications, limitations, 
recommendations and avenues for future research are also covered in this chapter, as 
detailed below. 
Chapters 1, 2 and 3 discuss the historical development of corporate governance under the 
auspices of the OECD, but also through the efforts of national organisations; for example, 
the U.K. Cadbury Report Commission, the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and other national 
efforts, as individual countries tried to improve corporate governance in response to some  
high-level scandals that occurred within their economies. Going back to 1997, the first 
Principles of Corporate Governance were put forward by the OECD, as a means of meeting 
its mandate to provide a strong foundation for economic relations among nations. During 
this period, England and the United States had started bolstering their corporate 
governance. In response to globalisation and the need to attract greater investment, 
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countries in Europe and America, and other Western countries, as well as the Middle East 
and Asia, demonstrated their willingness to use the OECD Principles of Governance to 
strengthen their corporate governance. By 2004, the OECD had put forward its 2004 
Principles of Corporate Governance, with a goal of giving nations with civil law and 
common law traditions, from varied accounting systems, different cultures, and both the 
stakeholding and shareholding models of corporate governance (Aguilera & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004), the opportunity to become compliant. This was based on the recognit ion 
that with common standards of compliance, prospective investors have a way of 
determining which countries present little risk and which are too risky to invest in. The 
significant differences among the countries studied reveals the extent to which adoption of 
the OECD 2004 Principles of Governance have become an internationally acceptable set 
of governance rules influencing a wide variety of countries (OECD, 2004, Principles; 
Krenn, 2014).  
However, by looking at how these firms use different corporate governance mechanisms, 
and measuring their financial performance in how they perform on risk-taking, credit rating 
and cost of capital, this study was able to identify the types of firms that performed better 
and to see how well they complied with the 2004 OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance. This was important to the field, as there was a dearth of information available 
on how different corporate governance mechanisms used by companies affects their risk-
taking, credit rating and cost of capital. This approach helps this study show how risk-
taking, credit rating and cost of capital, aspects of firm performance, have been included 
by the different corporate governance mechanisms. 
This study chose to examine and compare the economic performance of 200 firms drawn 
from 10 OECD countries, with five of the countries using the Anglo-American accounting 
system and five using the Continental European accounting system. This in effect meant 
that there were 20 large companies from each country. These firms were studied for five 
years after the 2007-08 global financial crisis. The fact that the companies were drawn 
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from different countries with different traditions, and the fact that the study was conducted 
over a period of five years after the financial crisis, allowed the research to remove 
extraneous factors that may prevent as clear an examination as possible of the impact of 
the use of corporate governance mechanisms on financial performance. Drawing 
information from the internal annual reports and websites of these firms, as well as from 
the external annual stock market and financial accounting performance variables, this study 
reveals that the corporate governance mechanisms affected corporate financ ia l 
performance as evidenced in risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. It was important 
to use a full five years of stock market and accounting information to provide balanced 
panel data analysis, with information for consecutive years (Yermack, 1996). This 
information was obtained from the firms’ internal annual reports and websites. 
Corporate governance was represented in this study by the mechanisms of corporate 
governance index, ownership structure and board structure, and firm performance was 
represented by risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. The research therefore 
examined how each of the corporate mechanisms impacted each of the firm performance 
measures. While some studies have examined corporate governance and some elements of 
firm performance, others have examined firms of different sizes, and from different 
traditions and cultures. Various studies on the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance show a positive relationship. This is confirmed by our findings, but 
what is further highlighted is the importance of using a corporate governance index (CGI) 
as opposed to individual corporate mechanisms. The rationale for using a corporate index 
or code is the fact that countries differ in terms of accounting tradition as well as politica l, 
legal and cultural factors (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997; Licht, 2004; Holm and Zaman, 
2012). Therefore, the findings from this study are based on using a corporate governance 
index, or CGI, as well as noting the aspects of corporate governance mechanisms, and the 
different aspects of ownership structure and board structure. 
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The important questions that were raised were whether firms that follow the Anglo -
American system, based on common law, perform better or worse in terms of risk-taking, 
credit rating and cost ofcapitalthan firms following the Continental European system. Other 
questions were also raised with respect to the kinds of theories that appear most influentia l 
in explaining corporate governance.  
The subsections below explain the research findings. Subsection 7.1 is the introduction, 
while Subsection 7.2 gives the research findings, and is further broken down into 
Subsections 7.2.1 to 7.2.5 Subsection 7.2.1 summarises the research findings based on the 
OECD Corporate Governance principles used with the full sample. Subsection 7.2.2 
summarises findings based on the level of compliance with OECD Corporate Governance 
Principles and based on country differences. Subsection 7.2.3 summarises the findings 
based on the relationship between CGI and risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. 
Subsection 7.2.4 present findings based on the relationship between ownership structure 
and risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. Subsection 7.2.5 summarises findings 
based on the relationship between board structure and risk-taking, credit rating and cost of 
capital. Subsection 7.3 presents the research implications, while Subsection 7.4 provides 
an account of the contributions of this research. Section 7.5 highlights the research 
limitations, while Subsection 7.6 summarises the research recommendations and avenues 
for future research. 
7.2.1 Findings based on the OECD corporate governance principles 
that were used with the Full sample 
Setting up the 2004 OECD corporate governance principles for this study required 
selecting some of the principles that have been identified as critical to the wellbeing of 
stakeholders. These principles were rights of shareholders; equitable treatment of 
shareholders; the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure and 
transparency; and responsibilities of the board. For each of these principles, several 
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questions were asked to ensure that different dimensions of the principles were covered. 
Therefore, while the majority of firms in some areas showed high compliance on some 
dimensions, others showed low compliance, based on the different traditions that the firms 
follow. 
In terms of rights of shareholders, the findings reveal that all firms increased their level of 
compliance with all dimensions of this principle over the five years of this study, 2010 to 
2014. Equitable treatment of shareholders differed among firms, but the differences were 
relatively small, with all firms showing that their average level of compliance was around 
88.5%, with small fluctuations.  
In terms of the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure and transparency, 
and responsibility of the board, the firms all showed that they were compliant, but they 
differed with respect to the dimensions with which they complied. While the firms had 
similar compliance in terms of employee safety and welfare, they differed in terms of 
mentioning key stakeholders and environmental issues. Yet, as a group, the firms were 
compliant in terms of the role of stakeholders. However, there was disparity in the level of 
disclosure and transparency: while some firms complied with disclosing ownership, others 
did not disclose management ownership, and while there was 100% compliance with 
disclosing financial reports in a timely fashion from 2010 to 2014. In terms of 
responsibilities of the board, most of the firms showed high levels of compliance.  
The findings show that these principles as included in the Corporate Governance Index 
(CGI) in this study were generally adhered to by the full sample, and that the general 
theories that supported these were agency, stewardship, resource dependence, legitimacy 
and institutional theories. These theories also support the relevance of including these 
principles in the CGI. 
Agency theory is used to explain the relationship between owners/shareholders and 
managers, which is the principal and agent relationship (Conheady, McIlkenny, Opong 
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&Pignatel, 2015; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). Therefore, agency theory applies to the 
responsibilities of the board (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009). Stewardship theory describes 
the role of the board, as the board ensures that it is a good steward for the shareholders. 
But the board of directors can also be described in terms of resource dependence theory, as 
individual board members contribute resources to the firm (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009; 
Letting et al., 2012). Independent board members also contribute resources in terms of the 
training they provide (Chen & Roberts, 2010). Legitimacy theory is used when the role of 
stakeholders is investigated, as it deals with firms’ concern with the safety and welfare of 
workers, environmental issues, long-term employee incentive plans and key stakeholders 
in general. The firms’ institutional legitimacy was also seen in how they demonstrate the ir 
concern for social values (Chen & Roberts, 2010). Therefore, the findings reveal that the 
principles included in the CGI in this study were relevant to adherence to the 2004 OECD 
Corporate Governance Principles. 
This CGI contains relevant principles, namely, the importance of shareholder rights, 
equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholder in corporate governance, 
disclosure and transparency and responsibilities of the board. Our findings reveal the 
degree to which corporate governance has an impact on these firms in terms of risk-taking, 
credit rating and cost of capital, as measured by different firm and country characteristics. 
7.2.2 Findings based on the level of compliance to OECD CGI based on 
country difference 
The goal of Subsection, 7.2.1 is to show the compliance level of the full sample of 200 
firms. In Subsection 7.2.2., the objective is to show the differences between firms based on 
the level of compliance between countries. Therefore, the study examines the level of 
compliance for the pooled sample, as well as the percentage levels of compliance for each 
year under study. 
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When the OECD CGI was applied to all the firms, nation by nation, the findings reveal no 
major variations among the firms. Over the five years, the level of compliance among the 
pooled sample increased, with only small deviations. But when the firms were compared 
according to country membership, the findings reveal that the overall level of compliance 
was highest among the firms in the U.K. and France over 44%, lower in Germany to about 
42%, lower still in Italian firms to a little above 41%, and still lower in Irish firms, to a 
little below 41%. These firms had compliance levels that were higher than the mean level 
for the pooled sample. However, the level of compliance for U.S. firms was a little above 
39%, which was about the mean for all firms in the pooled sample. Firms in Spain had a 
compliance level of just below 37%, while Japanese firms had the lowest compliance level, 
of just below 27%. Over the five years, the firms with the highest levels of compliance 
showed only small changes. It was also shown that compliance with the OECD governance 
practices was strong among the firms, and were related to country characteristics 
The findings also show that compliance was strong for these firms, and was based on 
corporate governance provisions that the countries practiced because of their traditions.  
In terms of compliance with the principles related to the quality of notice to call the 
shareholders meeting for dividends, to the chair of the firm attending board Annual General 
Meetings, to having a list of board members that attended meetings available, to having 
firm anti-takeover defences in place, and to having board members with more than 25% of 
shares outstanding, firms in the Continental European tradition far outscored those firms  
in the Anglo-American tradition 
However, the firms in the Anglo-American tradition scored higher in levels of compliance 
with the OECD Corporate Governance Principles than the firms in the European 
Continental tradition on principles of equitable treatment of shareholders; the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure and transparency; responsibilities of the 
board and the rights of shareholders.  
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The findings also reveal some principles of compliance had greater significance to firms in 
Anglo countries than to those in Continental countries, and vice versa. It was significant 
that firms from both traditions increased their level of compliance over the duration of the 
study. 
7.2.3 Findings based on the relationship between CGI and risk-taking, 
credit rating, and cost of capital 
In studying how corporate governance impacts risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital, 
three models were developed. While the first model measured risk-taking with respect to 
R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales, R&D expenditure and ROA as dependent variables, credit rating 
was measured as S&P, and cost of capital as itself. CGI was used as the independent 
variable in the first model. The second model used ownership structure as the independent 
variable, and measured risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital as the dependent 
variables. In the third model, board structure was the independent variable, and risk-taking, 
credit rating and cost of capital were the dependent variables.   
The findings reveal that there was a significant relationship between CGI as an independent 
variable and risk-taking as measured by proxies. The hypothesis on this relationship, 
Hypothesis H1a, held that there is no statistically relationship between CGI and risk-taking. 
But the findings reveal that there is a significant relationship; therefore, the null hypothesis 
is not supported, as an increase in CGI brings about a decrease in risk-taking. The 
significant relationship was negative, in terms of the proxies of R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales 
and R&D expenditure, but in terms of ROA, it was shown that there was a strong significant 
relationship between CGI and risk-taking.  
For the relation between CGI and risk-taking based on R&D/Assets, R&D Sales, and R&D 
Expenditures, the overall findings for all firm years was negative and significant. However, 
the relation between CGI and risk-taking based on ROA showed a strong significant 
relation. The findings support the position that compliance with CGI lessens risk-taking. 
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The amount of risk that firms undertook was strongly influenced by the corporate 
governance in place. Firms with good governance demonstrated good investment rating, 
suggesting that when management displays good governance, this is reflected in the 
performance of the firm. The research findings show that some of those firms that were 
able to improve their corporate governance over the five years also showed an 
improvement in their level of risk-taking. This finding supports the agency role of 
management, as the goal of management is to improve the wellbeing of the organisat ion, 
and this involves making the firm less risky. Therefore, fulfilling its agency role, firm 
management tended to improve its corporate governance, with the aim of receiving a higher 
rating for the firm. While some researchers feel that improved corporate governance 
influences firm performance (Elbannan, 2009; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2004), others feel 
that this is not necessarily the case (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Ntim et al. (2013), looking 
at corporate governance and risk-taking, conclude that there is no significant difference in 
corporate governance in firms in terms of risk disclosure. This raises the question of 
whether increasing corporate governance impacts risk-taking. Ntim et al. (2013) show that 
there is no significant impact of corporate governance on risk-taking. But Gompers et al. 
(2003) show that a corporate governance index does have a significant impact on risk-
taking, suggesting that the use of a corporate index is more relevant to organisationa l 
performance than using only one measure of corporate governance. It should also be 
considered that when comparing different countries, it is possible that country-specif ic 
factors can be seen to have an impact on what corporate mechanisms are most used, and 
how they affect firm performance (Gaeremynck, 2006).   
The relationship between CGI and credit rating was found to be positive. The implica t ion 
here is that when there is an increase in disclosure, there is also an increase in credit rating. 
This finding for all firm years is measured by S&P, and is both positive and significant, 
supporting the hypothesis in this study and the findings of other studies. 
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The research findings also reveal a positive relationship between corporate governance and 
credit rating, and that when corporate governance improved over the period under study, 
this had a positive impact on the investments in the firms. These findings are in line with 
previous studies. For example, Alali et al. (2012) find that firms with improved corporate 
governance demonstrate improvements in their investment grading. However, one research 
study shows that this is more apparent among smaller than larger firms (Alali et al., 2012). 
The research findings also reveal that the Corporate Governance Index was related to 
higher stock ratings among most of the firms studied. This is in line with research showing 
that in four elements of corporate governance, namely, CGI, type of ownership structure, 
board structure, and degree of financial transparency, firms were found to reveal higher 
corporate performance (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). Although there were differences 
between the firms in terms of traditions, the research findings show a positive relationship 
between CGI and credit ratings. 
The findings on the relation between CGI and cost of capital reveal that the hypothesis was 
proven. According to this hypothesis, “There is no statistically significant relationship 
between corporate governance index and cost of capital”. The findings reveal that the 
relationship is strongly significant and negative.  
Our findings reveal that cost of capital as performance of a firm was is clearly related to 
corporate performance; this was the case across all firms. The rationale is that if firms are 
good risk takers and have good credit, they will be able to borrow money or attract 
investment easily. This would mean that they would represent firms that would have 
investors willing to put money into. Risky or speculative firms, or firms with poor credit, 
would find it harder to borrow money, which would mean that they would have to pay 
more to borrow. Corporate governance was seen to affect credit rating and be influenced 
by the level of risk firms engage in. This finding is in line with previous research in this 
area: in their study of 4,500 firms in 50 countries between 2006 and 2012, and using as 
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proxy for corporate performance transparent disclosure, minority shareholder protection 
and corporate policy, Griffin et al. (2014) show that adherence to CGI is positively related 
to firm performance. Al-Malkawi et al. (2014), using evidence from the stock market, show 
similar finding. Our findings are therefore supported by other research showing that 
adherence to corporate governance has a positive effect on corporate performance. 
7.2.4 Findings based on the relationship between ownership structure 
and risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital 
There was a relationship between block ownership and risk-taking when measured in terms 
of R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales and R&D expenditure.  
The findings reveal that block ownership in effect gives such owners control over 
management, and can therefore be seen as having either a negative or positive impact on 
risk-taking, depending on the particular tradition in which the firm is located. Block 
ownership in the Anglo-American system, where the common law legal system is used, 
protects the rights of minority shareholders, so that large block holders are seen as not 
having a negative impact on risk-taking. In the Continental European system, which is 
based on civil law, large block holders have the power to influence management to take 
strategies that run counter to the wellbeing of the firm. Firms with more than 5% block 
ownership engage in higher risk-taking than other firms. In other words, block holders in 
the civil law tradition were found to have a tendency to promote more risk-taking. 
These findings are in keeping with previous research showing that block holders have the 
power to gain privileges and benefits that small shareholders do not (Barclay and 
Holderness, 1989), but that some companies repurchase these shares at a price above the 
market value to prevent proxy fights. Therefore, risk-taking is often negatively related to 
block holders, particularly in countries which are based on civil law (Bebchuk, 1999). 
These countries tend to have higher risk-taking than common law countries.   
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The findings reveal a relationship between block ownership and credit rating, as shown in 
previous studies. The findings reveal that where block holders had ownership in a firm, 
this was seen as having a negative impact on credit rating. The rationale for this is that 
these block holders could force management to take positions that run counter to 
shareholders’ interests. Again, this could be seen as involving agency conflict. The research 
findings show that fewer block holders were related to less risk-taking. This was based on 
the particular legal system in which the firm operates. 
These findings are in line with previous research. For example, it was shown that where 
block holders owned at least 5% of stock in a firm, this had a negative impact on the firm’s 
credit rating. Since block holders tend to have more control, influence and information than 
smaller investors, this represents an agency risk and information risk for the firm (Matthies, 
2013). This is worse in firms with civil law legal systems, where there is not as much 
protection for minority rights. 
Our findings reveal a strong positive and significant relationship between block ownership 
and cost of capital, suggesting that increased block ownership leads to increased cost of 
capital. 
Previous research reveals that block ownership could have negative or positive effects on 
the cost of capital. Corporate governance was seen to have an effect on the costs of 
borrowing capital or investing in firms. When block holders were family members, this 
sometimes led to higher cost of capital, since family members often did not invest their 
own capital. This is because they preferred to borrow, because block ownership was 
perceived as a credit risk (Tran, 2014).  
The findings also reveal that when there was an increase in block ownership, there was a 
tendency for a reduction in voluntary disclosure. It is possible that some block holders use 
this approach to obtain more information about firms than do other shareholders. This 
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finding is in line with previous research showing that block owners carry out greater 
monitoring of managers (Ntim et al., 2013). 
However, the research findings also reveal that both large and small shareholders had an 
interest in promoting corporate governance and wanted more monitoring of management. 
It was also revealed that block holders were interested in getting as much information as 
possible about their firms, as they may have been interested in using the information to 
their advantage and against the interest of small shareholders. The finding with respect to 
block owners and cost of capital reveals that in cases where block holders want more 
information, they may tend to reduce voluntary disclosure, while in other cases, they do 
the opposite. On the other hand, it was also noted that some block holders and other 
investors, both large and small, wanted more monitoring. Therefore, there were different 
costs associated with more and less corporate governance. According to Anderson and 
Reeb (2004), some founding families that are block holders tend to have lower costs of 
capital than firms that do not have block holders that are founding families. 
These research findings reveal that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
block ownership and cost of capital; this may have been based on the fact that block holders 
could be drawn from various types of investors, and that they have different incentives for 
investing. Consequently, these incentives have differing effects on the cost of capital for 
the firm. 
The findings reveal no statistically significant relationship between institutional ownership 
and risk-taking measured by R&D; however, there is a strong negative statistica l ly 
significant relationship with ROA. In fact, institutional owners are unlikely to invest in 
firms that display poor corporate governance, since these institutions are usually firms that 
are responsible for pension funds and the like. These institutional owners usually invest in 
companies that pay fair dividends, and not in firms with high levels of risk. The rationale 
is that these institutional owners have fiduciary responsibilities to their clients and so would 
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not take a chance by investing in risky or speculative firms. This is in line with previous 
research showing institutional owners as risk-averse (Tran, 2014), and as having greater 
incentives to monitor the behaviour of management. It follows that institutional owners 
would invest in firms with high corporate governance, and where risk-taking is low. 
Institutional owners would be interested in monitoring management and ensuring that there 
is no opportunity for management to display opportunistic and risky behaviour. At the same 
time, institutional owners may not be likely to invest in monitoring companies, which 
would suggest that institutional owners would very likely go for firms that are already well 
managed and have a record of fair dividends (Tran, 2014). 
The findings reveal a strong significant relation between institutional ownership and credit 
rating; according to the null hypothesis, there is no statistically significant relationship 
between institutional ownership and credit rating. These findings show that institutiona l 
owners invest in firms with higher bond earnings and lower bond yields. Since institutiona l 
owners are responsible for other people’s investment, it would follow that they would 
invest in firms with better credit ratings and good corporate governance. As mentioned 
above, there was also greater monitoring of management by institutional owners, so as to 
ensure that management did not display opportunistic behaviour. In addition, the findings 
reveal that institutional owners contribute to higher bond yields. 
Some of the findings are in line with previous studies. According to Bhojraj and Sengupta 
(2003), institutional owners tend to invest in firms with high bond yields and high bond 
ratings, but these authors discovered that while institutional owners influence bond yields 
and ratings, they could also be influenced by bond yields and ratings. Alternative theorising 
points out that although there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and 
credit rating, there is also a negative relationship between institutional ownership and credit 
rating. 
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This study reveals a statistically positive and significant relationship between institutiona l 
ownership and cost of capital. The findings reveal that firms with institutional owners tend 
to invest in firms with strong corporate governance, and that firms with strong corporate 
governance often have lower costs of capital. In other words, firms with institutiona l 
owners usually have various elements of corporate governance, including board 
independence, and also have strong financial performance. These firms also pay good 
dividends. More institutional owners lead to a decline in costs of capital over time.   
These findings are in line with previous studies. In one study, over a period of ten years, 
firms were seen to exhibit strong governance mechanisms, in the form of board 
independence, and those with institutional ownership also revealed that costs of capital 
declined over time, while these companies increased their value; however, this positive 
relationship was only applicable to a certain level of institutional ownership (Pham et al., 
2012). But this researcher noted that firms had to invest in improving their corporate 
structure, as failure to do so could lead to risks (Pham et al., 2012). 
There was no significant relationship between director ownership and risk-taking. The 
research findings confirm hypothesis 4, and revealed that there is no statistica l ly 
relationship between the director ownership and risk-taking. Previous research reveals that 
there is much risk-taking when directors own a large portion of a firm’s shares, and this 
was found in some Asian firms, where there was less monitoring as directors were able to 
promote their own interests. This represents high risk for the firm. However, when director 
ownership was small, there was less risk. 
This is in line with previous research. According to Chen and Jaggi (2000) and Ho and 
Wong (2001), in Hong Kong firms when owners are directors, it follows that there is not 
as much monitoring of management. In this setting, there is risk of management takeover 
(Shleiger and Vishny, 1996). Director/managers are more likely to carry out their agency 
responsibilities. 
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Both when firms have less than and more than 50% director ownership, there are different 
relationships between director ownership and risk-taking, which is seen as a curvilinea l 
relationship (McConnell and Servaes, 1990). This relationship is also evident in the United 
States and the U.K., but there are protections offered to minority shareholders, which 
makes these firms more attractive to invest in than similar firms in civil law countries. 
Using the different proxies for credit rating, it is shown that there is no statistica l ly 
significant relationship between director ownership and credit rating in this study. This is 
supported by previous research findings, which also revealed no statistically significant 
relationship between director ownership and credit rating. These findings also reveal that 
firms with greater shareholder rights also have lower credit ratings. The rationale is that if 
shareholders have more power, the firm could also greater risks, which could lead to lower 
credit ratings. This is in line with some previous research (Ashbaugh et al., 2006). But other 
previous studies show the reverse, with Gompers et al. (2003) showing that firms with 
greater shareholder rights tend to have greater value contributing to higher credit ratings. 
In this study, in terms of the relationship between director ownership and cost of capital, 
the findings reveal a negative significant relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables.  
The findings also show that as the firm faces higher risks, the cost of borrowing increases, 
making the cost of capital more expensive. This is in keeping with some studies and 
contrary to others; as Pham et al. (2012) maintain, poor corporate governance tends to be 
associated with higher costs of capital (Ashbaugh et al., 2006). It was also shown that when 
credit ratings are high, cost of capital is low (Gompers et al. (2003). 
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7.2.5 Findings based on the relationship between board structure and 
risk-taking, credit rating, and cost of capital 
Subsection 7.2.5 summarises how board variables, namely board size, independent 
directors, board diversity and frequency of board meetings, impact risk-taking, credit rating 
and cost of capital. Board size, the number of independent directors, board diversity and 
frequency of board meetings all have an impact on the monitoring of management. 
The findings reveal a statistically negative significant relationship between board size and 
risk-taking measured by R&D/Sales, and an insignificant relationship between board size 
and risk-taking measured by R&D/Assets, R&D expenditure and ROA. The findings reveal 
no significant relationship between board size and credit rating, or between board size and 
cost of capital. 
The findings reveal that boards that are the right size for carrying out their role effective ly, 
namely, monitoring and motivating management, and ensuring that directors provide 
pertinent and relevant information to shareholders, ensure that risk-taking is kept to a 
minimum, that credit rating is protected through better corporate governance and that the 
cost of capital decreases over time. These findings are in line with previous research, which 
shows that the right size of board is important (Davidson et al., 1998), and which shows 
that large boards hinder communication and decision making (Yawson, 2006). However, 
Wang (2012) shows that different board sizes impact differently on risk-taking. Some 
researchers believe that larger boards lead to higher firm value (Pham et al., 2012), while 
others believe that board size does not have an effect on credit rating and firm value 
(Upadhyay and Sriram, 2011). The research findings support the hypothesis that there is 
no statistically significant relationship between board size and risk-taking (measured by 
R&D/Assets, R&D expenditure and ROA), board size and credit rating, and board size and 
cost of capital. 
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Director ownership and risk-taking measured in terms of R&D/Assets show that in some 
instances, there is a strong positively significant relationship. The findings of this study 
report a strong relationship between independent directors and risk-taking in terms of 
R&D/Sales. There is also a strong positive relation between independent directors and risk-
taking in terms of R&D Expenditure. 
Independent directors were seen as having an important impact on risk-taking. This is in 
keeping with previous research which shows that independent directors are more objective, 
and bring more transparency to an organisation (OECD, 2004). Independent directors were 
also seen as being accountable to shareholders, as they oversee management and can 
prevent excessive risk-taking (Page and Spira, 2005), help promote a firm’s credit rating 
by strengthening corporate governance (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006), and reduce the cost 
of capital when corporate governance is strong (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006).  
The findings reveal that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between 
independent directors and credit rating in all firm years. The rationale for this is found in 
previous studies which point to independent directors as promoting corporate governance 
through their role of monitoring management (Davidson et al., 2005; Alali, 2012; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). Strong corporate governance is associated with higher credit 
ratings. 
Our findings reveal a negative significant relationship between independent directors and 
cost of capital. Previous studies argue that independent directors have a positive impact on 
firms by adding to the firm’s value (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006).    
Board diversity was examined in terms of risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. The 
findings report a strong positive relationship between board diversity and credit rating. The 
relationships between board diversity and both risk-taking and cost of capital are not 
significant.  
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The findings reveal that many European firms have noticeable board diversity in terms of 
gender. Firms with greater diversity were also larger and more prosperous. They had less 
risk-taking, greater credit ratings and lower cost of capital. Yet, the findings support the 
hypothesis that there is no statistically significant relationship between board diversity and 
risk-taking, board diversity and credit rating, and board diversity and cost of capital. 
Previous studies give some insight into these findings. Gender diversity is noticeable in 
Europe because of legislation mandating female representation on boards (Hoel, 2008; 
Sealy and Vinnicombe, 2012). However, there were conflicting reports on actual 
experience as to whether female board members contribute to less risk-taking, higher credit 
rating and reduced cost of capital (Tanaka, 2014). However, de Cabo et al. (2012) show 
that female board directors lead to less risk-taking. The application of agency theory and 
resource theory supports board diversity. 
A significant relationship between how frequently board meetings areheld and these 
dependent variables of risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. Research shows that 
when board meetings are held frequently, there is more monitoring of management, which 
has the effect of decreasing the cost of debt (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Similarly, Lorca 
et al. (2011) find that more meetings and more audit committees contribute to lower debts. 
Besides, those who held debts in the particular firms welcomed more frequent board 
meetings (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). 
7.3 Research implications 
From this study, several implications can be drawn with respect to the use of the OECD 
Principles of Governance and its applications to the various countries. First, it was shown 
that all the different companies drawn from Anglo-American and Continental traditions 
tend to use many of the same corporate governance, although with different levels of 
importance. One implication is that regardless of the company, country, and tradition or 
customs, corporate governance is seen as an important concept for improving firm 
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performance. Another implication is the levels of compliance increased steadily for all 
firms during the period of this study. This implies persistent efforts by the management of 
these companies and theestablishment of corporate governance mechanisms in these 
countries over the years.  
Third, this research study set out to ascertain whether using different models would make 
a difference in the empirical findings. The study compared the three models. In Model 1, 
the Corporate Governance Index was used as an independent variable, and the dependent 
variables were risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. These dependent variables were 
measured in terms of proxies. Risk-taking was measured in terms of the proxies 
R&D/Assets, R&D/Sales and R&D expenditure, and risk-taking as based on ROA, all of 
which were dependent variables. In studying credit rating, S&P was used only in analysing 
the dependent variable. Cost of capital was another dependent variable. In short, while 
Corporate Governance Index was used as the independent variable, proxies for risk-taking, 
as well as credit rating and cost of capital, were dependent variables. 
Model 2 used ownership structure as the independent variable, and the dependent variables 
were risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital. Model 2 followed the same pattern and 
used the same proxies as Model 1. Credit rating and cost of capital were treated 
individually, as they were in Model 1. 
Model 3 resembled the other two models in format, with board structure serving as the 
independent variable and with the same dependent variables of risk-taking, credit rating 
and cost of capital. The same proxies were used as in Models 1 and 2. 
Fourth, the findings reveal that the relationship between Corporate Governance Index and 
risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital is similar for all models. The general finding is 
that despite country differences, there is a close relationship between corporate governance 
and firm financial performance. A comparison between the three models shows very little 
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difference in how firm financial performance is affected by the level of corporate 
governance in the respective firms. 
Another finding is that the use of different proxies for firm performance reveals that 
corporate governance does have an important impact on firm performance. Also, the 
different corporate mechanisms are important for the respective traditions, and have 
significance for companies operating in these traditions. 
This research has important implications in terms of the methodology used. First, this study 
demonstrates that the methodology used could have had an impact on the research findings. 
Second, the nature of the research was time-consuming when composite corporate 
governance mechanisms are being constructed. Yet, there is great value in conducting 
research, compared to using a single corporate governance mechanism. The rationale for 
creating a corporate governance mechanism such as the Corporate Governance Index is 
that it brings together several corporate governance variables. This makes the corporate 
governance composite much stronger and of better in measuring corporate governance. 
Additionally, different aspects of the principles allow the researcher to be much more 
specific in reporting the findings.  
There are implications here for all the firms and countries involved in this study. For 
example, decision and policy makers in both traditions are able to see the findings of this 
study and observe how they differ from other studies. Policy makers related to the use of 
corporate mechanisms are able to observe how well they fared in this study, and they could 
also learn from how other decision and policy makers operate in other countries. Knowing 
the advantages and disadvantages of certain corporate mechanisms could be instructiona l 
and could help countries improve their corporate governance structures. Developing 
countries can observe what more developed countries are doing, and on this basis develop 
their corporate governance structures to facilitate financial performance among their 
firms.Similarly, firm decision and policy makers from both traditions are able to observe 
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what works well for them and for others. By imitating measures used by some firms, 
individual firms could improve their performance. 
Another implication is that it is possible that some firms would adopt voluntary compliance 
regimes based on what they observe from other firms. In some studies by Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2009), some firms in countries that have adopted the U.K. voluntary 
compliance style demonstrated that they adopted the ‘comply or explain’ regime. 
Therefore, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) point out that although there has been 
criticism that the voluntary nature of some corporate codes are limited in improving 
corporate governance practices, in reality, firms voluntarily adopting these codes helps 
promote corporate governance. One of the implications of this study isthat some firms may 
be motivated to voluntarily adopt practices that they see as important for improving firm 
performance. These firms would very likely be motivated to undertake more thorough 
implementation of corporate governance mechanisms. 
Attracting new investors is one of the things that this study could encourage. This study 
has shown how improving CG will reduce risk, and how with reduced risk firms can 
improve their financial performance. An implication of this study is to show countries how 
they could use this scenario to promote more investment in their firms. This study could 
also provide a guideline showing countries how they could reduce risk, thereby 
encouraging more investors to locate in them. By showing that good governance could 
reduce the cost of capital, governments and firms could also appeal to investors.  
However, despite the fact that the findings indicate that corporate governance has improved 
over the years of this study, there are noticeable differences among the firms studied. 
Further investigation also shows that the differences in corporate governance standards 
emanate from the fact that firms differ in terms of size, industry, country characterist ics 
and their particular tradition, whether Anglo-American or Continental. The rationale 
behind these differences in compliance among firms is based on some firms not having as 
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many resources as others to implement corporate governance mechanisms. Complying 
with corporate governance involves corporate governance mechanisms that may be costly 
in terms of time and money, which may preclude smaller firms from using these practices. 
One of the findings in Chapter 6 is that block holding is statistically significant, but not 
associated with firm size and corporate governance index. It is apparent from the finding 
that governance needs in the firms sampled appear to be based more on ownership. This 
may suggest that firms with different ownership styles require different levels of flexibi lity 
in their corporate governance mechanisms. 
There are implications for different governments. By looking at the findings, it is possible 
that some governments may think of updating their firms’ corporate governance 
mechanisms. More emphasis on corporate governance mechanisms could help nations 
make investment in their firms more attractive. For example, by improving the overall 
perception of firms’ financial performance in their countries, governments could help 
encourage more investors to consider them. The implication here is that governments must 
keep updating their corporate governance mechanisms. 
7.4 Research contributions 
Previous studies reveal that large firms usually get favourable ratings through the 
subjective rankings of analysts (Beattie et al., 2004), and with fewer and narrower 
reportings on corporate governance rankings, it is difficult to generalise across companies. 
For some companies, ranking of some corporate mechanisms is less relevant for some 
companies than others.  Besides, different corporate governance mechanisms and systems 
are more commonly used in some countries than in others (Andreasson, 2009).  Yet, even 
if it were possible to standardise corporate governance rankings, this still would not solve 
the problem of having a common measure of corporate governance. The reason for this 
would be that different countries have different governance structures that are influenced 
by institutional, cultural and contextual differences (Andreasson, 2009). 
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Firstly, previous studies have made use of corporate governance rankings to compare 
corporate governance in different countries.  Some of these studies have made use of some  
governance mechanisms, but as noted above, some corporate governance mechanisms are 
relevant to some countries and not to others. The major contribution made by this study 
involves the use of the corporate governance index that was manually created and included 
a wide variety of corporate governance mechanisms that have wide applicability among 
the countries studied. In this way, taking a less narrow view of corporate governance 
rankings allows for greater ability to compare companies from different countries with 
different traditions.  
Secondly, previous studies have looked at the level of compliance among firms. However, 
the contribution that this study makes is augmented by the fact that it fills this gap in the 
existing literature by offering, for the first time, direct evidence on the levels of compliance 
with corporate governance among firms in different countries based on their traditions, 
cultures, legal systems and practices. This study has made it possible to compare levels of 
corporate governance compliance among different countries by using different measures 
that could test compliance in many ways. 
Thirdly, although previous studies have investigated corporate governance using different 
mechanisms, this study makes the first comparison of findings based on corporate 
governance as evidenced through ownership structure and board structure. By looking at 
the structures that make up the boards and ownership of firms, this study examines the 
impact of these forms of ownership and board structures on firm performance.  
Fourthly, previous studies have made looked at firm performance, but this study has made 
a notable contribution by dealing with firm performance as measured by risk-taking, credit 
rating and cost of capital. The fact that the study shows the association between corporate 
governance and risk-taking, corporate governance and credit rating, and corporate 
 316 
 
governance and cost of capital is noteworthy as it looks at performance in terms of 
corporate governance and these measurement of risk.  
Fifthly, this study is unique in that it contributes to the literature by examining how legal 
and accounting systems, cultural aspects of different countries, as well as the corporate 
governance mechanisms can influence the financial performance of firms. 
Sixthly, this study would be of tremendous importance to organisational leaders as it can 
be recognised as making the notable contribution to the field.  Organisational leaders would 
recognise through this study the extent to which a company’s financial performance is 
influenced by its corporate governance. The take-away from this is that if companies want 
to improve their financial performance, they are encouraged to see the importance of 
complying with corporate governance. Managers can recognise the importance of using 
corporate governance mechanisms as they manage their corporations. Realising that 
corporate governance mechanisms vary, depending on the particular company and the 
particular country in which the company is located, managers would assume their 
responsibility in promoting disclosure and transparency to the community. This study also 
provides managers with information about the importance of reducing risk-taking and 
thereby providing an image of leading a well-managed company as a means of improving 
the company’s financial performance. 
This study also makes a notable contribution by demonstrating in practical terms the 
theoretical underpinnings of companies and of the relations that naturally exist between 
management and boards. Managers have the opportunity to understand how the particular 
approaches they take to carrying out their responsibilities have financial implications for 
their company. This study has explored the different approaches in terms of agency theory, 
stewardship theory and other theories, and shows how board members can be perceived as 
easing the conflicts between owners/shareholders and management through the use of 
resource dependency theory, legitimacy theory, institutional legitimacy theory and other 
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theories. In short, this study contributes to the field by contextualising the role of managers 
and boards in the operations of companies, and shows how these roles play a part in 
promoting financial performance of companies.  
This study makes an important contribution to the field by providing most users with 
relevant information. Based on the empirical, practical and theoretical findings of this 
study, corporate managers, policy and decision makers and other authorities can recognise 
the contribution that this study makes towards the improvement of firms’ financ ia l 
operation. For investors, the findings of this study could be important in helping them in 
their decision-making on investment in companies. This study facilitates this by alerting 
investors to the relationships that they should be looking at in companies that could reveal 
whether these companies are a good match for their investment needs. 
Lastly, this study makes a contribution to the field in that it takes a look at the differences 
and similarities between the various countries investigated. This study highlights the 
advantages and disadvantages of companies that operate in the Anglo and Continenta l 
traditions, and highlights the protections that are provided by the legal traditions in these 
different countries. For example, while the Anglo tradition involves common law 
protection, the Continental tradition uses a civil law system. This is significant information, 
because it allows users of this study to see how the characteristics and the cultura l 
uniqueness of the various countries play a part in how these countries provide an 
environment that is conducive to investment opportunities. 
7.5 Research limitations 
As with other empirical studies, this study has shortcomings and limitations that must be 
considered. Efforts were made to obtain a representative sample that would cover the 
criteria listed above. One limitation is that this study covers a five-year period. However, 
several governance reviews and reports were developed and published within this same 
time span, and this could affect the outcome of this study. Another limitation of this study 
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is the fact that when the various industries were selected, the utility and financial sectors 
were excluded, because they were thought to be too heavily regulated with capital 
structures that were unique to these industries. This could have the effect of giving results 
that are somewhat different from what they would have been if these industries were 
included. These limitations can also limit the generalisability of this study. 
 
The third limitation of this study pertains to the reliability and validity of the governance 
index used. When the various corporate governance provisions were used, the decision was 
made to assign them equal weight. This was the use of unweighted indices. The rationale 
for using it was that it did assign more eight to one of the indices over the other. This use 
of unweighted indices could constitute a limitation, since in real life, not all corporate 
governance indices have the same weight; some indices have greater influence than others.  
Fourth, a further limitation may be the sample selection procedure and the sample itself. 
The size of the sample is not particularly large, since only 20 companies were chosen from 
10 of the 34 OECD countries. Since they are drawn from several industries, this means that 
there is not a large selection of companies from the same industry. Besides, the sample 
selection was done manually and obtained using annual reports only. The information 
provided in these reports was obtained from the companies themselves, and could have 
been self-serving. It is possible that the information from the annual reports could have 
been verified. One way of doing this could have been to use other sources to support the 
information obtained from the annual reports. A questionnaire survey or face-to-face 
interviews could have been used. 
Another limitation is the manner in which the sample was selected. The selection of the 
final 200 firms was carried out in a stratified manner, based on the premise that larger firms 
are thought to disclose more than smaller firms (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Assuming that 
larger firms tend to be more likely to be compliant, this study decided in the interest of 
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fairness and balance to select firms from the top, middle and bottom. The sample therefore 
included firms of different sizes. 
Another limitation may also be evident with respect to the corporate governance variables 
used. Only some of the variables that were thought to be important were used, but it is 
possible that these variables may not have been able to truthfully identify the purposes for 
which managers had selected them. 
Lastly, the corporate governance data was collected manually, and the questions related to 
each corporate governance dimension were also manually developed. This could have 
contributed to some discrepancy how the corporate governance data is interpreted in the 
study. 
7.6 Research recommendations and avenues for future research 
In light of the research carried out in this study, there is room for further study. One 
important avenue for further study could be developing a corporate governance index using 
more corporate governance mechanisms and more dimensions. These dimensions could be 
used in conjunction with the ones used in this study, or could be used separately. A 
comparison could be carried out between the two sets of corporate governance mechanisms 
to see whether the differences would impact the empirical findings. Another approach 
could be to carry out a comparison between countries following the same traditions, to see 
what factors could contribute to different results based on using the same corporate 
governance mechanisms or others. A variety of studies could follow these research 
suggestions. 
Another avenue that could be pursued is that of using different measures of firm 
performance, again following the recommendations above, to see whether the empirica l 
findings differ. 
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Further research could be carried out examining how external corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as the managerial labour force, can affect firm financial performance. A 
comparison could also be made between the effects of external and internal corporate 
governance mechanisms on firm financial performance. 
Fourth, this study was carried out after the global economy recovered from financial crisis. 
It would be interesting to pursue similar research several years beyond the financial crisis 
to see if there are factors that would have different effects on the financial performance of 
firms.  
Fifth, this study focused on 10 countries and 200 firm years. Future research could focus 
on fewer countries, or explore the relationship between corporate governance and the 
financial relationship, but with a much larger sample that includes small, mid-size or large 
companies.  
While this study uses a quantitative approach to study the effect of corporate governance 
on financial performance, it is highly possible that a qualitative study would produce some 
elements not highlighted in this study. Therefore, a recommendation would be for a 
qualitative study to be carried out, obtaining more input from individuals associated with 
the companies in the research process. 
7.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter has provided conclusions for this thesis, and has achieved the five major 
objectives that it set out. This chapter also points to its own objectives outlined in Chapter 
1 of the thesis.It can be stated that the objectives outlined in Chapter 1 are clearly shown 
to have been achieved. The study carried out these objectives by giving a historical account 
of the rise of the OECD, and the role that it played in developing the 2004 OECD Princip les 
of Corporate Governance, which have become the gold standard around the world as a 
means of dealing with ethical practices among firms in different countries. The study also 
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showed how different member countries, for example, Britain, France and the United 
States, contributed to the development of these principles, as the OECD was influenced by 
the efforts of these countries in developing its Principles of Corporate Governance. It is 
based on this document that the study developed its own Corporate Governance Index, 
used to achieve the other three study objectives. This chapter discusses how the study 
achieved its objectives of ascertaining the relationship between corporate governance and 
risk-taking, corporate governance and credit rating, and corporate governance and cost of 
capital. Therefore, this chapter demonstrates that the five objectives of the thesis have been 
achieved. In carrying out its four objectives, the study followed a plan.  
First, this chapter summarised the findings of this research, which concern the levels of 
compliance with, and disclosure of, the corporate governance principles contained in the 
2004 OECD Corporate Governance Code by firms following the Anglo-American tradition 
and the Continental European tradition. In doing so, it reported on the findings of the effect 
of corporate governance on corporate risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital in firms 
following the two traditions. This chapter details findings that reveal how firms from the 
different traditions achieved compliance. It also reports on how compliance was shown 
through different corporate governance mechanisms and how this compliance had an 
impact on the firms’ financial performance. Risk-taking, credit rating and cost of capital 
were used to measure the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. 
Second, this chapter examines and discusses the policy implications of these findings. 
Section 7.2 presents a summary of the research findings, showing that regardless of the 
model or method used, corporate governance had a positive impact on firm financ ia l 
performance, and that the representative, or compliance, model provided better empirica l 
findings than the ownership model. 
Third, this chapter cites the contribution of these findings to the field, including empirica l, 
practical, theoretical and methodological improvements. The findings show that 
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contributions were made with respect to how corporate governance could be better 
represented through an index rather than by individual mechanisms, and how the different 
measures used to represent corporate governance and firm performance helped to provide 
stronger empirical findings. The findings also have practical application, as there are 
lessons to be learned by managers, decision makers, board members, and other authorit ies 
and investors. There are theoretical contributions, as shown through the use of various 
theories such as agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependency theory, 
legitimacy theory and institutional legitimacy theory, which show the various 
responsibilities of managers and board members, and their impact on firm performance.  
Next, this chapter discusses the limitations of the study. Some of the limitations highlighted 
include methodological limitations in the choice of sample, and the manual selection of the 
firms that were studied. Also, not all sectors in the economy were chosen, because of the 
nature of these sectors, including banking and utilities, but also because of the nature of 
disclosure in these sectors. 
Fifth, the chapter highlights recommendations and avenues for future research. Major 
recommendations were to carry out further studies using different measures for corporate 
governance and firm performance, to increase the size of the study, focusing only on certain 
countries, or even to use a different methodology, primarily doing a qualitative study. The 
overall objective of these studies would be to see whether the overall finding was that 
corporate governance adherence leads to better financial performance, regardless of the 
tradition and other characteristics of the firms involved. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: The OECD 2004 Corporate Governance Index 
Score 
Item 
Governance Provision 
 
Provision  
Code 
Scoring References 
Section A -- Rights of Shareholders OECD 
principles, 2004 
A1 Does the company provide other ownership 
rights besides voting? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
A2 Do the shareholders approve annually the 
decision on how much to remunerate board 
members or executives?  
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
A.3 Are shareholders presented with board 
remuneration? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
A.4 Are the names and backgrounds of the 
directors appointed presented in a Quality of 
Notice to call Shareholders Meeting in the 
past one year?  
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
A.5 Are the names and fees of the auditors 
appointed presented in a Quality of Notice 
to call Shareholders Meeting in the past one 
year? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
A.6 Is the amount and explanation for Dividend 
policy presented in the 
Quality of Notice to call Shareholders 
Meeting in the past one year?. 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
A.7 In the last two years, did the Chairman of 
the Board attend at least one of the AGMs? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
A.8 In the last two years, did the CEO/Managing 
Director attend at least one of the AGMs? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
A.9  Does the company make available a list of 
the board members in attendance at AGMs? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
A.10 Do the minutes from the AGM show 
whether shareholders had an opportunity to 
ask questions or raise issues with respect to 
the past year? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
A.11 Dividend policy amount and explanation for 
payment are clear 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
A.12 Does the company have anti-takeover 
defences “Cross shareholding’? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
A.13 Board members hold more than 25% of 
share outstanding 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
Section B -- Equitable Treatment of Shareholders OECD 
principles, 2004 
B.1 Is one-share, one-vote a rule that the 
company uses? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
B.2 Is there any mechanism to allow minority 
shareholders to influence board 
composition? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
B.3 Have there been any cases of insider trading 
involving company directors and 
management in the past two years? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
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B.4 Are explanations or rationales provided by 
the company for any related-party 
transactions affecting the corporation? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
B.5 Is the company part of an economic group in 
which the economic group or controlling 
shareholder is in control of the key suppliers 
and customers of the company and/or are in 
similar businesses as the company? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
B.6 Has the company been involved in any non-
compliance case pertaining to related-party 
transactions in the past one year? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
B.7 Does the company facilitate voting by 
proxy? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
B.8 Are the documents needed to give proxy 
specified in the notice to shareholders? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
B.9 Does the company ensure that shareholders 
receive notice of general shareholders’ 
meeting 30 days or more in advance of these 
meetings? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
Section C -- The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance OECD 
principles, 2004 
C.1 Are the safety and welfare of its employees 
explicitly mentioned by the company? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
C.2 Are the role of key stakeholders such as 
customers or the community at large, 
including creditors or suppliers mentioned 
explicitly by the company? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
C.3 Are environmental issues explicitly 
mentioned by the company in its public 
communications? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
C.4 Are ESOP (employee share option 
program), or other long-term employee 
incentive plan linked to shareholder value 
creation, provided to employees by the 
company? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
Section D -- Disclosure and Transparency OECD 
principles, 2004 
D.1 Is there a transparent ownership structure 
available for the company? Breakdown of 
shareholdings 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.2  Is it easy to identify beneficial ownership of 
the company? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.3  Does the company disclose director 
shareholdings? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.4  Does the company disclose management 
shareholding? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.5 Does the company possess a dispersed 
ownership structure? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.6 Is the company's actual ownership structure 
obscured by cross-shareholdings? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.7 Is it possible to assess the quality of the 
annual report, in particular, financial 
performance? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.8 Is it possible to assess the quality of the 
annual report, in particular, business 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
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operations and the company’s competitive 
position? 
D.9 Is it possible to assess the quality of the 
annual report, in particular, the backgrounds 
of board members? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.10 Is it possible to assess the quality of the 
annual report, in particular, the basis of the 
remuneration of board members? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.11 Is it possible to assess the quality of the 
annual report, in particular, operating risks? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.12 Are there any statements requiring directors 
to report their transactions of company 
stock? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.13 Is the company’s accounting carried out in 
accordance with an internationally 
recognised accounting standard? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.14  Is the company’s auditing carried out in 
accordance with an internal audit operation 
that is established as a separate unit in the 
company? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.15 Does the company perform an annual audit 
using independent and reputable auditors? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.16 Does the audited financial statements have 
any accounting qualifications apart from the 
qualification on Uncertainty of Situation? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.17 Does the company offer multiple channels 
of access to information? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.18 Does the company disclose the financial 
report in a timely manner? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
D.19 Does the company have a website, 
disclosing up-to-date information? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
Section E -- Responsibilities of the Board OECD 
principles, 2004 
E.1 Does the company have its own written 
corporate governance rules? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
E.2 Does the company’s board of directors have 
a code of ethics or statement of business 
conduct that all directors and employees 
must adhere to? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
E.3 Does the company have corporate 
vision/mission statements? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
E.4 Does the regulatory agency have any 
evidence from the regulatory agency over 
the past three years that the company has 
been non-compliant with rules and 
regulations? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
E.5 Is it possible to assess the quality and 
content of the Audit Committee Report in 
the annual report for Attendance 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
E.6 Is it possible to assess the quality and 
content of the Audit Committee Report in 
the annual report for Internal control 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
E.7 Is it possible to assess the quality and 
content of the Audit Committee Report in 
the annual report for Management control 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
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E.8 Is it possible to assess the quality and 
content of the Audit Committee Report in 
the annual report for Legal compliance 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
E.9 Is it possible to assess the quality and 
content of the Audit Committee Report in 
the annual report for Conclusion or opinion 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
E.10 Have board members participated in the 
Securities Regulation 
Committee (or equivalent) training on 
corporate governance? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
E.11 How many board meetings does the 
company have per year? 
 1 if 4 or more; 0 if less 
than 4 
E.12 Is the chairman and the CEO the same 
person? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
E.13 Does the company provide an option 
scheme with incentives for top 
management? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
E.14 Does the board appoint independent 
committees with independent members to 
carry out various critical responsibilities 
such as: audit, compensation and director 
nomination? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
E.15 Does the company provide contact details 
for a specific investor relations person? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
E.16 Does the company have a board of directors’ 
report? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
E.17 Does the company disclose the amounts 
paid to the independent nonexecutive 
directors? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
E.18 Do the company provide training to 
directors (including executive and 
nonexecutive directors)? 
 1 if yes; 0 if missing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 373 
 
Appendix 2: A List of the Names and Industries of the 200 Sampled Firms from the FORBES 
2000  
 Full Company Name Industry Country 
1. ANGLO AMERICAN Diversified Metals and Mining UK 
2. BP P.L.C. Oil & Gas Operations UK 
3. BT GROUP Telecommunication Services UK 
4. DIXONS RETAIL PLC Computer & Electronics Retail UK 
5. EVRAZ GROUP S.A. Iron & Steel UK 
6 GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC Pharmaceuticals UK 
7. HAMMERSON PLC Real Estate UK 
8. IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP PLC Tobacco UK 
9. InterContinental Hotels Hotels & Motels UK 
10. INTU PROPERTIES PLC Real Estate UK 
11. JOHNSON MATTHEY Diversified Chemicals UK 
12. MARKS & SPENCER Department Stores UK 
13. NEXT PLC Retail UK 
14. ROLLS-ROYCE HOLDINGS Aerospace & Defense UK 
15. SAB MILLER Beverages UK 
16. TESCO Food Retail UK 
17. TULLOW OIL Oil & Gas Operations UK 
18. VODAFONE Telecommunication Services UK 
19. WEIR GROUP Other Industrial Equipment UK 
20. WM MORRISON SUPERMARKETS P L 
C 
Food Retail UK 
21. ACCENTURE Computer Services Ireland 
22. ACTAVIS / WATSON Pharma Pharmaceuticals Ireland 
23. AER LINGUS Airline Ireland 
24. ARYZTA AG Food Producer Ireland 
25. COVIDIEN PLC Health Care Ireland 
26. CRH Construction Materials Ireland 
27. DCC Conglomerates Ireland 
28. DIAGEO Beverages Ireland 
29. DRAGON OIL PLC Oil & Gas Operations Ireland 
30. EATON Other Industrial Equipment Ireland 
31. FYFFES PLC Produce Ireland 
32. GLANBIA PLC Food Producer Ireland 
33. INGERSOLL-RAND PUBLIC LIMITED 
COMPANY 
Conglomerates Ireland 
34. IRISH CONTINENTAL GROUP shipping and transport Ireland 
35. KERRY GROUP Food Processing Ireland 
36. PERRIGO Pharmaceuticals Ireland 
37. RYANAIR HOLDINGS Airline Ireland 
38. SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY Computer Storage Devices Ireland 
39. SHIRE Pharmaceuticals Ireland 
40. UDG HEALTHCARE Pharmaceutical Ireland 
41. BOEING Aerospace & Defense USA 
42. CF INDUSTRIES HOLDINGS Specialised Chemicals USA 
43. CHEVRON Oil & Gas Operations USA 
44. COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES INC Beverages USA 
45. DEAN FOODS Food Processing USA 
46. EASTMAN CHEMICAL Specialised Chemicals USA 
47. FMC TECHNOLOGIES Specialised Chemicals USA 
48. FORD MOTORS Auto & Truck Manufacturer USA 
49. GENERAL ELECTRIC Conglomerates USA 
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50. GENERAL MOTORS AND CO Auto & Truck Manufacturer USA 
51. JOHNSON&JOHNSON Medical Equipment & Supplies USA 
52. MICROSOFT Software & Programming USA 
53. NEWMONT MINING Diversified Metals & Mining USA 
54. OCEANEERING INTERNATIONAL Oil Services & Equipment USA 
55. OSHKOSH Heavy Equipment USA 
56. PFIZER Pharmaceuticals USA 
57. PROCTER & GAMBLE Household/Personal Care USA 
58. STAPLES Specialty Stores USA 
59. WALL-MART STORES Discount Stores USA 
60. WW GRAINGER Electrical Equipment USA 
61. AMCOR Containers & Packaging Australia 
62. AURIZON  Rail Transport Australia 
63. BHP BILLITON Group Diversified Metals & Mining Australia 
64. CALTEX AUSTRALIA Oil & Gas Operations Australia 
65. CCAMATIL Manufacturer Australia 
66. CSL Medical Australia 
67. GPT Group Real Estate Australia 
68. LEIGHTON HOLDINGS LTD Construction Australia 
69. METCASH Food Retail Australia 
70. NEWCREST MINING Diversified Metals & Mining Australia 
71. ORICA LIMITED Diversified Metals & Mining Australia 
72. QANTAS AIRWAYS Airline Australia 
73. SANTOS Oil & Gas Operations Australia 
74. STOCKLAND AUSTRALIA Real Estate Australia 
75. TELSTRA Telecommunications Services Australia 
76. TPG TELECOM LTD Telecommunications Services Australia 
77. WESFARMERS Food Retail Australia 
78. WESTFIELD GROUP Real Estate Australia 
79. WOODSIDE PETROLEUM  Oil & Gas Operations Australia 
80. WOOLWORTHS Food Retail Australia 
81. BARRICK GOLD Diversified Metals & Mining Canada 
82. BELL CANADA Telecommunications Canada 
83. BOMBARDIER Aerospace & Defense Canada 
84. CAMECO CORPORATION Diversified Metals & Mining Canada 
85. CANADIAN OIL AND SAND Oil & Gas Operations Canada 
86. CANADIAN TIRE Specialty Stores Canada 
87. CRESCENT POINT ENERGY Oil & Gas Operations Canada 
88. EMPIRE COMPANY LIMITED Food Retail Canada 
89. ENCANA Oil & Gas Operations Canada 
90. FIRST QUANTUM MINERALS Diversified Metals & Mining Canada 
91. GEORGE WESTON Food Retail Canada 
92. GOLDCORP Diversified Metals & Mining Canada 
93. METRO INC Food Retail Canada 
94. POTASH OF SASKATCHEWAN Specialised Chemicals Canada 
95. ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS Telecommunications Services Canada 
96. SAPUTO Food Processing Canada 
97. SILVER WHEATON Diversified Metals & Mining Canada 
98. SNC- LAVALIN GROUP Construction Services Canada 
99. TIM HORTONS Restaurants Canada 
100. VALEANT PHARMACEUTICALS Pharmaceuticals Canada 
101. AIR FRANCE KLM  Aviation France 
102. ARKEMA Chemicals and advanced materials France 
103. CARREFOUR Retail Stores France 
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104. EADS N.V. Aviation France 
105. EUTELSAT Telecommunication France 
106. GECINA Real Estate Investment Trust France 
107. HERMES INTERNATIONAL Consumer goods France 
108. LOREAL Consumer goods France 
109. MICHELIN GROUP Automotive France 
110. ORANGE Telecommunication France 
111. PERNOD RICARD Beverages France 
112. PEUGEOT Automotive France 
113. RENAULT Automotive France 
114. SAINT GOBAIN Constructions France 
115. SANOFI Pharmaceutical France 
116. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Energy France 
117. TOTAL Oil & Gas Operations France 
118. VALEO Automotive France 
119. VINCI Constructions France 
120. ZODIAC AEROSPACE Aerospace France 
121. AURUBIS Diversified Metals & Mining GERMANY 
122. BASF SE Diversified Chemicals GERMANY 
123. BAYER GROUP Chemicals and advanced materials GERMANY 
124. BAYWA AG Specialty Stores GERMANY 
125. BILFINGER SE Construction Services GERMANY 
126. BMW GROUP Auto & Truck Manufacturer GERMANY 
127. BRENNTAG Specialised Chemicals GERMANY 
128. DAIMLER Auto & Truck Manufacturer GERMANY 
129. DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AG Airline GERMANY 
130. DEUTSCHE TELECOM  Telecommunications Services GERMANY 
131. FRAPORT AG Transportation GERMANY 
132. GEA GROUP Conglomerates GERMANY 
133. Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG Construction Materials GERMANY 
134. INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG Semiconductors GERMANY 
135. KULICKE AND SOFFA INDUSTRIES, 
INC. 
Diversified Chemicals GERMANY 
136. SAP Software & Programming GERMANY 
137. SIEMENS AG Conglomerates GERMANY 
138. SUEDZUCKER AG Food Processing GERMANY 
139. THYSSENKRUPP AG Conglomerates GERMANY 
140. VOLKSWAGEN Auto & Truck Manufacturer GERMANY 
141. ABENGOA S.A Constructions SPAIN 
142. ABERTIS INFRAESTRUCTURAS, S.A Transportation SPAIN 
143. ACCIONA S.A. Construction SPAIN 
144. ACERINOX S.A. Stainless Steel Manufacturing SPAIN 
145. ACS GROUP Construction SPAIN 
146. AMADEUS IT HOLDING S.A. Software & Programming SPAIN 
147. CEPSA GROUP Oil & Gas Operations SPAIN 
148. DIA S.A. Food Retail SPAIN 
149. DIASORIN GROUP Industrial SPAIN 
150. EBRO FOODS, S.A Food Manufacturer SPAIN 
151. FCC S.A. Constructions SPAIN 
152. FERROVIAL S.A. Transportation SPAIN 
153. GAMESA CORPORACIÓN 
TECNOLÓGICA, S.A.  
Manufacturer SPAIN 
154. GRIFOLS, S.A. Biotech’s SPAIN 
155. IAG Airline SPAIN 
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156. INDITEX GROUP Retail Stores SPAIN 
157. OHL GROUP Construction SPAIN 
158. REPSOL, S.A. Oil & Gas Operations SPAIN 
159. TELEFONICA GROUP Telecommunication SPAIN 
160. ZARDOYA OTIS Manufacturing SPAIN 
161. ACEA S.P.A Automotive ITALY 
162. ATLANTIA GROUP Other Industrial Equipment ITALY 
163. AUTOGRILL GROUP Food & Beverage  ITALY 
164. BUZZI UNICEM S.P.A Construction ITALY 
165. CNH INDUSTRIAL Construction ITALY 
166. DAVIDE Campari-Milano S.P.A. Beverages ITALY 
167. ENI GROUP Oil & Gas Operations ITALY 
168. FIAT Automotive ITALY 
169. FINMECCANICA Aerospace & Defense ITALY 
170. GTECH S.P.A. Information Technology ITALY 
171. ITALCEMENTI Construction ITALY 
172. Luxottica Group S.P.A., Specialty Stores ITALY 
173. MEDIASET S.P.A. Mass Media ITALY 
174. PARMALAT S.P.A. Food Processing ITALY 
175. PIRELLI & C. S.P.A. Auto & Truck Parts ITALY 
176. PRADA GROUP Apparel/ Accessories ITALY 
177. PRYSMIAN S.P.A. Electrical Equipment ITALY 
178. SAIPEM GROUP Oil & Gas Operations ITALY 
179. SARAS S.P.A. Oil & Gas Operations ITALY 
180. TELECOM Italia Group Telecommunication ITALY 
181. CANON INC. Business Products & Supplies JAPAN 
182. FUJI ELECTRIC Co. Ltd Electrical Equipment JAPAN 
183. FUJITSU LIMITED Technology JAPAN 
184. HITACHI LTD Electronics JAPAN 
185. HONDA MOTOR CO. LTD Automotive JAPAN 
186. J POWER ELECTRICAL POWER 
DEVELOPMENT 
Power & Energy JAPAN 
187. JAPAN Tobacco Inc Tobacco JAPAN 
188. KAWASAKI KISEN KAISHA Other Transportation JAPAN 
189. MEIJI HOLDINGS Food Processing JAPAN 
190. MITSUBISHI CORP Automotive JAPAN 
191. MITSUI & CO. LTD Oil & Gas Operations JAPAN 
192. NIPPON Paper Industries Co. Ltd. Other Industrial Equipment JAPAN 
193. NIPPON STEEL & SUMITOMO METAL Iron & Steel JAPAN 
194. NIPPON TELEGRAPH & TEL Telecommunications Services JAPAN 
195. OSAKA GAS GROUP Energy JAPAN 
196. OTSUKA HOLDINGS CO. LTD Pharmaceutical JAPAN 
197. TERUMO CORP Medical Equipment & Supplies JAPAN 
198. TOKYO ELECTRON LIMITED Semiconductors JAPAN 
199. TOYO TIRE & RUBBER CO. LTD Consumer Goods JAPAN 
200. TOYOTA Motor Corporation Automotive JAPAN 
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Appendix 3: Credit Rating 
 
Moody's S&P Fitch 
rating description 
Long-term  Long-term  Long-term  
Aaa 
 
AAA 
 
AAA 
 
Prime  
Aa1 AA+ AA+ 
High grade 
 
Aa2 AA AA  
Aa3 AA− AA−  
A1 A+ 
 
A+ 
 
Upper medium grade 
 
A2 A A  
A3 
 
A− 
 
A− 
 
 
Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 
Lower medium grade 
 
Baa2 
 
BBB 
 
BBB 
 
 
Baa3 BBB− BBB−  
Ba1 
 
BB+ 
 
BB+ 
 
Non-investment grade 
speculative 
 
Ba2 BB BB  
Ba3 BB− BB−  
B1 B+ B+ 
Highly speculative 
 
B2 B B  
B3 B− B−  
Caa1 CCC+ 
 
CCC+ 
 
Substantial risks 
 
Caa2 CCC CCC  
Caa3 CCC− CCC−  
Ca 
CC CC Extremely speculative  
C C Default imminent  
C RD 
 
DDD 
 In default 
 
/ SD DD  
/ D D  
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Appendix 4: Computing implied cost of capital 
 
The implied cost of equity is computed as the average of the two commonly used metrics, 
ICCGM and ICCPEG.  
 
ICC based on the OJ Model: ICCGM and ICCPEG 
Ohlson and Juettner – Nauroth (2005) show ICC can be expressed as:  
 
𝑟𝑒 = 𝐴 +  √𝐴
2 +
𝑒𝑝𝑠1
𝑃0
 (𝑔2 − (𝛾 − 1)) 
 
Where 𝐴 =  
1
2
((𝛾 − 1) +  
𝑑𝑝𝑠1
𝑃0
) and 𝑔2=
𝑒𝑝𝑠2 −𝑒𝑝𝑠1
𝑒𝑝𝑠1
 
 
Gode and Mohanram (2003) make the following assumptions. They set (𝛾 − 1) to 
𝑟𝑓 − 3% where 𝑟𝑓is the risk free rate. 
 
 
Additionally, ICCPEGcomputed as a simplified version of the OJ model that ignores 
dividends as: 
 
𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐸𝐺 =  √
𝑔2
(𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸/𝑒𝑝𝑠1)
Where𝑔2is defined as above. 
 
